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Sheffield's £5,000 on his death without issue. The applicant urged that it of the Court of Queen's Bench (consisting of Cockburn, C.J., and Crompton, was contrary to the practice of the Court of Chancery to make a prospective Hill, and Blackburn, JJ.), in The Queen v. Boyes (1 B. & S. 311). The judge declaration of rights to arise at a future time, and that, on the true construc ment of the court was delivered by Cockburn, C.J., and he said :-“We are tion of the testator's will, the words “surviving children " of the testator clearly of opinion that to entitle à party called as a witness to the privilege meant children living at the death of Edward Sheffield, and not, as the Vice- of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case, and the Chancellor bad decided, children living at the date of the testator's own death. nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reasonThe court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, LJJ.) refused the applicable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from bis being compelled to cation. JESSEL, M.R., said that the application was made to the discretion answer. We, iodeed, quite agree that, if the fact of the witness being in of the court, and it was made under circumstances which he thought could danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed to him in never bave occurred before. In 1836 Vice-Cbancellor Shadwell made certain judging for bimself of the effect of any particular question, there being no declarations of right with regard to seven legacies given by the testator's will. doubt, as observed by Alderson, B., in Osborn y, The London Dock Company He declared the rights of the persons who were entitled to present interests, (10 Ex, 698, 701), that a question, which might appear at first sight a very and he also made declarations of future rights after the deaths of the respec- innocent one, wight, by affording a link in a chain of evidence, become the tive tenants for life. The declarations were made in the presence of all the means of bringing home an offence to the party answering. Subject to this testator's children, who appeared to have been then of full age and to have reservation, a judge is, in our opinion, bound to insist on a witness answering, been represented by counse). Subject to a technical rule, there was no more unless he is satisfied that the answer will tend to place the witness in peril.” objection to the question being decided then than now. The technicality That decision was not technically binding on this court, but the Master of was of the barest kind-tbat is, it was not the practice of the Court of the Rolls said that he should differ from it with very great besitation. He Chancery to decide as to future rights, but it was the practice to wait until thought it stated the law correctly, and that, if it was necessary for this court the event happened on which those rights would arise, unless some special to affirm it, they would be acting well and wisely in so doing. The rule was circumstance, such as the fact that some present right depended on the stated in the same way in the standard works on Evidence of Mr. Best, Mr. decision, rendered it desirable that the question should be decided at once. Phillips, and Mr. Pitt Taylor, who also pointed out that, if a witness was But, if all the persons who could possibly be interested in any event were of allowed to escape from answering on his owo mere statement that his answer full age, and were before the court, the reason for the rule ceased. The might tend to criminate himself, this would always enable a witness friendly to reason was that the court would not decide if it did not know who were the an accused person to decline to give any evidence at allman evil so great as persons who might become entitled on the bappening of the future event; so to outweigh the possibility that sometimes tbe compelliog a witness to answer that they could not be represented before the court. But, in a case like the might assist in convicting him of a crime out of his owá mouth. And even present, the rule was the barest technicality: the number of the persons those judges who had entertained the opposite view, that the statement of interested in the fund might diminish, but it could not inorease. Wbether there the belief of the witness, that his answer would tend to criminate him, was to were any special circumstances which led to the declaration of future rights one be received as conclusive, had always said that there was an exception in the could not now tell. On the face of the order, without knowing more case of manifest mala fides on the part of the witness. In the present case of the circumstances, it could not be said that the order was his lordship believed that the witness had declined to answer merely because not right. The next point, and it was one of a most serious character, was be did not wish afford any assistance to the creditors of the bankrupt. He must, this :-After what time were people entitled to rely on the judgment of a therefore, answer the questions, though, of course, he would still be entitled to competent tribunal as to their right to property? A great change of opinion object to answer any particular question which would obviously tend to crimi. on this question had taken place in recent times. It was now thought most pate him, or which, in the opinion of the judge, would reasonably tend to do important that the right to property under the decision of a competent tribu 80. COTTON, L.J., said that he adhered to the docision in The Queen v. Boyes. nal, if it was to be questioned at all, should be questioned at once. Formerly LINDLEY, L.J., said that he had always regarded the point as settled by there was no limit of time for the bringing of an appeal. Then the practice The Queen v. Boyes. The rule was settled twenty years ago, and this court sprang up of not allowing a re-hearing after the expiration of twenty years. ought not to dieturb it.-SOLICITORS, G. S. & H. Brandon ; Bellamy, Strong, That practice was afterwards embodied in a general order of the Court off Baker, Chancery. By & subsequent general order the twenty years was cut down to five. By the Judicaturē Rules the time was again cut down to one year. TRESPASS-NUISANCE-OBSTRUCTION ON LAND-CAUSE OF Action-ReThe rights of persons were fixed after the expiration of one year, unless, VERSIONER-WEEKLY Tenant.-On the 17th inst., the Court of Appeal under special circumstances, special leave to appeal was given by the Court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.), affirmed the decision of of Appeal. Formerly, the judges were much more ready than now to listen to Fry, J., in the case of Cooper v. Crabtree (ante, p. 110, L. R. 19 Ch. D. 193). a demand for a re-bearing after the expiration of the twenty years, and circum. The defendant, whose land immediately adjoined that of the plaintiff, had stances were then considered special which would not be so considered now. erected a boarding on poles, for the purpose of preventing the access of light Since the Judicature Act this rule had been laid down, that in general the to a window in a cottage which stood on the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff court would pot allow an appeal after the expiration of the time, unless the alleged that the poles had been improperly placed on his land ; the defendant respondent had done something to oreate an equity against him. What, said that they stood on his own land. The plaintiff also alleged that the then, was the case of the present applicant ? He said that the order of 1836 hoarding made a rattling and creaking, and that it caused an intolerable was wrong, because the court had given a wrong meaning to the word “sur. nuisance to himself and his tenant. And he claimed an injunction to restrain viving.” Tbat was a word the construction of wbich had perhaps caused the trespass, and, in any event, an injunction to restrain the nuisance, and also more difference of opinion among judges than any other word in the English damages. The tenant of the cottage, who was only a weekly tenant, gave language. There was no hard and fast rule as to its construction ; it was a evidence of the nuisance to himself and his family, bat the plaintiff addaced question as to the meaning of the whole will. There might possibly have no evidence of injury to the reversion. Fry, J., said that a reversioner could been some other passage in the will which led tbe Vice-Chancellor to depart not maintain an action of trespass ; such an action could be maintained only by from the ordinary construction of the word. The applicant was now the sole a person who was in the actual possession of land. A reversioner might mainsurvivor of the testator's seven children-tbat is to say, he took his chance tain an action in the nature of an action on the case in respect of an entry on during forty-six years of dying during the life of the tenant for life, in which bis land, or a nuisance. But then he must show either an actual injury to the event his estate would have been augmented by the Vice-Chancellor's order as reversion, or that the aet complained of was of such a permanent character it stood, and now, baving had that advantage for forty-six years, the event that it must necessarily injure the reversion. Neither of these things bad having happened in his favour, he wanted to have the order altered. This was | been shown, and therefore the action must be dismiss ed. On the bearing of a special circumstance adverse to allowing an appen. The cases of Brandon v. the appeal the case of nuisance was abandoned, and the plaintiff relied solely Brandon (8 D. M. & G. 365), and Walmsley v. Foxhall (1 D. J. & S. 451), on the alleged trespass. And the court affirmed the decision of Fry, J., on which had teen relied on, were entirely different from the present case. In the substantially the same ground. --SOLICITORS, Jaques & Layton ; Williamson, former there was an obvious error in the decree. In the latter there had been | Hill, £ Co. a declaration of future rights in the decree, but the proper persons to argue the question had not been before the court. In the present case everyone who by any possibility could be entitled was of age and was before the court. Moreover,

