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which the registration of titles could be made compul- 43 of which provides that if a candidate has been found by sory”; and the committee, “without expressing any the report of a judge upon an election petition to have final opinion on this latter question,” thought it “suffi. been personally guilty of bribery, he is to be incapable of cient to observe that it will be very difficult to force being elected to, or sitting in, the House of Commons for upon every purchaser or mortgagee in this country a seven years, of being registered as an elector, or voting mode of dealing with his property which not one pur at any election, of holding any judicial or municipal chaser or mortgagee in 20,000 at present adopts of his own office, and of being appointed or acting as a justice of accord. Your committee feel that in arriving at the the peace. Section 45 contains a similar provision in above conclusion, they are only acting upon the axiom the case of a person“ other than a candidate, found which is laid down by the Royal Commission of 1868 in guilty of bribery in any proceding in which, after notice their report, and which they believe to be perfectly sound, of the charge, he has had an opportunity of being that, 'for an institution to flourish in a free country, it heard." These words were considered by Mr. Justice must offer to people the thing that they want.'” BLACKBURN in the second Bewdley Petition (1 O'M. & Surely, in face of this opinion, we sball not have H. 174). A previous election had been declared void, another attempt next session to galvanize the lifeless and a question arose as to whether two persons who had scheme of registering titles. We cannot help express been reported as guilty of having been bribed, by the ing our regret that the Government have again set judges who tried the first petition, were disqualified aside, on the ground of their intention to deal with from voting at the second election. It was argued the general question of land transfer, Mr. Hopwood's that, since they had been examined as witnesses on useful little measure, which would only have affected a the trial of the previous petition, they had had “an small area, and would have been of infinitely more prac opportunity of being heard” within the section ; but Mr. tical service than any great land transfer scheme which Justice BLACKBURN ruled that the witnesses were not dishas hitherto been launched.

qualified; first, because a report of a judge as to an offence committed by a person other than the

candidate was not a finding of guilty; and, secondly, WE PUBLISH in another column a letter from a corres. | because the voters bad not had “ an opportunity of being pondent with reference to a general reform of the law

heard,” since those words must mean "an opportunity

heard" sind and practice relating to defamation. His suggestions

of being heard when he has had fair warning of the appear well worthy of consideration. In one or two

charge, and is asked to meet it, and be heard by himself points, however, we feel doubtful as to the advisability

or his counsel.” There appears to be no special penalty of the reforms he suggests. He proposes to abolish the

or disqualification attached to persons reported by comlegal distinction between libel and slander, which renders

missioners to have been guilty of bribery, except the slander only actionable in the case of special damage,

liability to a criminal prosecution, which (as the unless it be of a man in the way of his business, or unless

| Attorney-General pointed out) is, in many cases, pre. it imputes an indictable offence. We fully agree that this

cluded by the granting of a certificate of indemnity. It distinction is very difficult to justify in principle, but

appears that in the case of several magistrates reported for this, as for some other doctrines of the common law

as guilty of corrupt practices, the Lord Chancellor has, which are difficult to justify from a philosophical point

in the exercise of his discretion, called upon them to of view, we are disposed to think there is a good deal to

show cause why they should not be removed from the be said from a practical point of view. The judges of

Commission of the Peace, and we observe that a contem. old thought that life would be almost unbearable if for

porary has hazarded an opinion that solicitors who have every unfavourable opinion of his fellow-creature that a

been similarly reported upon ought to be called upon to man expressed he was liable to be sued, although

answer such matters, although we do not gather what such fellow-creature could not show that he had sustained

sort of jurisdiction would be thus enforced. In the case one halfpenny worth of damage. Our correspondent

of aldermen and other municipal dignitaries found guilty points out that spoken words delivered in a public place of bribery the attorneracena

a public place of bribery, the Attorney-General hinted at further legis. or on a public occasion may be far more injurious to a

lation, with a view to disqualification. person than a private letter. This is true, and in these particular cases the distinction may work badly, but the question is, whether the rule in the main is a wise one; whether, on account of these cases, it would be well to

WE ARE INFORMED that Mr. GLASSE, Q.O., will, after make every defamatory statement made orally actionable.

his present cases have been disposed of, attach himself to We are disposed to doubt whether the change suggested

the court of Mr. Justice F'ry. by our correspondent in this respect is desirable, though we are by no means prepared to express a decided opinion, and we feel the force of what he says. Again, our correspondent proposes to abolish the existing pro- The Solicitors' Remuneration Bill was in the orders of ceedings by indictment and criminal information, and the day of the House of Commons for second reading on substitute one proceeding by action, to include (if we do

