THE COURT OF APPEAL has reversed the strange decision of the Common Pleas Division in Davies v. Goodman (28 W. R. 150), that a bill of sale not duly executed and attested is void as against the grantor. The ground taken by the learned judges is apparently that we have always urged -viz., that, reading the 8th and 10th sections together, it is obvious that while there are express provisions making bills of sale void as against the classes of persons it is the main object of the Act to protect under certain circumstances, there are no express provisions for making bills of sale void as against the grantor, or void generally for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act; and a court cannot safely imply that a bill of sale is void except as expressly provided by the Act. DISCUSSIONS ON SOCIAL QUESTIONS Occasionally diversify the proceedings in a certain court. This is a very happy relief from less interesting matters; and, as regards the suitor, the benefit he derives from hearing a subject of great personal importance completely threshed out more than compensates for any loss of On Tuesday, upon a motion time which may occur. directed against a theatre which, being built of wood, was liable to conflagation, the subject of smoking was quite naturally brought to the attention of the court. Mr. A., Q.C., who moved on behalf of the plaintiffs, stated that the danger of fire was increased by reason of people smoking in the theatre. Thereupon, after a few preliminary remarks, the following conversation ensued: The LEARNED JUDGE (addressing Mr. A., Q.C.).—Do you smoke, Mr. A. ? [Mr. A., Q.C., pretends not to hear.] The LEARNED JUDGE.-Do you smoke, Mr. A. ? Mr. A., Q.C. [pretending to wake up]-Oh! yes, certainly, I do, and I fear I smoke rather too much. The LEARNED JUDGE.-I am forbidden to smoke. Mr. A., Q.C. [professing not to have heard the remark, and addressing the bench].-You smoke, don't you? The LEARNED JUDGE.-I am forbidden to smoke. Mr. A., Q.C.-Do you find yourself any the better without it? The LEARNED JUDGE.-I don't know that I find any difference. Mr. A., Q.C.-I should think not. Mr. B., Q.C.-I believe smoking is beneficial when not excessive. We are assured that this instructive conversation was listened to by a crowded court with great seriousness. THE JUDGMENT of the House of Lords affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of The Queen v. The Bishop of Oxford was, we believe, in conformity with the general expectation of the profession, and we must confess, quite apart from the merits of the particular case, to a feeling of satisfaction whenever in the construction of an Act of Parliament words receive their natural meaning. No one but a lawyer would suppose that the words "it shall be lawful" imported a duty, and we are glad it is now determined that "it shall be "it shall be lawful." It must be a most lawful" means sad and repugnant duty to any right-minded judge to have to say that "may means "shall," or to decide in any case that the legal meaning of words is other than the plain English of them. It is also satisfactory to find that the House of Lords decided mainly on the words of the Act, and not on a wearisome review of all manner of antiquated and barely intelligible precedents and authorities. We do not despise erudition, and we admit that in order to arrive at a right conclusion it is frequently necessary to grope amid the musty relics of the past; but both the process and the result, from a lawyer's point of view, are apt to be very unsatisfactory. The studies of the antiquarian have great value and interest, but it is not qua lawyers that we respect them. A really sensible inquirer, diving into the recesses of the past for legal purposes, constantly experiences a feeling of profound dissatisfaction. The clue to the precise meaning of the ideas and expressions he meets with is too often lost from the total alteration of habits and institutions, and it generally happens that the authorities that can be found are capable of being twisted either way by the ingenuity of the contending parties. The arguments in the Bishop of Oxford's case illustrated very well what we mean. For nearly every dictum that one side could rake up out of an old Maxwell, James, Harp lane, Railway Agent. Mar 31 at 11 at offices of Philp, Walbrook Middleton, Thomas, Lancaster, Stonemason. Mar 31 at 2 at offices of Miers, George Henry, Clapham pk rd, Cabinet Maker. Mar 31 at 11 at Mordecai, Richard, Bridgend, Glamorgan, Farmer. Mar 27 at 11 at