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A case involving several interesting questions concerning Domicile, and Consular Jurisdiction in Extra-Territorial Crime, according to Italian law, recently came before the Court of Cassation, in Rome, and is reported in the Circolo Giuridico of Palermo (11th year, Ser. II., Oct.-Nov., 1880, Penal Decisions, p. 125).
The person accused was a native of, and domiciled in, Palermo. The crime charged was attempt at homicide (mancato omicidio), on the person of another Italian subject, in Tunis, where both parties were under the Italian Consular jurisdiction. A conflict having arisen between the Correctional Tribunal of Palermo, which claimed to be competent, in virtue of Articles 6 of the Penal Code, and 34 of the Code of Penal Procedure, and the Consular Tribunal of Tunis, which claimed under Articles Ill and 115 of the Consular Law of 18th January, 1866; the Consular Court being under the Court of Cassation of Turin, the decision of the conflict belonged to the Court of Cassation of Rome, in virtue of Article 3 of the Law of 14th December, 1876. The Royal Procurator-General argued : That the Consular Jurisdiction is exceptional, and to be called into action in default of the ordinary jurisdiction, but ceases to exist the moment that the subject returns to the country of his allegiance, and falls under the sway of the law of the land (legge comune), in accordance with Article 166 of the Consular Law. The person charged returned to his country, and was arrested in Palermo, the place of his domicile. The Courts of the Kingdom have jurisdiction, by the Articles above cited of the Penal Code, and Code of Penal Procedure. Consequently, the Court of the place of domicile or arrest is competent. The Procurator-General accordingly demanded, on behalf of the Crown, that the Court of Cassation should determine the conflict by declaring the competency of the Correctional Tribunal of Palermo, and ordering the case to be taken there. The Court adopted the prayer of the Royal Procurator-General, and held that the Correctional Court of Palermo had jurisdiction, and must try the case.
No question appears to have arisen as to the oaths under which the charge must have been made. We presume that they were administered, in the first instance, by the Italian Consul in Tunis, and were held adequate to sustain the charge in Palermo.
Reviews of New Books.
The Law of Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, together with International and Foreign Copyright, and the Statutes relating thereto, &u. By Walter ARTHUR COPINGER, of the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition. Stevens and Haynes. 1881.
This new and revised edition of Mr. Copinger's valuable work on Copyright comes out at a very opportune moment. The law of the land, after having been subjected to a close, not to say microscopic analysis, by a Royal Commission, including one of the masters of English juridical thought, has been described in the forcible language of the Report as “nowhere stated in any definite or authoritative way.” The “form" of the existing law is acknowledged by the Commissioners to be bad, and wholly destitute of any sort of arrangement; still nothing has yet been done to remedy the confusion induced by such a state of things. This is, no doubt, very characteristic of our country, but it is not therefore creditable to us, or to our civilization. Our “kin beyond sea ” are by various recent decisions of their Courts, and by the conflicting views, which threaten tò prevent any amelioration of the existing American position, practically at a dead-lock. On all these points much might have been said, but on these points Mr. Copinger is, we presume designedly, silent. Perhaps the broader line which we should have liked to find taken in his new edition lay, strictly speaking, outside the province which he had marked out for himself from the first. Still, we regret the passing of such a “self-denying ordinance," as we think these are days in which the question of Copyright requires to be treated from the point of view of criticism and suggestion. We are glad to observe that in his present edition Mr. Copinger has made some use, for the Foreign Law, of the valuable “ Annuaire,” published by the Society of Comparative Legislation, in Paris, as well as of some of the information on this branch of the subject which has appeared in our own pages. But it seems curious that he should only cite our number for August, 1878, and not have taken note of the number for November, 1879, in which we printed, with additions, Mr. Carmichael's paper on “ Copyright Reform and the Report
of the Royal Commission,” read before the Jurisprudence Department of the Social Science Association at the Manchester meeting. The suggestion there made that the question should be taken into consideration by the Jurisprudence Committee of the Association, is now, we are glad to say, being acted upon, the Bill originally introduced by Lord John Manners, Viscount Sandon, and the then Attorney-General, having been placed in the hands of Mr. G. W. Hastings, M.P., President of the Council. We should have been pleased to have seen greater fulness of treatment of the American branch of the Copyright question, which is alike important and intricate. The close connexity of the Trade Mark question with that of Copyright, in the United States, is manifest both in the recent well known Trade Mark cases, United States v. Steffens, &c.(U.S. Reports, 100, Otto, 10), and in the still more recent case of “Washington Irving's Works," where the representatives of Irving claimed a Trade Mark in that title, in order to restrain the publication of an imperfect edition of the “Works,” after the Copyright therein had expired. This interesting point is, we understand, awaiting solution, the judgment of Justices Best and Lawrence, adverse to the existence of such a Trade Mark, having at once been appealed. We shall be curious to see the result. It seems obvious that the success of the appellants would turn the flank of the existing American Copyright Legislation. And one remarkable feature of the case is that such success would, if we mistake not, bring in perpetuity by a side wind, so to speak, the right of property in a Trade Mark, being, as we understand, unlimited in duration. Protection is given to a Trade Mark for the period of thirty years from registration, renewable on demand for a fresh period of thirty years. Thus, in any case, the appellants, if successful, would be able to secure a longer protection than by means of the local Copyright Law, and, admitting this, we see no abstract difficulty in the way of an unlimited chain of registrations and renewals of the Trade Mark “ Washington Irving's Works.” It might then, perhaps, be worth while for Mr. Copinger himself to register a Trade Mark in the office of the Commissioner of Patents, Washington. We should have liked, from the point of view of style, to see greater attention paid to his English by Mr. Copinger. The utility, no less than the elegance, of his Treatise would have been enhanced, and notably so in the sections relating to Translation, by a closer fcllowing of the best masters of our literature.
