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RETAINERS OF COUNSEL.

It is very desirable that plain and intelligible regulations as to retainers of counsel should be universally known and observed. The practice is, however, in many respects doubtful and unsettled, and disputes often arise which cause much inconvenience and annoyance both to barristers and solicitors. It is in most cases difficult, and in some cases impossible, to get disputed questions of this kind promptly and authoritatively answered.

The rules as to retainers have, as a matter of fact, been made by counsel's clerks, and when a clerk has any doubt as to whether he should accept a retainer, he seeks advice from some other clerk, generally the clerk to the Attorney-General or a leader, and the question is often settled without any reference to the counsel sought to be retained. There are, however, cases where the decision of the clerk is not accepted by the contending parties, and in that event the counsel either refuses to act at all, or he refers the question to the leader of the court or circuit, or to the Attorney-General; but an opinion can seldom be obtained early enough to be of any practical use, and, because of the necessity for expedition, disputes must be settled by the barristers themselves. This being so, it would be a great boon if the rules as to retainers could be collected, in order that both barristers and solicitors should know the principles which regulate the practice on this subject.

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We are aware of the steps taken by the Incorporated Law Society in 1847 and 1848 for collecting and formulating the rules as to retainers. They sent a circular containing a series of questions to all London solicitors as well as to the provincial law societies, and from the materials thus collected they framed a set of rules which were submitted to the Judges and Serjeants and the Inns of Court. The rules were also sent to the Attorney-General and to all the Queen's Counsel, but the junior bar was consulted, which, in our opinion, was a mistake. No reply was received from the judges, the serjeants, the Attorney-General, or the Inns of Court. Some of the Queen's Counsel suggested amendments, which were adopted, but the bar as a body held aloof. The principal reason for this appears to have been that it was considered a piece of assumption on the part of solicitors to frame rules for the guidance of counsel; but all that appears to have been done was simply to state the practice as it was then known to exist, with the view of making it generally known and uniform. Although the rules seem to have been sent to all practising barristers and solicitors, they do not appear to have been acted on, and are now almost, if not entirely, forgotten. A better feeling now exists between both branches of the profession, and it is to be hoped that the Bar Committee and the Law Society will unite in promulgating rules which would then be binding both on barristers and solicitors.

With the view of assisting in the attainment of this object, a correspondent has sent us some rules relating to the matter which have been formulated by way of suggestion only. It is not pretended that they are complete, or perhaps in every respect in accordance with existing practice. They are, however, intended to be framed in the interest of both branches of the profession, and may serve as a groundwork for discussion:

1. A general retainer, unless otherwise expressed, applies to all courts in which the counsel receiving it usually practises at the time it is given, and gives the client a preference in retaining specially the counsel to whom it is given in any action in which the client may be concerned, including new trials, rehearings, and appeals, but a special general retainer must be given for business in Parliament.

2. If the counsel should be offered a special retainer or brief by the opponent of the party having given such general retainer, the party who gave the general retainer is entitled to notice, and unless the counsel receives a special retainer or brief from the party who gave the general retainer, he may accept the special retainer or brief of the opponent.

3. In case a special retainer or brief is offered to counsel against the party who has given a special retainer, the counsel is at liberty to accept the special retainer or brief of the other party unless, two days before the time appointed for the trial, argument, taking evidence, or hearing, a brief be given by the party who gave such special retainer.

This rule is intended to meet the case of a retainer without the intention to send a brief unless the opposite party sends a brief. "Retainers to your enemies and briefs to your friends," Sir Samuel Romilly used to say was a disgraceful proceeding, and ought to be resisted.

4. In the case of a special retainer, or a general retainer followed by a special retainer or brief, counsel is entitled to a brief on every occasion on which the case is brought before the court, except when a brief is given to a junior only; otherwise the retainer is void.

This regulation is for the advantage of the junior bar, and is but

fair towards those who ought not to be required to deliver briefs to the leader on all occasions.

5. When counsel has drawn pleadings, or advised during the progress or in contemplation of an action, a retainer or brief may be accepted from, and pleadings drawn for and advice given to, the opponent, unless a retainer has been given by the first client after notice to the first client.

the counsel had acted or advised at an earlier stage of the proceedings. Great difficulty was felt when there was not a general retainer, but Nothing occurring in a barrister's practice can be more annoying and repugnant than to have had a personal conference with a client, masfind himself subsequently holding a brief for the opposite side. It tered the intricacies of his case, and discussed its difficulties, and to may be that the whole, or the greater part, of what passed at the early conference has escaped his memory; but one fact frequently recalls another, and if information is derived from different sources, when it comes to be used and applied some time after, it is quite impossible for the counsel to distinguish and appropriate each particular fact as it recurs to his memory. There is, we trust, no man at the bar, who would wilfully use information obtained in professional confidence from a client to his disadvantage, but it is possible that this may be done involuntarily, and the suspicion is painful and degrading. Sir Samuel Romilly said, in the case of Lord Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton (17 Ves. 261):-"My opinion is that a counsel ought not, if he knows anything that may be prejudicial to the former client, to accept the new brief, though the first client refused to retain him." The unpleasant consequences suggested can be avoided by sending to the earlier client the notice suggested in the rule, and as a general form of notice might be readily framed and used, the object of sending it would be universally understood, and no apprehension need be felt that counsel would lay open to the imputation of soliciting briefs. 6. As between two clients for whom general retainers have been given, the right of the clients to the services of the counsel depends on the priority of such retainers.

themselves

7. A general retainer, except in the case of corporations, joint stock companies, benefit or other societies, and newspapers, lasts for the joint lives of the client and counsel.

