suggest that "it would, in most cases, be found convenient that the solicitor to the trustees or mortgagees should be employed [by the incumbrancer] to obtain his client's personal acceptance of service." They also suggest that a fee of 6s. 8d. for each trustee or other person to whom the notice is to be given should be paid by the person giving the notice to the solicitor so employed, such fee to include correspondence. Considering the letters which will have to be written, and the fact that the solicitor who acts in this way as agent for the incumbrancer will be liable to him for the consequences of any omission to bring "the mind of the trustee to an intelligible apprehension of the nature of the incumbrance which has come upon the property, so that a reasonable man, or an ordinary man of business, would act upon the information, and would regulate his conduct by it in the execution of the trust (see Lloyd v. Banks, L. R. 3 Ch. 488), this proposed fee certainly cannot be considered exorbitant. THE INTERPELLATIONS which have arisen out of the rumour that the delicate privilege of opening letters, which has long been intrusted to a Secretary of State, has been exercised of late in relation to Irish correspondence, are very natural and proper, but the answers which have been given in the House of Commons are only just what might have been expected. If the privilege is to exist at all, it must, like the disbursement of "Secret Service Money" (see 22 Geo. 3, c. 82, ss. 24-30) be exercised in secret and without any liability upon the minister exercising it to be called to account. Section 25 of 7 Will. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 36, which confers the privilege, is rather a curious one. Its main object is the punishment of Post-office employés for opening, detaining, or delaying a letter, which is made a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, without any limit, and the privilege is merely given by way of proviso "that nothing herein contained shall extend to the opening. a letter for want of true direction, nor to the opening or detaining or delaying of a post letter in obedience to an express warrant in writing under the hand, in Great Britain, of one of the principal Secretaries of State, and in Ireland, under the hand and seal of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland." By the interpretation clause of the Act, the singular includes the plural, so that any number of warrants to open, &c., all letters addressed to any number of particular persons would be perfectly legal, although more than one addressee could not be comprehended in the same warrant. "Detaining," it seems, is equivalent to retaining," and would, perhaps, include " destroying," though it would have been better if the power of destruction had been more expressly given. It is material to point out that the obligation to carry on a correspondence through the Postoffice can only be evaded in a very limited manner, expressly defined by 7 Will. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 33, s. 2. By that section the exclusive privilege of conveying letters from one place to another-wheresoever post communications may be established-is conferred upon the Postmaster-General and his servants, except in the cases of (inter alia) (1) "letters sent by a private friend in his way, journey, or travel, so as such letters be delivered by such friend to the party for whom they shall be directed"; and (2) "letters sent by a messenger on purpose, concerning the private affairs of the sender or receiver thereof," it being added in the same section that "nothing herein contained shall authorize any person to make a collection of such excepted letters for the purpose of sending them in the manner hereby authorized." The privilege of the Post-office is protected by 7 Will. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 36, s. 2, which imposes a penalty of five pounds a letter upon any person conveying otherwise than by post a letter "not exempted from the exclusive privilege of the Postmaster. General, and of one hundred pounds a week on every person making a practice of so doing "-no exception being made for gratuitous conveyance of letters. Although, no doubt, secrets not treasonable are perfectly safe with the officials, who would probably forget them as soon as read, it is perhaps to be regretted that no penalty is imposed upon an official disclosing the contents of correspondence otherwise than within the limits of his duty. The Telegraph Act, 1868, it will be remembered (see section 20), makes it a misdemeanor for an official to disclose the contents of any telegraphic message "contrary to his duty "-words which it is presumed would absolve the telegraph clerk disclosing the contents of a messagewhich he bona fide believed to be treasonable. It is noteworthy, in connection with the subject, that the Act 39 Geo. 3, c. 79, "for the more effectual suppression of societies established for seditious practices," is still unrepealed. This Act, which was passed for the purpose of suppressing a conspiracy which had long been carried on with France "to dissolve the connection between the two kingdoms [of Great Britain and Ireland] so