be taken to have drawn out his own money first. This presupposes that he had money of his own to draw out. John Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd. v. Winder (supra) decides that where he has none his drawings must be taken as what, in fact, they are, drawings out of the trust money, and that when he subsequently pays in money of his own, this is not to be taken, in the absence of evidence to that effect, to be intended to replace the trust money which he has improperly appropriated.

The case of In re Caledon (Earl), Alexander v. Caledon (Earl) (L. R. [1915], 1 Ch. 150) is not altogether a satisfactory decision. There a testator devised a house to his wife for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, and he bequeathed certain chattels to his wife for life, and then to the person "who shall at her death become entitled to the possession" of the house. The wife and eldest son disentailed the house and resettled it to such uses as they should appoint, and in default of appointment, on the uses declared in the will. This disentailment would seem to put an end to all remainders following the eldest son's estate tail so far as the will was concerned, and to make him the sole person who could take the house under it. In other words, he became the only person who could obtain possession of the house under the will; any other person obtaining possession would do so under some other act or instrument. But Joyce, J., held that the gift of the chattels did not vest in him, but was a contingent bequest which will vest in the person who, on the wife's death, is entitled to possession of the house. If that person is a purchaser for value of the house from the wife and son, will he be the person entitled? Or, are the words "shall be entitled" in the will to be read in such event "should have been but for the sale of the house entitled" to the possession of the house?

Delivery is necessary to complete a gift of chattels. It is not necessary to complete a transfer of them in equity by declaration of trust; but it has long been a principle of equity that, where a gift was intended, the words of gift will not be held a declaration of trust in order to make a gift, bad at law, binding in equity. In donationes mortis causa actual delivery is not necessary; what may be called symbolic delivery is sufficient. But where there is symbolic delivery merely, is the Court to hold that that which all the evidence indicates was intended to be a gift inter vivos was a donatio mortis causa? That would seem to be the effect of In re Wasserberg, Union of London & Smiths Bank, Ltd., v. Wasserberg (L. R. [1915], I Ch. 195). It is true, Sargant, J., says in his judgment, that he is convinced that if the deceased there at first intended a gift inter vivos, he afterwards changed his mind. The grounds for this conviction are not stated, and certainly are not very apparent.

It should be noted that Lord Ashburton v. Noctin (L. R. [1914], 2 Ch. 211, referred to in our November issue, p. 90), has been reversed by the Court of Appeal, Kennedy, L.J., dissenting. (See Ashburton (Lord) v. Noctin (L. R. [1915], I Ch. 275.)) The practical ground of convenience given by Swinfen Eady, L.J., is probably the safest on which to base this reversal.

In a certain very learned treatise on equity, the writer, after stating in the text that a restraint on anticipation imposed on a legacy to an unmarried woman did not prevent her being put to election if, in the same will, property to which she was entitled was given to another person, added in a foot-note, "Kekewich, J., has decided to the contrary: Haynes v. Foster ([1901], 1 Ch. 361)." Some critics expressed themselves in strong terms about this note. Well, at any rate, it and the text were both correct: In re Hargrove, Hargrove v. Pain (L. R. [1915], I Ch. 398).

J. A. S.

It is important to remember that the effect of the Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict., c. 39), sect. 14, sub-sect. (4), is that an unstamped document which requires a stamp cannot be received in evidence except in criminal proceedings for any purpose whatever, including a collateral purpose (Fengl v. Fengl (L. R. [1914], P. 274)).

