through his proper work without raising unnecessary objections. On Wednesday last, however, counsel moved before Vice-Chancellor HALL that the Chancery Paymaster might be instructed to act upon an affidavit which he had objected to act ou, because, being made in a remote part of America, it purported to be sworn before a person describing himself as a "probate judge." The affidavit had passed the censorship of the Masters of the Central Office, who had placed it on the file, and that fact alone we should have thought sufficient to show that the proper formalities had been complied with. The Vice-Chancellor directed the Paymaster to act upon the affidavit. It would be convenient to solicitors to be informed by what right the Chancery Paymaster considers himself entitled to go behind an affidavit for such a purpose, and more especially after the proper officer has held it to be sufficient. The Masters now file all affidavits sworn before any person qualified to administer oaths in foreign countries, and so long as the signature is authenticated by the official seal of this qualified person, no question is ever raised. In fact this affidavit was rightly filed, and the application to the Vice-Chancellor ought not to have been necessary; but this brings us to the whole subject of affidavits required by the Chancery Paymaster. Take, for instance, an affidavit of residue. The deponent, who really knows nothing, or next to nothing, of the matter, has to obtain the facts from the Paymaster himself, and then to go and swear to them. Such an absurdity is a relic of the old days of “ unnecessary oaths and affirmations," and ought to be abolished. If the residue of a fund has to be ascertained, the Chancery Paymaster's certificate of that fact should take the place of an affidavit.

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THE QUESTION as to what "relief" may be applied for and given to a defendant on motion under ord. 40, r. 11 recently came before the Master of the Rolls in Pascoe v Richards (noted ante, p. 258). The pleadings, including special reply and joinder of issue, had been delivered and were closed; and the defendant thereupon moved, under ord. 40, r. 11, to dismiss the action, on the ground that the pleadings did not show any case for relief against him. It appears to have been argued, on the authority of Litton v. Litton (24 W. R. 962, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 794), that the dismissal of an action was not "relief claimed" within the meaning of ord. 40, r. 11; and the fact that the defendant had not made a counter-claim was relied on in support of the argument that no relief" could be granted to him. The Master of the Rolls, however, took a view similar to that which we ventured to express (21 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 236) when commenting on the decision in Litton v. Litton-viz., that the dismissal of an action was the very best relief that could be granted to a defendant in the action; and pointed out that the word "relief" in the Rules of Court should be construed in a wider sense than as being merely equivalent to the "relief" expressly claimed by a pleading. The learned judge distinguished Litton v. Litton; but it appears to us that his decision must have the effect of overruling the decision in that case. The only difference in the two cases was that in Litton v. Litton default had been made in replying to a defence which, if uncontradicted, constituted a good defence to the claim" (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 794), while in Pascoe v. Richards a special reply, followed by a simple joinder of issue, had been delivered; but the admitted facts showed no ground for relief against the defendant. The effect of ord. 29, r. 12, is to put both cases on precisely the same footing; for it, in effect, provides that default in reply shall operate as an admission of all statements of fact in the defence, and that the pleadings shall be deemed to be closed on the expiration of the time limited for reply. Therefore, in each case the pleadings were closed, and the admissions on the pleadings showed no case for relief against the defendant; but it was clear

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that if the action went to trial, judgment must be in his favour. Surely, in such a case, it could scarcely be doubted that if the defendant, by notice of motion, "claimed such relief" as the dismissal of the action, he would only be applying "for such order as he may, upon the admissions of fact in the pleadings, be entitled to," and would, therefore, be strictly within the letter as well as the spirit of ord. 40, r. 11? But in Litton v. Litton it was expressly decided that a defendant seeking to dismiss an action in this manner is not a party applying for relief within the meaning of that rule," and it was held that he must proceed under ord. 36, r. 4, or ord. 36, r. 4a, which, in effect, provide that he must wait for six weeks, and then either set down the action for trial (if the plaintiff fails to do so), or move to dismiss for want of prosecution. That a defendant whose right to judgment on the admitted facts is not clear must avail himself of one of these provisions we should not dispute; but, in spite of the decision in Litton v. Litton, we have always entertained a strong opinion that, although a defendant whose case is clear on the merits may, if he pleases, proceed under ord. 36, r. 4, or 4a, he ought not to be precluded by a narrow and rigid construction of the word "relief" from availing himself of the simpler and speedier procedure under ord. 40, r. 11; and we welcome Pascoe v. Richards as a decision in accordance with the spirit of the Rules of Court.