necessary to the security and prosperity of both," prohibits by name (inter alia) “the London Corresponding Society and all other corresponding societies of any other city, town, or place." MOVED by our correspondent's appeal last week, with reference to the closed gates of the Royal Courts of Justice in Carey-street, we have instituted an investigation into the causes of the delay in re-opening the passage. We find that the chief cause is a tender care for the necks of our correspondent and other professional persons. There is a large hole leading to the lavatories, which in the opinion of the authorities is not yet so securely guarded as to prevent solicitors and their clerks from tumbling in. There is, it is true, a parapet of sto ne, but it appears to be considered that solicitors are not to be trusted near this dangerous place until an iron rail has been placed around the opening. REFRESHERS. THE suggestion of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society that refreshers to counsel should be abolished will draw attention to the reasons on which the practice of giving refreshers to counsel is based, and also to the rapid extension of the practice in recent times. The reasons are not far to seek. In trials with witnesses you cannot tell the length of time which will be occupied, because you don't know how many witnesses your opponent may call, or how long they may take in giving their evidence. The custom in these cases, therefore, has been to supplement the fee on the brief by daily re-freshers. In theory the fee on the brief represents the first day's hearing, and if any additional time is consumed, additional fees are paid. Theoretically this is fair enough for both suitor and counsel, but there is doubtless a tendency to make the fee on the brief a covering fee, and yet to add refreshers. As to the progress of the custom, it is to be observed that up to 1874 the practice in the common law courts was not uniform, the Common Pleas masters refusing in general to allow refreshers, while the masters of the Queen's Bench and Exchequer allowed them. But in Lawrie v. Wilson (23 W. R. 139, L. R. 10 C. P. 152), a case which had lasted several days at Nisi Prius, and in which the Common Pleas masters had disallowed refreshers to counsel, Lcrd Coleridge said that the court wished to assimilate its practice to that of the other courts; and the matter was referred back to the master on the understanding that, as a principle, refreshers may be allowed." Thenceforth, of course, the allowance of refreshers in common law actions was firmly established. 66 It was not long before the practice was also sanc ac tioned in the Chancery Division. For a long time-indeed, ever since the Court of Chancery began to try questions of fact arising in a suit, and to take cognizance of matters previously decided by courts of law, instead of directing issues at law-common law counsel had been engaged to assist the equity counsel at the hearing of such questions; and these common law counsel could not be induced to attend unless refreshers were paid to them. The equity counsel engaged in these cases, seeing their common law brethren receiving refreshers, put in a claim to the same remuneration, and "in order to put them upon an equality with gentlemen from the common law bar engaged with them," the claim was usually allowed. This is the count of the origin of the practice in the Chancery Division given by the defendant in Smith v. Buller (L. R. 19 Eq., at p. 482) in his objections to the taxation of costs. It is certain that twenty years ago there were cases in which the equity judges directed the costs in the class of cases to which we have referred, to be taxed on the same principle as that upon which they would be taxed at law. Thus it was stated in Hill v. Hibbit (L. R. 14 Eq., at p. 223), that this course was adopted by Vice-Chancellor James in a case in 1869, in which issues were tried before the court without a jury. It is also, however, clear that less than ten years ago the claim of equity counsel to be placed on the same footing as the common law counsel engaged in the same case was not clearly established. In Hill v. Hibbit (see L. R. 14 Eq., at p. 222), in which both common law and equity counsel were engaged, it was stated that where counsel of the common law bar appear in a court of equity, the practice, in the absence of express direction, was to allow the costs, so far only as they included the fees of the common law counsel, upon the common law principle, while the equity counsel engaged obtained their fees upon the basis of an equity taxation only. But in the last-mentioned case the taxing master expressed an opinion that it was reasonable that the fees of all the counsel should be allowed on the common law principle, and Vice-Chancellor Bacon directed the taxation to be made on this scale. Up to the time of this decision, so far as appears, the practice of allowing refreshers in chancery was confined to what may be called isolated common law cases. It is obviously difficult, however, to define such cases, and the taxing masters naturally accepted as the only practical and simple test the question whether witnesses were examined in court. In