ACTION OF DECEIT-MISREPRESENTATION-ONUS OF PROOF-PROSPECTUS there the applicant came to the court only four years after the expiration of the

OF COMPANY.-In a case of Smith v. Chadwick, before the Court of Appeal on time. Here he came forty-five years after. It would be an outrageous exercise

the 17th inst., the action was brought by a shareholder in a company to recover of the discretion of the court to grant the present application. COTTON, L.J.,

damages from some fioancial agents, who had been employed to bring out and LINDLEY, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Henderson f. Buckle ; Loxley de

pany, on the ground that the plaiotiff had been induced to subscribe for shares Morley.

by fraudulent representations contained in a prospectus issued by the defend. ants. Fry, J., bad decided in the plaintiff's favour, but his decision was re

versed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, WITNESS—RIGHT TO REFUSE TO ANSWER-ANSWER TENDING TO CRIMI- L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that the action was brought to recover damages NATE-DISCRETION OF JUDGE.--In a case of Ex parle Reynolds, before the from the defendants for inducing the plaintiff to take shares in the company Court of Appeal on the 16th inst., the question arose whether, when a wit- by means of false and fraudulent representations--that is, by means of repreness under examination declines to answer a question, on the ground that his sentations which were material to induce him to take the shares, and wbich were answer might tend to criminate himself, he is to be the sole judge whether either false to the knowledge of the defendants, or were made by them so reckbe will answer, or whether he can be excused from answering only if the judge lessly without knowledge of the facts that in a court of law they would stand is satisfied that there is reasonable ground for apprehending danger to the wit. in the same position as if the statements had been false to their knowledge, ness if he should answer. The exanination in the present case was of a wit. The questions, therefore, were whether any such representations had been ness who bad been summoned for examination by the trustee in a bankruptcy, made by the defendants to the plaintiff, whether they were false to the know. under section 96 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The witness refused to answer ledge of the defendante, or were made by them so recklessly that they were a number of questions, on the ground that his answer might tend to criminate equally liable, and whether the representations were material to induce the himself. The registrar referred the matter to the Chief Judge, who held that plaintiff to take the shares. The law on the subject was clear. A man might the witness must answer, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Ap. | issue a prospectus containing statements which he believed to be true, but, if peal (JESSEL, M.R., and Cotron and LINDI.EY, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said he had made them recklessly, without inquiry, he would not be allowed to that there were several dicta on the point, and there was ope decision in 1861 escape werely because he had good intentions. If the statements were such that the court could see that they were material to induce the plaintiff to act brought from an order appointing a receiver of the rents of land which the on them, it would be assumed that he did act on them. It migbt be shown plaintiffs sought to recover from the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed to be that he did not rely on them, by showing either that he knew all the facts, or beneficially entitled to the land under a will, and they alleged that the that he had bound himself in some way not to rely on them, but to take the defendants were in possession without any title whatever. The legal estate risk bimself, or he might have s'ated that, in fact, he did not rely on them. was outstanding in some mortgagees of the testator. The appointment of a But, if it was not shown in one of these ways that the plaintiff did not rely on receiver was objected to on the ground that it had been made in the absence representations which were material, the assumption was that he did rely of the owners of the legal estate, reliance being placed on Dunn v. Ferrier (16 on them. There might be cases in which it was not obvious what the W. R. 922, L. R. 3 Ch. 719). The court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and meaning of the statements was. If & statement was so ambiguous tbat the LINDLEY, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal. JESSEL, M.R., said that section 25 court could not tell what it meant, the plaintiff must tell the court what he of the Judicature Act was intended to do away with such decisions as Dunn v. did rely on, in wbat sense he uoderstood the statement. It would not do for | | Ferrier. Under the present practice a receiver of the rents of land could, in bin to say, “I relied on the statement in the prospectus whatever its meaning a proper case, be appointed in the absence of the owner of the legal estate. might be. Find out the meaning for me." He might bave thought it had SOLICITORS, Brook & Chapman; G. E. Carpenter. quire a different meaning from that which the court gave to it. Again, the defendant in an action for deceit would be excused if he had reasonable ground for believing the statement which he had made to be true, and, moreover, a LEASE - AGREEMENT - FORFEITURE — PROVISO FOR RE-ENTRY - ACTION mig-statement might be so trivial as to give no ground for an action. Here the to RECOVER POSSESSION-JUDICATURE Acr, 1873, 8. 25.- In a case of The plaintiff said he understood the statements in the prospectus to mean what Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851 v. The Royal Horticultural Society, the words composing them obviously conveyed, and that he was coable to before the Court of Appeal on the 22 ad iost., the action was brought to recover express in any other words what be understood to be their meaning. That the possession of land which the plaintiffs had, by an agreement in writing, was not dealing fairly with the court nor with the defendants. He was not agreed to demise to the defendants, on the ground that the plaintiff's were entitled to say he relied on the representations, but to refuse to tell what was entitled to re-enter under the terms of a proviso for re-entry contained in the the meaning he put upon them was.