WE HAVE OFTEN had to complain of the delays in printing Bills and Acts of Parliament and parliamentary papers, and we turned with some interest to the first report to the Lords of the Treasury of the Controller of the Stationery Office, which has just been published. The report discloses many weak points in the present printing and publishing arrangements of the Government. The magnitude of the transactions of the office is shown by the vote which, "in spite of large economies effected by recent contracts," amounted to nearly £460,000 for 1880-81. The main heads are three : " Printing for Public Departments," "Parliamentary Printing," and "Printing of Acts of Parliament." The contracts for the first were given in 1877 to Messrs. EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, "after competition," and expire in 1884. The contracts for the second are divided between Messrs. EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE and Messrs. HANSARD, and expire partly in 1884, and partly in 1886. It is noteworthy that the terms of Messrs. HANSARD'S contract for printing House of Commons Papers-Bills appear to be printed by Messrs. EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE-are about twenty-six per cent. in excess of those admitted for "book-work" for public departments. It is curious that House of Lords papers should be intrusted to other contractors-Messrs. EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE (who print the Bills)-and that yet others-Messrs. NICHOLLS-should have the turning out of "Votes and Proceedings," and we are not surprised to find a suggestion by the controller that "the employment of a common printer would perhaps be found not without economical advantages," especially as each member of the House of Commons received through the last Parliament, (6 according to a moderate calculation," parliamentary papers amounting to "about a ton of printed matter." Turning to Acts of Parliament, we read that the whole question of their production and distribution "is one to which your lordships' early attention might, with advantage, be directed." It seems that the responsibility for the arrangements is apparently—" so far as it can be brought home to any department, divided between your lordships, the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and the Controller of the Stationery Office." By " arrangements" here is meant, we suppose, the supplying of the " copy," and the fixing of the time for publication, for we read afterwards that, "by arrangements terminable at your lordships' pleasure," all Acts of Parliament are edited and printed by Messrs. EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE as private

property, so that any other printer may take over the

MIN

ASSETS.

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No person

WE REPORT elsewhere a Scotch case in which the question was raised whether section 6 of the Ground Game Act, 1880, probibiting the employment of spring traps, except in rabbit holes, applies to the case of the tenant of a farm having a right to kill rabbits under a tenancy in existence at the time when the Act came into operation. In other words is the provision of section 6 applicable to all tenants? We should have thought that the words of the section, having a right of killing ground game under this Act or otherwise shall use any firearms, &c., and no such person shall, for the purpose of killing ground game, employ spring traps, except in rabbit holes," were sufficiently clear on this point. The section is intended to restrict the destruction both of winged and ground game, and obviously applies to all persons having a right to kill ground game. So it was held in the Scotch case.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF APPEAL in Egypt, of which Mr. JOHN SCOTT, the English delegate, has just been appointed vice-president, is probably the most unique and polyglot court in the world. England, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, and the United States of America all send delegates; and while the law and procedure are French, the languages allowed to be used in court are French, Italian, and Arabic.

A solicitor writes to ask when the authorities intend to re-open the gates leading from Carey-street to the Royal Courts of Justice. These gates, he points out, were closed in August last, when certain excavations were being made with the object of making a lavatory under the steps. These buildings were completed in December last, and our correspondent states that much inconvenience and waste of time arises in consequence of the gates still being kept closed.

The following petition has been presented in the House of Commons by Mr. Gregory : "To the Honourable Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled : The humble petition of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom showeth,-That your petitioners regard with satisfaction a proposal which is now under discussion in Parliament to abolish the offices of the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. Your petitioners desire to express their opinion in favour of the abolition of the offices referred to, tending as it does to consolidate the various divisions on the common law side of the High Court of Justice into one division, thereby placing the whole under one presidency, which your petitioners consider to be in conformity with the object and intention of the Legislature in passing the Judicature Acts. Your petitioners hereby humbly pray your honourable House to take such steps as may be necessary for carrying into effect the proposal above referred to." "The common seal of the Incorporated Law Society was affixed hereto in my presence, E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary."

