"conduct" amounting to such corroboration as would have been sufficient to satisfy them. "I have only to examine," said Buckley, L.J., "whether there is evidence in some "material particular which could satisfy the justices, for "they and not we are the people to be satisfied. “The "statute," observed Kennedy, L.J.," says that it must be "corroboration in some material particular,' and we must "consider the particular in regard to the charge which is "made, which is here one of paternity. As I say, I am "not sure that I should have acted upon it."

Nor does it appear that the magistrates would themselves have regarded such corroboration standing alone as sufficient. It is manifest that they placed great reliance on the fact of the conviction. Indeed, in the report of the case in the Law Reports on the argument before the Divisional Court, there is no reference whatsoever to any other form of corroboration. Presumably, the special case did not contain a request by the magistrates that the case should (if necessary) be remitted to them. It would be interesting to refer to the depositions taken before the committing justices, in order to see in what form the appellant's suggestions that the respondent was a "fast" girl is there recorded.

In these circumstances it is, perhaps, not surprising to find that Kennedy, L.J., expressed some dissatisfaction with the course which the case had taken.

66

"In my view," said he, "this is an exceedingly unsatisfactory 66 case. One cannot help feeling that the admission of "the conviction as a piece of evidence, which I think clearly ought not to have been admitted, was a fact which may have "led to the conclusion to which they (the magistrates) came, "and which may, perhaps unconsciously, have influenced their "minds, although there be sufficient in the rest of the evidence. "for the conclusion at which Buckley, L.J., has himself arrived. "Worse still, when the matter came before the Divisional Court, "when the Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Barrington Ward,

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1

was not called upon to argue in support of the proof of the "conviction, the case proceeded upon grounds which with all "due respect I think are grounds which I could not possibly "have supported. Indeed, Mr. Barrington Ward says that they "could not be supported. The judgment could not be sup"ported on the grounds given. . With considerable

"hesitation I think I ought not to differ from the other mem"bers of the Court. It is, as Mr. Barrington Ward said, to use "his own words, 'only just over the line.' I confess that I feel "some doubt whether it is over the line at all."

CHARLES M. ATKINSON.

IT

V. SOME CHANGES IN THE LAW OF

NATURALISATION.

T is generally admitted that the English law on the subject of the naturalisation of aliens and their status when naturalised has hitherto not been entirely satisfactory, and few persons have found a good word to say for the Naturalisation Act 1870. In 1899, Sir Matthew Ridley, who was then Home Secretary, appointed an Inter-Departmental Committee to report upon the matter and to advise as to further legislation. In July 1901 this Committee made their Report, recommending (inter alia) (1) That the existing statute law should be consolidated; (2) that the existing law as to acquisition of British nationality by parentage should be re-enacted in a simpler form, and provide that where the father was born out of the British Dominions, a child also born abroad should not be a British subject; (3) that power should be conferred on a Secretary of State or the Governor of a British possession to confer the status of a British subject upon persons who fulfil the requisite conditions in any part of the British Dominions, and that the status so conferred should be recognised by British law everywhere.1

1 See the Report printed in extenso in Foote, Private International Jurispru dence, 4th Ed., pp. 23 ct seq.

After a lapse of twelve years the labours of this Committee have borne fruit, and many of their recommendations are found embodied in the Act with which this article deals, although, indeed, some of the provisions of the Act are quite contrary to the suggestions of the Committee.

The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 17) came into force on the 1st of January, 1915, and is a statute of far-reaching importance; indeed, if the great war had not so much absorbed the attention of the country, the provisions of this statute would doubtless have come in for a far greater measure of attention than they have received. As recommended by the Committee, the statute repeals the earlier legislation on the subject and consolidates the law, but while so consolidating it, the statute makes also numerous alterations and additions.

The first alteration in the law is made by sect. 1, in which it is declared that

The following persons shall be deemed to be natural-born British subjects, namely:-

(A) Any person born within His Majesty's Dominions and allegiance; and

(B) Any person born out of His Majesty's Dominions whose father was a British subject at the time of that person's birth, and either was born in His Majesty's allegiance or was a person to whom a certificate of naturalisation had been granted; and

(c) Any person born on board a British ship whether in foreign territorial waters or not.

There is also a provision that a person born on board a foreign ship shall not be deemed to be a British subject by reason only that the ship was in British territorial waters at the time of his birth.

The Act of 1870 contained no definition of the term " natural-born British subject."

Now, by Common law every person born within the

British Dominions is a natural-born British subject; every person born outside the British Dominions (with few exceptions) is an alien.1 The statute 4 Geo. II, c. 21, engrafted an exception to this rule in providing that a person born abroad whose father was a natural-born British subject should himself for all purposes be considered a natural-born British subject, assuming that the father had remained a British subject. This exception was followed by another added by 13 Geo. III, c. 21, which declared that the son of such a person so born abroad should himself, although born abroad, be considered to be a naturalborn subject, with the same proviso as before.

A few things call for notice in connection with these old statutory provisions (which are now repealed): (1) Such statutory subjects were to be deemed natural-born subjects; (2) the father or grandfather of the person so born abroad must have been a natural-born subject-not a person made a subject by naturalisation or denization; (3) the father must have remained a British subject at the time of the birth of the person whose nationality is in question; (4) the possession of an English mother or grandmother was not sufficient-it must have been a father or grandfather. The Naturalisation Act of 1870 did not affect these provisions, so that a person naturalised under that Act whose children. were born abroad could not transmit British nationality to such children, who could only become British subjects by residing during their minority in the United Kingdom with their father or subsequently becoming naturalised. The new Act effects far-reaching changes in this, as will be seen by a perusal of sect. I. The anomaly of considering a person born abroad to be a British subject whose father might perhaps never have been within the dominions of the Crown (as could happen under 13 Geo. III, c. 21) is

1 Anson, Law of the Constitution, Vol. II, Part I, p. 240. Piggott, Nationality, Part I, p. 41.

swept away, and British nationality in the case of persons born abroad is confined to the first generation, as recommended by the Committee's Report. There is, however, the important proviso that the father of such person so born abroad need only be a naturalised subject. Again this is in accordance with the views of the Committee.

The Act of 1870 required applicants for naturalisation. to have resided within the United Kingdom for five years or to have been in the service of the Crown for that period. Further, the applicants were required to state their intention either to reside in the United Kingdom or to serve under the Crown. The new Act (sect. 2) provides that the five years' residence may have been in any of His Majesty's Dominions. So that, e. g., while formerly a Frenchman, who, after having lived, say, in Australia for three years, came to England, would have had to reside here for five years before he could apply for naturalisation; now, such a person could add his period of residence in Australia to that in the United Kingdom, and apply for a certificate after a further two years' residence in England, making, with the three years he resided in Australia, the five years' residence required by the Act. It is, however, stipulated that the applicant must actually have resided in the United Kingdom for not less than one year immediately preceding the application for naturalisation, and there must have been previous residence either in the United Kingdom or in some other of His Majesty's Dominions for a period of four years within the last eight years before the application (sect. 2, sub-sect. (2)). Every applicant must now also prove that he is of good character and has an adequate knowledge of the English language. This provision is also new; although, of course, the inquiries made. by the Home Office in all cases of naturalisation would. usually prevent persons of bad character obtaining such certificates. It is a matter of interest how the language