paid off, it may not be permissible, it being for the benefit of all parties interested, that the debt should be paid off by a mortgage of both A. and B. estates. Under the will of the fifth Lord Monson, dated in 1841, the applicant, Lord Oxenbridge, was tenant for life of certain settled estates, and he was tenant for life also of certain estates conveyed to the uses of the said will in 1889. In 1892 the applicant brought into settlement-ie, under trusts similar to those of the said will and conveyance of 1889, certain other Lincolnshire property which was subject to heavy incumbrances, particularly one for £52,650 to the Law Life Office. Recently, in consequence of the depreciation of the value of land in Lincolnshire, the Law Life Office had given notice calling in their mortgage. With the exception of a certain jointure and power to charge annuities which could be released, the limitations in the two settlements-i.e., the will of 1841 and conveyance of 1889, being considered one, and the deed of 1892 the other, were identical, and the persons interested and the trustees were the same in both cases, and all concurred in the present application. Under these circumstances Lord Oxenbridge took out the present summons asking for an order declaring that he had power to raise upon the hereditaments comprised in both settlements the sums required to meet the incumbrances on the second property. ROMER, J., stated the legal point raised, and said that, in his opinion, it would be clearly beneficial to the settled estates as a whole that the application should be complied with. The cases of Re Mundy's Settled Estates (1891, 1 Ch. 399) and Re Byng's Settled Estates (1892, 2 Ch. 219) were decisions that two instruments could constitute one settlement under section 2, sub-section 1, of the Act, and that if estate A. had been subject to the mortgage the fresh mortgage might have been on estate B. He saw no reason why there should be any distinction in the present and converse case. The only ground suggested for making a distinction was that to allow that a second estate might be settled in the same way as a prior estate so as to become one with it for all purposes under the Settled Land Act, might lead to acts of fraud. It was suggested that the mortgagor of estate B., who was tenant for life of the settled estate A., might settle the worthless equity of redemption of B., and then free himself from his personal liability as mortgagor by getting estate A. to pay the mortgage de bt. But in reality such a case of fraud could not practically be carried out, for, apart from the difficulty of getting trustees appointed or to accept office on the settlement of a worthless property like B., before any mortgage of esate A. could be made, notice would have to be given to the trustees under section 45 of the Act of 1882, and they would at once put a stop to the attempted fraud by obtaining an injunction as in Hampden v. The Earl of Buckinghamshire (1893, 2 Ch. 531). A mere Euggestion that fraud might be attempted ought not to interfere with the utility of the decision in Re Mundy's Settled Estates. In ordinary cases, when two estates were settled in the same way, it was most useful to the beneficiaries that the two should be treated together for the purposes of the Settled Land Act, and it would impair the usefulness of the Act to limit it so as to exclude an application in the way contended for by the respondents to the summons. He held that what was proposed to be done could be lawfully done, and he therefore, and for the reasons given, made an order as prayed.-COUNSEL, Farwell, Q.C., and F. C. Wright; Neville, Q.C., and Ribton; Onslow. SOLICITORS, Stileman, Neate, & Toynbee, for Toynbee, Larken, & Toynbee, Lincoin; Crawley & Co.

Reported by RALEGH B. PHILLPOTTS, Barrister at-Law.)

HOBSON v. TULLOCH. Romer, J. 18th Feb. COVENANT-CONVEYANCE OF FREEHOLD-RESTRICTION AGAINST USER OTHERWISE THAN AS PRIVATE RESIDENCE-BOARDING-HOUSE.