An interesting question was decided by Mr. Justice Fry in the recent case of Eames v. Hacon (29 W. R. 259). Although the distribution of the personal estate of a deceased person is to be regulated by the law of the country in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, yet the administration of such estate is, to a certain extent, in the country in which possession of it is taken and held by lawful authority. The assets in any particular jurisdiction are liable to pay the debts of the deceased contracted there, and the creditors may maintain an action for such debts against the local administrator (Chambers v. Bicknell, 2 Hare, 536). To this extent it is incorrect to say, as Lord Westbury is reported to have said, in Enobin v. Wylie (10 W. R. 467, 10 H. L. C. 1), that "the administration of the personal estate of a deceased person belongs to the court of the country where the deceased was domiciled at his death."

But to what extent do the powers of the local administrator go? Who is entitled to receive, and give a receipt for, the net residue of the personal estate of the deceased in any country the legal personal representative constituted by the forum of the domicile of the deceased, or the local administrator? The observations of Lord Westbury in the case above mentioned indicate the answer to these questions. He said that the court of the domicile is the forum concursus to which the legatees under the will of a testator, or the persons entitled to the estate of an intestate are required to resort, and he pointed out that "confusion must arise if, when a testator dies domiciled in one country, the courts of every other country in which he has personal property should assume the right, first of declaring who is the personal representative, and next of interpreting the will and distributing the personal estate situate within its jurisdiction according to that interpretation. An Englishman dying domiciled in London may have personal property in France, Spain, New York, Belgium, and Russia, and if the course pursued by the Court of Probate and the Conrt of Chancery in the present case should be adopted by the courts of those several countries, there might be as many different personal representatives of the deceased, and as many varying interpretations of his will, as there were countries in which he was possessed of personal property.... It is unnecessary to dwell on the evils which would result from the conflict of jurisdiction. It was to prevent them that the law of the domicil was introduced and adopted by civilized nations. I am, therefore, of opinion that the [Russian] executors might have excepted to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery as a court of construction and administration; they might have insisted that it was the duty of the court to hand over to the executors the clear English personal estate, and to remit the next of kin to the court of the domicil of the testator." But in that case the executors were held to have renounced their rights by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and we are not aware that the point has been definitely decided before the recent case.

In Eames v. Hacon the deceased was assumed to be domiciled in Ireland, and letters of administration were granted there to his widow. He was possessed of personal property in India, and the Irish administratrix executed a power of attorney authorizing a firm in India to take out letters of administration there. These were taken out. The firm administered the Indian property, ascertained the net residue, and remitted it to their agents in London with instructions to pay it to the person entitled. The London agents declined to pay it to the Irish executrix, on the ground that they were liable to the next of kin of the intestate, and that her receipt would not discharge them from this liability. The Irish executrix sued the

agents for the balance, and Mr. Justice Fry held that she was entitled to recover it, on the ground that the legal personal representative constituted by the forum of the domicile of the deceased is entitled to receive the moneys belonging to the personal estate of the testator which represent the clear net receipts obtained in any country wherever it may be, and through the intervention of any letters of administration wheresoever granted.

But it is not merely legal training that the promoters of the tribunal wish to be rid of; they are also desirous to avoid what Mr. Slagg called another Charybdis-that was, they might fall into the hands of solicitors in a manner that would be very burdensome to them." "Solicitors," he continued," he had no doubt, meant well, but what he complained of was the outcome of a bad system for which they were not responsible. He maintained that the manner in which their charges were made and imposed on the public was a perfect scandal to our civilization." Mr. Slagg would probably be surprised to learn that the solicitors are perhaps more

THE Manchester Chamber of Commerce has finally resolved to try the experiment of establishing a tribunal of commerce. The putative father of the proposal, Mr. Slagg, M.P., does not, if one may judge from his speech in moving the resolution constituting the tribunal, seem very hopeful of the immediate success of the experiment. "If," he said, "they floundered about somewhat at first, and judgments of a conflicting nature were given, not reconcileable with the most scientific law of the age, yet they might, he hoped, in time become so important, and aggregate such an amount of business, that a legally trained judge might be appointed." So it appears the best hopes of the founder of the new system are that it may ultimately lead to the old. The Tribunal of Commerce is to end by becoming a second-rate county court.