8. A general retainer given for any corporation is determined by its dissolution or by its acceptance of a new charter or obtaining a new act of incorporation.

9. A general retainer for a joint stock company, benefit or other society is determined by such company changing its style or title or becoming incorporated.

10. A general retainer given for a newspaper is determined by an alteration in its name, but not by a change of its proprietors, publishers, or printers, and it extends only to matters affecting such newspaper, but extends to all such matters, whether the proprietors, the publishers, or the printers are parties to the action, suit, or proceeding.

11. A general retainer given for a partnership or firm is determined by a change in the style of the partnership or firm, but not by a change in the constituent members of it.

12. A general retainer given for a partnership or firm extends only to matters affecting the partnership, but extends to all such matters, notwithstanding that all the partners may not be included in the action brought.

13. A general retainer given for one person extends to matters affecting himself personally, but it does not extend to matters in which he is interested as assignee, trustee, executor, or administrator.

14. Where a general retainer is given for one person and he sues or is sued with others, such retainer is not binding in that action, except in the case of such person being a defendant and defending separately.

15. A special retainer cannot be given until after the commencement of an action or proceeding.

16. A special retainer gives the client a right to the services of the counsel during the whole progress of the action and at every stage thereof, including new trials, re-hearings, and appeals. 17. All retainers, whether general or special, are determined by the counsel ceasing to practise, but they are not determined by his being promoted to a higher rank at the bar.

18. Where a special or general retainer has been given and a brief is not duly delivered to the retained counsel in any action, suit, or proceeding in which the special retainer has been given or in which the party giving the general retainer is concerned, and pending in the court where the counsel usually practises, such retainer is entirely lost unless in matters where a brief is given to a junior only.

19. A special retainer must be given for a particular assize, but if the venue be changed to another place on the same circuit a fresh retainer is not required.

20. If the action be not tried at the assizes for which the retainer has been given, the retainer must be renewed for every sub

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Will it not be possible, after this decision, for money-lenders and borrowers to obtain all the advantages of a bill of sale without the necessity of having a schedule of the goods or the publicity of registration? An intending borrower wishes to raise money on his furniture, but is restrained from doing so by the necessity that, if he gives a bill of sale, it will have to contain a complete schedule of the property and must be registered, and thus be made public. At this point the recent decision comes to his aid, and, if the house is his own where the furniture is, or he has a lease which he can get leave from his landlord to sub-demise or assign (in most cases granted without much question) he has only to mortgage the premises to the money-lender by a deed containing an attornment clause, and a bill of sale, without its drawbacks, is obtained.

In many cases the premises mortgaged may be practically valueless compared with the furniture and goods therein, which are the real security for the advance. Thus, a document having all the effect of a duly registered bill of sale can be safely relied on; and, what is more, it has the advantage of covering all the after-acquired property brought on to the premises. Will not creditors in this way be defrauded, and, in fact, the very objects of the Bills of Sale Acts defeated? HENRY J. H. BULL.

21, Westcroft square, Ravenscourt Park, W., April 18.

MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL CHANCERY ACTIONS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-The recent order assigning all Manchester and Liverpool Chancery causes raises two curious points.

First, what is to be done with actions begun in Liverpool or Manchester, but afterwards transferred to London, by appearance being entered there or otherwise?

Secondly, how are questions adjourned from the district registrar to the judge to be dealt with, seeing the judge has no chambers? Will solicitors be heard in court, or must litigants in all cases employ counsel ?

In any case, I, for one, see no practical utility in the order, and I can see considerable jealousy and friction arising from it. WM. MAUDE.

Arundel House, Arundel-street, Victoria Embankment,
London, April 18.

NEW ORDERS, &c.

PROBATE REGISTRIES.

AMENDED RULES, ORDERS, AND INSTRUCTIONS.

By virtue and in pursuance of the provisions of the statutes 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77 and 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, I, the Right Honourable Sir James Hannen, Knight, President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, with the concurrence of the Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, and of the Right Honourable John Duke Baron Coleridge, Lord Chief Justice of England, do make and issue the following amended rules and orders for the registrars of the Principal Probate Registry and for the district probate registrars, in respect of non-contentious business, to take effect on and after the 19th day of April, 1887. Dated the 29th day of March, 1887. (Signed)

Approved. (Signed)

HALSBURY, C. COLERIDGE, C.J.

JAMES HANNEN.

AMENDED RULES, ORDERS, AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REGISTRARS OF THE PRINCIPAL PROBATE REGISTRY AND FOR THE DISTRICT PROBATE REGISTRARS IN NON-CONTENTIOUS BUSINESS.

Rule 15 of the Rules, Orders, and Instructions for the registrars of the Principal Probate Registry in non-contentious business, dated the 30th of July, 1862, and rule 18 of the Rules, Orders, and Instructions for the district probate registrars in such business, dated the 27th of January, 1863, are respectively repealed, save so far as concerns anything done or proceeding taken in accordance with them, and in place of the said rules it is ordered that the following rules shall take effect:

Rules 15 and 18. In a grant of probate of the will of a married woman, or of the will of a widow made during coverture, or letters of administration with such wills annexed, it shall not be necessary to recite in the grant or in the oath to lead the same the separate personal estate of the testatrix or the power or authority under which the will has been or purports to have been made. The probate or letters of administration with will annexed in such cases shall take the form of ordinary grants of probate or letters of administration with will annexed without any exception or limitation, and issue to an executor or other person authorized in usual course of representation to take the same; a surviving husband, however, being entitled to the same in preference to the next of kin of the testatrix in case of a partial intestacy. The forms of instruments annexed to the before-mentioned Rules, Orders, and Instructions for the registrars of the Principal Probate Registry, numbered 12, 13, and 14, and in the Rules, Orders, and Instructions for the district probate registrars, numbered 13, 14, and 15, and thereby directed to be adopted as nearly as the circumstances of the case will allow in respect of the wills of married women, shall cease to be adopted in respect of such wills, except so far as the same may be applicable to oaths sworn before these rules and orders take effect, and also except so far as the same may be applicable to any second or subsequent grants required to complete the representation in cases where limited or special grants have already issued.