offices of Rees, Cowbridge Morris, Benjamin, Llandewy Velfrey, Pembroke, Farmer. Mar 27 at 2 at offices of Lascelles, Narbeth Mortimer, Joshua, Brookroyd, York, Grocer. Apr 1 at 3 at offices of Ridgway and Ridgway, Wellington st, Batley Nutland, William, Sharcott, Wilts, Farmer. Mar 30 at 11 at offices of Marsnall, St John st, Devizes Palmer, Richard, Puriton, Somerset, Baker. Apr 2 at 12 a: offices of Reed and Cook. Bridgwater Parkin, Richard, New inn yard, Cabinet Maker. Mar 30 at 11 at offices of Jones, St Benet chambers, Fenchurch st Picking, Joseph Charles, Draper st, Newington Butts, Baby Linen Dealer. Mar 31 at 3 at offices of Cross and Co, Lancaster pl, Strand Pinniger, George, Bristol, Builder. Mar 22 at 11 at offices of Nurse, Corn st, Bristol Platford, George Frederick, Pendlebury, Lancaster, Draper. Mar 31 at 11 at offices of Nadin and Wild, King st, Manchester Prescott, Charles, Lower Norwood, Grocer. Apr 7 at 3 at offices of Rumney, Walbrook Rhodes, William, Heckmondwike, York, Basket Maker. Mar 30 at 11 at offices of Sykes, Ings grove, Heckmondwick Richards, Samuel, Bulwell, Nottingham, Grocer. Mar 31 at 12 at offices of Brittle, St Petter's chambers, St. Peter's gate, Nottingham Richardson, George, Felstead, Essex, Farmer. Apr 3 at 12 at White Hart Inn, Gt Saling. Smoothey, Braintree Roberts, John, Pond Croft, Harlesden, Schoolmaster. Mar 24 at 2 at offices of Philp, Walbrook Robinson, William, Barrow-in-Furness, Shoemaker. Mar 31 at 11 at Imperial Hotel, Cornwallis st, Barrow-in-Furness. Nalder and Jones, Barrow-in-Furness Romsey, Ellen, West Wallsend, Northumberland, Boot and Shoe Dealer. Mar 27 at 11 at offices of Smith, Camden st, North Shields Rust, Thomas, jun, Tredworth, Gloucester, Auctioneer. Mar 31 at 11 at offices of Henderson, Berkeley st, Gloucester Sanderson, William, Batley, York, Flock Manufacturer. Apr 1 at 2.30 at Batley Station Hotel, Batley. Scholefield and Taylor Sandilands, John, and John Mitton, Liverpool, Tailors. Mar 31 at 12 at offices of Fildes, North John st, Liverpool Schofield, Charles Richard, Bredbury, Chester, Schoolmaster. Apr 7 at 3 at offices of Smith, Warren st, Stockport Scott, Isaac, Hanley, Stafford, Journeyman Printer. Mar 31 at 11.30 at offices of Tennant, Cheapside, Hanley Smallwood, Thomas, Macclesfield, Chester, Dyer. Mar 29 at 11 at offices of Cooper, Townhall chambers, Congleton Smith, Jabez, Ashby-de-la-Zouch, Butcher. Mar 30 at 12 at Queen's Head Hotel, Ashby-de-la-Zouch. Fisher and Co, Ashor-de-la-Zouch Spencer, William, Birmingham, Retail Brewer. Apl 3 at 10.30 at offices of East, Temple st, Birmingham Steven, James Peter, Sunderland, Grocer. Apr 2 at 12 at offices of Wright, John st, Sunderland Stevenson, Henry, Hanley, Stafford, Ale and Porter Dealer. Mar 31 at 11.30 at offices of Tennant and Co, Cheapside, Hanley Stone, James, High st, Brentford, Boot and Shoe Dealer. Mər 27 at 11 at offices of Staniland, Hare chambers, Hare pl, Fleet st. Siniland, Highgate Sutcliffe, Ann, Habergham Eaves, Lancaster, Farmer. Mar 27 at 12 at Swift, Thomas Dicken, Harefield, near Uxbridge, Saddler. Mar 23 at 3 at the George Hotel, High st, Bedford. Staniland, North rd, Highgate Sykes, Henry, Ellesmere rd, Old Ford, out of business. Mar 24 at 12 at offices of Mortimore, Coleman st Tarry, Francis, Derby, Boot Maker. Mar 31 at 3 at the Bell Hotel, Sadler gate, Derby. Powell, Derby Tattersall, Richard Augustus, Birmingham, Provision Merchant. Mar 31 at 12 at offices of Hawkes and Weekes, Temple st, Birmingham Tetley, John, Bradford, York, Commission Agent. Mar 27 at 10 at the Odd Fellows Hall, Thornton rd, Bradford Thomas, Edmund, Bristol, Refreshment House Keeper. Mar 30 at 11 at offices of Tribe and Co, Albion chambers, Small st. Brittans and Co, Bristol Thomas, Morgan Jenkin, Porth, Glamorgan, Weigher. Mar 25 at 12 at offices of Rosser, High st, Pontypridd Thurmand, James, Mark Thurmand, Edwin Thurmand, and William Thurmand, Batley Carr, York, Woollen Manufacturers. Mar 31 at 3 at Station Hotel, Batley. Ibberson, Dewsbury Trowsdale, Ephraim, Marske-by-the-Sea, York, Blacksmith. at 10.30 at Zetland Hotel, Marske-by-the-Sea, borough Mar 24 Ward, Middles Turner, Henry, William, Burslem, Stafford, Clothier. Mar 31 at 11 at Spread Eagle Hotel, Corporation st, Manchester. Johnson and Crook, Huddersfield Ulyett, John, Liverpool, Brewer. Mar 30 at 3 at offi.es of Parkinson, Commerce st, Lord st, Liverpool Upton, George, Worcester, Grocer. Mar 27 at 2 at offices of Miller, Broad st, Worcester Mar 30 at 12 