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We learn, however, from the discussion which took place on the proposal, what it is that the promoters aim at in their scheme. In the first place, Mr. Slagg, apparently with reference to some remarks which appeared in the columns of this journal some weeks ago, said: "They were told by objectors that there would be an absence of that quality of legal training which was considered by some so important an element in the settlement of disputes. He should say that one of the chief objects of the scheme was to get rid of that legal training as much as possible, and the less they had of it, he thought, the better." Why, then, look forward with such hope to the day when the "legally trained judge' might be appointed ? If we ask why legal training is objectionable in commercial judges, we fail to meet with any attempt at an answer: the net result of Mr. Slagg's speech is this: -legal proceedings, as at present conducted, are expensive and tedious; let us do away with the whole of them. So be it; but will not the machinery of a tribunal of commerce, with its registrar," its "arbitrators," its rules of procedure, its precedents, its assessors and experts, also be expensive and tedious? Precedents, says Mr. Slagg, will be gradually accumulated for the guidance of the arbitrators; these must be searched for, and examined by, or on behalf of, the litigants. Rules of procedure, even down to the most minute points," will, says Mr. Slagg, be made; these will have to be carefully considered by, or on behalf of, the litigants. Will John Jones, merchant, of Manchester, take it upon himself to search the precedents, and construe the "minute" rules of procedure? Being a busy man, unaccustomed to searching precedents, we trow he will not. Will he then rush into the tribunal without having had the precedents searched and the "minute" rules examined. Being a shrewd man who wishes to win his cause, we trow he will not. Will the arbitrators act gratuitously? Will they sacrifice all business engagements to fulfil their duties at the Tribunal? We imagine they will not. Well, then, here is expense and delay for John Jones, even in this newfangled legal cure-all. If the Chamber of Commerce want to be rid of expense and delay, the only plan is to constitute their porter the tribunal, and provide that he shall decide all cases by the method taught by the light of nature from the earliest times—namely, by first balancing on his thumb and forefinger a coin of the realm, and after presenting to the litigants the option of "heads" or tails," tossing the coin in the air, and deciding the case according to the result.

which their charges are compelled to be made, and since he is a legislator, a bill may probably come under his consideration by which that system, as to a large branch of those charges, will be wholly changed. Possibly it might be more rational to join in the attempt to improve the system of charges than to attempt to dispense with solicitors, but the latter course is quite in keeping with the idea which is at the basis of this tribunal of commerce. There are evils and abuses in our legal system, therefore let it be swept away; this is the doctrine of the Manchester prophets. Just as reasonable would it have been to contend before the Reform Bill, that because the system of representation was full of abuses, we ought, therefore, to sweep away the House of Commons.

In truth a tribunal of commerce from which lawyers are excluded is a chimera, and we are astonished that sensible and shrewd business men can pledge the credit of a chamber of commerce to the task of attempting to establish such an institution. The probable result of such an attempt will be, as a facetious speaker at the recent meeting expressed it, "to create in the chamber a pandemonium of assessors, experts, and other nuisances."

REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS IN COLOUR.

II.

THE cases on the present subject are not very numerous as yet, though it is to be anticipated that they will soon be multiplied; but they do serve to afford some indications as to the working of the present system. In the first place we may refer to In re Orr Ewing (26 W. R. 259, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 794). in which a point was raised before the Vice-Chancellor which turned on colour, but which a simple explanation prevented from reaching the higher courts. Among the marks to which the Committee of Experts objected, as wanting in distinctiveness, was an oval mark, which they treated as being a mere blotch, but the objection had to be at once withdrawn on its being explained that in practice this blotch was always gilded so as to represent a golden egg. Thus we have here an instance of litigation occasioned by the restrictions in respect of colour. But on other points the case went up to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, and by reference to the reports of this case (26 W. R. 777, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 794, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 479), as well as to those of Orr Ewing v. Johnston (27 W. R. 575, 28 Ib. 330, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 434), it will be readily understood that much assistance would have been rendered to the court if the marks had been registered in their colours, as the common use of a green colour for the triangular labels affected by the yarn trade would have been at once apparent. Then we come to the case of Nuthall v. Vining (28 W. R. 330), in which the Court of Appeal is reported to have laid down that colour would not be regarded in questions of infringement of trade-marks registered in black and white. The report does not pretend to give the judgment in detail, and it seems rather doubtful whether any such sweeping assertion was made, especially having regard to the decision in In re Worthington (28 W. R. 747, L. R. 14

Ch. D. 8); but at all events it seems clear enough that an additional obstacle was thrown in the way of a tradesman, who was not unreasonably complaining of the use of a label similar in many respects to his own, by the restrictions as to registration in colour.