Smith v. Buller (L. R. 19 Eq., at p. 483), the taxing master disallowed refreshers, on the ground that "on the hearing of causes in the Court of Chancery, where written evidence only was used, and no witnesses were examined in court, it had never been the practice to allow daily fees to counsel where the cause was in hearing more than one day." Vice-Chancellor Malins, however, in this case made a vigorous effort to extend the system of refreshers to all classes of cases in chancery. He said that there might be quite as much difficulty in a case where evidence was adduced by affidavit as by examination viva voce. "The true criterion," he continued, "is the length of time cccupied, not how it is occupied," and he expressed an opinion that where the hearing of a cause extended over more than two days, refreshers ought to be allowed. In Harrison v. Wearing (27 W. R. 526, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 206), however, the Master of the Rolls dissented from this view, pointing out the great distinction, as regards the reason for giving refreshers, between evidence taken on affidavit and that taken viva voce at the trial-viz., that in the former case you can easily calculate the time a case will take to hear, and can mark a covering fee accordingly, while in the latter case you cannot form any accurate estimate of the length the trial. After consulting the common law masters, he laid down the principle that a refresher should only be allowed in a case with witnesses after one entire day's hearing. It will be observed that in Smith v. Buller, Vice-Chancellor Malins allowed refreshers only where cases extended over two days. In the very recent case of Brown v. Sewill (29 W. R. 295) the Master of the Rolls further defined the meaning of the term "one entire day's hearing." He said: -" When a case occupies more than one day, which means more than the time of one day for it may occupy parts of two days, making together less than the time of one whole day the taxing master has a discretion to allow refreshers; but when the case takes less than the time of one day, the taxing master has no discretion, and cannot allow refreshers." THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION BILL. THE Bill which it is proposed to style "The Local Government Areas (Commission) Act, 1881," which has already passed a second reading, and is not likely to excito much discussion in Parliament, although it creates considerable interest throughout the country, is a very useful measure. Its objects, which may be gathered from the 11th clause-of which the germ may be found in the Poor Law Amendment and Divided Parishes Amendment Act, 1876, and the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878-are to provide that-(1) no poor law parish or union shall extend over the boundary of any county; (2) that no poor law parish shall be divided into isolated parts; (3) that no poor law parish shall be so small as to render the administration of the poor law inconvenient; (4) that every highway parish shall be coincident in area with some poor law parish; and (5) that every highway district shall be coincident in area with some rural sanitary district. The work is to be accomplished by means of an indefinite number of "boundary commissioners," assisted by "such assistant commissioners, officers, clerks, and servants" as the Treasury may sanction, and to continue in office until, or rather not longer than, the 31st of December, 1890. The mode of working is to be by "schemes," to be confirmed in due course by Act of Parliament, which may constitute new parishes, dissolve unions, and alter highway districts, and otherwise reorganize and arrange the local government areas of the country. The local authorities are to have full powers and facilities in objecting to schemes, and are further empowered to initiate "schemes" of their own. "Inquiries' may also be held in the discretion of the commissioners, and we presume, though we rather miss an express direction to that effect, that objecting parties will be heard by counsel. The commissioners, at any rate, have full powers to enter lands or premises, to require the attendance of witnesses, and to take sworn evidence. There are savings for the metropolis, for school districts, and for urban sanitary districts; also we find a proviso, which might well be spared, or altered into a discretionary power to be vested in the commissioners or the Charity Commissioners, that "nothing in this Act, or in any such scheme contained, shall prejudice, vary, or affect any right, interest, or jurisdiction in or over any charitable endowment which now is, or hereafter may be, applicable for the benefit of any area which may be dealt with or affected by such scheme." It is not quite clear whether" extra-parochial places" (see 20 Vict. c. 19, s. 4) may be amalgamated with parishes, and we think that occasion might have been taken to provide for "liberties" (ses 13 & 14 Vict. c. 105) and "detached parts of counties (see 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61) being embraced in a scheme, unless indeed the partial and discretionary powers of the statutes already dealing with these sporadic globules of decentralization