agreement. No lease had been executed. Fry, J., held, on the One of the alleged misrepresentations was that the prospectus had stated construction of the agreement, that no breach had happened entitling the name of a person as a director of the company when he had, in fact, the plaintiffs to re-enter. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and withdrawn his name. JESSEL, J.R., said that no doubt the directors COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) reversed the decision. And JESSET., M.R., were an important element in forming a judgment as to whether a observed that since the Judicature Act the effect of a holding under an man would take shares in a company, but then he must know somethiog agreement for a lease is the same at law as in equity. In such a case now, about them. There might be, of course, names so well known that the both at law and in equity, the tenant holds under the agreement, and is not court could eome to the conclusion that the name of even one director miglot simply, as he was formerly at law, a tenant froin year to year. The result is influence people in joining the company. For instance, it would be an obvious that in every court he is now liable to be ejected, if he would have been liable inducement in the case of a new bank if the chief partner in Rothschilds' was to be ejected supposing that a lease had been actually granted in pursuance of on the list of directors. Bat, if the public were told that Jones, of the New the agreement. And now a mortgagor could maintain an action to recover eut, or Robinson of Ratcliff-highway, were directors, that alone would not do. I possession of land, though the legal estate was outstanding in the mortgagee. Still, if the plaintiff said tbat Jones or Robinson was his great friend, that be 1-SOLICITORS, Fladgate, Smith, g Fladgatel; Webb, Stock, f Burt. had always followed his advice, and that it was his name which had induced him to take shares, that would be enough. In the absence of such evideoce it was impossible to support an action of deceit oo the ground that one man who had ' APPEAL-EXTENSION OF TIME-EX PARTE APPLICATION-FORM OF NOTICE consented to become a director, but had withdrawn, bad wrongly been put on the OF Motion-Orp. 68, R. 15.-In a case of Berry v. Gawkroger, before the list of directors,

Court of Appeal on the 22nd inst., an application was made ex parte for leave Another alleged misrepresentation was that the purchase-money to be given to serve a notice of motion for leave to appeal from the order made on the for the business which the company was to acquire was, as stated in the further consideration of the action, notwithstandiog the expiration of the time prospectus, to be paid partly in cash and partly in paid-up shares, and the for appealing, on the ground that there was on the face of the order an evident cash was to be paid by instalments, but the prospectus did not state, wbat error which bad only recently been observed. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and was the faot, that the instalments were to bear interest. JESSEL, M.R., said Cotton and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) at first expressed somo doubt whether such an that this was a mere omission. If a man stated falsely the contents of a l application should be made ex parte. But ultimately they gave leave to serve written document, he could not escape by saying be bad offered to show the tbe postponed notice of motion, and to include in it a notice of appeal from the docoinent. But, if he only stated part of the contents, and said the whole order on further consideration, in case the leave to appeal should be granted, was in a document open to be inspected, it was different. The common case and the court said that the notice might also include a notice of a motion to of a lease with restrictive covenants might be taken. A vendor might prop. vary the chief clerk's certificate, upon the footing of which the order on erly state some of the covenants of a lease, and say nothing about a restric. | further consideration had been made.-SOLICITORS, Peace & Co.; Williamson, tive covenant against carrying on a trade; but, on the other hand, it would | Hill, f. Co. be wrong for him to say there was no restrictive covenant. In the present case the plaintiff was not entitled to complain. Fry, J., had relied on the language of Lord Cairns in Peek v. Gurney (L. R. 6 H. L. 403), “There

PRACTICE--MODE OF TRIAL-Right OF DEFENDANT TO JURY-ORD. 36, must, in my opinion, be some active mis-statement of fact, or, at all events,

RR. 3, 26.-In a case of Clarke v. Skipper, before Fry, J., on the 13th inst., á such a partial and fragmentary statement of fact as that the withholding of

question arose as to the right of a defendant, in what would have been that which is not stated makes that which is stated absolutely false." Here

formerly a cbancory action, to bave the issues of fact tried by a jury. The the statement was absolutely true. What Lord Cairns referred to was a case

action was brought io restrain the commission of an alleged nuisance by noise. where what was concealed out down what was stated, as, for instance, if a

The writ was issued on the 7th of January, and on the 2nd of February & vendor said he had an estate in fee, concealing the fact that it was leased ;

motion by the plaintiffs for an interlocutory injunction came on to be heard for an estate in fee alone would mean an estate in possession, so that to state

i by Fry, J. The plaintiff,' counsel then proposed that the motion should it as an estate in fee alone would be absolutely false. And JESSEL, M.R.,

stand over to the trial of the action, with liberty to the plaintiffs to apply to cited with approval the words of Turner, L.J., in Jennings v. Broughton (5 |

expedite the trial when the parties should be ready. Tbis was assented to by De G, M. & G. 140), “ Although I think it is the undoubted duty of this

the defendants' counsel, and an order to that effect was made. After this court to relieve persons who have been deceived by false representations, it is

both sides delivered their pleadings, the plaintiffs' reply being delivered on equally the duty of this court to be careful that, in its apxiety to correct

the 2nd of March, and on the same day the plaintiffs gave notice of trial of frauds, it does not enable persons who have joined with others in speculations

the action before Fry, J. On the 6th of March the defendants gave notice to to convert their speculations into certainties at the expense of those with

the plaintiffs, under rule 3, that they desired to have the issues of fact tried whom they have joined.” COTTON, L.J., said that the action was in the

before a judge and jury, and they afterwards moved before Fry, J., that, notnatare of a simple common law action of deceit, and it was necessary for the

withstanding the plaintiffs' notice of trial, the issues of fact might be tried plaintiff to prove that the misrepresentations had been made by the defendants

before a judge and jury, pursuant to the defendants' notice. The plaintiffs with knowledge or recklessly, and also that he was deceived by them, and

opposed the application, urging (inter alia) that what took place on the 2nd of induced to act upon them to his prejudice, upon which prejudice he claimed