Monday last, but it was not reached. not misunderstand his proposal) damages for the

The Liverpool Town Council on Wednesday agreed to civil injury and also the question of punishment. increase the salary of the Town Clerk (Mr. Rayner), The main object appears to be to make the evidence of

from £2,500 to $3,000 a year. both parties admissible. We see no logical objection to

In the course of the hearing of a case in the Lancathis, but we doubt whether it would not involve too

shire Chancery Court, on Tuesday last, the Vice-Changreat an interference with the established lines of cellor (Mr. Bristowe, Q.C.) referred to the manner in demarcation between criminal and civil matters to be which affidavits in that court were framed. He said the practically possible.

practice appeared to be to set out at length any correspondence which might occur in the case, the result being

to throw upon suitors considerable expense which might SOME MISAPPREHENSION appears to exist as to the dis- be avoided. He would suggest that in future letters qualifications and other inconveniences which attach to should be mentioned as exhibits in ordinary cases, parpersons who have been reported to have been guilty of ties being of course at liberty to insert in the affidavits corrupt practices at elections. The Attorney-General, in any particular passage in a letter upon which reliance answering Mr. RYLANDS' question in the House of Com- was placed. He hoped that solicitors practising in the mons, pointed out some of the distinctions between the court would make a note of what he had said, and he report of an election judge and the report of an election should take care to instruct the registrar in future commission. The former case is regulated by the Parlia- to disallow costs which had been unnecessarily incurred mentary Elections Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 125), section in this direction.

for this deficiency hy appealing to the authority of deTHE EFFECT OF DISCLAIMER cided cases. The cases which he is said to have cited.

were three : Toylor v. Gillott (L. R. 20 Eq. 682), Ex UPON AN UNDERLEASE.

parte Ditton (44 W. R. 1008, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 459), and Ex WHEN Mr. Justice Mathew took his seat on the bench parte Boston (29 W. R. 28, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 289). How for the first time, he found himself called upon to deal far these cases support such a contention we leave the with more than one matter of more than common reader to judge. In the first of them, upon which Mr. difficulty. Few judges have, in the same day, disposed Justice Mathew is reported to have relied, a lessee, who of two more important cases than Clarke v. Bradlaugh had agreed to grant a sub-lease, had let the intended and Smalley v. Hardinge. In the latter case the plain sub-lessee into possession without having otherwise pertiff was the reversioner upon a lease, which had been formed the agreement. The lessee became bankrupt and disclaimed, with leave of the court, upon the lessee's his trustee disclaimed the lease. Thereupon the intended bankruptcy, by his trustee. The defendant was in sub-lessee filed a bill in chancery against the superior possession, as sub-lessee, of a part of the premises com- reversioner, claiming to have a lease grant prised in the lease, under a sub-lease granted, and

to the lessee's agreement, and to restrain the reversioner regularly executed, by the lessee before the adjudication. from proceeding against him in ejectment. In plain Mr. Justice Mathew held that by the disclaimer the language, he asked that the reversioner might be ordered sub-lease was destroyed; that the only remedy of the specifically to perform something which neither he, nor sub-lessee, if he wished to preserve his interest from anybody under whom he claimed, had agreed to perform destruction, was to have applied, under section 23 of the at all. It was never the practice in equity to make such Bankruptcy Act, to oppose the disclaimer, and to ask for

orders, and there is no need to wonder that the bill was a transfer of the lease to himself; and that, as the sub-dismissed. Vice-Chancellor fall, in giving judgment, lessee had neglected to avail himself of this remedy, the declined to say what would have been the result if sub-lease had been destroyed by the disclaimer, and the the sub-lease had been actually granted, though plaintiff was entitled to recover the premises by action of

he expressed in strong language his sense of the hardejectment. This decision of Mr. Justice Mathew was,

ship which would be inflicted upon the reversioner if he last week, reversed by the Court of Appeal..

was forced to content himself with any rent and any It is evident that the practical consequences involved covenants, however inadequate, which his lessee had in the question at issue are of great gravity. For it is chosen to insert in the sub-lease. As to the last the common practice to draw mortgages of leaseholds by point, there cannot be two opinions; and it hapway of demise ; and if the sub-terms thus created were pened that the circumstances in Taylor v. Gillott lent held to be destroyed upon a disclaimer by the trustee in a peculiar emphasis to the Vice-Chancellor's remarks. bankruptcy of the mortgagor, the mortgagee would be

