13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, § 4, "in all Acts, words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females, . . . unless the contrary. . . is expressly provided." Held, that women could not vote for members of parliament under the first-mentioned act: (1) because subject to a legal incapacity; (2) because the word "man" in said act does not include women. - Chorlton v. Lings, L. R. 4 C. P. 374; Chorlton v. Kessler, ib. 397.

A married woman wrote out an assignment to her husband of her reversionary interest in a trust fund, dating it before her marriage and signing it in her maiden name. She did so to enable him to borrow money upon it, and moved thereto, as she alleged, by his threats. He sold said interest, and before completion, about six months after signing the above paper, she signed and gave to the purchasers a letter to one of the trustees of the fund, stating that she had before her marriage assigned her interest in the same to her husband. The latter was at this time in prison. Held, that she had been guilty of a fraud which precluded her from claiming her equity to a settlement against the purchasers. — In re Lush's Trusts, L. R. 4 Ch. 591.

WILL.

1. A will was witnessed by an attorney and his clerk. After the testator's death an affidavit was written out by the clerk and sworn to by the attorney, that, inter alia, the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. After the attorney's death the clerk for the first time stated and testified that the witnesses did not sign in testator's presence. The court declined under the circumstances to set aside the will on the clerk's recollection, alone. - Wright v. Rogers, L. R. 1 P. & D. 678.

2. The deceased wrote on the back of his will, which was not duly executed, a document headed "2 codicil." This document was properly executed, according to the law of the country where it was made, but could not by that law stand apart from, or establish, the will. Held, that neither will nor codicil could be admitted to probate. — Pechell v. Hilderley, L. R. 1 P. & D. 673.

3. Deceased at the foot of his will wrote: "This my last will and testament is hereby cancelled, and as yet I have made no other," signed this in presence of two witnesses who attested the execution. Administration was granted with the memorandum annexed. · Goods of Hicks, L. R. 1 P. & D. 683.

4. If a testator of sound mind reads a will and then signs it, the presumption that he understood it is conclusive. Atter v. Atkinson, L. R. 1 P. & D. 665.

5. A party gave personalty to his son T., by will, subject to legacies thereinafter given, and then gave legacies to his daughters A. and E. He next devised his real estate to T. and appointed him sole executor, and directed that A. should reside with and be maintained by T. so long as A. should remain unmarried. A., after living for a time with T., left of her own accord and resided elsewhere. Held, that A. was only entitled to be maintained by T. during his life and while she resided with him, T. being always willing that she should do so. Wilson v. Bell,

L. R. 4 Ch. 581.

See CODICIL; LEGACY; PERPETUITY, 2; POWER; REVOCATION OF WILL.

"Money due me at the time of my decease." — See LEGACY, 1. "Next of Kin."-See REVOCATION OF WILL.

"Perils of the Seas."- See INSURANCE, 3.

"Person in Charge.” — See Collision. "Port of Loading."— See INSURANCE, 2. "Under Way." See ADMIRALTY.

"Warren of Conies." - See DEED.

DIGEST OF CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE United States courts have exclusive jurisdiction of a suit in rem to enforce a shipper's lien under a contract of affreightment, if the voyage is on navigable waters, though these waters are entirely within one State. The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 624.

See BLOCKADE; COLLISION; PILOT; PRIZE.

AGENT. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AGREED FACTS.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of a case brought up on an agreed statement of facts without writ of error or appeal. Washington County v. Durant, 7 Wallace, 694.

See ERROR, 6.

ALIEN.

See INCOME TAX, 1; NATURALIZATION.
AMENDMENT. - See APPEAL, 4.

APPEAL.

1. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of an appeal, unless the transcript of the record is filed at the next term after the appeal is allowed, though the transcript is filed at the next term after the appeal bond is given, and though the citation recites that the appeal was allowed at the term at which the appeal bond was given. — Edmondson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wallace, 306.

2. A decree in a suit to enjoin trustees from selling, dissolving an injunction before granted, and ordering that they shall sell and bring the proceeds into court, to abide further orders, is a final decree from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court, within the meaning of the Act of March 3, 1803.— Railroad Co. v. Bradleys, 7 Wallace, 575.

3. A decree is final, within the meaning of the Act of March 3, 1803, so that an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court therefrom, if it decides the ownership of the property in suit, and directs its immediate transfer, though accounts remain to be taken between the parties. - Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wallace, 342.

4. No appeal lies to review the terms imposed on allowing amendments to a bill in equity after a demurrer to it was sustained. — Sheets v. Selden, 7 Wallace,

5. That the transcript of a record in a case on appeal is incomplete cannot be shown by certificate of the clerk. - The Grapeshot, 7 Wallace, 563.