Motion. This was a motion to restrain the 'defendant from using a certain dwelling-house called "Whitefriars," situated on the Cotton Estate in Hampstead, for the purposes of any trade or manufacture, or for any other purpose than a private residence. The facts were as follow In 1886 the plaintiff sold the house "Whitefriars," which was the largest house on the Cotton Estate, to one John Saner, and in the conveyance was contained a covenant on the part of the purchaser that he, his heirs and assigns would observe the stipulations in the schedule thereto. The material covenant was "not to use and occupy, or permit to be used or occupied, the said messuage or dwelling-house for the purpose of any trade or manufacture, or for any other purpose than a private residence." In September, 1897, the defendant purchased the fee simple of the house "Whitefriars" from the mortgagees of John Saner. The defendant had carried on for some years, and was still carrying on, a girls' school on premises in West Hampstead, about half a mile distant from "Whitefriars," and not on the Cotton Estate. The point at issue was whether her proposed user of the house "Whitefriars" as a house where pupils attending the school and governesses might be boarded was an infringement of the above-mentioned covenant. The defendant stated that she did not intend to use the house" "" Whitefriars as a school, or to put up any board or to advertise that those premises were in any way connected with her school. It was insisted on behalf of the plaintiff that in effect the proposed user as a boarding-house for pupils was part of the school business, and for the defendant that there was nothing in such user inconsistent with use as a private residence and no detriment to the neighbours. Reference was made to German v. Chapman (25 W. R. 802, 7 Ch. D. 271), and Rolls v. Miller (32 W. R. 386, 27 Ch. D. 71). ROMER, J.-The question raised in this case is a very short pointnamely, whether what the defendant proposes to do will not amount to the use of the house "Whitefriars" for a purpose other than a private residence. In my opinion it would be such a use. On the facts it is clear that she intends to use it a boarding-house for her adjacent school, and to take in there governesses and pupils on paying terms to make a profit, and to use the house as an adjunct to the school. In my opinion that is

practically a business and not using the house as a private residence within the ordinary acceptance of the term, any more than if it was proposed to use it as a lodging-house. It does not seem to me material as to whether or not there is any advertisement of the proposed user. The question is aye or nay, Would the proposed user be using the house as a private residence? In my opinion it would not, and I so decide.-COUNSEL, Farwell, Q.C., and T. F. Hobson; Neville, Q.C., and H. C. Gollan. SOLICI TORS, Edwards & Cohen; William Haigh. [Reported by RALEGH B. PHILLPOTTS, Barrister-at-Law.]

Winding-up Cases.

Re OLYMPIA (LIM.). Wright, J. 17th Feb. COMPANY-WINDING Up-Misfeasance-Promoter-FIDUCIARY POSITION—SECRET PROFIT.

proposes to

Misfeasance summons. The official receiver and liquidator asked for a declaration that Mr. Montague Gluckstein was guilty of misfeasance and breach of trust, in that he and others, while promoters and directors of the company obtained and retained the sum of £6,341, which had been Olympia had secretly for their own use out of the purchase-money paid by divided among them. The summons asked that Mr. Gluckstein might be ordered to repay the whole amount with interest. In 1892 the grounds and buildings of Olympia were the property of the National Agricultural Hall Co. (Limited), a company then in liquidation, it was also subject to debentures for £100,000, and to a second mortgage for £10,000. A syndiformed, of which Mr. Gluckstein and the other persons mentioned in the cate of thirty-three persons, afterwards called the Freehold Syndicate, was summons were the founders and trustees, as well as members, and this syndicate, by purchasing the debentures and the mortgage, was alleged to have made a profit of about £20,000. The £6,341 named in the summons was said to be the share of Gluckstein and the other trustees in this profit. A form of agreement, dated the 19th of January, 1893, was drawn up for signature, each on a separate print, by the thirty-three members of the syndicate. This agreement recited that the syndicate " purchase Olympia, Kensington, Middlesex, with a view to the resale to some other purchaser. thereof either to a company to be registered under the Companies Acts, or 99 Each subscriber was to subscribe a certain amount, paying a deposit on signing the agreement, and the trustees were to do their best to purchase Olympia on behalf of the syndicate and to resell it at such reasonable advance in price as would cover the charges and expenses and yield a bonus for division amongst the subscribers to the agreement. The trustees had also power to purchase as an interim investment any first mortgage bonds of the National Agricultural Hall Co. (Limited). by auction by the chief clerk in the debenture-holders' action against the In February, 1893, the Olympia property was sold National Agricultural Hall Co. for £140,000 to Mr. John Hart, acting for the trustees of the syndicate, and this sum was sufficient to pay the expenses of the liquidation and to pay in respect of the debentures and the mortgage a sum sufficient to give the profit of about £20,000 above mentioned. On the 20th of March, 1893, the syndicate trustees entered into an agreement with Mr. Charles Close, as trustee for an intended. company (afterwards registered in 1893 as Olympia (Limited) ), for the sale of the Olympia property to the company for £180,000, made up of (a) £20,000 paid into court as deposit under the agreement for sale with the liquidator of the National Agricultural Hall Co.; (b) as to £120,000 paid into court or as might be directed by the judge; and (c) as to the balance of about £40,000 paid to the vendors, the trustees of the syndicate. vendors were to pay the preliminary expenses, and that "the validity of Clause 7 provided that the this agreement shall not be impeached on the ground that the vendors parties hereto, as promoters or otherwise, stand in a fiduciary relation to the company, nor shall the vendors parties hereto be required to account for any profit made or to be made by them by the purchase of any debentures of the National Agricultural Hall Co. (Limited), or of any other charges upon any of the property of the last-mentioned company, which into court in the said action." Olympia (Limited) was registered shortly are to be satisfied wholly or in part out of the fund paid or to be paid afterwards with a capital of £155,000 in £5 shares, one of the objects of the company, as stated in the memorandum of association, being to adopt and carry into effect the agreement of the 20th of March, 1893. The agreement was afterwards adopted by the company. In March the company issued a prospectus to the public inviting subscriptions for shares and debentures. The directors were stated be be Messrs. Joseph Lyons, John Hart, H. T. Hartley, and Montague Gluckstein, and the prospectus disclosed the fact that the directors were also the vendors, and that. £140,000 had been paid for the property, and also the price to be paid by Olympia (Limited). The agreement of the 20th of March, 1893. was mentioned by the usual reference to the date and parties to it, but the profit made out of the debentures and mortgage was not stated. promoter; it was impossible to say what his position would have been it WRIGHT, J., held that in February, 1893, the respondent was not a he had been a promoter. He and the others mentioned in the summons had bought the property out of their own money and were perfectly free to do what they liked with it, and they were, therefore, not in a fiduciary should be very sorry to say that general words like those in the agreement position to any person or body. If they had really been promoters he of the 20th of March, 1893, should make people think that such a provision would be sufficient to protect those who were really promoters. The application was dismissed with costs.-COUNSEL, A. T. Lawrence, Q.C., and Kirby; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and Muir Mackenzie. Oliver; Lewis & Lewis. SOLICITORS, Roderio