We suppose the argument founded on this case in exposed to the risk, in the event of the mortgagor's Smalley V. Hardinge was somewhat as follows :bankruptcy, of being obliged to accept an assign. That an agreement for a lease is in equity the same ment of the original lease : thus making himself liable thing as a lease; and that, as the agreement was not for its rent and covenants-a liability which he had | enforced, so the sub-lease, if actually granted, would expressly bargained to avoid. On the other hand, the

have been held to have been destroyed. But it is not result of holding, as the Court of Appeal has held, that correct to say that, in contemplation of equity, a thing the sub-lease remains valid, notwithstanding the dis-agreed to be done is the same as a thing done : at the claimer of the lease, is of no less serious consequence to most, this is true only as between the parties to the every reversioner. For any lessee might make & sub. agreement. And in Taylor v. Gillott, the defendant lease at a premium with a peppercorn rent, and then, on was no party to the alleged agreement. There was no his becoming bankrupt, and the trustee disclaiming, the equity against

equity against him, whatever there might be against reversioner would find himself in possession of nothing somebody else. The fact that equity would not step but a peppercorn rent during the sub-term, which might out of its way to make him grant to the plaintiff a legal be the original term minus one day.

right which the plaintiff had not got, by no means The defendant in the recent case relied solely, and in shows that it would have deprived the plaintiff of the the Court of Appeal successfully, upon his position under legal right if he had got it. the words of the Bankruptcy Act. By section 23, it is The bearing of the other two cases cited upon Smalley enacted that, “when any property of the bankruptv. Hardinge is less obvious. In Ex parte Ditton, a acquired by the trustee under this Act consists of land lessee had deposited his lease with a person by way of of any tenure burdened with onerous covenants, .. equitable mortgage. The lessee became bankrupt, his the trustee may ... disclaim such property, and trustee disclaimed, and the equitable mortgagee, who upon the execution of such disclaimer the property shall, had been present when leave was given to disclaim, ... if the same is a lease, be deemed to have been sought to appeal from the order giving the leave. It surrendered" on the date of the order of adjudication. was held that he ought to have asked the Bankruptcy The effect of the surrender of a lease upon a sub-lease Court to stay execution of the order to disclaim pend. previously granted by the lessee admits of no dispute, ing the appeal; and that, as he had failed to do so, and was not disputed. The sub-lessee at common law and had suffered the act of disclaimer to be perfected, was so far from being ousted from his rights by the this disclaimer could not be undone. What do we find lessee's surrender, that he retained them without any here to give any new or peculiar meaning to the word obligation to pay rent or perform covenants; for this “surrender"? In Ex parte Buxton, it was decided that obligation was incident to the immediate reversion upon the equitable mortgagee of a lease, willing to accept an the sub-term, which reversion was destroyed by the assignment of the lease, had a right to prevent the merger of the term in the superior reversion. The well- | trustee from disclaiming, upon the terms of indemnifying known statutes which gave the superior reversioner a him against liability under the lease. We once more remedy in respect of the rent and covenants of the sub- find nothing here bearing upon the meaning of the lease do not afford him any help towards ejecting the word “surrender"; and nothing to justify us in recon. sub-lessee. In short, if the word " surrender" is in the structing an Act of Parliament which has said one thing Bankruptcy Act to be taken to have its ordinary sepse, pretty clearly in such a way as to make it say another. it means that the rights of the sub-lessee are left in- | The clumsiness of modern legislation has made tact; and this is the view which prevailed with the Court it quite inevitable that a hardship shall be inflicted of Appeal.

upon one party or the other; and by the use of The plaintiff in the recent case had thus evidently the word “ surrender," it is plainly indicated that little to rely upon so far as the language of the Bank. the reversioner is the one to suffer hardship. We think ruptcy Act is concerned. He endeavoured to make up | that the Court of Appeal, in refusing to take it upon

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them to shift the burden of inconvenience to the shoulders itself, and it may be noticed that the provision isof somebody else because they might think him better by accident we suppose-made for appealing against able to bear it, or because the burden would be smaller part of a decree, which is of course more frequently in his case, or because the circumstances of the first case severable than a judgment. It so happens that the part which happened to turn up cast an unfavourable light of the judgment against which Mr. Bradlaugh does not upon his claim, have only refused to substitute a public propose to appeal affects very materially-though indirectly evil for a private evil of much less consequence.