February amounted to a bargain between the parties that the trial should by damages. A mere omission, unless it made the whole statement untrue, was

before a judge alone, and that, if the application was granted, the plaintiff's not enough to support an action of deceit. There being some doubt as to the

would lose the advantage of having the trial expedited, for which they bad meaning of the prospectus, the plaintiff ought to have stated in what sense

given up their application for an immediate interlocutory injunction. Fry,J., he took it. His lordship referred to what he said in Arkwright v. Newbold

however, granted the defendants' application. He said that the action was (17 Ch. D., p. 324), “In my opinion it would not be right in an action of

one wbich fell within rule 26, which made the right to a jury, given to the deceit to give a plaintiff relief on the ground that a particular statement,

defendants by rule 3, subject to the discretion of the court. His lordship according to the construction put on it by the coart, is false, when the

was of opinion, both on the construction of the rules and on the decisions, plaintiff does not venture to swear that be understood the statement in the li

that the defendant bad a prima facie right to a jury; in other words, that the sense which the court puts on it. If he did not, then, even if that construc

burden of showing that the court ought to exercise its discretion in refusing a tion may have been falsified by the facts, he was not deceived."

| jury rested on the plaintiff, And his lordsbip was of opinion that what took

LINDLEY, LJ., said that the plaintiff, in effect, said he had taken shares on the faith of

place on the 2nd of February did not amount to any bargain between the the prospectus, and wanted the court to spell out what was material and what

parties as to the mode of trial. It was for the plaintiffs to make the applihad misled him. That was for bim to do.-SOLICITORS, Darley & Cumber

cation which they then made, but it was for the court to decide whether it ought land; Ashurst, Morris, & Co.

to be granted, and though the assent of the defendants' counsel facilitated the decision, yet it was not a material element in inducing the plaintiff's 10

shape their course. The plaintiffs had not shown any sufficient ground PRACTICE-APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER-ABSENCE OF OWNER OF LEGAL for depriving the defendants of their prima facie right to a jury. If ESTATE-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, S. 25, SUB-SECTIONS 5, 8.-In a case of necessary the plaintiffs conld now move for an interlocutory injunction.Berry v. Keen, before the Court of Appeal on the 22nd inst., 89 a ppeal was SOLICITORS, Vandercom, Hardy, di Oalway; Wilkins, Blyth, di Dutton.


SOLICITORS' CASES. REPORT – JUDICATURE Act, 1873, ss. 64, 66 - ORD. 3, R. 8 - ORD. 15, R. 1- ORD. 35, RR. 1a, 4.- In a

QUEEN'S Bench Division. case of Bennett v. Bowen, before Fry, J., on the 18th inst., the question arose whether an account

(Sittings in Bano, before GROVE, J., and HUDDLESTON, B.) against an executor on the footing of wilful default is an ordinary

Maroh 22.-In re W. H. Brown, Solicitor. account," within the meaning of rale 8 of order 3, so that a summary

Alfred Wills, Q.C., and W. Murray, appeared for the Incorporated Law judgment for such an account, in default of appearance of a defendant executor,

Society in support of the role. can be given under rule l of order 15. Fry, J., said that it was perhaps

G. Sills appeared for the defendant to gbow cause. not very easy to draw the border line as to the accounts which were meant to

This matter was referred to Master Brewer by an order of November 22, come within rule 8 of order 3, but, baving regard to the broad distinction

1881, and he made the following report thereon after hearing the evidence wbich had always existed between an account against an executor where wilful default was alleged and proved, and an account where there was no such

adduced and reading the affidavits : -" First, that in August, 1877, the de. allegation or proof, he could not hold that an account on the footing of wilful

fondant received from the bankers of one Francis Hill, administatrix, default was an “ordinary account." Therefore a summary judgment for such

£1,139 79. 5d, for investment, but instead of investing it he wilfully leot

and misapplied it in his own name, together with $360 12s. 7d., making an account could not be given under rule 1 of order 15.

£1,500, without any security whatever, to J. H. Bryan; and afterwards, in There was the further question whether a district registrar has power to make a summary order for an account in a case which properly falls within rule 8 of

January, 1878, the affairs of the defendant went into liquidation, and J. H. order 3, and rule 1 of order. 15. FRY, J., held that, by virtue of rule la of order

Bryan afterwards repaid the whole of the $1.500 to the trustee under that 35, and rule 4 of the same order, which provides that “where an action proceeds

liquidation, and Mrs. Hill thereby has lost £1,139 78. 5d. Secondly, that in a district registry, the district registrar may exerciee all such authority and

the defendant by misrepresentation and concealment on July 20, 1877, jurisdiction in respect of the action as may be exercised by a judge at

obtained from Mrs. Hill à power of attorney for the transfer and sale of chambers," a district registrar bas power to make such a summary order.

£2,000 worth of stook in the New Three per Capt. Consolg, standing in the His lordship also held, following the decision of Hall, V.C., in In re Smith

pame of Thomas Hill, deceased, by wbich the defendant on July 26 sold (25 W. R. 452, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 692), that, if the judgment directs that the

them and received the proceeds thereof ( £2,000), and willally and corruptly accounts whiob it orders to be taken shall be taken in the district registry (but

misapplied them, amounting to £1,896 189. 60., by paying these proceeds not otherwise), the accounts can be taken there. His lordship also said that

into his banking account with the Leicestershire Bank; and at the time of the report made by a district registrar to the court of the result of the accounts

the payment the defendant's account was overdrawn to the extent of which he has taken ought to be in the form of a chief clerk's certificate,

£7,635, which the defendant well knew. Thirdly, that in 1870 showing on the face of it the materials upon which the registrar has proceeded,

the defendant received for one Mary Pridmore £2,500 to be placed and the persons who were represented belore bim.-SOLICITORS, H. Keeble ; out on mortgage ; and the defendant informed her that he bad eo Robert Carter.