Vearncombe, John, Bridgewater, Boot and Shoe Maker. Apr 1 at 2 at Walker, Charies, Darlington, Durham, out of business. Mar 25 at 10 Walklate, Joseph, Penkhull, Stoke-upon-Trent, Provision Dealer. Mar 25 at 3 at the North Staffordshire Railway Hotel, Stoke-upon-Trent. Ashwell, Stoke-upon-Trent Watts, Joseph, Strangeways, Manchester, Joiner. Mar 31 at 3 at the Manchester Guardian Society, Moseley st, Manchester. Sale and Co, Manchester Webb, James, Grove rd, Mile End, Bootmaker. Mar 25 at 2 at St White, John James, Walton, near Liverpool, Estate Agent. Apr 2 at Williams, Henry, Cwmilethrhyd Uchaf, Carmarthen, Farm Labourer. Wilson, Richard, Kingston-upon-Hull, Tobacco Manufacturer. Mar 25 at 1 at offices of Champney, Parliament st, Kingston-upon-Hull Winch, William Henry, Reading, Watchmaker. Mar 31 at 11 at offices of Dodd, Friar st, Read ng Withers, Henry, Westbury-on-3evern, Gloucester, Farmer. Mar 27 at 3 at offices of Haines, Westgate chambers, Berkeley st, Gloucester Yorke, George, Rock, Ferry, Ches.er, Painter. Apr 7 at 3 at offices of Carruthers, Lord st, Liverpool Young, George Augustus, Avondale sq, Old Kent rd, out of business. Mar 31 at 2 at offices of Layton and Co, Budge row SCHWEITZER'S COCOATINA, Anti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powder. Guaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of the Finest Quality, with the excess of fat extracted. The Faculty pronounce it "the most nutritious, perfectly digestible beverage for Breakfast, Luncheon, or Supper, and invaluable for Invalids and Children." Highly commended by the entire Medical Press. Being without sugar, spice, or other admixture, it suits all palates, keeps better in all climates, and is four times the strength of cocoas THICKENED yet WEAKENED with starch, &c., and IN REALITY CHEAPER than such Mixtures. Made instantaneously with boiling water, a teaspoonful to a Breakfast Cup, costing less than a halfpenny. COCOATINA A LA VANILLE is the most delicate, digestible, cheapest Vanilla Chocolate, and may be taken when richer chocolate is prohibited. In tin packets at 1s. 6d., 3s., 5s. 6d., &c., by Chemists and Grocery. Charities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprietors, H. SCHWEITZER & CO., 10, Adam-street, London, W.C. PAINLESS DENTISTRY. THE COURT OF APPEAL has reversed the strange decision of the Common Pleas Division in Davies v. Goodman (28 W. R. 150), that a bill of sale not duly executed and attested is void as against the grantor. The ground taken by the learned judges is apparently that we have always urged ―viz., that, reading the 8th and 10th sections together, it is obvious that while there are express provisions making bills of sale void as against the classes of persons it is the main object of the Act to protect under certain circumstances, there are no express provisions for making bills of sale void as against the grantor, or void generally for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act; and a court cannot safely imply that a bill of sale is void except as expressly provided by the Act. DISCUSSIONS ON SOCIAL QUESTIONS Occasionally diversify the proceedings in a certain court. This is a very happy relief from less interesting matters; and, as regards the suitor, the benefit he derives from hearing a subject of great personal importance completely threshed out more than compensates for any loss of time which may occur. On Tuesday, upon a motion directed against a theatre which, being built of wood, was liable to conflagation, the subject of smoking was quite naturally brought to the attention of the court. Mr. A., Q.C., who moved on behalf of the plaintiffs, stated that the danger of fire was increased by reason of people smoking in the theatre. Thereupon, after a few preliminary remarks, the following conversation ensued: The LEARNED JUDGE (addressing Mr. A., Q.C.).-Do you smoke, Mr. A. ? [Mr. A., Q.C., pretends not to hear.] The LEARNED JUDGE.-Do you smoke, Mr. A. ? Mr. A., Q.C. [pretending to wake up].-Oh! yes, certainly, I do, and I fear I smoke rather too much. The LEARNED JUDGE.-I am forbidden to smoke. Mr. A., Q.C. [professing not to have heard the remark, and addressing the bench].-You smoke, don't you? The LEARNED JUDGE.-I am forbidden to smoke. Mr. A., Q.C.-Do you find yourself any the better without it? The LEARNED JUDGE.-I don't know that I find any difference. Mr. A., Q.C.-I should think not. Mr. B., Q.C.-I believe smoking is beneficial when not excessive. We are assured that this instructive conversation was listened to by a crowded court with great seriousness. 