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CASES OF THE WEEK.

MACALPIN v. YOUNG-C. A. No. 1, 20th April. MARRIED WOMAN-SEPARATE PROPERTY-VESTED INTEREST IN RE

MAINDER.

The defendant, who was a married woman, on April 14, 1880, gave a promissory note to the plaintiff. Judgment was signed on that note on August 18, 1885. By the will of the defendant's aunt, who died in 1872, certain real property was left to trustees in trust for the testatrix's sister, Mary Wright, for life, and after her death to be sold and the proceeds to be divided between such of the testatrix's nieces as were then surviving.

Mary Wright died in July, 1886. An inquiry having been directed as to the separate estate of the defendant, the master reported that she was in possession at the time of making the contract and at the time of the admitted that the only property she had was her interest under her judgment of sufficient separate property to satisfy the debt. It was aunt's will; but it was contended that that was not separate property which could be bound by the contract, since her interest in it was contingent on her surviving the life tenant. It was further contended that if, at the dates of the contract and the judgment, the defendant had a separate property in this reversionary interest, execution could not now be issued against the property which had since come into her possession, but only against that reversionary interest Stirling, J., at chambers, considered that the interest of the defendant was part of her separate estate, and was bound by the contract, and his decision was upheld by

the Divisional Court (Coleridge, C.J., and Mathew, J.). The defendant
appealed.
THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M.R, and LOPES, L.J.) dismissed the appeal.
Lord ESHER, M.R., said that he was clearly of opinion that the defendant
had at the time of making the contract a vested interest in remainder,
which was liable to be divested if she pre-deceased the tenant for life.
That interest vested in her at the moment of the death of the testatrix.
The fact that her interest had now increased by coming into possession on
the death of the life tenant made no difference. The judgment had the
same effect as a charge on her separate property. LOPES, L.J., said that
it was beyond all question that the defendant had at the time of making
the contract a vested interest in remainder, since it was ready to come
into possession the moment the tenant for life died.-COUNSEL, Bigham,
Q.C, and H. E. Duke; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and McClymont. SOLICITORS,
Taylor, Hoare, Taylor, & Box, for J. & A. Burton & Scorer Lincoln; Morton,
Cutler, & Co.

LINWOOD v. ANDREWS-C. A. No. 2, 19th April.
ATTACHMENT-DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF MONEY-FIDUCIARY
CAPACITY-DEBTORS ACT, 1869, s. 4, SUB-SECTION 3.

of this sum to apply £4,000 and the income thereof in the establishment
of a soup kitchen for the parish of Shoreditch and of a cottage hospital
adjoining thereto, in such manner as not to violate the Mortmain Acts,
such hospital to be provided with not less than four beds. And he directed
that the income of the remaining £6,000 should be applied in paying
certain salaries to a resident nurse and a surgeon for the hospital, and
otherwise towards the necessities of the hospital, and for the benefit
thereof, and of the patients who should from time to time be taken into
It was
it, as his trustees should in their absolute discretion think fit.
decided by the court that the gift was valid under the Mortmain Acts,
because it might be carried out either on land already in mortmain or by
inducing some one to give land for the purpose. An inquiry was directed
whether the fund, or any part thereof, could be applied for the establish-
ment of a soup kitchen and cottage hospital, and for the benefit of such
The chief
hospital, in accordance with the directions of the testator.
clerk found that no part of the fund could be so applied, because no
land could be obtained for the purpose in the parish. Kay, J., refused an
application to vary the certificate. The testator's next of kin took out a
summons asking that the fund might be paid over to them, on the ground
that the charitable purpose had failed altogether. Kay, J., held that the
testator had manifested a general intention to benefit the poor of the
parish of Shoreditch, independently of the particular mode of applica-
tion which he had pointed out, and that, as that mode could not be
carried out, the court would apply the fund cy-près. His lordship accord-
the fund.