placed it, whereas in truth and fact the defendant never placed it on mortgage at all, but appropriated it to his own use, and never informed her

of it, and she has lost that sum. Fourthly, that one Samuel Stokes died in WilL-ATTESTATION-ACKNOWLEDGMENT-REQUEST BY THIRD PERSON.- 1873, and appointed Richard Greaves and the defendant trustees under his will, In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, on the 21st inst., a and the defendant as such trustee received for the estate £4,025 10s, 3d. after motion was made (In the Goods of Bishop for probate of a will under the Stokes's death, and before 1875; but the defendant has in no way accounted following circumstances :--The will was prepared by the person whom the for that som or any part of it, but has applied the same to his own use. testator had named as executor, and was duly executed in the presence of the Richard Greaves, the co-trustee, has filed an affidavit, in which he says, I executor and of the wife of the latter. The executor immediately afterwards do not blame the defendant, or make any complaint against him.' Fifthly, sent for two other persons, who, in the hearing of the testator, he requested that the defendant received from J. C. Sowerby, about eighteen months before to attest the will. They accordingly signed their names as witnesses, and on the defendant's liquidation, £8,000 to pay off a mortgage ; but he neglected their leaving the room the testator tbanked them for what they had done, and failed to pay it off, and has applied the same to his own use. There has HANNEN, P., held that there had been & due acknowledgment of the been a dividend of 5s, in the pound paid on all these sums, which amount t) testator's signature to the attesting witnesses, on the authority of Inglesant £17,561 58. 11d." It appeared that Mr. Brown was tried in London in the v. Inglesant (L. R. 3 P. D. 172). In that case the testatrix had herself sent Court of Queen's Bench before Mr. Justice Watkin Williams about these for the attesting witnesses, but in the present case, although another person | matters in December, 1880, when the jury found him not guilty. bad sept for them, the request for their signature was made in the presence Sills, in showing cause, said this mode of carrying on business was no and hearing of the testator, and be afterwards thanked them for signing the doubt irregular and could not be defended; but no fraud was intended by his will. It must, therefore, be inferred that he understood what was done, and client in the first instance. It was not a case of a man being in difficulties the will would be admitted to probate.-SOLICITOR, Sealy.

and resorting to these means to extricate himself therefrom. The bank knew of these transactions, and were a party in a sense to them ; for they knew he was overdrawing, and held securities of his up to over £7,000.

4. Wills said there was no evidence of any such knowledge or countenance HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

in the bank. Queen's Bench Division.

Sills said his client bad carried on his business with admirable success for (Before North, J., at Chambers.)

twenty-three years. In two cases of misapplication all the money had been Maroh 9.-Edwards v. Mallam ; Kelsey, claimant.

repaid, and no complaint had been made. When the defendant was on

his trial for a criminal offence, the diffioulty was to ohoose what witness to This was an interpleader summons which came on for bearing before Mr. call to oharacter, so many presented themselves; the chairman of quarter Justice North, sitting at chambers, and involved a decision upon a point of

sessions, the clerk of the peace, and men of large business testified to his considerable practical importance. The facts, as to which there was no dis

good name. The county people were all satisfied that this trouble was pute, were as follows :-The defendant was a tailor at Faroham, in Sarrey,

due to the defendant's being dragged down by the bankruptcy of a and on February 16 last, being in difficulties, he executed a deed by which he

olient oalled Ingram, who owed him £8,000. As a result Do poblio assigned all bis property to the claimant, W. Kelsey, as trustee for realization

appointment held by the defendant bad been abandoned, and he still reand distribution among such of his creditors as should be willing to execute

mained the receiver on several large estateg. He begged the court to deal and take the benefit of the deed and release bim from the debts due to them.

as leniently with the case as the circumstances warranted. On the same day, February 16, the claimant took possession of the property

Wills was not called on by the court to argue, and included in the deed of assignment, and he remained in possession until

GROVE, J., in delivering jadgment, said :-It has been my misfortune to March 2, when the sheriff of Surrey seized under a f. fa. in execution of a

sit and bear many cases of this sort, but I do not know that I ever met & judgment obtained by the plaintiff. The claimant thereupon produced the deed of assignment, but the sheriff refused to withdraw, upon the ground, as

stronger or worse case. Here is a solicitor obarged with misappropriation the fact was, that the deed had pot been executed by the claimant or any of

of moneys in five cases ; and the master finds that in most, if not all of

them, this has been done wilfally and corruptly. One sum was intrusted to the creditors. On March 4 the claimant executed it as trustee, and also as a creditor, the sheriff having taken out the usual interpleader summons. At

him for investment, but Mr. Brown paid it into bis bank in his own dame. the hearing,

Another sum was intrusted to him to take care of, to be handed over on the

death of the person who gave it to him ; that was dealt with in the same J. C. Earle, for the claimant, urged that the case was governed by the

way. Then came the sum he misapplied under the will of Mr. Stokes. The decision in Siggers v. Evans (24 L. J. Q. B. 305), and that the property

| whole matter of mitigation urged is, that he was dragged into difficulties by passed under the deed so soon as it was communicated to and assented to by

the failure of Ingram ; that be would have paid the money back if he had the claimant, who, being a creditor, could not be said to be a mere agent of

had the funds. Is there any forger or embezzler tried at the Old Bailey the defendant.

who does not seek to avail himself of the same defence ? Bat, assume that Lush. Wilson, for the plaintiff, relied upon the fact that at the time of the he would have paid the money back which he misapplied in placing in a levy the deed did not appear to have been assented to by any of the creditors, bank on which he was overdrawing to any extent they would allow him, and contended that the case cited was not now law.

how is that any exouse? It is a fandamental duty of the solioitor's office NORTH, J., however, was of opinion that this case was governed by that of that he must not traffic with his client's money for his own use. It is as Siggers v. Evans, and that as the claimant was a creditor, and so a beneficiary bad a case as one oan well conceive

bad a case as one oan well conceive. It seems to me that this coart has no under the deed, the deed was not revocable by the defendant after the | option in the matter, but that Mr. Brown must be struok off the rolle, exclaimant bad unequivocally shown his assent to it, and he, therefore, allowed pressing the opinion that our utmost punishment is quite inadequate to the the claim.

offence. Solicitor for the plaintiff, William Morley,

HUDDLESTON, B., concurred in that last remark, and said:--I had Solicitor for the claimant, William Sturt.

occasion at the summer assizes of 1880 to read the depositions in this case Solicitors for the sherif, Abbolt, Jenkins, & Co.

when Mr. Brown was to be triod at Oakham, and expressed a decided

opinion thereon to the grand jury. But I found that some indiscreet admirer three years the shareholders have received in the shape of dividend and of Mr. Brown's had endeavoured to corrupt the body of jurors from which the bonus à som Dearly equal to the whole paid-ap capital, and yet we have jury were to be summoned to try his case, that he had called on them and still in band £19,000 ondivided profits applicable to future dividend and tried to influence them in various ways. As I found that thus the fountains of bonug. The eyes of the shareholders are, however, sofficiently open to the justice were, as it were, poisoned, I felt it necessary to postpone the case and value of their property, and need no hiots from me upon the sabjeot. to order the person who bad interfered to be punished. 'I am bound to say Before moving the adoption of the report, I shall be happy to answer any that it was not brought home to Mr. Brown that he had ordered this to be questions aboald any gentleman desire farther information, done or sanctioned it in any way. The prosecution was then removed to No one asking any question, London, and Mr. Brown was tried and acquitted. Whatever opinion