66 THE JUDGMENT of the House of Lords affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of The Queen v. The Bishop of Oxford was, we believe, in conformity with the general expectation of the profession, and we must confess, quite apart from the merits of the particular case, to a feeling of satisfaction whenever in the construction of an Act of Parliament words receive their natural meaning. No one but a lawyer would suppose that the words "it shall be lawful" imported a duty, and we are glad it is now determined that "it shall be lawful" means "it shall be lawful." It must be a most sad and repugnant duty to any right-minded judge to have to say that may means shall," or to decide in any case that the legal meaning of words is other than the plain English of them. It is also satisfactory to find that the House of Lords decided mainly on the words of the Act, and not on a wearisome review of all manner of antiquated and barely intelligible precedents and authorities. We do not despise erudition, and we admit that in order to arrive at a right conclusion it is frequently necessary to grope amid the musty relics of the past; but both the process and the result, from a lawyer's point of view, are apt to be very unsatisfactory. The studies of the antiquarian have great value and interest, but it is not qua lawyers that we respect them. A really sensible inquirer, diving into the recesses of the past for legal purposes, constantly experiences a feeling of profound dissatisfaction. The clue to the precise meaning of the ideas and expressions he meets with is too often lost from the total alteration of habits and institutions, and it generally happens that the authorities that can be found are capable of being twisted either way by the ingenuity of the contending parties. The arguments in the Bishop of Oxford's case illustrated very well what we mean. For nearly every dictum that one side could rake up out of an old ecclesiastical author or report, the other side could find another in the opposite direction. In the particular case we find great difficulty in believing that all the wealth of antiquarian research that was lavished on the argument was not entirely thrown away. Can any sane person believe that the framers of a comparatively recent statute like the Church Discipline Act, in using the words "it shall be lawful," had, in their minds, any reference to the previous practice of the ecclesiastical courts, as it might be gathered from this contradictory learning? It is really too absurd. If it took a week's argument at the present time to investigate the question what the practice was, and then the answer remained very doubtful, how can it be supposed that such a comparatively short time ago the framers of the statute acted upon the assumption of a well-established practice in the use of the words "it shall be lawful." With reference to the general construction of the words "it shall be lawful," we must say, with great submission, that some of their lordships seem to have used arguments more ingenious than sound. The reason why they were reduced to this sort of argument seems to us to arise from the unfortunate use of the words "it shall be lawful" in one or two previous cases. Their lordships strove very hard to show that the words "it shall be lawful" are not ambiguous, and always import a power and not a duty. As we said before, this view has our warmest sympathy, because it is an endeavour to give words their natural meaning. But they proceed to say-being driven to do so by the decisions-that the nature of the case and the context of the Act are sometimes such as to make it a duty to exercise the power. The duty is not, they say, to be educed from the words "it shall be lawful." They only give the power. The duty is to be educed aliunde, from the scope and context of the Act. This seems to us to come very near to trifling with words. If, when an Act has said "it shall be lawful," it has, nevertheless, been held sometimes to mean "you must," it seems to us impossible to say that the words thenceforth are not legally ambiguous. If you may look to the context in one case, the result is you must always look to it. We cannot but think that the law lords failed entirely in this commendable endeavour to make out that the words "it shall be lawful" are never ambiguous and always import merely a power. We agree that they never ought to have been ambiguous and ought always to import merely a power; but the