The question in this case was whether an order for an attachment had been properly made against the defendant. The plaintiff claimed as his property certain foreign Government bonds which were in the possession of the defendant, and brought the action to enforce his claim. An order was made restraining the defendant from parting or dealing with the bondsingly directed a scheme to be settled in chambers for the application of if unsold, and from parting or dealing with the proceeds of the bonds if sold. A subsequent order continued the injunction, and required the defendant, within four days, to deposit the bonds in court, or, if sold, to pay the proceeds into court; and a third order directed an attachment to issue against the defendant for not complying with the order to deposit the bonds or the proceeds of them. Under the will of his father the plaintiff was entitled to the bonds on attaining twenty-five, and he attained twenty-five on the 23rd of March, 1886. The defendant, who was a trustee of the will, had obtained possession of the bonds, and she made an affidavit in which she alleged that they had been given to her by the plaintiff for her absolute use without any condition whatever; that she had parted with them long before the action was commenced and before she had any idea that proceedings would be taken against her in respect of them, and that she was, therefore, not in a position to comply with the order to deposit them in court. Kay, J., made an order for attachment against the defendant. It was objected, on her behalf, that the order was one for the payment of money, and that obedience could not be enforced by attachment, unless the defendant was acting in a "fiduciary capacity" within the meaning of sub-section 3 of section 4 of the Debtors Act, 1869, which could not be determined till the trial of the action.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case, in answer to which the defendant only said that the plaintiff intended to and did make the gift to her. The court watched such cases with jealousy, unless there was a clear explanation given of a gift to a guardian or trustee. It would be a question for decision at the trial whether such an explanation had been given to the plaintiff as would enable him to understand what he was doing. So far, however, the plaintiff had made a prima facie case. An order had been made for the defendant to deposit the bonds, or, if sold, to pay into court the proceeds of sale. That not having been done an order for attachment was made. The attachment was ordered on the grounds that the bonds were not deposited and that the proceeds of sale had not been paid in, the defendant being in a fiduciary position. Having regard to section 4 of the Debtors Act, 1869, some doubt arose as to that, because the question whether the defendant was in a fiduciary position was one which would not be decided until the trial of the action. So far, therefore, as the order seemed to decide that question it ought not to stand. But was the court satisfied that the defendant had made default in depositing the bonds? So far as the order for attachment depended upon that, it was not affected by the Debtors Act, tor the order to deposit the bonds was not an order to pay money. Default by the defendant involved that she had it in her power to comply with the order by depositing the bonds. In his lordship's opinion the court was justified on the evidence in concluding that it was in the defendant's power to deposit the bonds. Her evidence was very unsatisfactory, and his lordship did not believe the defendant had parted with the bonds when the order was made. The order for attachment was right, but it must be varied by confining the reasons for it to non-compliance with the order for deposit of the bonds. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the order was not an order to pay money within the Debtors Act; it was an order to deposit the bonds, or, if sold, the proceeds. If they were sold it was an order to pay money within the Act, but there was no evidence that the bonds were sold. Therefore the order was for deposit of the bonds. He believed the defendant had got the bonds-that is, she could get at them if she chose.-COUNSEL, Marten, Q.C., and C. E. Moore; Ince, Q.C., and Alexander Young. SOLICITORS, T. E. Watkin; Hyde, Tandy, & Mahon.

BISCOE v. JACKSON--C. A. No. 2, 20th April. CHARITABLE BEQUEST-CY-PRÊS-FAILURE OF

TESTATOR.

PARTICULAR INTENTION OF

This was an appeal from a decision of Kay, J. (35 W. R. 152), the question being whether a charitable bequest had failed altogether, or whether it could be applied cy-près. A testator, by his will, appointed the plaintiffs his executors, and directed them, out of such part of his residuary estate "as should be pure personal estate and might by law be bequeathed for charitable purposes," to set apart the sum of £10,000, and

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and FRY, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said that for the purpose of the appeal it must be assumed that the fund could not be applied in the manner pointed out in the will. The question was whether the court could apply the doctrine of cy-près. If there was a gift to a particular legatee the legacy failed if the legatee did not or would not take it. But the question in the present case was whether the testator had given a legacy to a particular institution, or whether he had expressed a general intention to benefit the poor of the parish of Shoreditch, pointing out a particular mode of effecting his intention. In the latter case, if the particular intention could not be carried out, the court would apply the fund cy-près. In his lordship's opinion the latter was the true view of the bequest. The testator had expressed an intention to give £10,000 for the benefit of the sick and poor of Shoreditch, and had pointed out the mode in which it was to be done. The gift was not for erecting a particular building in the parish; it was for the parish-not merely in it; it was for the benefit of the poor in the parish. It was clear that the testator intended to benefit the poor of the parish in the particular way which he had pointed out, if possible, but, at any rate, to benefit them. LINDLEY and FRY, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, Pearson, Q.C., and Cecil Russell; Sir R. Webster, A.G., and Ingle Joyce; Edwin Ward and F. E. Ward. SOLICITORS, Pattison, Wigg, & Co.; Hare & Co.; Angell, Imbert-Terry, & Page.

M. MELACHRINO & CO. v. THE MELACHRINO EGYPTIAN
CIGARETTE CO.-Chitty, J., 19th April.

PATENTS, &C., ACT, 1883-TRADE-MARK-INFRINGEMENT-INVALID User.
In this case a motion was made by the plaintiffs for an interim injunc
tion to restrain the defendants (inter alia) from infringing or colourably
imitating the plaintiffs' registered mark or label. It appeared that the
plaintiffs had registered a mark for cigarettes consisting of a design, and
had also sought to register three coats of arms, but their application in
that respect was refused by the comptroller. The plaintiffs' label con-
sisted of the registered design and the three coats of arms, and the plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendants had imitated their label by copying
the design and the coats of arms. The defendants, however, submitted
that, as the plaintiffs had never used their mark in a valid manner, but
only together with matter which had been refused registration, they were
not entitled to protection.

CHITTY, J., said that the plaintiffs' use of the coats of arms did not vitiate their right to have their registered mark protected. It would be splitting hairs to hold that the use of that which was not registrable in conjunction with that which had been registered deprived a registered mark of the protection which registration had given it. The defendants' intention to copy was shewn by the circumstance that they had made use of the coats of arms. He granted the injunction.-COUNSEL, Romer, Q.C., and Sebastian; Sir A. Watson, Q.C., and Oswald. SOLICITORS, J. Algernon Latham; Spyer & Son.