6. Where it appeared that an appeal was prayed, and the appeal bond filed and approved, it was inferred that the appeal was allowed. - Railroad Co. v. Bradleys, 7 Wallace, 575.

7. On abolishing the Provisional Court of Louisiana, Congress enacted, by Act of July 28, 1866, that the decrees of the court should be transferred to and stand as the decrees of the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court refused to dismiss an appeal brought from the Circuit Court on a decree so transferred. — The Grapeshot, 7 Wallace, 563.

8. A decree was made on February 6; during the term a motion to rescind the decree was denied on March 13. Held, that the time within which an appeal must be perfected so as to operate as a supersedeas should be reckoned from March 13.- Railroad Co. v. Bradleys, 7 Wallace, 575.

See ERROR; HABEAS CORPUS; INFORMER, 1; JUDGMENT AND DECREE, 1; PRIZE, 2.

ARBITRATION.-See CLAIMS, COURT OF, 3, 4.

ASSIGNMENT.

See CLAIMS, COURT OF, 2; Patent, 2, 3.
ATTACHMENT. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.

ATTORNEY.

1. A judge of a court of general jurisdiction which has power to remove an attorney for malpractice, is not liable to an action by an attorney for wrongfully removing him, unless perhaps the judge has acted maliciously or corruptly. Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wallace, 523.

2. The decision of the highest court of a State that the removal of an attorney without formal legal process is not a violation of the State constitution will be followed by the Supreme Court. — Ib.

The Secretary of War has no authority to accept drafts drawn by contractors for army clothing and subsistence to be furnished, and such acceptances do not bind the Government (NELSON, GRIER, and CLIFFORD, JJ., dissenting). — The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wallace, 666.

See BOND; ERROR, 1; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.,

BLOCKADE.

Vessel condemned on the facts for running the blockade. The Diana, 7 Wallace, 354.

BOND.

Government bonds payable to bearer, purchased after the date at which they are redeemable, are taken subject to all equities. Texas v. White, 7 Wallace, 760.

See INCOME TAX, 1; INTEREST, 2; LIS PENDENS; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; PAYMENT; RAILROAD, 1; RES ADJUDICATA, 2, 4; Tax, 3.

BOUNDARY. See PUBLIC LAND, 1.

CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction under the Act of April 29, 1802, § 6, on a certificate of division of opinion concerning a motion to quash an indictUnited States v. Rosenburgh, 7 Wallace, 580.

ment.

CERTIFICATE OF INDEBTEDNESS. See TAX, 2.

CHARITY.

G. devised his estate to the city of P. to hold on valid charitable trusts, in the first place for a college, and any residue for municipal purposes. The State legislature afterwards increased the area of the city, and vested in the corporation of the increased city all the trusts vested in the city as originally constituted. The income of the trust was not at present greater than was required for the college. The heirs of the testator filed a bill praying an account, and alleging that the income should be largely increased. Held, that the corporation of the increased city had capacity and power to hold and manage the trust, and (the trust being originally valid) that whether they had such capacity and power or not was no concern of G.'s heirs. — Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wallace, 1.

CHARTER PARTY.-See SHIP, 3.

CIRCUIT COURT.

A State law, as interpreted by the State courts, provided that a county (which was made a municipal corporation) could be sued only in a court of the county. Held, that, notwithstanding, the United States Circuit Court had jurisdiction of a suit against the county, by the citizen of another State. -Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wallace, 118.

See APPEAL, 7; CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION; PRIZE, 3; REMOVAL OF SUITS.

CLAIMS, COUrt of.

1. The Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of a claim under the Revenue Laws, which might have been prosecuted by a suit against a collector had a proper protest been made. - Nichols v. United States, 7 Wallace, 122.

2. An interest in an uncertain, unliquidated, and unadmitted claim against the United States, was assigned to a third person. The United States, knowing of the assignment, yet settled with the original claimant, by Treaty and Act of Congress, without regard thereto. Held, that the assignee could maintain no suit against the United States in the Court of Claims. - Kendall v. United States, 7 Wallace, 113.

3. A resolution of Congress directed the Secretary of War to make such allowance to a claimant as should be just. The Secretary stated that a certain allowance ought to be made. Congress then passed another resolution pronouncing the former resolution and all proceedings under it void. Held, that the claimant could not maintain a petition in the Court of Claims founded on the allowance made by the Secretary. - Gordon v. United States, 7 Wallace, 188.

4. A contract, by which A. agreed to furnish bricks to the Government, provided that the contract should not be sublet or assigned. A. having made default,