have been already sufficiently carried into effect. It is very properly provided that the commissioners THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART, &C., TOGETHER WITH INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN COPYRIGHT. By W. A. COPINGER, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition. Stevens & Haynes. Mr. Copinger's book is very comprehensive, dealing with every branch of his subject, and even extending to copyright in foreign countries. So far as we have examined, we have found all the recent authorities noted up with scrupulous care, and there is an unusually good index. These are merits which will, doubtless, lead to the placing of this edition on the shelves of the members of the profession whose business is concerned with copyright; and deservedly, for the book is one of .considerable value. If it were less diffuse and more carefully arranged, we could give it unqualified praise. On some parts, however, on which we could have excused a little diffuseness, we find it absent. For instance, with reference to the copyright in photographic portraits, on which our readers may remember a controversy raged in the Times and in the columns of this journal about two years ago, Mr. Copinger's remarks, on p. 408, are comprised in six lines, which might be more accurately expressed. There is, however, a great deal of valuable, and some curious, information in the book. Thus we learn (p. 286) that the property in almanacks was at one time said to "be the King's-first, because derelict; second, because they regulate the feasts of the Church," and a narrative is given of the efforts of the Stationers' Company to protect the monopoly of almanacks granted to them in 1615, until it was finally overthrown by the decision in Stationers' Company v. Carman (2 W. Bl. 1004). The book will be found entertaining by the general reader, and we do not know a better recent work on the subject for the lawyer. CORRESPONDENCE. NAVAL DISCIPLINE ACT AMENDMENT BILL. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, The Statute Law Committee, some years back, recommended that Government Departments should aid in the work of revision of the statutes by consolidating the particular group of statutes which they have to 1. administer. This is a very useful recommendation, which has been well carried out in regard to the Factory, Customs, Mutiny, and other sets of Acts. I am surprised that no one has noticed the Government Bill on the subject of Naval Discipline just issued. It is stated to be a consolidation Bill, but it is framed in a most novel and absurd manner, as instanced by the following section : "11. Every enactment of this Act which is expressed to be substituted for, or added to, any portion of the "Naval Discipline Act, 1866, shall form part of that Act in the place assigned to it by this Act, and the Naval 'Discipline Act, 1866, shall, after the commencement of, and subject to the savings contained in, this Act, be construed as if the said enactment had been originally enacted therein in the place so assigned, and, where it is substituted for another enactment, had been so enacted in lieu of that enactment. 66 A copy of the Naval Discipline Act, 1866, with every such enactment inserted in the place so assigned, and with the omission of the part repealed by this or any other Act, and with the sections and sub-sections remodelled in such manner as may be necessary in order to bring the same into conformity with this Act, shall be prepared and certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments and deposited with the rolls of Parliament. Her Majesty's Printers shall print in accordance with the copy so certified all copies of the Naval Discipline Act, 1866, which are printed after the commencement of this Act." Now, the result of all this elaboration is not consolidation, for there will still be three Acts on the Statute Book (namely, the Act of 1866, the Act of 1881, and the revised edition of the Act of 1866) when there ought only to be one. repealing all the existing statutes and reprinting them What could be simpler than the old and usual way of with the amendments in one Act? If the Government sets the example of such peculiarities of legislation, what can we expect from private members? J. G. Feb. 15. THE PROCEDURE COMMITTEE. THE subject of the expense and delay in legal proceedings under the Judicature Acts being now under consideration by a committee appointed by the Lord Chancellor, consisting of judges, barristers, and solicitors, the Lord Chief Justice of England being chairman; the Council of the Incorporated Law Society have submitted the following sugges tions to the committee for consideration :— "1. All actions should be tried by one judge, whether they be tried with or without a jury; and every appeal should be made direct to the Court of Appeal. This system has been found to work satisfactorily in the Chancery Division. "2. No appeal should be permitted on a point of practice or procedure from a decision of a judge in court or in chambers, except by his leave; and every permitted appeal should be made direct to the Court of Appeal. "The delay and consequent expense of a succession of appeals, now so frequent, would thus be prevented. 