-the constitution of the very court to which he appeals. Assuming that the House, or a single member of it, should be prepared to give judgment on the question of the oath, but not on the question of the right to sue,

what is there to prevent this being done? Again, it is MR. BRADLAUGH'S APPEAL.

possible that an objection might be taken to the jurisdic. MR. BRADLAUGH'S appeal to the House of Lords is tion of the House, looking to the fact that the right of likely to raise questions of some little interest as to the a particular individual to sit in the House of Commons practice and procedure under the Appellate Jurisdiction

was being questioned in the court below. If the House Act, 1876, and the Standing Orders of the House of Lords | itself should take a stand upon such an objection, the which derive their force therefrom. The 11th section of 1 appeal could not be heard. In conclusion, it may be the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, enacts that an appeal worth while to point out that neither the Appellate shall be “subject to such conditions as to the value of the

Jurisdiction Act, nor any standing order, has taken away subject-matter in dispute, and as to giving security for the right always existing, but never exercised since 1783, costs, and as to the time within which the appeal shall of every lord, temporal and spiritual, to hear the appeal, be brought, and generally as to all matters of practice although there must be a quorum of three qualified and procedure, or otherwise, as may be imposed by | peers. orders of the House of Lords." The Standing Orders of the House, therefore, have all the force of a statute, and 80 wide are the terms of the section authorizing them, THE CONVEYANCING BILL. that it would be almost impossible for any particular order to be ultrà vires.

VI.-MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS. Turning to the Standing Orders, we find that they | In concluding our notice of this Bill we shall follow, with deal with their subject-matter with great particu- some exceptions, the arrangement of subjects adopted larity. Order 1 fixes the time within which an appeal by the draftsman. may be lodged at one year, not five years, as With regard to married women, the Bill contains some Mr. Gladstone and the Attorney-General stated, the rather revolutionary provisions. Clause 42 proposes to period of five years being confined to cases where the abolish acknowledgment of deeds and examination of person entitled to appeal is non compos mentis, or under married women (under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, or other disabilities in the order mentioned. The saving on & surrender by husband and wife of copyholds), and words in this order, "except where otherwise provided the next clause enables a married woman, by deed made by statute," have, we should imagine, reference to the with the concurrence of her husband, to dispose of provisions of the “ Divorce Amendment Act, 1868," 31 reversionary interests in personalty, to release powers, & 32 Vict., c. 77, which limits to one month the period or release or extinguish her equity to a settlement, and within which must be brought the appeal to the House to dispose of, release, or disclaim any personal property of Lords, first given by that act, against a decree for in possession, or any debt or chose in action to which she dissolution of marriage. We know of no statute or her husband in her right is entitled under any instruextending the period of appeal. Order 2 prescribes ment made before or after the commencement of the that all petitions of appeal be signed, and the reason. | Act. As a necessary consequence it is proposed to ableness thereof certified by two counsel, who shall have repeal Malins' Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57). The attended as counsel in the court below, or shall purpose section is not to authorize & married woman to attending as counsel at the hearing in the House. It make any disposition, release, extinguishment, or will be remembered that Mr. Bradlaugh appeared in disclaimer of any property which she is restrained from person in the court below, so that a new Standing Order alienating or anticipating, or of any property would seem to be required, the present order not being settled by marriage settlement. Clause 44 enables the quite applicable. With regard to security for costs, court in cases where a married woman is restrained from Standing Order 4 requires that the appellant shall be- anticipation, by judgment or order, to bind her interest come bound to the Queen in a penalty of five hundred in any property. Clause 46 provides that a covenant, or pounds, and also procure two sufficient sureties in the other contract in writing made by a married woman, sum of two hundred pounds apiece, and a very recent "shall operate to bind her separate estate, if any, real amendment of this order (ante, p. 389) provides that the and personal, and to create a debt recoverable thereout, appellant must lodge in the Parliament Office“ an affi | as against her, her heirs, executors, and administrators, davit by the proposed sureties setting forth specifically | taking her separate estate, but to the extent only of that the nature of the property in consideration of which they separate estate.” This provision, which it will be seen claim to be accepted as sureties," failing which affi. proposes to make a married woman's charge effectual davit the appellant himself, so it is ordered, must pay I against all her separate property, whether acquired £200 into the account of the fee fund of the House of before or after the charge (so far reversing the rule laid Lords. It may perhaps be doubted whether this amend. | down by the Court of Appeal in Pike v. Fitzgibbon) is, in ment would be held applicable to an appeal in an action accordance with that decision, to apply oniy if and so far commenced before it was made, but the amendment it. as the married woman is not restrained from anticipaself contains no saving words, and no objection could be tion, and is, moreover, applicable only if and so far as a taken in ordinary cases to its having a retrospective contrary intention is not expressed in the covenant or application.