[Reported by C. W. MEAD, Barrister-at-Law.]

High Court-Queen's Bench Division.

MANDER v. RIDGWAY. Div. Court. 15th Feb. PRACTICE-COUNTY COURT-EVIDENCE-DOCUMENT-SUFFICIENCY OF STAMP -RULING OF COUNTY COURT JUDGE-Right of APPEAL-COUNTY COURTS ACT, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 164—Ord. XXXIX., v. 8. This was an appeal from a decision of a county court judge, and the question raised was whether there is any appeal from a county court judge who has held that a document has or has not been properly stamped. In this case an instrument on which the action was brought was produced by the plaintiff and was found to be stamped with six penny postage stamps. The defendant objected to its admission, on the ground that it was not sufficiently stamped. The learned judge held that it was properly stamped. The defendant appealed, asking for a new trial, on the ground that there had been a wrongful admission of evidence. In support of the appeal it was contended that there is a general right of appeal given by section 120 of the County Courts Act, 1888, and the following case was cited: Neptune Steam Navigation Co. v. Sclater, The Delano (43 W. R. 65; 1895, P. 40). For the respondent it was contended that there is no right to appeal, and there is no authority to shew that such a right exists. By section 31 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), stamp appeals are prohibited. When a judge in the High Court rules that a document is sufficiently stamped his decision is final: Siordet v. Kuczynski (4 W. R. 153, 17 C. B. 251) and Blewitt v. Tritton (41 W. R. 36; 1892, 2 Q. B. 327). By section 164 of the County Courts Act, 1888, it is enacted that in any case not expressly by that Act provided for, the general principles of practice in the High Court of Justice may be adopted and applied to actions and matters in the county courts. Therefore there is no right of appeal in this case. Ord. 39, r. 8, provides that "a new trial shall not be granted by reason of the ruling of any judge that the stamp upon any document is sufficient, or that the document does not require a stamp.

THE COURT (MATHEW and WRIGHT, JJ.) dismissed the appeal. MATHEW, J., in giving judgment, said there could be no appeal in such a case. By section 164 of the County Courts Act, 1888, the general principles of practice of the High Court of Justice are applied to the County courts in matters not otherwise provided for. In this case the learned county court judge has held that a certain document tendered in evidence was properly stamped. In the High Court it is expressly provided, by ord. 39, r. 8, that such a decision is final, and therefore such a decision in the county court must be final, and there is no right of appeal.