We have, for instance, had a hard struggle, and we are not sure that it has been altogether a successful one, to make out Mr. Copinger's meaning in his 5th paragraph on p. 211. What between the non-protection of the original work there referred to, and the “unauthorised copy of a translation ” of a work which is yet, according to the hypothetical statement, “open to any number of persons to translate," we find extreme difficulty in reaching the desired goal of “piracy.” Nevertheless, in the interests of Juridical Science we welcome our author's reappearance on the field of Copyright Law. It is a wide field, with room and with need for many workers. Mr. Copinger's chapter on Foreign Law is a useful feature of his Treatise, and it is one which, both in its Continental and American sections, cannot fail to become more and more useful. It is somewhat disappointing, after reading in a note to p. 506 that the Copyright Convention of 1857 with Spain had been denounced so as to expire in March of last year, not to find at least a hint of the fresh Convention notified by Order in Council, dated at Balmoral, 20th November last. And the Spanish Draft Law of 1877 having been cited, it would have been worth while mentioning, as an index of a rather widely-spread current of thought on the proper duration of Copyright, that the long period of the author's life and 80 years, now fixed in Spain, is avowedly only a step in the direction of perpetuity. If we have not misapprehended M. Demeur's personal tendency, as we gathered it at the Brussels Congress of Commerce and Industry, it sets rather in the same direction, and may not be without influence on future Belgian Legislation. There will be much to add, we expect, to the Foreign Chapter of Mr. Copinger's next edition, and we hope it may not be long before the public demand shall require a fresh issue of his useful and comprehensive Treatise.
The Institutes of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian, with Translation, Notes critical and explanatory, and a copious Alphabetical Digest. By James MUIRHEAD, Professor of the Civil Law, University of Edinburgh. (Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark. 1880.)
The revived interest in the study of Roman Law, which in England has been greatly fostered by the enlarged courses of study at the ancient Universities and the Inns of Court, never really needed revival in Scotland. For there, at least, it was
always, and is still, a practical study, the necessary complement of education in a legal system more closely akin in many respects to that of Rome than to the Feudalised Teutonism of English Law. Professor Muirhead, therefore, to our mind, starts with a great advantage over his English brethren when he proposes a Translation of the Institutes of Gaius. And this advantage, we think, is perceptible in his work as a translator, except where he presses it too far in asking us to receive as English what is nothing more than Latin, with scarcely even an English termination to it. We should, for instance, much prefer to import bodily into the translation the words senatusconsulta, plebiscita, and the like, to seeing such uncomfortable looking words there as “ Senatus-consult," and "plebiscit." And a "thing legated by damnation ” must look rather an odd sort of thing to the student who comes suddenly upon it without note or comment. As Professor Muirhead has taken “ vindicta," rightly we think, to be one of the words which it is necessary to retain untranslated, it would have been well that he should have gone a step further, and written “ by vindicta," when using the word in its ablative form. Or he might have printed it in those cases with the old fashioned mark of the ablative, only we quite see that his principles of Latin orthography are too orthodox, according to the newest fashion of orthodoxy, for such a piece of backsliding on his part. We cannot say that we like this new fashion. It may be very correct, but it is certainly very uncomfortable. And a good many changes are introduced without our being told the reason why. Our old friend the " Lex Fusia (or Furia] Caninia," for instance, becomes, in Professor Muirhead's hands, “ Fufia Caninia," without a hint of a change. We need hardly say that the great Ulpian himself suffers a sort of “capitis deminutio," very real to us, even though “minima” as to its extent, and comes before us in mystic brevity, as “ Vlp." But these, we suppose, are penalties which we must pay for having been brought up in the old school, and not having cordially accepted the new lights. We quite think, nevertheless, that by whatsoever lights he may be guided, Professor Muirhead is doing good service to scientific jurisprudence by devoting so much time and care to giving us as clear and harmonious a text as may be possible alike of the Institutes of Gaius, and of the Rules of Ulpian. Too often, indeed, our eye is met by foot-notes, telling of a mutilated or an undecipherable text. And from our recollection of the