contract. Another question which may arise is whether the With regard to infants, clause 47 provides that where appeal may be partial only-i.e., whether it may be a person in his own right seised of or entitled to land for only against so much of the judgment as decides an estate in fee, or for any leasehold interest at a rent, is the right of the particular plaintiff to sue for the an infant, the land shall be deemed to be settled land, and penalty. “The Form of Petition" provides for a partial the infant to be tenant for life thereof, within the proappeal, but we greatly doubt whether an appeal against posed Settled Land Act, and the land shall be deemed to part of the reasons of a judgment may be said to be be a settled estate within the Settled Estates Act, partial where there is no attempt to split the judgment | 1877. Clause 48 proposes to imply (subject to the expression of a contrary intention) extensive powers of management of land during minority in trustees either

CORRESPONDENCE. appointed for the purpose by the settlement, or, if none are so appointed, then in the trustees of the settlement within the proposed Settled Land Act, or, if there are

THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER. none, then ir trustees to be appointed for this [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] purpose by the court. Clause 49 proposes to amend the provisions of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 26, as to

Sir,—The observations in your last week's number as maintenance, mainly by omitting the words “income to

to proceedings for libel, taken in connection with some which such infant may be entitled in respect of such

recent cases which have attracted public attention, sugproperty,” which in In re George (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 837)

gest the consideration whether the time has not arrived were held to render the provision applicable only to cases

for an entire reform of the law of libel and slander, where the infant was either absolutely entitled to the

which, as it now stands, is admittedly unsatisfactory. the principal and income or was entitled to the principal

Probably the reason why a reform has not been hitherto contingently in such a manner as that he would, on

attempted has been because the intricacies of the existcoming of age, become entitled to the income also. It

ing law are known to but few, and those few being men is now proposed to be provided that “where any property

| of large practice in the common law courts, have rarely is held by trustees on trust for an infant, either for life

had the time or the inclination to undertake legal reor for any further interest, ... the trustees may, at

forms. What I propose to do in this letter is to sketch their sole discretion, pay to the infant's parent or

out a general outline of the reform which it appears to guardian, if any, or otherwise apply, &c., ... the

| me would meet the wants of the age, leaving the details income of that property."

to be filled in by more experienced hands. Passing over clauses 50 and 51, relating to rent-charges

First, I would abolish the existing technical distincand other annual sums, we come to the provisions as to

tion between libel and slander-a distinction known to powers of attorney. Clause 52 enables the donee of a

lawyers, but very little understood by the general public, power of attorney to execute any instrument in his own

and which is well illustrated by the old case, where an name. Clause 53 makes irrevocable, except with the

action was brought by a parson against his parishioner for consent of the donee, a power of attorney, whether given

calling bim“ a d- d fool”; and it was held, per totam for a valuable consideration or not, which is expressed

curiam, that the action would not lie, being for spoken to be irrevocable for a fixed time specified in the instru.

words, and no special damage proved—"parceque on ment creating the power, not exceeding a year from the

poet estre bon parson et

d d fool; aliter si il avaist date of the instrument, and clause 54 makes irrevocable,

esté attorney-at-law, parceque d d fool ne poet estro except with the consent of the donee, a power of at

hon attorney-at-law." It is obvious that spoken words, torney given for valuable consideration and expressed to

if delivered from a pulpit or platform, may be far more be absolutely irrevocable. Clause 55 protects payments

injurious to the person attacked than a private letter, made, and acts done in good faith, without notice of the and the principles on which the remedy is to be based revocation of a power, and clause 56 provides that in.

should be the same in both cases. struments creating powers of attorney may be deposited

Next, I would abolish all the existing proceedings by in the Central Office of the Supreme Court, and that a

indictment and criminal information, which are based on separate file shall be kept of the instruments so deposited,

fictions of the law, and would substitute as the sole which may be searched by any person, and office copies

remedy an action, to be called an action for defamation, obtained, which are to be sufficient evidence of the con.