Re ALLEN, SIMES v. SIMES-Stirling, J., 19th and 20th April. PRACTICE-ORIGINATING SUMMONS-R. S. C., 1883, LV., 3, 4, 8—APPOINT. MENT OF NEW TRUSTEES-JURISDICTION.

An originating summons was taken out under ord. 55, rr. 3, 4, in the matter of an estate, asking for general administration if and so far as necessary, the sanction of the judge to the compromise of probate proceedings in respect of the estate, and the appointment of new trustees. An order in terms of the summons was made at chambers, but the registrar took the objection, founded upon the decision of Kay, J., in Re Gill, Smith v. Gill (34 W. R. 134), that there existed no jurisdiction to appoint new trustees upon an originating summons. All the persons interested in the estate were parties to the summons. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that Re Gill, Smith v. Gill was distinguishable, inasmuch as in that case an originating summons was intituled as being taken out under the Trustee Acts, and the decision was founded upon the absence of jurisdiction to act under those statutes upon an originating summons, whereas, in the present case, the summons was an action within the definition of the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 100 (Re Fawsitt, 34

W. R. 26, 30 Ch. D. 231), and there was power under the general juris
diction of the court to appoint trustees as being a judgment which the
nature of the case required within the meaning of ord. 55, r. 8.
STIRLING, J., held that the distinction between Re Gill, Smith v. Gill and
the present case was well founded, and that, all persons interested in the
trust being parties to the application, the order was rightly made upon
the originating summons in the exercise of the general jurisdiction of the
court.-COUNSEL, Waggett; Daniel Jones. SOLICITORS, Courtenay, Croome,
Son, & Finch; Nichol, Son, & Jones.

SOLICITORS STRUCK OFF THE ROLLS.

19th April-GEORGE SPACKMAN.

20th April-AUGUSTUS HENRY MAULE. 20th April-CHARLES RICHARD Copeman, 20th April-G. B. H. DREW.

20th April-CHARLES ARTHUR SLADER.

MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL CHANCERY

ACTIONS.

MR. JUSTICE KEKEWICH, on taking his seat in court on Tuesday, addressed Mr. Barber, Q.C., the leader of the court, with reference to the recent ord. 35, r. 6a, made under the powers of the new clause of rule 9 of order 5 (ante, pp. 140, 389),

many ways. Since the last report in October, 1886, fifty-nine new members have been admitted. The aggregate number of solicitors in England and Wales now enrolled as members of the association is 3,003, of whom 1,068 are life, and 1,940 annual subscribers. Fifty-one life members are also contributors of annual subscriptions ranging from one to ten guineas each. During the four months the general receipts of the association, from all sources, amounted to £1,003 15s. 4d., in which sum is included a liberal donation of £105 from Mr. John North, solicitor, Leeds. The purchase of a sum of £111 19s. 3d. New Two-and-half per Cent. Stock having been completed as the investment of the late Mr. John Mason's legacy of £100, the invested capital of the association now consists of £46,091 19s. stock, in addition to the sum of £5,048 10s. 5d. Met. Three-and-half per Cent. Stock pertaining to the Reardon Bequest. During the same period many distressing cases were considered by the directors, and a sum of £825 was distributed in grants. Of this amount £270 was given in the relief of six cases of member's families, and £555 in twenty-seven cases of non-members and the families of non-members. The audited statement of accounts shews that at the close of the year ending December 31st, 1886, a balance of £115 7s. 3d. remained to the credit of the association at the Union Bank of London, together with a further balance of £207 10s. 5d. belonging to the Reardon Trust Account; the sum of £15 remained in the hands of the secretary. While renewing their appeal for the individual help of members in obtaining new subscribers to the association, the board desire to record their thanks

the cause.

to those local committees and other gentlemen who have lately taken up added to the list through the kind efforts of two members of the associaIn Newcastle-upon-Tyne many members have recently been tion. The result of the work undertaken by the Cardiff district local committee also continues to be encouraging. The following is an extract from the second annual report forwarded by Mr. G. F. Hill, the hon. sec., have, since their last report, canvassed the town of Newport (Mon.) for and signed by Mr. R. W. Griffith, the chairman:-'Your committee subscriptions to this association, and are glad to say that they have already secured fourteen new members; but they intend to further prosecute the work in that town, as there are many solicitors there who, your this society. They scarcely met with a single refusal; and when they committee feel persuaded, have but to be asked in order readily to join have completed their efforts in that town they intend turning their attention to Swansea, Pontypridd, Bridgend, and other places. Your committee are more than ever satisfied that the sending of circulars to members of the profession is of very little use in inducing them to subscribe to the association.' Such valued efforts cannot fail to bring much benefit to the association, and an extension of such organizations is earnestly hoped for throughout the kingdom. With much pleasure the their invitation to preside at the twenty-seventh anniversary festival of board have to announce that E. J. Bristow, Esq., has kindly accepted the association, to be held on Thursday, June 9th next, at the Hôtel Métropole, London. The board venture to hope that members of the fitting celebration of Her Majesty's Jubilee Year, and that a hearty and association, and the profession generally, will regard this festival as a general response will be given to Mr. Bristow's advocacy of the claims of the association. Gentlemen willing to add their names to the list of