The CHAIRMAN moved the adoption of the report. as to bis criminality the jury may have formed cannot influence us if we are satisfied with the facts. An officer of the court

Mr. C. PEMBERTON (vice-chairman).-I have muoh pleasure in seconding has been conclusively found guilty of & scandalous violation of that motion, and I wish I could have seen a larger pumber of shareholders his duty to this court and his clients. Each one of the five cases proved

here, in order that I might have pointed out to them the importanos of their would be & justification for his suspension from practice as a solicitor.

|0o-operating with us with the view of extending the businegg. I can only His lordship then dealt with the sums obtained by misrepresentation and con- / say I hope the future will be as prosperous as the past has been with this cealment from an illiterate and aged woman. As to another sum handed to company. him by a lady, she said it was for investment on mortgage; but his version of The report was adopted unanimously. the affair was vory much worse-that it was given to keep as a sacred duty to Mr. HARCOURT MASTER proposed, " Tbat the recommendation of the direcbe banded over to some one else after her death. As to the £4,025 under tors in their report now read as to the payment of dividend and bonus be Mr. Stokes's will, it was said his co-trustee found no fault with Mr. Browo in adopted, and that a dividend of 3s. per share and a bonus of 1s. per sbare, free regard to that; but he might have ingratiated himself in some way with his of income tax, be paid to the shareholders for the financial year ending co-trastee. Although this court does not investigate criminal matters, it on the 30th of November, 1882, the dividend to be payable as usual on the certainly will take notice of gross and wilful negligence. As to the £8,000 1st of June and the 1st of December, and the bonus to be distributed imme. handed to bim by Mr. Sowerby to pay off a mortgage, Mr. Brown said there diately." was a little difficulty in arranging the matter. But the master finds that the Mr. H. Roscoe seconded the motion, which was agreed to. money was paid to him eighteen months before his liquidation, and that there

On the motion of Mr. EDMUND JAMES, seconded by Mr. RICHARD WARD, was plenty of time to pay it off. It is said that Mr. Brown has long borde a l the following directora, who retired in pursuance of the terms of the deed of bigh character among his county neighbours; but it is just that high

Just that high settlement, were unanimously re-elected :-Messrs. G. M. Aroold, F. Charsley, character which has enabled him to commit these frauds.

nmit these frauds., Tbose who do Charles Cheston, William Crossman, G. D. Harrison, Henry M 1800, H. Mun.

Tbose who do these things generally do bear an ontward appearance of honesty, respect. I ster. George Thomas, F. R. Ward, H. S. Wasborough, J. R. Wood, and Sir ability, and morality. And if the public still continues to hold this opinion

Erasmus Wilson, of Mr. Brown, all I can say is the sooner the public is undeceived the better. On the motion of Mr. A. R. OLDMAN, seconded by Mr. H. E. BURY, Rule absolute.-Times.

Mr. Theodore Waterhouse was re-elected an auditor on behalf of the shareholders.

The CHAIRMAN, on behalf of the board, appointed Mr. James J. Darley as the

directors' auditor. SOCIETIES.

Mr. H. Roscoe proposed that the sum of seventy-five guineas be paid to each of the auditors. He felt quite sure that, although this amount was an increase

of twenty-five guineas over the preceding year, the shareholders would feel LAW UNION FIRE AND LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,

that it was by no means an excessive payment for the services which the The annual general meeting was held on the 16th inst., Mr. James Caddon auditors rendered. The company's figures were growing year by year, and (chairman) presiding.

necessitated a good deal of care and attention, which he was sure the auditors Mr. F. McGEDY (actuary and secretary) read the notice convening the bad never failed to bestow when they wera called apon to discharge their meetiog and the mioutes of the previous meeting. The report and accounts

duties. were taken as read. The following is a copy of the report :

Mr. E. JAMES seconded the motion, and it was agreed to. The directors bave pleasure in submitting to the shareholders the accounts The CHAIRMAN next proposed & vote of thanks to the solicitor, Mr. of the company for the financial year ended November 30, 1881, being the George Burges, for his great assiduity ani attention to the business of the twenty-seventh year of the company's operations. The new insurances for the company. year, in the fire department, were 6,904 in Duinber, and amounted to Mr. C. PEMBERTON seconded the motion, and it was carried, and briefly £5,979,473, yielding in new premiums the sum of £7,650 08. 8d. In the

ackoowledged by Mr. BURGES. life department 264 new policies were issued, insuring the sum of £278,301, tbe new premiums upon wbich amounted to $11,355 83. 2d., of which

The CHAIRMAN.-I beg to propose a vote of thanks to the aoluary and staff £4,638 1s. 3d. were single premiums. Thirty life annuities were granted for

for the able and energetic manner in which they have conducted the business £2,021 10. per annum, the purchase-money for which amounted to

of the company. I am sure that the shareholders ara very much indebted to £20,760 63. 7d. Eight annuitants died during the year, resulting in the

those gentlemen for the advantages they are receiving, and I can testify to falling in of annuities to the amount of £334 141. 6d. per annum. The net

the fact that the greatest possible attention is paid by all of them to the losses in the fire department were £9,393 58. id. The claims under life and

smallest point of detail which may arise in the business transactions of the endowment policies amounted to £43,099 le. 100. (less re-assurances). The

