Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1870, by LITTLE, BROWN, & Co., in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts. CONTENTS OF No. III. Zabriskie's Land Laws, 556. Morse on Banking, 557. Bingham on Descent, 558. Redfield's Railway Cases, 559. Hetzel's Die Todesstrafe, 560. Abbotts' New York Digest, Supplement, 560. Gross's Illinois Statutes, 561. Benedict's Reports, Vol. II., Parts 2 & 3, 562. Abbotts' Practice Re- ports, N.S., Vol. VII., Part 1, 563. California Reports, Vols. XXXV. and XXXVI., 564. Edmunds's Select Cases, Vol. I., 565. Florida Reports, Vol. XII., 566. Illinois Reports, XLV. and XLVI., 567. Indiana Re- ports, Vol. XXX., 570. Hughes's, Sneeds's, and Hardin's Reports, 571. Maryland, Reports, Vol. XXIX., 574. Massachusetts Reports, Vol. XCIX., 575. Michigan Reports, Vol. XVIII., 576. Law Almanac, 577. Banker's Almanac, 577. Suicide and Intemperance in Life Insurance, 578. American Journal of Insanity, Vol. XXVI., No. 3, 578. Bench and Bar of North Carolina, 578. Trial of John A. Monroe, 579. Schoeppe's Trial, 580. Revue de Droit International, 581. Periodicals, 582. UNITED STATES. - Supreme Court, Legal Tender, Hepburn v. Griswold, 586. New Appointments, 613. New York-Bar Association, 613. United 584 WHETHER negligence on the part of a parent or guardian of an infant, in permitting the child to be exposed to an injury, will be a bar to an action brought by the infant for the injury against a third person who has caused it by his negligence, is a question which has recently attracted much attention in the courts of several of the States. That such negligence is a defence to the action, has been held by the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, and in many subsequent cases. The same doctrine has been held in Massachusetts in several cases; among others, in the cases of Wright v. Malden & Melrose R. R. Co., 4 All. 283, and Callahan v. Bean, 9 All. 401. In Wright v. Malden & Melrose R. R. Co., the matter is stated as follows: "In this Commonwealth and in New York, it has been held, that in the case of a young child, the negligence of a parent, or other person to whose care the child is intrusted, has the same effect in preventing the maintenance of an action for an injury occasioned by the negligence of another, that his own want of due care would have if the plaintiff were an adult." The application is made to the particular facts of the case as follows: "We think the fact that a child of two years old is passing unattended across a public street in a city, traversed by a horse-railroad, is in and of itself necessarily prima facie evidence of neglect in those who have it in charge. It is a fact open to explanation, and not conclusive." The first announcement of this doctrine, as a principle of law, was made in the case of Hartfield v. Roper. Other courts, which have subsequently taken the same view, have been content to rest upon that case as an authority; they have not sought by additional reasoning to fortify the general principle there announced. The facts in the case of Hartfield v. Roper were these: The plaintiff, a child about two years old, was alone in the travelled portion of a highway at some distance from any house; the defendant was driving a sleigh; the child was run over by the horses and injured; neither the defendant nor those with him saw the child before the injury. The action was an action upon the case. The verdict was for the plaintiff. The opinion of the court was delivered by Cowen, J., upon a motion for a new trial. A new trial was granted first, because the evidence, which is fully reported, failed to show negligence on the part of the defendant; and, secondly, because it did show clearly negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The reasoning of the court upon the second branch of the decision is in substance as follows: The custody of a child is confided by law to its parents, or to others standing in their place; it cannot be exposed as this child was without gross carelessness. An adult injured by a collision, cannot recover if he has contributed to the injury; the same rule is applicable to children; it can be enforced only by requiring care from those who have their custody. An infant is not sui juris. He belongs to his custodian; the custodian is his agent. The custodian's neglect is the infant's neglect. One who unfortunately drives against a lunatic lying helpless in the road is not liable. The neglect of the committee is the neglect of the lunatic. One incapable of discretion is not above the law. An infant or lunatic is personally liable for wrongs committed by him and a defendant has the right to insist that he shall not bring an injury upon himself. It is probably true that in no reported case has the neglect · of an infant been allowed as a defence, but this is balanced by the fact that such defence has not in any reported case been denied. Negligence may be predicated of an infant or lunatic. Trespass lies against an infant for negligence. Under some circumstances, detinue, replevin, and trover will lie against him. If he bring suit, and its maintenance depend upon a condition, he must show performance of the condition. If he be bound to maintain a partition fence, and by reason of his neglect so to do cattle trespass upon him, |