3. Except in vacations, two courts at Nisi Prius should sit continuously in the metropolis, one court to take special and the other common jury actions; and extra courts should be formed if and when found requisite. The arrears of causes waiting for trial in Middlesex and London are exceedingly heavy, and the loss to suitors caused by the delay in the trial of actions is very serious and brings discredit on the administration of justice. Moreover, under the present system, the greatest uncertainty exists as to the time when causes are likely to be heard, and thus it is frequently neces sary to have witnesses in attendance long before they are wanted. "4. Rule 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of April, 1880, by which the practice under the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 67), is abolished, should be annulled, and the practice under the Act should be re-established; the number of days in which judgment may be obtained should be reduced from twelve to eight days. Oid. 16, r. 10, should be made to apply to summary proceedings on bills of exchange. "The alteration here suggested would probably reduce by about one-half the expense of obtaining judgment in undefended cases. "5. There can be no reasonable doubt that the main cause of the heavy expense of modern litigation is due to the largely increased fees paid to counsel of late years, and daily refresher fees, which were all but unknown a quarter especially to the comparatively recent practice of giving of a century ago. It is, therefore, recommended that daily refreshers should be abolished, as being one of the principal causes of the undue lengthening of trials and the increased expense thereby occasioned. "6. The gratuities given to counsels' clerks should be abolished. The existing system, especially the practice of paying a percentage to the clerk on certain fees, leads to 1 fees in many cases being suggested which are not justified by the circumstances, and to a pressure being put on the suitor and his solicitor to which they ought not to be -exposed. "The clerks of counsel, like other persons, should be paid by their employers. 7. It has been suggested that pleadings should be abolished, but the committee are of opinion that, although there may be instances in which pleadings could be dispensed with, yet in the majority of contentious cases the result of not ascertaining, by means of pleadings, the issues to be tried, would be to increase greatly the expense of preparing for trial. "8. The provisions of ord. 14, r. 1, should be extended to actions for recovery of land in cases where the plaintiff seeks to recover possession from a tenant holding over after the expiration or determination of the tenancy, or after his lease has been forfeited by non-payment of rest for which there is no sufficient distress, or through neglect of the tenant to insure." CASES OF THE WEEK. BANKRUPTCY-OFFER OF COMPOSITION BY DEBTOR-ACCEPTANCE BY CREDITORS-APPROVAL OF COURT-JUDICIAL DISCRETION-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 28, 126.—In a case of Er parte The Merchant Banking Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 11th inst., a question arose as to the extent of the power of the Court of Bankruptcy in approving or declining to approve of an arrangement or composition offered by a bankrupt or liquidating debtor to his creditors under section 28 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. That section provides that "the trustee may, with the sanction of a special resolution of the creditors, accept any com. position offered by the bankrupt, or assent to any general scheme of settlement of the affairs of the bankrupt, upon such terms as may be thought expedient, subject, nevertheless, to the approval of the court." Some partners in trade filed a liquidation petition, and by the statement of their affairs, produced at the first meeting of the creditors, it appeared that their debts were about £153,000, and that their assets were estimated to produce about £100,000. The creditors resolved upon a liquidation by arrangement, and appointed a trustee. Shortly afterwards, two of the debtors (the firm consisting of four partners, two of whom managed branches of the business abroad), made an offer to the trus tee to purchase all the joint assets on the terms of paying a composition of ten shillings in the pound to the creditors. The composition was to be paid in four instalments of two and sixpence each, the first at once in cash, and the other three respectively in six, twelve, and eighteen months, security being given for the last instalment, but not for the others. The trustee convened a meeting of the creditors under section 28 to consider this proposal. The day before the meeting was held, the principal partner in the firm was examined in the county court in which the proceedings had been taken, at the instance of a banking company, who were creditors for a considerable amount, and who intended to oppose the acceptance of the debtors' offer. From this examination it appeared that five years before the stoppage of the firm, the debtor had a capital of £80,000 invested in it; that since that time he had