His lordship said, "I wish to make some remarks for the convenience of the bar and the public concerning the ord. 35, r. 6a, and which was recently completed by the Lord Chancellor. By the order in question it was provided that every cause or matter in the said (Chancery) Division thereafter commenced in the District Registry of Liverpool or the District Registry of Manchester should be marked with the name of such judge of the Chancery Division as the Lord Chancellor might by order from time to time direct. The Lord Chancellor has directed, by an order dated the 5th of April, 1887, (see ante, p. 392) that on and after the 18th of April, 1887, every cause and matter in those registries in the Chancery Division are to be marked with my name and to come before me, and I shall therefore have to see these matters through their various stages. I shall say nothing now about the machinery for trial of causes, because business here will not be interfered with, as when ten or more causes proceeding in those registries are ready to be tried, some judge will be sent down from London, say in June, to try them. What I specially wish to advert to is the interlocutory business, such as motions, petitions, and adjourned summonses. As the order only actually came into effect yesterday, the 18th, it will be some time before any matters come before me, and in any case some further rules may be required before there is any accumulation of work, but what I wish ascertained now is what day should be assigned for hearing these interlocutory applications. Saturday has been suggested, and I would like your advice as to what would suit your convenience and that of other leaders, and also, of course, that of officers of the court. I must also give some time to cham-stewards will please send them to the secretary as early as possible." ber business; that can be done by my rising two hours earlier on the day before the day which may be set apart for the interlocutory business. Assuming Saturday be fixed for such matters, I wish your assistance in deciding whether we are to put in any ordinary actions for trial with witnesses, or are to confine ourselves entirely to the interlocutory work? Many other questions may arise. and I do not ask you to express any opinion at present on what I have stated, but I should be glad if you would consult Mr. Warmington and other leaders practising in this court, your juniors, and your clients, who know better than even counsel how the convenience and interest of suitors will be best served by any arrangements we may decide to adopt. I am desirous of having this advice in order that the usefulness of this court, which has now existed for some ten years, and has done much to relieve the Chancery Division from the scandal of a block of business, may be unimpaired, and so that this new business may be despatched with the least possible interference with the ordinary business." Mr. Barber said he desired to thank his lordship for the early intimation he had given concerning the business, and, on behalf of himself and colleagues, could say they would do all in their power to aid in deciding on the most beneficial arrangement to be made.

LAW SOCIETIES.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION.

The fifty-eighth half-yearly general meeting of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, the 20th inst., Mr. W. EDWOOD SHIRLEY (Doncaster) in the chair.

The SECRETARY read the minutes of the previous meeting. The following report, as circulated among the members present, was taken as read :- "The Board of Directors, in conformity with the sixteenth rule of the association, have pleasure in presenting their fiftyeighth report. The statement of accounts appended hereto shews the working of the association for four months ending December 31st. The directors, in future, will present a balance-sheet annually, instead of half-yearly as formerly, and the financial year will close on December 31st. This arrangement has been come to after the careful considerataion of your directors, and will, they believe, prove advantageous in

of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association was stated in a single sentence, The CHAIRMAN, in moving the adoption of the report, said that the object and Wales, and their wives, widows, and families." Never was the asso"for the relief of poor and necessitous solicitors and proctors in England ciation more needed. It was a common notion that lawyers were prosperous when other people were suffering. Nothing could be further from the truth. Lawyers prospered when other people prospered, and were depressed when other people were depressed. Never, probably, within the experience of business men, had there been greater depression in every branch of trade. During the past half-year the board considered many distressing cases of solicitors in "necessitous circumstances," of widows and children absolutely destitute. All had received the most careful and anxious consideration; the directors spared neither time nor trouble in investigations. He (the chairman) was glad to think how many homes had been brightened and hearts relieved by the grants they made. The board remembered with pleasure the pecuniary help received from time to time. Their funds were increased from two sources-gifts and bequests; and they need only look at the donation lists to realize how liberal hands had devised liberal things. Only recently Mr. John North, of Leeds, sent a cheque for a hundred guineas; and they could never forget the princely donation of £1,000 from Mr. John Hollams when he presided at the annual festival of 1885, in addition to a sum of £200 contributed by him between 1882 and 1884. Respecting bequests also, they would remember a legacy of £100 from Mr. Mason, of a similar sum from Mr. Craddock, and of £2,000 from Mr. Appleton. It was singular however, that their largest bequests had come from three maiden ladies :- £3,000 from Miss Brackenbury in 1873, £500 from Miss Hurst in 1879, and £5,000 from Miss Reardon in 1882. But, unhappily, there was another side to the picture. As Mr. Gregory pointed out, at their last annual festival, there were 14,000 solicitors upon the roll, and but 3,000 subscribing members. No less than 11,000 solicitors withheld their support from their own association. That ought not so to be. He (the chairman) had mentioned Mr. Gregory; and he would like to commend his well-timed and judicious observations to his professional brethren. There were two special subjects he had been asked to mention. One was the intended alteration of an annual instead of a half-yearly balance-sheet. The board considered it a muchneeded reform; and the financial year would, in future, close on the 31st of December. The other subject he had to mention was the urgency of an effort all over the kingdom to raise funds in celebration of her

Majesty's Jubilee, to found "Victoria Annuities." He said all over the kingdom, because there was scarcely a county in England or Wales which had not experienced the benefits of the association. He trusted they might be successful. Let them reflect upon the benefits they had received since her Majesty's accession. When the girl queen came to the throne railway enterprize was in its infancy; steam navigation in its infancy; gas in its infancy. There were no telegraphs, no photographs, no electric lights, no omnibuses, no hansoms, no penny steamboats on the Thames, no fine hotels, and not a postage-stamp in the whole world. A provincial town was then a little world in itself, and knew less of its neighbours than London at the present time knew of Paris; while a farthing rushlight illuminated the houses of the poor. Surely, if ever a nation had cause for gratitude it was the one to which they belonged; and he (the chairman) was sure the lawyers would not lag behind in manifestations of loyalty. He moved "That the report and statement of accounts for the four months ending December 31, 1886, now presented, be received and adopted, and that the same be printed and circulated in the usual way with the proceedings of this meeting."