office, total number of policies in force in the life department at the close of the Mr. PEMBERTON.-I have great pleasure in seconding that motion, as I year was 3,279, insuring the sum of £2,812,759 (including bonus additions). also can testify to the good qualities of our excellent actuary, who never loses The gross income for the year was £178,415 189. Bd., inclusive of purchase. an opportanity of doing bis utmost for the good of the company. money received for granting annuities. The average rate of interest obtained Mr. GEORGE TAYLER.- Before the proposition is put to the vote, I should on the total assets of the company was £4 4s. 6d. per cent. The excess of like to say one word. I have not been here now for some years, although as receipts over expenditure for the year in the life department was an original shareholder I used at the commencement to attend these meetings £54,865 10s. 3d., by which sum the life assurance fund has been iocreased. occasionally. Now I am here I must say the success of the company has The total receipts of the fire department (less re-insurance) were £38,816 4s., been so great and so marked that every one who has been connected with it and the total payments amounted to £20,766 03. 9d., leaving a surplus on the for a great number of years, as I have, must feel that some reference should year's account of £18,050 33. 3d. Out of this surplus the sum of £4,000 be made on these occasions to the great services rendered by the actuary and has been added to the fire insurance fund, which now stands at £40,000, being the other officers ; and therefore I rise to express my personal thanks, not more than one year's pet premium income. The remainder of the surplus, namely, only to them, but to the directors past and present for their efficient services. £14,050 38. 38., bas been carried to the profit and loss account, making the I would respectfully suggest that, as a bonus is being given to the sbare. balance at credit of that account £39,081 78. 5d. The directors recommend holders, the directors might consider whether this is not a fitting opportunity to the shareholders the payment out of such balance of a dividend of 38. to make some substantial recognition of the services of the actuary and staff. per share and a bonus of 18. per sbare, making togetber a dividend and I should certainly very much approve of something of the kind being done, bongs of 48. per sbare, wbiob is equal to a distribution of £20,000 for the and it seems to me that this is a favourable occasion for doing it. However, I year. There will be then remaining at oredit of profit and loss account throw out the suggestion, leaving it to the consideration of the directors, the son of £19,081 78. 5d. The dividend will be paid ag usual on the lat although if it is in order for me to make a motion on the subject I shall be of Jane and 1st of December, bat the bonus of 18. per share, if agreed to, happy to do so. will be paid forthwith.

The CHAIRMAN.-No doubt the directors will at their next or some early The CHAIRMAN gaid-Gentlemen, the accounts before you are so plain and meeting be glad to take the matter you suggest into their consideration. I explicit, and present such satisfactory results, tbat I feel it is quite un. think you may safely leave it to the board. necessary to any one word about them. It may, however, not be amies jast The resolution was carried unanimously. to remark that tbe new life policies for the past year average $1,049 per Mr. F. MOGEDY.—I rise on my owa behalf and that of the staff to polioy, wbile in the previous year tŁat averago was £980. Sixty-four policies retura my sincere thanks to the gentlemen present for the very kind became claims during the past year, the average amount thereof having voto which they have just passed. I wish especially to refer to the been only £595, while the average amount of the subsisting policies was services of Mr. Rogers, chief of the fire staff, and of Mr. Macpherson, £857. Eighty-six policies, insuring the aggregate sum of £64,872, lapsed, chief of the life staff, who discharge cheir duties very energetically, and I may the annual premiam, whereon amounted to £1,369 168. 8d. Forty-six say tbat all the clerks do their best to promote the interests of the company. policies, for the aggregate amount of £56,991, were surrendered, the annual The past year and the two preceding years have been exceedingly prosperous premiums on thoge policies having been £1,346 38, 10d. One of the best for the office, but, of course, we cannot expect that this great prosperity will proofs of the great prosperity of the compony ig het dgring thọ space of always continue, We must make up our miada to experience a little advers sity some time or other, and I hope that when that time comes you will appreciate as you have done hitherto the services which we render. I may

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS. mention that one of the largest fire insurance companies in London, with an influential board of directors, obtained in premiums last year £723,475, and the claims and expenges were £712,175, leaving a surplus on the year of .

Mr. ARTHUR CRABTREE, solicitor and proctor, of Macclesfield, has been £11,300 only. That was the experience of a first-class office, and I only

appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Married allude to it for the purpose of sbowing that, although our business is small in

Women in and for the County of Chester. comparison, yet we have out of a fire premium income of £37,000 been able Mr. WILLIAM PARR, solicitor, of Ormskirk, has been appointed a Perpetua to put away $17,000. I often bear it said in the City, “ Ob, you are a small Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Married Women in and for fire office ; " and no doubt we are as compared with offices having an income of the County of Lancaster. hundreds of thousands, derived from foreign business and special risks ; but,

Decial risks ; but, Mr. JAMES JOHN Lambert, solicitor, of Manchester and Chorlton.cumaltbough small, our business is of a very high character.

Hardy, bas been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the The CHAIRMAN.-Perhaps I may add that whenever we attempt to get an

Supreme Court of Judicature. enormous income for the sake of the large figures, from that time our prog. perity will cease. It is only by being extremely cautious ani accepting

Mr. Hugh Quinn, solicitor, of Liverpool, has been appointed a Perpetual ouly good business that this state of things can by possibility arise. We

Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds to be executed by found that to be the cage before we gave up the foreign business.

Married Women. Sir ERASMUS WILSON. I have your permission, I think, Bir, to say a

Mr. John WORRELL CARRINGTON, barrister, has been appointed Chief few words on the present occasion. Oor meeting has been one of great

Justice of the Islands of St. Lucia and Tobago. Mr. Carrington was called unanimity. If it were permissible to make use of such a word as regret or

to the bur at Lincoln's-ion in Trinity Term, 1872. He has been for several sorrow, I should only use that word in connection with the fact of our ex.

years Solicitor-General of Barbadoe, and he recently acted as Attorneytreme uzanimity and prosperity having prevented us from bearing, as we have

General for that island. heard on previous occasions, the lucid and satisfactory account wbich you, Mr. CHARLES SHEPPARD, solicitor, of Battle, has been appointed a Per. Sir, bave been in the habit of giving to us year by year of the progress of the petual Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married company. But at the present moment, while making use of the word success, Women for the Counties of Sussex and Kent. not boastfully, but as representing the characteristic of the report-for if we Mr. John CLERK BRODIE, writer to the signet, of Edinburgh, has been talked about success without having real success, our figures would contradict

ct appointed Deputy Keeper of the Signet in Scotland. us-we may, with great satisfaction, appeal to the figuros besore us in the report and accounts. As our actuary has told us, this is a comparatively

Mr. Joseph GRIFFITH, solicitor, of Newcastle-under-Lyme, has been elec'ed small company. It is little, but it is good. It is fortunately 80

an Alderman for that boroogb. Mr. Griffith is mayor of the borough for the emall that it leaves room for individual action and influence in

present year. He was admitted a solioitor in 1875. connection with its management and its success. If I go to a Mr. EDWARD Henslowe BEDFORD, solicitor, of 9, King's Bench-walk, shop to buy an article I like to be served by the principal. I feel more Temple, has been appointed Solicitor to the Joiners' Company. Mr. Bedford satisfied with the article when I get it home, when it has been served in that was admitted in 1864. manner. Now, I want to call your attention to this fact, that in this shop we | Mr. THOMAS LLANWARNE, solicitor. of Hereford, has been elected Clerk tɔ are the principals, and as such we look to all matters of detail, and we are the Allensmore School Board. Mr. Llanwarno was admitted a solicitor in greatly indebted for our prosperity to the personal attention and care-I will 1859 not say labour, because it is a labour of love-which has been given to the

1859. He is clerk to the county magistrates for the Dore Division. company by our chairman, The spirit which guides and influebees our chair.