laid out £40,000 in furnishing and decorating a large country house, of which he had taken a lease, he being previously possessed of furniture worth £15,000, which was removed to the new house; and that during the five years he had, in addition to the £40,000, lived at the rate of £8,000 a year, though in the same period the average net profits of the business were only £2,000 a year, of which he was entitled to a half. This expenditure was met by drawings from the business, and be admitted that his drawings for the five years had amounted to £80,000. It also appeared that the defendants bad committed several breaches of trust by lending trust moneys which were under his control to the firm. He was the acting executor and trustee of his father's will, in the residue of whose estate he took a large beneficial interest. At the time of the father's death the firm owed him £42,000 in respect of moneys which he had lent to them at interest. A few months before the stoppage of the firm the son lent them a further sum of £1,000 be. longing to the father's estate, this loan being a breach of trust. Two days before the stoppage of the firm he obtained £6,000 by discounting some bills belonging to the firm, and with the proceeds he paid to the trust estate the £4,000, and £2,000, part of the £42,000. He admitted that he did this without being asked by his cotrustees or any one else to make the repayment, and that the firm were hard up for money at the time. In fact, their stoppage two days afterwards was caused by their bankers declining to make them any more advances. The examination also showed that there were strong grou ds for believing that the debtors had in their statement of affairs considerably under-estimated the value of their assets. At the meeting of the creditors the solicitor of the banking company opposed the acceptance of the composition offered, on the ground that the amount of the assets showed that a composition of at least 123. 63. in the pound could be paid, and he offered, on behalf of the banking company, to buy the assets of the firm on the terms of paying the creditors a composition of 10s. 6d. in the pound, in four equal instalments, at the dates proposed by the deb ors, or, if the creditors preferred it, to pay them at once in cash a composition of 10s. 21. in the pound. The creditors, however, by the proper statutory majority, the bank ng company being the only dissentients, resolved to accept the offer of the debtors. The notes of the examination of the principel partner were not, however, read to the meeting. The judge of the Manchester County Court refused to approve of the composition, on the ground that the effect of the arrangement was to hand over all the assets to the debtors without any security being given for the payment of the composition, except the last instalment. Bacon, C.J., reversed this decision. He was of opinion that there was, in regard to the functions of the court, no distinction between sections 28 and 126, and that the court had no power to set aside the determination of the creditors, unless it was shown that there had been some fraud in the proceedings. The Court of Appeal (JE-SEL, M.R., JAMES, and BRETT, L.JJ.) held that this view of section 28 was erroneous. JESSEL, M. R., said that the words of section 28 were clear, that the resolution of the creditors was to be "subject to the approval of the court.'' No terms of approval were laid down by the section, but the obtaining of the approval or sanction of the court to an arrangement was a thing very familiar to all courts, and especially familiar to the judges of the Chancery Division, who were frequently called upon to give the sauction of the court in administration actions, in matters relating to infants, in partnership actions, and in the winding up of companies. His lordship had never heard the proposition doubted that when in such matters the approval of the court was required to make some arrangement valid, it was the duty of the judge fairly to investigate the objections which might be brought before him and to give his opinion judicially upon sufficient reasons. On general principle, therefore, and in the absence of any decision to the contrary, section 28 must be taken to mean what it said-viz., that the approval of the court was to be given or withheld according to reason. In other words, there to be an exercise of a judicial discretion founded on reasons. No doubt the exercise of the discretion was subject to an appeal, but the Court of Appeal ought not to be ready to interfere unless it was clearly shown that the judge of first instance had exercised his discretion wrongly. It was only necessary to refer to the provisions of section 126 to show that the decisions upon it had no bearing upon section 28. Under section 126 the composition was to be approved by two meetings of the creditors; under section 28 there was to be only one meeting. The court was a substitute for the second meeting. The second meeting could investigate everything, and could withhold its confirmation of the resolutions passed at the first meeting, and why should not the court have the same power when there was only one meeting? In the present case his lordship was