During the continuance of the war the cases of The Tommi and The Rothersand (L. R. [1914], P. 251) will have an important effect on attempted sales of vessels belonging to members of belligerent States. These vessels belonged to a German company. In July, 1914, they left German ports, and on August 1st (the date of the Declaration of War between Germany and Russia) they were on the high seas. Whilst thus in transitu an attempted transfer took place from the German company to an English company whose shares were wholly held by Germans. At that time they were entitled to fly, and did fly, the German flag. There was no delivery of the vessels before the war broke out between Great Britain and Germany and no completion of the steps required for legal transfer. On August 5th (the day after the Declaration of War between these countries) these vessels were detained in England and Scotland respectively by the proper authorities. The President of the Admiralty Division. (in Prize) made an Order for the detention of the two vessels on the grounds that (1) The nationality of a vessel is determined by the flag she is entitled to fly, and at the time of seizure by the authorities here that flag was German; and (2) That the alleged transfer in transitu was invalid, as mere communications which may suffice to bind the parties in time of peace are insufficient to change the ownership of the property in time of war, as against captors whether imminent or actual belligerents, and he expressed a doubt whether a company nominally English but consisting (as in this case) entirely of aliens can own a British vessel.

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With this case a useful comparison may be made with that of Robinson & Co. v. The Continental Insurance Company of Mannheim (L. R. [1915], I K. B. 155). In the latter case Bailhache, J., decided that an alien enemy, if objection be taken by the defendant, cannot sue as plaintiff in our Courts and cannot proceed with an action pending in these Courts while the state of hostilities which makes him an alien enemy lasts. "Whether he can sue or proceed with his action if no objection be taken by the defendant is perhaps open to doubt." But there is no rule of Common law which suspends an action in which an alien enemy is defendant, and no rule of Common law which prevents his appearing and conducting his defence" either personally or by counsel. The learned judge, in the course of his judgment, says: "I am not such a convinced disciple of Rousseau as to be able to base any opinion upon the principles of social compact." The learned editor of the Law Reports (Sir Frederick Pollock) has appended a note to this observation that "the doctrine of the social contract as found in American publicists is derived from Locke rather than from Rousseau. See Scherger, The Evolution of Modern Liberty, New York, 1904"!

The Court of Criminal Appeal had to consider unusual circumstances, and their effect, in the case of The King v. Ketteridge (L. R. [1915], 1 K. B. 467). A juror, after the judge had summed up in a criminal trial, separated himself from his colleagues, and, not being under the control of the Court, conversed, or was in a position to converse, with other persons. The Court held that this was an irregularity which rendered the whole proceedings abortive, and that it was not necessary or relevant to consider whether the irregularity has in fact prejudiced the prisoner, and that the only course open to the Court was to discharge the

jury and commence the proceedings afresh. It appeared that, after the summing up by the judge, the jury, upon the trial of a prisoner for felony, expressed their desire to retire and consider their verdict. The Court bailiff, having been duly sworn, proceeded to conduct them to the juryroom. One of the jurors, apparently not understanding what they were intended to do, departed from his colleagues and left the building, and was absent for about a quarter of an hour, when he rejoined his colleagues, his absence apparently not having been noticed. After some deliberation, the jury returned into Court and gave their verdict, finding the prisoner guilty. The conviction was therefore quashed.

At the present time the decision in Glamorgan Coal Company v. Glamorganshire Standing Joint Committee and others; Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company v. Same (L. R. [1915], I K. B. 471), is valuable. The cases were tried before Mr. Justice Bankes without a jury on the preliminary questions of liability. He decided that "The power of the Chief Constable of a County, in times of emergency, to strengthen his own police force by the addition of constables belonging to the police force of another police authority, is not limited. to cases in which his own police authority have, under sect. 25, sub-sect. 3, of the Police Act 1890, delegated to him the power to do so. He is, by virtue of his office, under a duty to preserve the peace and to protect life and property in the county, and, in the discharge of that duty, he may, when necessary, engage the assistance of outside police, and he may do so upon the terms, amongst others, of providing them with board and lodging. The cost of providing such board and lodging may, subject to examination and audit by the Standing Joint Committee of the County, be recovered by him from the County Fund, under sect. 18 of the County Police Act 1839, as being extraordinary expenses necessarily incurred by him in the execution of his duty."

J. H.