The case of In re Worthington (28 W. R. 747, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 8) was a registration case, and here the next point came up for decision whether registration should be allowed to a mark which might be rendered extremely similar to one already registered by the application of colour, on the ground that there was sufficient distinction between the two in black and white, or whether it should be refused to a mark which, as advertised in black and white, was sufficiently distinctive, on the ground that a similarity might be produced by the addition of colour, a matter to which no allusion was to be found in the rules. Cotton, L.J., taking what is perhaps the more logical view, thought that the former alternative was to be preferred, and that the mark should be admitted to registration, leaving any subsequent production of similarity by the application of colour to be dealt with at a later date as a matter of fraud; but the majority of the court, affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls, took the course which was possibly less logical, but was certainly more in the interest of traders, of refusing the registration. James, L.J., said, “It appears to me that the intention of the Legislature was to prevent a person having a trade-mark from being liable to be injured by another trade-mark, which might be used to imitate his, or be passed off as his. Now the proposed trade-mark of Messrs. Worthington, no doubt, as it stands in black and white, seems to be very substantially different from that of Messrs. Bass & Co. But then, I think, we must look at this, that the Trade-Marks Act says nothing about the colour, and the appellants might use exactly the same colour upon their trade-mark which Messrs. Bass have used upon theirs; that is to say, each of the marks might be a mass of red, on one of which masses of red there would be a design of a church. Of what colour that design of a church might be, I do not know; it might be red of the same shade or a different red; but there might be a mass of red with a design on it which would be, with that difference, the same as Bass's triangular mass of red." And Brett, L.J., going still farther into the question of principle, said, "It is obvious that there is nothing in the statute to prevent the trademark which is registered from being used in any colour. Therefore it seems to me that the proper construction is that where a trade-mark is registered, it is not merely the outline or design as printed in the advertisement in black, or black and white, which is to be protected, but that which is to be protected is the trade-mark as it may be used or will be used in the ordinary course of trade that is, in any colour. That being so, it seems to me that the proper test is this: assume both trade-marks to to be registered, and let it be supposed that each person registering is ignorant of the other's trade-mark, would any fair use of the second be calculated to deceive? I quite agree that we ought not to take into consideration an obliteration or a fraudulent alteration of the second design. The question is whether any fair use of the second would be calculated to deceive. Now, if the first may be used in any colour, so also the second, if registered, may be used in any colour, and supposing the parties to be ignorant of, each other's marks, they might both with a perfectly fair intention use them of the same colour. The question would then be whether, supposing them both to be registered, and supposing them both to be fairly used with the same colour, would the second be calculated to deceive any person who only used ordinary observation? That brings us to a matter of fact to be considered in each particular case." From this decision it follows that, though colour is not to be registered in connection with a mark, it is nevertheless to be treated in registration cases as forming a potential element, and a not unimportant element, in a registered mark-a scarcely logical position.