Mr. Joseph CHALLINOR, solicitor, of Leek, has been appointed by the high man is necessarily infused into the rest of the establishment. The fact of this sheriff of Staffordsbire (Mr. John Robinson) to be Under-Sheriff of that being a successful company is due, not only to the way in which the business county for the ensuing year. Mr. Cballinor was admitted a solicitor in 1850, is conducted financially, bnt also to the care and attention which have been and is clerk to the deputy lieutenants for the Totmonslow Division. bestowed upon it by our chairman and the other directors and officers. Our Mr. John EADEN, solicitor (of the firm of Eaden & Knowles), of Cambridge, chairman has pointed to the attendance-book on the table, and I am bound to

has been appointed Under-Sheriff of Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire for say that if tbat book is examined there will not be found any neglect of duty

the ensuing year. Mr. Eaden was admitted a solicitor in 1832. on the part of the directors, and no absences unless they were brought about by illness or causes beyond control. Now, gentlemen, I wish to propose that

Mr. WILLIAM Newton, solicitor (of the firm of Newton & Wallis), of the best tbanks of the meetiog be given to the chairman for his careful atten

Newark, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Nottinghamshire (Sir tion to the business of the undertaking during the time he bas been with us,

Henry Bromley) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. and also to express a hope that he will be spared to continue that attention,

Mr. Newton was admitted a solicitor in 1852. He is registrar of the Newark and carry on the compuny to a higher point of snccess even than it has hitherto

County Court, clerk to the Newark Board of Guardians, and superintendent attained. I need hardly look for a seconder to this resolation. I am sure all registrar. His partner, Mr. William Wallis, is coroner for the borough of will be desirous to become seconders, and, therefore, I will put it to the

Newark. meeting.

Mr. HENRY FREDERICK VALENTINE FAULKNER (of the firm of Faulkner & The motion was carried by acclamation.

Owen), of Louth, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Lincolnshire (Ur. The CHAIRMAN.-I feel, gentlemen, that I really do not deserve anything

William Henry Smyth) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing like the commendation wbich bas been so eloquently expressed by friend Sir yea

year. Mr. Faulkner was admitted a solicitor in 1869. Erasmus Wilson. All I can say is, that I have endeavoured to promote the Mr. WILLIAM STEPHEN JONES, solicitor (of the firm of Jones & Forrester), interests of the company by every means in my power. Nevertheless, our of Malmesbury, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Wiltshire (the success could not bave been attained unless I had the co-operation and the Right Hon. Edward Pleydell Bouverie) to be Under-Sheriff of that county valued assistance of my co-directors and of Mr. McGeds and I may add that for the ensuing year. Mr. Jones is clerk to the county magistrates at Malmes. the fire department owes a great deal of its success to the care and ability of bury. He was admitted a solicitor in 1846. Mr. Rogers in particular. Gentlemen, I thank you very much for your kind

Mr. HENRY ALLEYNE BOVELL, barrister, has been appointed to act as expressions towards myself,

Solicitor-General for the Island of Barbadoes. Mr. Bovell was called to the The meeting then separated.

bar at Lincoln's-inn in November, 1876.

Mr. GEORGE O'CONNOR PARNELL, solicitor (of the firm of Salt & Parnell), of Bristol, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the

Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. WALTER REGINALD COLLINS, solicitor (of the firm of Brown, Collins,

& Woods), of Swansea, has been appointed à Perpetual Commissioner for The following suggestions have been laid before the Lord Chancellor by the

Glamorganshire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women, Incorporated Law Societies of Manchester and Liverpool:1. District registrars should have all the powers, not only of a master and

Mr. JOHN JOSEPH BICKERSTETH, barrister, has been appointed by Lord chief clerk, but also of a judge in chambers."

Herries, lord lieutenant of the East Riding of Yorkshire, to the office of 2. Where a summons is adjourned by a district registrar to a judge in

Clerk of the Peace for the East Riding, in succession to the late Mr. George chambers, the matter shonld go direct to the judge (withont it being required Leeman, of York, Mr. Bickersteth is the son of the Right Rev. Robert that a fresh summons should be issued) as origically contemplated by ord. 35,

Bickersteth, D.D., Bishop of Ripon. He is a graduate of Cbrist Churoh, rr. 6. 7: and, further, in causes in the Chancery Division. without first going Oxford, and he was called to the bar at the loper Temple in Hilary Term, before the chief clerk; the present practice is not authorized by the rules and 1875. He is a member of the North-Eastern Circuit. orders, and does not obtain in the Rolls Court. The district registrar should Mr. HOWARD HORNER, solicitor, of Wakefield, has been appointed a send a minute with the summons in the same manner as the chief clerk Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicatore. does. 3. Appeal summonses should issue out of the district registries; the record

Mr. John PENNOCK, solicitor (of the firm of Pennock & White), of is otherwise imperfect.

Liverpool, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in 4. On a trial in the provinces before a judge, with or without a jury all the Supreme Court of Judicature. questions should be argued at the time, so as to enable the sutors and their Mr. JOHN HENRY BRAND, barrister, President of the Orange River Free solicitors to be present; there should be no reservation of points for argument State, has been created a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael in London, a practice which entails the payment of fresh fees to counsel, and and St. George. Sir J. Brand is tbe son of Sir Charles Brand, many the expense of the attendance of the solicitor in London in most cases, and years Speaker of the House of Assembly of the Cape Colony, and was born other additional costs. The judge, of course, will bave discretion to reserve in 1823. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, his judgment.

1849. He wag eleoted President of the Orange River Free State in 1874.

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