of opinion that the county court judge had exercised his discretion properly, and that the reason which he had given for his decision was a sufficient one-that is, that the debtors, who had been guilty of such reckless extravagance, were not fit persons to be trusted with the future management of the business and the custody of the assets, when no security was given for the payment of the second and third instalments of the composition. Commercially speaking the debtors were not to be trusted. The fact that the principal partner had committed breaches of trust, and had made such a large payment by Was way of fraudulent preference for the benefit of his own family just before the stoppage of the firm was an additional reason for not trusting him. But his lordship was also of opinion that there was, at least, strong ground for suspecting that the debtors had greatly under-estimated the value of their assets. Moreover, it was impossible to say that the offer made by the banking company was not more favourable to the creditors than the offer made by the debtors, and it was difficult to see why it was not accepted. The majority of the creditors might bind the minority when they were acting in the interest of the creditors; they ought not to be permitted to do so if they were guided by feelings of friendship for the debtors, or by the hope of deriving a profit to themselves indirectly. JAMES and BRETT, L.JJ., concurred. The decision of the Chief Judge was accordingly reversed, and the order of the county court judge restored. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was asked for, and was refused.-SOLICITORS, Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Co.; Phelps, Sidgwick, & Biddle. WILL-EXERCISE OF GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT -GENERAL BEQUEST OF PERSONAL ESTATE-PROCEEDS OF SALE OF REAL ESTATE-WILLS ACT (1 VICT. c. 26), s. 27. -On the 15th inst. the Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and LUSH, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of Jessel, M.R., in the case of Chandler v. Pocock (28 W. R. 806, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 491). The question was whether a testatrix, who, under her marriage settlement, had a general power of appointment over real estate, had exercised the power by her will, and the circumstances were somewhat peculiar. The father of the testatrix, by his will, executed in 1831, devised real estate to her for her life, with remainder, in default of her having issue, to such uses as she should, by will, notwithstanding coverture, appoint. In 1832 she married, and prior to her marriage a settlement was made, to which the father was a party, and by which the devised real estate was limited, after the solemnization of the marriage, to certain uses for the benefit of the father, the husband, and the wife respectively, for their respective lives, with remainder to uses in favour of the issue of the marriage, and in default of issue, a general power of appointment by will was given to the wife, whether covert or sole. The settlement contained a power for the trustees. during the lives of the tenants for life and the survivors and survivor, by their, his, or her direction, to sell the estates, and the trustees were to lay out the money arising from the sale in the purchase of other land to be settled to the same uses, but during the lives of the tenants for life, or the lives or life of the survivors or survivor, the purchases were to be made with their, his, or her consent in writing; and until the money was so laid out the trustees were empowered to invest it in Government securities, the dividends on which were to be paid to the person or persons to whom the rents of the land purchased would be payable. Three days after the execution of the settlement the father made a codicil to his will, by which be re-devised the settled property to the uses of his will, subject to the limitations of the settlement. He died in 1843, and the husband died in 1853. There had been no issue of the marriage. In 1855 the trustees sold the whole of the settled estate for a sum of consols which was transferred into their names by the purchaser. No purchase of other land was made, and in 1875 the trustees transferred the consols into the name of the testatrix at her request. Soon after this transfer was made she executed a will, by which she bequeathed all the residue of her personal estate to W. and M. in equal shares. She died in 1879. She had never had any issue. At the time when she executed her will, and at the time of her death she had personal estate other than the consols which bad been transferred to her by the trustees. Jessel, M. R., held that in determining whether section 27 applied, the question to be considered was what was the personal estate to which it referred, and he was of opinion that in answering this question regard was to be had to the nature of the actual property itself, not to the way in which it would devolve upon the remainderman in default of an exercise of the power. That being so, the consols were clearly personal estate. There was no indication of a contrary intention, and, therefore, the general bequest amounted to an exercise of the power. The Court of Appeal adopted the same view of the case. They were of opinion that the testatrix intended to reduce the consols into her possession and to make it her personal estate, and that she had done all in her power to do so, and that, having regard to the provisions of the Wills Act, it was impossible to cut down the words of the bequest, and to say that it was not an exercise of the power of appointment given to her by the settlement.