to be brought by the person injured, or, in the case of tents of the instruments. Clause 45 enables a married defamation of public persons, by the Attorney-General. woman to appoint an attorney to execute any deed, or

The statement of claim should state shortly the do any other act, which she might herself execute or do.

act of defamation, the innuendo (if any), and the Clauses 57–73 contain various small provisions in.

special damage (if any); and should pray (1) for damages, tended to shorten deeds, among which may be men (2) for an injunction, (3) for costs, and (4) for such tioned the abolition of the feoffee to uses in the convey

punishment as the court may think proper. The defence ance of freeholds by a man to himself jointly with would then either deny or justify the act, and the court another; the abolition of the indorsed receipt (clause 63), at the trial would adapt the relief to the circumstances. In and of the authority for payment to the vendor's solicitor

many cases, where the sole object of the action was to clear

many cases, where the sole object of t. (clause 65); and the implication of the joint account the plaintiff's character, an injunction with payment of clause (clause 70), and of the estate clause (clause 72). costs would be a sufficient remedy, and a jury would be Clause 75 provides for the protection of solicitors and

unnecessary; in other more serious cases the court might trustees adopting, or allowing the adoption of, the Act.

award fine or imprisonment. In every case, however, the evidence of both parties ought to be freely admitted, and the trial should be either by a judge alone, or &

judge and jury, at the option of the parties. Mr. Justice Kay will join Mr. Justice Stephen at Leeds,

Having provided for a simple plan of procedure, it the latter judge going alone to Newcastle and Durham, would be necessary to classify in & codified form the where prisoners only will be tried.

various acts of defamation for which an action would lie The recept recognition by her Majesty of a Canadian

-such as defamation of public persons, imputation of Barony, says Debrett's Peerage for 1881, is an exceptional

criminal offences, cases of special damage, defamation of circumstance, and the gentleman (Baron de Longueüil) title, &c., and the various defences which would be an whose title bas been acknowledged, holds the remarkablé l answer to the action, as privilege, public interest, &c., position of being the only subject of the Queen who is a l and provisions would be introduced to secure the absolute colonial Peer, and who, at the same time, has not any pre immunity of witnesses, legal and parliamentary proceedcedence. The Feudal Barony is entirely exceptional, and is ings, reports in newspapers, &c. It would also be the only Canadian hereditary title existing. The patent of reasonable to provide that a person in the position of the nobility signed by King Louis XIV. granting this title to

printer of a newspaper should be free from liability on Charles Le Moyne for distinguished services, is remarkable as creating, not only a territorial barony, but also conferring

his giving up the name of the editor. a title of honour opon himself and his descendants, whether

The above is a mere outline, but if the principles of male or female. The cession of Canada to England by the

the reform are once agreed upon, the details can be easily Treaty of Paris in 1763 made no change in the legal right to

filled in, and advantage taken of the experience of those hold honours ; since this period each successive head of the

who are familiar with the subject. It is, of course, too family bas, by assumption of rigbt, used the title; but it much to hope that any reform of this nature can be so was not officially recognized by the British Government until framed as to meet every possible case, but if the basis of December 4, 1880.

| the law be sound it will not be difficult to introduce

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NEW ORDERS.

amendments, and a satisfactory code of law on this / The council do not meet the complaint that, without subject may be ultimately obtained.

consulting the members, they decided to abandon an It would be an advantage if such of your readers as arrangement which there was no necessity to discontinue, have given special attention to this subject would give I submit that a new list of members, prepared in the the public the benefit of their views.

R. J. C. society's own office, and, as now alleged, because of Lincoln's-inn, April 5.

inaccuracies in the official Law List, ought not to need an apology for mistakes “here and there." I send yon

a list of about 170 such omissions as the one to which I BILLS OF SALE.

drew your attention in my letter of the 23rd ult., and

which I have compiled from the Law Lists of 1880 and [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

1881. Sir,-Attention being called to this subject by the two

I have learnt from other members that there are or three Bills now before Parliament for an amendment

numerous mistakes in the Calendar of the following kinds of the law affecting these instruments, a few statistical

- viz., names mis-spelt, year of admission incorrect, and remarks respecting them may not be without interest.

appointments omitted. In each instance named to me I In the year 1878, being the last one under the old

have verified the statements, and on each of the first Act, there were 20,059 bills of sale filed; but in the

| three pages of the list of London members I have found year 1880, viz., within two years after the new (the

other errors. I have gone no further.-I am, dear Sir, present) Act came into operation, the number filed rose

yours faithfully,

John NICHOLLS. to the large number of 56,625, being an average of 1' E. W. Williamson, Esq., Secretary, Incorporated Law 1,089 weekly ; or, allowing for Sundays and holidays,

Society. nearly 200 each day of the year past.