WRIGHT, J., Concurred. Appeal dismissed.-COUNSEL, W. Graham ; Macaskie. SOLICITORS, Digby & Riddell, for H. & E. H. Small, Birmingham; Field, Roscoe, & Co., for W. L. Whitehorn, Banbury.

[Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Barrister-at-Law.]

THOMPSON

LORD MONKSWELL AND OTHERS (Petitioners) v. (Respondent). Div. Court. 11th and 12th Feb. ELECTION PETITION-SCHOOL BOARD ELECTION-RECOUNT-VALIDITY OF ELECTION-BALLOT ACT, 1872 (35 & 36 VICT. c. 33), s. 2. Special case stated for the opinion of the court by order of Kennedy, J., dated the 21st of December, 1897, and made under section 93, sub section 7 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, in the matter of an election petition touching the election for the office of members of the School Board for London for the Chelsea Division held on the 25th of November, 1897. There were eight candidates for the five seats at the election, and in the order of the number of the votes given to the candidates, the fourth (Viscount Morpeth) had 13,292 votes; the fifth (Mr. William Thompson, the respondent) had 13,221 votes; and the sixth (Mr. Leslie Johnson) had 13,218. The first five of the candidates were declared by the returning officer in the usual manner to be elected. The fifth or last of the successful candidates was Mr. Thompson, the respondent, and the sixth in order, being the first unsuccessful candidate, was Mr. Leslie Johnson. A petition was presented against the return of the said William Thompson (the respondent) alleging that mistakes had been made in the counting of the ballot-papers and the votes recorded thereon in favour of the respondent and of Mr. Leslie Johnson, and that by reason of such mistakes the result of the poll had not been truly ascertained and that the majority of votes declared in favour of the respondent was an apparent majority only, and that the said Mr. Leslie Johnson had a majority of lawful and valid votes at the election. The petition prayed for a recount of the votes recorded in favour of the respondent and the said Leslie Johnson, and that it might be determined that the respondent was not duly elected, and that his election was void, and that Mr. Leslie Johnson (for whom the seat was claimed by the petitioners) was duly elected and ought to have been returned. Kennedy, J., ordered that the case raised by the petition should be stated as a special case by Mr. Cooke of the Election Petitions Office, and that the ballot papers and

votes recorded thereon in favour of the said Leslie Johnson and the respondent respectively should be re-counted before Mr. Cooke, and that he should state the result of the recount in the special case and that such only of the ballot papers as might be in dispute at the end of the recount should be annexed to the case. Such examination and recount took place, with the result that Mr. Leslie Johnson had 13,183 votes, and the respondent had 13,176 votes; and there were in addition, 23 ballot papers remaining in dispute at the end of the recount. The respondent stated he would contend-whether the examination of the disputed ballot papers showed that Mr. Johnson had a majority or not over the respondent-that it is in any case not sufficient for the petitioners merely to shew a majority for Mr. Johnson over the respondent, without further

The

shewing that on a true calculation of all the votes recorded at the election, the respondent was not one of the five candidates standing highest on the poll, and that Mr. Leslie Johnson was one of such candidates; in other words, that before the respondent could be unseated it was necessary for the petitioners to shew not only as between the respondent himself and Mr. Johnson that Mr. Johnson had a larger number of votes than the respondent, but that upon a recount of all the votes recorded at the election, the respondent was not among the five successful candidates. In candidates, the official declaration of the result of the poll not having been answer to this objection the petitioners alleged that as regards the first four questioned by petition, is now conclusive as to their election and as to the number of votes polled for each of them, and that it was sufficient for the petitioners so shew that upon the recount as between the respondent and Mr. Johnson, Mr. Johnson had the larger number of votes. result of the adjudication by the court of the disputed ballot papers was to place Mr. Johnson in a majority of five over the respondent, and the it was sufficient for them merely to shew that Mr. Johnson had a majority question of law was then argued as to whether-as the petitioners allegedover the respondent, or whether as the respondent alleged that that upon a recount of the whole votes for all the candidates, he (the the petitioners must also shew, in order to unseat the respondent, respondent) did not come within the first five candidates. THE COURT (HAWKINS and CHANNELL, JJ.), without calling upon the petitioners, held that as there was no petition presented against the votes recorded for the first four candidates within the twenty-one days allowed, and as there was no recount asked in respect of such candidates, the result as declared by the returning officer under section 2 of the Ballot Act, 1872, was final as regards them, and that such result could not be questioned in the present case; and that, therefore, it was sufficient to unseat the respondent, and to seat Mr. Johnson, if it were shewn that as between them Mr. Johnson had a majority of votes over the respondent; that it was for the respondent, if he asserted that the return as to the votes of the first four candidates was incorrect, to prove such incorrectness, which he had not done, and that, therefore, Mr. Johnson, having a majority of lawful votes over the respondent, was entitled to the seat as against the respondent.-COUNSEL, S. H. Day and Willoughby Williams; Yarborough Anderson. SOLICITORS, Radford & Frankland; Lewin & Co.