inappropriate use of the words by our Legislature in one or two instances seems to us to have in substance brought about the consequence that the words are legally ambiguous, and do sometimes occur when a duty is imposed. In one of the cases that is always cited in relation to this kind of question, an Act providing for costs, and pointing out distinctly in what circumstances a party was or was not to have his costs, used the words "it shall be lawful" with relation to the functions of the judge in the matter. It was held that they could not mean that the judge might or might not, when the indicated circumstances existed, exercise his jurisdiction. It seems to us really impossible that any court could have held otherwise; but the unfortunate result of this class of cases is that thenceforward the meaning of the words is necessarily rendered ambiguous. If you once hold that a word may mean something in a particular case, it is involved that it may possibly have a similar meaning in any other case. It must always be open to discussion that it has that meaning in the particular case. Their lordships assume in their judgments a somewhat lofty air, as having detected an underlying fallacy in the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division which vitiated their view of the case ab initio; but we doubt after all whether, except in words, there is any difference between the point of view of the Queen's Bench Division and that from which the learned law lords themselves approach the case. A RECENT PROSECUTION for perjury raised an interesting question of evidence which has apparently never yet been formally decided. A person was summoned before a police magistrate on a charge of perjury, alleged to have been committed as a witness in a reference before Mr. Kaye, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court. The master, being summoned as a witness for the prosecution, at first declined to give evidence, alleging that, as a judicial officer, he was privileged from so doing. Mr. Montagu Williams, the counsel for the prosecution, stated that he had once examined Mr. Justice Fry under precisely similar circumstances; and after some discussion the master withdrew his objection, and consented to be sworn. It appears that the limits of a judge's liability to be called as a witness have never been expressly laid down. Mr. Justice Stephen in his "Digest of the Law of Evidence" (Art. 111), remarks that "It is doubtful whether a judge is compellable to testify as to anything which came to his knowledge in court as such judge." The question has been more than once incidentally discussed. In Reg. v. Gazard (8 C. & P. 595), the Prisoner was indicted for perjury at quarter sessions, and the chairman of that court was at the assizes called as a witness before the grand jury, who solicited the opinion of Patteson, J., as to whether they ought to examine him. The learned judge replied, "It is a new point, but I should advise the grand jury not to examine him; he is the president of a court of record, and it would be dangerous to allow such an examination, as the judges of England might be called upon to state what occurred before them in court." On the other hand, in R. v. Harvey (8 Cox. C. C. 99), where the perjury was alleged to have been committed before a county court, Byles, J., stated that the county court judge ought to have been called as a witness, although he added that there was a distinction between the judges of the superior courts and of the inferior courts, and that he himself, if subpoenaed to produce his notes, would have refused to appear. It be added that the Indian Evidence Act has estab. lished a distinction between questions as to the conduct of a judge in court, or as to matters coming to his knowledge in that capacity, and collateral matters; it being provided that "no judge or magistrate shall, except upon the special order of some court to which he is subordinate, be compelled to answer any questions as his own conduct in court as such judge or magistrate, or as to anything which came to his knowledge in court as such judge or magistrate, but he may be examined as to other matters which occurred in his presence while he was so acting." may THE FOLLOWING is a list of the new Queen's Counsel, with their respective years of call to the bar :-Three members of the Equity bar, viz., Mr. Edgar Rodwell, 1846; Mr. F. C. J. Millar, 1856, and Mr. J. T. Crossley, 1863. Four members of the Northern Circuit, viz., Mr. J. J. Aston, 1846; Mr. F. W. Gibbs, 