During the fortnight ending the 23rd ult. there were 2,144 bills of sale filed, of which 310 were for sums not

QUERIES. exceeding £10 each, and 460 for between £10 and not WINDING UP OF NEWSPAPER COMPANY-RIGHTS OP exceeding £20 each, being more than one in every three CONTRIBUTOR.-I should be glad if any of your readers for £20 and under.

could inform me as to the rights of a gentleman who for This is owing entirely to the operation of the 20th several years was on the permanent staff of a newspaper, section of the present Act, which enacts that “ chattels and regularly contributed weekly articles, in the liquidacomprised in a bill of sale which has been, and continues tion of the proprietors. Can he claim as a "clerk or to be, duly registered under this Act, shall not be servant” to be paid in full ? I am told there has been deemed to be in the possession, order, or disposition of a case in which it was held that he could do so, but I the grantor of the bill of sale within the meaning of the cannot find any authority on the subject. TEMPLAR. Bankruptcy Act, 1869."

As to the class of persons to whom these small bills of sale are given, the constant repetition of the names of Moses, Aaron, Solomon, Abraham, &c., sufficiently testifies.

Wbilst, doubtlese, one-half or three-fourths of the bills of sale now given are to these professional money

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. lenders, yet the remainder may be, and perbaps are,

CHANCERY Division. legitimate enough, and the difficulty is, whilst trying to I, the Right Honourable Roundell Baron Selborne , prohibit or check the one class, to insure that the other Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order class is not unduly prevented or prejudiced. One or more and direct as follows:of the Bills now before Parliament provides that every l 1. Each of the several causes which shall be transgrantor of a bill of sale shall file therewith an affidavit ferred to Mr. Justice Kay shall, until further order, be that all the goods thereby charged are his own and have deemed to have been transferred to him for the purpose been paid for, and that under no circumstances shall a only of trial or of hearing. bill of sale be valid if the grantor becomes bankrupt 2. No cause or matter shall, until further order, be within three months next after giving it. No doubt but assigned to the said Mr. Justice Kay by the same being that some such enactment would go a long way to marked by the plaintiff or petitioner with the name of stop many of the money-lenders' bills of sale; but I am the said Mr. Justice Kay. not so sure whether it would work well as a general | Dated this 30th day of March, 1881. measure affecting every case.

SELBORNE, C. The subject is a pressing one, and calls for a remedy ; but, as we know, it is often easier to ask a question than to satisfactorily answer it.

REGISTRATION OF BRITISH TRADE-MARKS

John MILLER. Bristol, April 2.

IN SWITZERLAND. A copy of a form of certificate of establiebment or domicile, which is required by the Swiss Federal Bureau

in addition to the ordinary forms constituting the appliTHE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY AND

cation of a British subject for the registration of his tradeTHE “LAW LIST."

mark in Switzerland, may be inspected at the office of the [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Registrar of Trade-Marke, 25, Southampton-buildings, Sir,-May I ask the favour of space for the enclosed copy of my reply to Mr. Williamson's letter of the 30th ult.

I propose at the annual meeting of the society to move a resolution on the subject referred to in the corres

The members of the South-Eastern Circuit have invited

| Mr. Justice Watkin Williams and Mr. Justice Mathew to a pondence between Mr. Williamson and myself, and I

dinner to celebrate their recent elevation to the bench. The shall hope to induce the council to revert to the former

dinner will take place on Tuesday, the 12th inst., in the practice.

JOHN NICHOLLS. Inner Temple-hall. 73, Gresnam-street, London, E.C., April 6.

• The Board of Legal Studies of the University of Cambridge [The following is the letter referred to:

have received from the committee of the George Long Me73, Gresham-street, London, E.C., April 3, 1881. morial Fand an offer of £500 to provide a prize or medal for Dear Sir,

the candidate in the law tripos most distinguished in The Incorporated Law Society and the Law List. Roman law and jurisprudence. The board recommend that I am obliged by your letter of tbe 30th ult.

the memorial should take the form of a prize.

Chad

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