Mr. EDWIN HEDGER having seconded the motion, the report was unanimously adopted.

Mr. R. WALL WALL proposed a vote of thanks to the directors and auditors for their services during the past half-year; this was seconded by Mr. SAMUEL DAY, and carried unanimously.

A vote of thanks to Mr. W. EDWOOD SHIRLEY for so ably presiding at the meeting brought the proceedings to a close.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION.

EASTER EXAMINATION, 1887.

GENERAL EXAMINATION OF STUDENTS OF THE INNS OF COURT, held at Lincoln's Inn Hall, March 29, 30, and 31 and April 1, 1887.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded to the following students
certificates that they have satisfactorily passed a public examination :—
Arthur William Bainton, Arthur Lionel Baxter, Edward Boyle, Edward
Fitzherbert Gwavas Carlyon, Lord Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne
Cecil, Edward Maynard Des Champs Chamier, Hugh Robert Eardley
Childers, Benjamin Arthur Cohen, Hayward Ratcliffe Darlington, Cecil
Outram Gillbanks, Henry Colquhoun Hayter, Charles Lushington Hickley,
Louis Johannes Jacobsz, Russell James Kerr, Sidney Ernald Ralph Lane,
Thomas Charles Bruce Mackintosh-Walker, George Mary on Maryon-
Wilson, Robert Metcalf Minton-Senhouse, David Owen, Douglas William
Owen, Marshall Harcourt Paine, William Tyrone Power, Khushwakt Rai,
Henry St. John Digby Raikes, Henry Goodwin Rooth, Henry Sandbach,
Helperius Benedictus Sauer, Henry Schultes Schultes-Young, Joseph
Egerton Shyngle, Ralph Iliff Simey, Lowji Merwanji Wadia, Thomas
Waghorn, Charles Edward Stevenson Webb Ware, Frederick Edward
Weatherley, John Arthur Williams, and Andrew Brocket Wilson, of the
Inner Temple; Southwell George Theobald Bourke, Thomas Douglas,
William Arthur Emsley, Arthur George Ford, Herbert Granville Grant,
Charles Ormond Hazell, Richard John Hodgson, Rufus Daniel Isaacs,
John Henry Keeling, Reginald Kemp, Thomas Charles Ledlie, Guy Lush-
ington, John James McLean, Michael Stewart Johnstone Macmorran,
David Villiers Meager, Harington Morgan, Nai Pleng, James John
Parfitt, George Bettesworth Piggott, John Edwin Piper, John Cathcart
Wason, James Wilson-Holden, and Henry Woodley Boscawen Wright,
of the Middle Temple; Dwarka Nath Banerji, Francis Edward Prescott
Decie, Bartle Henry Temple Frere, Alexander Graham, Richard Cotton
Walker Hill, John Ewer Jefferson Hogg, Richard Horatio Couch Kent,
Walter Barry Lindley, Henry John Newbolt, John Henry Rimmer, Arthur
Augustus Saltren-Willett, Richard Watson, and Edward Herbert Widnell,
of Lincoln's-inn; and John Joseph Hayden, of Gray's-inn, Esqs.
The following students passed a satisfactory examination in Roman

law:

Henry Campbell Alchorne Bingley, George Chivers Bower, Arthur Frederick Burton, Henry Larnoy Cancellor, Carteret Fitzgerald Collins, Kenneth Campbell Da Costa, Alfred Hamilton Douglas-Hamilton, Albert Frederick Ehrhardt, Thomas Gawthorne, Frank Gover, Robert Fletcher Grant, Alfred Hughes, Bertram Keightley, Henry Gervaise Le Gros, Patrick Peter Joseph Lynch, James Harry Stuart McArthur, George Espec John Manners, Thomas Maude, Sarfrazali Adulali Meer, Samuel Moses, Arthur Carson Roberts, Paul Frederick Simonson, Frederick Follett Younghusband Thorpe, Lakhamganda Vantmuri, Edgar George Vickers, George Williamson Wallace, Henry O'Kelly Webber, and Walter Addington Willis, of the Inner Temple; James Bell, Lakshman Gangadhar Bhadbade, John Bruce, William Carr, John Nicholas Chaster, Robert Augustus Davis, Madan Gopal, Robert John Pottinger Hendricks, George Waford Hudson, Arthur Mason Tippetts Jackson, John Penny Lewis, George Henry Mallinson, Naraina Lakshmi, Latifur Rahman, Rang Lal, Seva Ram, William Crichton Slagg, Mansel Teixeira, and Alfred Isaac Tillyard, of the Middle Temple; Alfred Adams, Arthur Richmond Atkinson, Nandlol Banerji, Alexander Millington Begg, Hewitt Bostock, William Towers Brown, Henry Wilson Fox, Gerald Clayton-East Pelham Gordon, Ronald John McNeill, Frederick Scott Oliver, Richard Evans Prall, Alfred Roscoe, and James Weir, of Lincoln's-inn; and James Knott, of Gray's-inn, Esqs.