-SOLICITORS, Rogerson & Ford; J. Crowdy & Son. COMPOSITION-SECURED CREDITOR-EXECUTION LEVIED BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MEETINGS-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 125, 126-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 279, 281, 282, 283.-In a case of Ex parte McLaren, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., a curious question was raised, apparently for the first time since the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, came into operation, as to the effect of an execution levied on the goods of a compounding debtor between the first and second meetings of the creditors under the liquidation petition. In Ex parte Jones (23 W. R. 886, L. R. 10 Ch. 663) it was decided by the Court of Appeal that an execution levied between the filing of the petition and the first meeting of the creditors was valid as against the debtor, the creditors having resolved to accept a composition. But it was not necessary for the court to go further on that occasion. In Ex parte McLaren a creditor had commenced an action. against the debtor before the filing of the petition. The creditors at their first meeting under the petition resolved to accept a composition. After this, but before the second meeting, the plaintiff in the action signed final judgment and issued execution, and the sberiff had seized the debtor's goods before the second meeting. An injunction was then granted to restrain the plaintiff from further proceeding under his judg ment. At the second meeting the composition resolutions. were confirmed and they were subsequently registered. After this had been done Mr. Registrar Brougham made the injunction absolute. The creditor had not proved his debt in the composition proceedings, and had not voted upon the resolutions. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) discharged the registrar's order, being of opinion that there was nothing in the Bankruptcy Act to take away the legal right of the execution creditor to enforce his execution. JAMES, L.J., said that the extraordinary resolution which, under section 126, is to bind the non-assenting creditors, did not exist till the resolution passed at the first meeting had been confirmed at the second. meeting, and section 126 expressly said that, until the registration of the resolution, it should be of no validity. BRETT, L.J., said that the only thing which could deprive the execution creditor of his rights would be the existence of an extraordinary resolution under section 126 at the time when the sheriff levied under the writ. was no extraordinary resolution until the resolution passed at the first meeting had been confirmed at the second, and. the resolution had no validity till it had been registered, for there were distinct negative words in section 126 to that effect. Consequently, a valid security could be obtained at any time before the extraordinary resolution had been registered by any creditor who had not shut himself out from so doing on some equitable ground. His lordship added that he thought the registrar had misconceived the meaning of what was said by Mellish, L.J., in Ex parte Jones (L. R. 10 Ch. 666). COTTON, L.J., was of opinion that, except by his own personal conduct, no creditor was precluded from exercising his legal rights between the two meetings,. the joint vote of which was necessary to constitute the resolution which was to bind the creditors. His lordship referred to the analogy afforded by section 130 of the Companies. Act, 1862, which provides that a volantary winding up of a "shall be deemed to commence at the time of the company passing of the resolution authorizing such winding up,' upon which it was held by the Court of Appeal in Weston's case (17 W. R. 510, L. R. 4 Ch. 20) that when the resolution is a special one, passed at one meeting and confirmed at another, it is only after the confirmation at the second meeting that it becomes a resolution authorizing a winding up of the company. JAMES, L.J., added that their lordships were all of opinion that the extraordinary resolution had no legal validity whatever until it had been registered. It was urged on behalf of the debtor that the execution creditor was precluded from enforcing his legal right by reason of his having acquiesced in the composition proceedings. He had, however, done nothing but attend the first meeting, without taking any part in the proceedings, not even saying a word at the meeting. It was contended that this amounted to an acquiescence in the debtor's statement of affairs, in which the creditor's name was entered as having no security for his debt, that statement being the basis of the proceedings. The court, however, held that there was no acquiescence But there |