Then we come to the case of Mitchell v. Henry (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 181), in which a trade-mark for worsted stuff was registered by deposit. The description of the mark in the Trade-Marks Journal was: "A white selvage on each side of the piece, having a red and white mottled thread interwoven the full length of the selvage, between the edge of the piece and the edge of the selvage." The deposited specimen of the plaintiffs' goods, showing their mark, was undyed, and in that condition it presented a light gray appearance with a white border, a red and white line running through the border. In practice the goods were dyed before being exposed for sale, and in that condition the goods appeared to be black, the selvage rather lighter than the rest of the piece, and the red and white thread had become dingy, but was still perfectly distinguishable. The defendants used a mottled thread of three colours, but when their goods were dyed they were scarcely distinguishable from the plaintiffs', except that their thread was differently placed, and their selvage was somewhat lighter. The Master of the Rolls held that the selvage of the plaintiffs' goods, as used by them, was not white, as described in the advertisement; that the three colours of the defendants' thread differed sufficiently from the two colours of the plaintiffs' thread; and that the different position of the thread supplied another sufficient distinction. On all these grounds he decided, on motion, in favour of the defendants. The Court of Appeal, however, took the contrary view, holding that the question as to the whiteness of the selvage was to be decided by the understanding of the trade, and that the other questions were also to be decided on the evidence of experts, and that the motion must stand till the hearing. Thus, even when a trade-mark is registered in colour, the actual appearance of the goods is not necessarily conclusive of the trade-mark proprietor's rights. So that, at all events with regard to some classes of trade-marks, not only is the colour of so much consequence as to require registration by deposit, but expert evidence is requisite to explain the effect of that registration.

The last case to which we propose to draw attention is that to which allusion was made at the opening of our first article on this subject, that of In re Robinson (29 W. R. 31), before the Master of the Rolls on the 5th of June last. In that case the question had reference to the proposed registration of the representation of a gold coin, called a mohur, for certain cotton goods. Another firm had already registered the representation of a silver rupee, and it was contended that if the rule laid down in In re Worthington, that the Trade-Marks Act did not protect colour, was to be applicable in all cases, the mark proposed for registration might deceive, for it might be used without colour or with any colour. The Master of the Rolls, however, pointed out that the two marks, both old ones, being used in respect of cotton goods, both would be registered in their colours by deposit at South Kensington, and he went on to say :"The only trade-mark which is protected by the Act of Parliament is the registered trade-mark, and where it is a cotton mark which is deposited and advertised, the only trade-mark registered is that of which the representation can be seen at the places mentioned in the advertisement, and no other is ever registered, and the register refers to the deposited trade-mark which remains in the possession of the registrar and can be produced." And he further added:-"That which would have been an infringement of a trade-mark as regards that registered thing before the Act is still an infringement, and nothing else." The Master of the Rolls, therefore, held that the different colours of the two coins constituted an essential difference between them, a difference so important as to outweigh any considerations derived from the similarity of the design, the Oriental character, &c.

These, then, are the facts at which we have arrived. In cases of trade-marks not applied for in respect of cotton goods, and not possessing special characteristics, colour

will be disregarded in registration, and the marks will be advertised and registered in plain black and white. The marks being registered only in black and white, protection will be refused in cases where, on the mere comparison of the registered design with that used by an alleged infringer, differences are found to exist, even though by the adoption of a similar colour those differences are removed to a considerable extent. On the other hand, if application is made for the registration of a somewhat similar design, the possibility of that design being assimilated to the registered one by the use of colour will be taken into consideration adversely to the applicant. When, however, the trade-mark is one used in respect of cotton goods, or one which, for special reasons, it has been decided to register by deposit, the colour will be treated as an integral part of the trademark, and registered as such, and it will be necessary for the registered proprietor, in proceeding against infringers, to show that the mark of which he complains is too similar, not to the mere design in the abstract, but to the design as represented in a particular manner and colour, and which manner or colour, it may be, expert assistance may be required to rightly interpret.

This is how the matter stands at present, but it may reasonably be expected that it will not rest here. These refinements appear to be unnecessarily minute and perplexing, and it is difficult to see why, if it is a real advantage for a manufacturer to have the design of his trade-mark protected against use in any colour cotton manufacturers and others, whose trade-marks are registered by deposit, should be limited to protection against use in a particular colour; or why, if it is beneficial to have a trade-mark registered in the form and colour in which it is used in practice, all but cotton manufacturers and some few others should be deprived of that advantage. As the matter is now explained by the Master of the Rolls, it turns out that the whole elimination of colour from registration was the result of some more or less substantial practical difficulties in the way of an efficient system of advertisement; but those difficulties have been got over in the case of the whole important class of cotton marks, and it seems that the extension of the system of registration by deposit could hardly overtax the resources of the Trade-Marks Registry. In several cases of application for registration, especially where the application has had reference to marks to be placed on metal goods, the court has pointed out the importance of testing the question of similarity by a comparison of the marks as they appear in actual use on the metal, and such a comparison would be much facilitated, and the necessity of travelling outside the registered mark removed, if the stamped metal were deposited, instead of a mere paper representation of the mark being advertised and registered. Uniformity in such matters is much to be desired.