1848; Mr. W. Potter, 1861, and Mr. J. Addison (recorder of Preston), 1862. Two members of the South-Eastern Circuit, viz., Mr. Lumley Smith, 1860, and Mr. Edward Clarke, 1864. Two members of the North-Eastern Circuit, viz., Mr. W. Shaw, 1844, and Mr. W. C. Beasley, 1853. Three members of the Oxford Circuit, viz., Mr. G. Browne (recorder of Ludlow), 1849; Mr. J. Underhill, 1862, and Mr. A. R. Jelf, 1863. Two members of the Western Circuit, viz., Mr. F. Bailey, 1845, and Mr. W. C. Petheram, 1869. One member of the North Wales Circuit, Mr. G. Swetenham, 1848. One member of the South Wales Circuit, Mr. H. G. Allen, 1841; and Sir W. T. Charley, M.P. (Common Serjeant) 1865. There will be no judge in attendance at judges' chambers until Wednesday, March 31, when the usual sittings will be resumed. THE LAW OF VOTING. THE Ballot Act has now been in force for more than seven years. Only one general election, however, has been held under it, and since that election the number of potential voters has been considerably increased by the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act of 1878. We propose to go briefly through the leading enactments and cases which bear on the law of voting, and we cannot do better than preface our remarks by transcribing the two following sections of the Ballot Act: 7. At any election for a county or borough, a person shall not be entitled to vote unless his name is on the register of voters for the time being in force for such county or borongb, and every person whose name is on such register shall be entitled to demand and receive a ballotpaper and to vote: provided that nothing in this section shall entitle any person to vote who is prohibited from voting by any statute, or by the common law of Parliament, or relieve such person from any penalties to which he may be liable for voting. 13. No election shall be declared invalid by reason of a non-compliance with the rules contained in the first schedule to this Act [relating to the use of the ballot], or any mistake in the use of the forms in the second schedule to this Act, if it appears to the tribunal having cognizance of the question that the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the body of this Act [relating to secrecy], and that such non-compliance or mistake did not affect the result of the election. The first of these sections, dealing with the right to vote, has been almost exhaustively explained in Stowe v. Jolliffe (22 W. R. 911); the second, dealing amongst other things, with the mode of voting, has been elaborately commented on in Woodward v. Sarsons (L. R. 10 C. P. 733). Both these cases will well repay perusal, and we believe we are right in stating that both have been accepted as correct by the profession. Woodward v. Sarsons, it may perhaps be remembered, is in direct conflict upon certain minor points with the Scotch Wigtown case (2 O'M. & H. 215), so that where those points come to be in issue, a vote may be good in England, but bad in Scotland-an anomaly which a select committee of the House of Commons in 1876 recommended the "passing of a short Act" to remedy. (Earl Beauchamp v. Madresfield, 21 W. R. 124), women (Chorlton v. Lings, L. R. 4 C. P. 374), aliens, unless certificated (Middlesex case, 2 Peck. 118, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 102, ss. 2, 7), infants (7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 8), and felons (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 2) labour under the "inherent incapacity." In a similar predicament are police-constables (19 & 20 Vict. c. 69, s. 9; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 93), persons employed as canvassers, agents, clerks, or messengers for reward by or on behalf of any candidate" (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 11; Ballot Act, 1872, s. 25), and metropolitan police-magistrates (10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 18), but not revenue officers, this body of persons, disfranchised by 22 Geo. 3, c. 41, and other Acts, having recently been re-enfranchised by 31 & 32 Viet. c. 73, and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 22. 