[Reported by Sir SHERSTON BAKER, Bart., Barrister-at-Law.

COLBECK v. ASHFORD. Div. Court. 15th Feb.
JUSTICES-SEA FISHERIES-TRAWL NET.

This was an appeal on a stated case from a conviction by the justices for the East Riding of the county of York sitting in petty sessions at Bridlington, on the 4th of September, 1897, of Haggitt Colbeck, upon an informa tion preferred under bye-law 1 of the North-Eastern Sea Fisheries District, charging the said Colbeck with unlawfully using in fishing for sea fish a certain trawl contrary to that bye-law. Bye-law 1 is as follows: "Within the North-Eastern Sea Fisheries District, except as may be otherwise provided by the 13th section of the Sea Fisheries Regulation Act, 1888, a person shall not use in fishing for sea fish, any trawl or trawl net, or any net having a beam which is pulled or pushed or otherwise propelled along or over the bottom of or in the sea, or along or over the sea shore, or any seine net, sand-eel net, sparling net, haffle It was proved before the magistrates that the net, or offal net." appellant was in the area affected by the above bye-law with a steamboat about 50 feet long and was trawling, and that the net used otter" trawl. This was a trawl of a new construction. It had no beam across from side to side as found in the usual form of trawl nets, but it had two "otter" boards fixed by a new mechanical system, and these were kept apart by their motion through the water and thus held a line across instead of a beam. The magistrates convicted the appellant and fined him £10 and costs, and ordered the fishing net to be confiscated. The defendant then appealed, and the question for the court the fact that the appellant was using such a trawl excluded him from the was whether the said bye-law applies to an "otter" trawl, or whether operation of the bye-law. For the appellant it was contended that the bye-law only applies to a trawl net with a beam. The net used by the appellant was a new net and was not contemplated when the bye-law was made. The bye-law referred to any trawl net with a beam, and it should

was an

be so read.

THE COURT (MATHEW and WRIGHT, JJ.) dismissed the appeal and hel that the words of the bye-law must be construed in their natural sense. They really meant that one may not use a trawl net or net with a beam or any imitation. A beam is not an essential part of a trawl net. The magistrates were right in convicting the appellant and the conviction The magistrates had no doubt inflicted a somewhat must be confirmed. severe penalty, but it was not for the court to interfere in that matter. Appeal dismissed.-COUNSEL, Isaacs; Kemp. SOLICITORS, C. J. Smith & Hudson; Harefield & Lambert, Hull.

[Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Barrister-at-Law.]

appellant in the first case, had had numerous contracts for differences with George Gregory & Co., and on the 1st of February, 1897, his account shewed winnings to the amount of about £220. On the 8th of February Waud directed George Gregory & Co. to purchase £200 Great Eastern Railway Stock, for investment; and on the 9th of February directed them to apply his winnings to pay for the same. Gregory & Co. sent Mr. Waud a contract shewing that the £200 Great Eastern Stock was sold to him, but never delivered the stock. Upon the 3rd of April, 1897, Mr. Waud's account again shewed considerable winnings, which he directed to be applied in purchase of Dover "A" Stock, but as in the other case Gregory & Co. failed to deliver. Mr. Waud proved for damages for the non-delivery of this stock, but the trustee rejected the proof on the ground that there was no consideration for Cronmire's promise to deliver the stock, because Cronmire was not to get anything for it except a discharge or set-off of a claim for gambling differences. A further item in Mr. Waud's proof was a claim for £60 cover, which had not been appropriated to losses at the time of Cronmire's death. Mr. Chetham's claim, which was argued with this part of Mr. Waud's, was similar in nature but larger in amount The trustee rejected the claims for cover on the ground that they were irrecoverable under the Gaming Act, 1845, s. 18, as sums "which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made." Mr. Waud and Mr. Chetham having both appealed, their cases were argued on the 11th and 25th of January, when judgment was reserved.