REVIEWS.

MARINE INSURANCE.

A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE. By RICHARD LOWNDES. Stevens & Sons.

It is no secret that, in the recent case of Attwood v. Sellar (28 W. R. 604, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 286), Mr. Lowndes' views of the law were supported by the Court of Appeal against the almost universal practice of average staters. But, notwithstanding that decision, the law of marine insurance is based to so large an extent upon custom, that a treatise on the subject by a gentleman who has made average stating his profession is pretty sure to be of practical value. Mr. Lowndes, who has a wide reputation as an average stater, and whose work on General Average is well known, has just brought out this small volume on Marine Insurance, and in his preface

acknowledges his obligations to Mr. Cohen, Q.C., who, he says, "has, in the midst of his laborious occupations, found time to read through the proof-sheets, and to give the author many valuable suggestions and criticisms." The combination of two such authorities as Mr. Lowndes and Mr. Cohen on the subject of marine insurance could hardly fail to produce a work of interest and importance; and the result, we are happy to say, does not fall short of our expectations. It is rarely, indeed, that we have been able to express such unqualified approval of a new legal work. Contrasting favourably in its terseness with other more pretentious text-books, the author's style is at once lucid and exact, whilst he deals with the subject from a thoroughly practical point of view, and at the same time with a logical coherency which leaves nothing to be desired.

We do not pretend in every case to agree with his conclusions. For instance, we doubt whether Dickenson v. Jardine (16 W. R. 1169, L. R. 3 C. P. 639) is an authority for the whole breadth of the proposition for which it is cited on page 192. Mr. Lowndes is there discussing the subject of general average, and the proposition which he bases upon Dickenson v. Jardine is that "the loss of property as it exists before distribution-whether it be of cargo jettisoned or otherwise sacrificed, or of a mast cut away, or the like—is recoverable by the owner of the thing sacrificed from his underwriters, just as if it had been destroyed by the winds and waves." Now, in Dickenson v. Jardine the sacrifice was by jettison, which, as is always the case in a Lloyd's policy, was one of the perils expressly insured against; and all that the court decided was that, the loss being by jettison, the amount was recoverable as a total loss from the underwriters in the first instance, notwithstanding the fact that an indemnity might afterwards be obtained in respect of a portion of the value of the jettisoned goods from the other persons interested in the adventure. The court by no means decided that if the loss had been by a peril not in terms insured against -for example, as in the case of Stewart v. West India and Pacific Steamship Company (21 W. R. 381, L. R. 8 Q. B. 362), by water poured down a hold to extinguish a fire-such loss would have been directly recoverable in full, in the first instance, from the underwriters. Possibly it might, but Dickenson v. Jardine does not, in our opinion, decide that it would have been so recoverable. Again, though we have not space to discuss the question, the recent decision in Greer v. Poole (28 W. R. 582, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 273) seems to us to be well distinguishable from Dent v. Smith (L. R. 4 Q. B. 414), though Mr. Lowndes, at p. 214, seems obviously to consider that the latter case is inconsistent with the former.

These, however, are matters of detail. It is indeed refreshing to note the powerful way in which Mr. Lowndes grapples with the decisions, and, instead of noting them up, enunciates and explains the principles upon which they appear to be based. A remarkable instance of this will be found in the discussion, on page 230, of the recent important decision in the West India Telegraph Company v. Home and Colonial Insurance Company (29 W. R. 92, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 51), where, for the first time, so far as we are aware, in England, the question was raised and decided as to the liability of underwriters on an ordinary Lloyd's policy for the loss of a vessel caused by the explosion of a ship's boiler, such explosion having been due to the fact that the boiler from age and neglect had become too thin to resist ordinary pressure of steam. On the whole we congratulate Mr. Lowndes on the successful way in which he has treated a difficult subject, and can cordially recommend his treatise to either lawyer or layman who desires to have presented to him an intelligent and intelligible view of the law of marine insurance.