son.-The subject for debate was a hypothetical case in the following terms:- -"A. sold to B. 2,000 tons of pig iron, the same to be delivered by equal monthly instalments of 500 tons. B. refuses to receive the second 500 tons, and A. gives notice that he no longer intends to be bound by the contract. Is A. thereby freed from his liability to supply the remainder?” Mr. Nathan opened in the affirmative, and cited a number of cases in support of his contention, including the well-known case of Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor. Mr. Marshall opposed, and was followed by Messrs. Rogers, Steere, and Abrahams; while Messrs. Knight, Edmonds, Parsons, and others spoke in the affirmative. After Mr. Nathan had replied, the chairman put the motion to the House, and, the numbers being equal, gave his casting vote in favour of the affirmative view. The motion was therefore carried by one vote. The secretary for the Legal Correspondence Department states that there are still vacancies on the third section of that department. It should also be stated that the time for sending in essays for the Union Prize Competition has been extended to the 1st of October.

April 18-Chairman, Mr. Batchelor.-The subject on the paper for discussion was, "Does the insertion of the usual attornment clause in a mortgage make the document a bill of sale requiring registration under the Bills of Sale Act?" At the commencement of the debate Mr. Moyle moved the adjournment of the House, owing to there being only thirteen to after a short discussion. It is a matter of regret that more interest is members present. The motion was seconded by Mr. Goodall, and agreed not shewn in the legal debates, from which students may reap no small advantage; and it is to be hoped there will be a larger attendance henceforth.

LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY.-March 22-Chairman, Mr. W. Van Sommer.-The subject for discussion was, "In an action for damages founded on negligence, must the plaintiff prove, not only negligence of the defendant, but also the absence of contributory negligence on his part?" Mr. J. M. McCarthy opened the debate in the affirmative, and was supported by Messrs. W. H. Quarrell and J. J. Woolcombe. The negative was sup. ported by Messrs. G. F. Berney, R. McNab, W. G. Hawtin, W. M. Woodhouse, C. S. Magee, W. Mackenzie, and W. H. Ayson. After the opener had replied, the chairman put the question to the society, when it was negatived by a large majority.

held with the United Law Students' Debating Society. The subject for March 29-Chairman, Mr. Bateman Napier, LL.D.-A joint debate was debate was: "That it is the duty of the Government, whilst granting to Ireland all reasonable remedial measures, strenuously to oppose any movement tending towards Home Rule and the repeal of the union, and for this purpose to firmly administer the existing law." Mr. A. K. Common opened the debate in the affirmative, with whom also were Messrs. Stewart Smith, J. D. Crawford, Whitehouse, and J. C. Wheeler. Messrs. T. P. Rhys, H. W. Marcus, and C. Russell, jun., opposed the motion, which, when put to the two societies, was carried by a very large majority.

April 19-Chairman, Mr. E. Todd.-Mr. T. B. Napier, LL D., opened the debate: "That the new Procedure Rules of the House of Commons, as originally proposed by the Government, are an insufficient remedy for the evils attempted to be removed." Messrs. J. Lethriby, Cornelius Wheeler, C. A. Markham, and J. D. Crawford took part in the debate. The motion was carried.

BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.-March 29-Chairman, Mr. W. Showell Rogers, M.A., LL.D.-The case of Thomas v. Quartermaine (ante, p. 347) was the subject for discussion. Mr. J. N. Fuller, supporting the decision of the Court of Appeal, argued that the facts of the case did not shew that there was any defect in the plant," &c., within the meaning of the Act for which the employer could be made liable. Messrs. C. S. Rayner, J. B. Scurrah, and A. H. Adcock followed on the same side. For the negative, Mr. V. G. Milward maintained that the case was governed by the Act, and that consequently the case of Weblin v. Ballard was a binding authority, and should secure a verdict for the plaintiff. He was supported by Messrs. F. S. Pearson, W. J. Jeffery, A. C. Hayes, and the hon. secretary. The chairman summed up the arguments on either side, and, putting the question to the meeting, the negative secured a majority of one vote.

PRESTON AND LANCASTER LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETIES.-March 10-Chair

man, Mr. John Tomlinson, solicitor.-The case for argument was as follows:-"A testator who died in 1868 by his will, dated in the same year, gave a legacy in the following terms:-'I give £1,000 to my wife for life. When she dies my three sons, A., B., and C., and my daughter, D., are to have it in equal shares; but, if any of them shall die without issue, his or her interest shall go to the survivors or survivor equally.' The widow died in the present year. A. was dead at the date of the will without issue; C. is a bachelor; and D., who was married to her present husband at the date of the will, has issue. Are C. and D., with the concurrence of her husband, entitled to have the fund now paid over to them?" (Jarman on Wills, 4th ed., pp. 790-799, vol. 2). Messrs. J. J. Rawsthorn, J. Bell, and G. Cartwright represented the Preston Society, and argued on behalf of the affirmative, contending that, on the authority of the case of O'Mahoney v. Burdett, that the words "die without issue" meant death at any time, there being no express direction to distribute the fund on the death of the widow, and also that the accrued share of B. would pass. Messrs. J. E. Lambert, J. Tilly, jun., and H. D. Wilson, the representatives of the Lancaster Society, upheld the negative contention, arguing that the words used in the will were an express direction to distribute the fund, and quoted the cases of Edwards v. Edwards and Olivant v. Wright as authorities. Mr. Lambert having summed up, UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY,-March 21-Chairman, Mr. Rawlin- and Mr. Rawsthorn replied, the chairman gave his decision on the case,

LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETIES.

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