WRIGHT, J., delivered judgment in favour of the appellants on the 19th of February. As to the first part of Mr. Waud's claim, his lordship held that Cronmire's contract to sell the Great Eastern Stock on the 8th of February shewed a written and real agreement made on that day by which Waud became bound to take up and pay in cash on the first day of the account, and Cronmire became bound to deliver on such payment being made. The next day, as appeared by a letter from Waud dated the 9th of February, Waud proposed that, instead of cash passing, the payment should be made out of the balance due to him, and Cronmire assented. That relieved Waud of the necessity for performing the condition of payment in cash, but did not otherwise alter Cronmire's conditional contract to deliver, which was a good one when made. As to the claim for the Dover "A" Stock, his lordship came to the same conclusion, and allowed Mr. Waud to prove for damages for the non-delivery of both the stocks. As to the claims of Mr. Waud and Mr. Chetham for unexhausted cover, his lordship, after fully reviewing the authorities on the subject held that cover so deposited may be recovered by the depositor at any time before it has been appropriated to losses, and that the taking steps to recover it is in itself a sufficient repudiation of the gaming contract under which it has been deposited.-COUNSEL, Herbert Reed, Q.C., and Israel Davis; Carrington; Robson, Q.C., and Macaskie. SOLICITORS, Atkinson & Dresser; Lowless & Co.; H. H. Boorne.

[Reported by P. M. FRANCKE, Barrister-at-Law.]

LAW SOCIETIES.

THE HARDWICKE SOCIETY.

The annual dinner of this society was held on Monday at the Westminster Palace Hotel. Mr. Edward Atkin, the president, was in the chair. The chief guest was the Lord Chancellor, and there were also present the Earl of Hardwicke, the Bishop of London, the Japanese Minister, the Chinese Minister, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal (High Commissioner for Canada), the Siamese Minister, Mr. Justice Phillimore, Sir Francis Jeune, and many others.

The PRESIDENT, in proposing "Our Guests," congratulated the Lord Chancellor on the honour which her Majesty had been pleased to confer upon him; and referred to his connection with the Hardwicke Society, and said that a few of the members of the society wished to make him a little presentation. A loving cup had been subscribed for by past and present officers and present members, and it was offered to Lord Halsbury as an expression of the regard they had for him.

The cup was then filled with champagne, and the president drank from it to the health of the Lord Chancellor amid loud cheers.

The LORD CHANCELLOR, in reply, referred to the fact that fifty years ago he was one of the founders of the Hardwicke Society. He would like to mention that the Lord Hardwicke, after whom the society was named, twice refused office rather than compromise the principles which he held. He believed that if they searched the record of British history they would find no class more distinguished than lawyers for their determination to adhere to the principles which they professed, despite the common talk about place-hunting and self-seeking. His belief was that the lawyers were the really disinterested class of the community, and he thought they were the most liberal-minded and candid listeners and speakers in the community. It was not simply because they were lawyers, but because he believed the habit and education of lawyers, and the mode in which they were taught to recognize the fact of there being two sides of a question, was the best education any human being could receive. It was not, as a matter of fact, very easy to recognize the fact that one might be mistaken. Most people thought they were certainly in the right, but he thought lawyers were apt to remember that they might possibly be in the wrong, and both lawyers and judges-especially the latter-were called upon to remember that they had to listen and not to make up their minds until they had heard both sides. It would be undesirable for him, for many reasons, to point to object-lessons as to what was not a system of hearing both sides equally. All he could say was that the one thing which English lawyers and Englishmen, by reason of the education of