66 Secure in his right to give an indisputable vote, we will assume the voter to have reached the polling place, and finding himself alone in the compartment, with the statutory pencil there provided, to be desirous of voting. This, it is well known, is done by means of a cross. But there are crosses and crosses, and in Woodward v. Sarsons not only were voters discovered of great ingenuity of draftsmanship, but a returning officer was found bold enough to admit most possible marks, not even rejecting ballot-papers bearing the voter's signature." The effect of the carefully-written judgment of the court is this:-The ballot-paper must not be marked so as to show that the voter intended to vote for more candidates than he is entitled to vote for; or so as to leave it uncertain whether he intended to vote at all, or for which candidate he intended to vote; or so as to make it possible, by seeing the paper itself, or by reference to other available facts, to identify the way in which he has voted. If these requirements are not substantially fulfilled, the ballot-paper is void, and should not be counted; and, if counted, it will be struck off on a scrutiny. The court, on this principle, allowed a double and even a triple cross; allowed a straight line; allowed an "imperfect P" in addition to the cross; allowed a blurred cross; allowed a star, and allowed a pencil line drawn through the name of the candidate not voted for. A paper having the thereon of the candidate voted for written was, "with some hesitation," disallowed. As to the double and triple cross the remarks of court are very sensible : name There can be no doubt as to the intention to vote, and no doubt as to the intention to vote emphatically for the one candidate. If there were evidence of an arrangement that the voter would place two marks so as to indicate that it was he, that voter, who had used that ballot-paper, then, by reason of such evidence, such double mark would be a mark by which the voter could be identified, and then the paper, upon such proof being made, should be rejected. But the mere fact of there being such two crosses is not in our judgment a substantial breach of the statute. . We are aware that in so applying the principles which we have deduced from the statute, we are acting apparently in opposition to some of the decisions in the Wigtown case; but there may have been evidence in that case which does not exist in the present case, and which made many of the marks there marks of identification. If this was not so, we respectfully differ from the strict view taken by the majority of the learned judges who decided that case. First, then, as to the 7th section. The exhaustive form of the first paragraph would seem to leave no door open for doubt; but the proviso evidently required judicial interpretation to make it clear. Stowe v. Jolliffe cuts down this proviso, and settles that it applies only to " persons who, from inherent, or for the time irremovable, quality in themselves have not, either by prohibition of statutes or at common law, the status of parliamentary electors," and does not apply to persons who have received alms (see Reform Act, 1832, s. 36), or who have lost their residential qualification (see ib., s. 33), between the day up to which the revision lists are made up (the 31st of July) and the day of the election. This is a liberal construction of the section, no doubt, for it may enfranchise some persons to whom, they being qualified at the time of revision, no objection could have been taken before the revising barrister. The Petersfield voters whose votes were questioned in Stowe v. Jolliffe were of In the Wigtown case, on the other hand, the Scotch a variegated type, some having received alms, some judges rejected the single line, the misplaced cross, and having become paupers, some having ceased to reside, the cross made with pen and ink, although they allowed some having neglected to pay rates, and for varying the cross supported by small feet or claws, because they periods too; but in each one of the seven several cases were little ones. There being, it would seem, no appeal put the court held the votes good. If, then, a voter is (see Judicature Act, 1873, s. 19, as amended by on the register he may vote, whoever he be. Identity of Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, s. 20), the law of the claimant with the registered voter is all that is England and the law of Scotland must remain disrequired. Further, his vote will be good unless he have cordant until altered by the Legislature, for we can some inherent incapacity. But what is an inherent find no trace in the Wigtown case of the evidence incapacity? Resorting to and expanding the instances courteously suggested as possible by the Court of given in Stowe v. Jolliffe, we find it plain that peers Common Pleas. The question whether a cross in pen |