English lawyers, were apt to remember was that each man had a right to be equally heard, and that equal force ought to be given to what he said. It was for that reason he believed that the great institution of trial by jury was one of the most efficient means of education tɔ English people that had ever been invented. He knew it was very easy to sneer and to make a joke of what the jury might do, but let any man consider what the importance of the administration of justice was to mankind, let him consider this-that each citizen in turn might be called upon, in every county in England, from time to time, to see and to take part in the administration of justice under the procedure of one of her Majesty's judges. He would ask any man what could be a better and more enduring education to anyone than to have that kind of thing put before him as one of the duties he had to fulfil, and to learn from that what the spirit of fairness was, and how important it was that they should have fair play insisted on as one of the institutions of their country. These were not times in which we could neglect that education. There was one consolation that those could enjoy who, like himself, could look back with fifty years' experience of the Hardwicke Society, and that was the pleasure with which they saw that those who were to succeed them exhibited the same quality of determination to do right which they remembered when they were themselves young. He did not suppose there was any period in the history of England when we had a more intelligent, a more coura. geous, and a more independent bar, and, as a natural consequence, flowing from those qualities, a more independent bench of judges. The Lord Chancellor concluded by thanking the subscribers to the cup for their gift, and asked the Hardwicke Society to keep it for him in memory of that night.

Mr. BIRRELL, M.P., proposed "Her Majesty's Judges," to which Mr. Justice PHILLIMORE responded.

The JAPANESE MINISTER proposed "The Four Inns of Court," which was acknowledged by Mr. ÎNDERWICK, Q.C.

The Hon. M. M. MACNAGHTEN gave "The Visitors," coupling with the toast the names of the CHINESE MINISTER and LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL.

The CHINESE MINISTER, in reply, said that in his optical eye he saw a great and powerful Lord Chancellor before him. But in his mind's eye he saw a great many potential Lords Chancellor, who, in the ardour of their youth, were now pressing forward to the Woolsack. What struck a foreigner, and especially one who came from a very ancient nation, where antiquity was appreciated more than anything else, was the permanence of English institutions, which, unlike individuals, did not appear to grow old with age. The Inns of Court had been good enough to give opportunities to Chinese students to study law.

Mr. HERBERT PAUL proposed "Kindred Societies," to which the PRESIDENTS of the OXFORD and CAMBRIDGE UNIONS replied. The toast of "The Hardwicke Society" was proposed by Mr. CRUMP, Q.C., and acknowledged by Mr. CECIL WALSH (the vice-president).

SHEFFIELD DISTRICT INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. The following are extracts from the report of the committee: Members.-The number of members is now 164.

Land Transfer Act.-The familiar title of the Land Transfer Bill has now developed into the Land Transfer Act, which received the Royal Assent on the 6th of August, 1897. Part I. of the Act is a survival, in an emasculated form, of provisions in previous Bills destined to assimilate the devolution of real estate on death to that of personal estate. The House of Lords declined to abolish the principle of primogeniture, and to allow freeholds to descend to the next-of-kin, as proposed, but allowed the portion of the Bill providing that freeholds should devolve to, and become vested in, a personal representative on death, like leaseholds, to remain. This most important alteration of the law applies in the case of any person dying after the 1st of January, 1898, and the details of it need most careful consideration. Practitioners will have to decide whether a conveyance should be taken in every case from the real representative to the heir or devisee, what shall be the future forms of covenants relating to real estate and many other matters. It is probable that many questions will arise in construing this part of the Act, and it will cause an alteration in the form of oaths of executors and administrators, and grants of probate and administration.

County Court Rules. Your committee had under careful consideration certain new county court rules, which it was proposed should come into operation on the 25th of March last, and they objected to those portions which provided that, "in granting leave to issue a summons against a defendant residing out of the jurisdiction, the registrar shall take into account the balance of convenience' of such a course"; and "that where such a summons is issued, and the defendant lives more than twenty miles from the court, the plaintiff must deposit a sum in court to meet the possible travelling and other expenses of the defendant, should the latter prove successful." They accordingly forwarded to the Lord Chancellor a resolution pointing out their objections, and requesting that the rules should be reconsidered. The rules were subsequently rescinded, and in May further rules were issued with the objectionable provisions omitted.

Registration of Affidavits of Intestacy.-An opinion of Mr. John Dixon was taken on this question, and was as follows: "I think that a purchaser from an heir-at-law of land in Yorkshire is entitled to require the vendor to register an affidavit of intestacy, even though it might perhaps be held that such an affidavit is not absolutely essential to the title; and I agree that a slight amendment of the wording of the seventh condition of sale is desirable, which I have accordingly made in the copy conditions herewith.-JOHN DIXON. May 22, 1897." The amendment recommended Mr. Dixon is effected by inserting, in the third line from the top of the