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importance between them. We need not dilate on the paramount necessity of preserving intact the absolute inviolability of the dominions of States if our system of International Law is not to be shaken to its foundations. Once let it be established that for reasons of expediency, or as a so-called peaceful measure of self-redress, a State is entitled to invade the dominions of another, a principle of anarchy will be admitted into politics totally inconsistent with the fundamental postulate of International Law, based, as it is, on the territorial independence of nations. That a new law might be worked out on the new lines indicated by the admission of such a principle is possible. That, for our familiar circle of Powers, each developing its genius and energies in its own fashion, we might have in exchange the autocracy of a clique of diplomatists, or the supremacy of a dominant State, might be an advantage to the world, though opinions will doubtless differ as to the immediate desirability of such a metamorphosis. But the system of law which has been worked out on the basis of the territorial independence of nations with such elaboration and, on the whole, with such deeply beneficial results, would have vanished for ever, in the process of substituting a world-empire, or a set of tribal sovereignties, for the territorial sovereignty with the conception of which the fabrics of that system is bound up. And in the chaos which would ensue, much would happen of a more serious character than the trivial or conjectural dangers which induce politicians to permit their armed forces to act in foreign territory with a self-approving consciousness that they are the instruments of preventing alarming disturbances, that they are not at war, and are only improving upon that most ridiculous of all pretensions, “a pacific blockade.” The support which is accorded to the notion of the "hegemony of the Great Powers" -- which inevitably implies the more

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immediate dictatorship of the greatest-by persons who
arrogantly apply the term “criminal” to the conduct of
States which exercise their rights without regard to the
policy which for the moment commends itself to the Powers
in question, is one sign of change, and points to the substi-
tution for independent territorial sovereignties of a world-
sovereignty, or empire ; but there is also another feeling
to be considered, equally subversive of the principle of
territorial independence, although pointing in quite a
different direction, namely, that of tribal sovereignty. If
followed to its logical extreme, the principle of nationality
leads to the conclusion that individuals are justiciable only
by the organised tribunals of their nationality, and are
subject only to its laws, whatever local portion of the
earth's surface may be for the moment honoured by their
presence. From this point of view the land which is
actually occupied by the bulk of a race is a matter of
quite secondary importance. Signs of the practical
influence of this tendency are to be seen in the extreme
prominence and influence which the personal statute has at
the present day; as exemplified by Italian legislation, and, in
Conservative England, by such judgments as that in which
the Privy Council's Judicial Committee broke away from
the doctrine of Niboyet v. Niboyet.

Whether a return to the system of Imperial Rome or
Macedon, or to the inglorious anarchy of tribal independence,
would be an improvement on our present methods of
government, we do not here discuss.

Only it is desired to emphasize the fact that, whether difficult or easy, the transition to either plan would be accompanied by the total and entire failure of International Law to accommodate itself on any terms to the new conditions.

The principle of territorial independence has lain at the root of the public law of the world since the days of Hugo de Groot, and so long as no substitute for our present Law

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of Nations has been worked out, no steps can be tolerated which would render that law at once inapplicable by falsifying its fundamental assumption. So we have to consider whether the principle of territorial sovereignty is seriously impaired by the recognition of the legality of landing troops or sailors, though in small numbers, in foreign dominions upon emergency. Unbiassed consideration-unless an admiration of the system by which various forms of human activity can exist and develop side by side, each in unquestioned security, can be termed a prejudicewill probably lead to the conclusion that it is. In the first place, the spectacle of a foreign military force exercising authority, under whatever circumstances and for whatever purposes, on the soil of a State, is enough to create, in the minds of the subjects of the latter, an impression that their own Government is not really independent. They feel that it has not that unlimited authority which they have attributed to it, but that it is liable, upon occasion, to the interference of foreign officials, and that not as an act of war, which everyone can understand, but as a measure of public order taken, to all appearance, in the exercise of some regular reserve jurisdiction.

The mass of the population do not draw delicate distinctions. Foreigners, they notice, step in and keep order when matters come to a head. The inevitable conclusion is that, when it suits them to do so, they will step in

The authority of the State is at once lowered, if not undermined, in the estimation of the unreflective body over whom its maintenance is of the utmost importance. Besides this, although the symbolic influence of the absolute immunity of territory upon the populace is surely, in these days, important enough—there is a further consideration of practical gravity. This lies in the unfortunate tendency of armed forces, when once they have obtained a footing on land to remain there. Examples, not few nor unimpressive,


of this danger are the commonplaces of history. That
of late there have been less frequent occasions of its
occurrence is due to the very fact that nations have now
for many years regarded the presence of foreign troops
within their jurisdiction with peculiar jealousy. But it is
still possible to instance cases in which a purely temporary
occupation has run out into one to which no definite limit
can be put. France threw troops into Chantabûn during
the difficulty with Siam, to secure the fulfilment of a
temporary purpose, which was carried out years ago; yet
the tricolour still floats there. The forces of the same
nation entered Tunis to exact satisfaction for an outrage-
they remain there until the French Government and the
Bey recognise by common consent that the Government
of the latter is capable of maintaining order ; i.e., so far as
appears, until the Tunisian calends. Lastly, there is the
case of Corea ; there the Russian troops which were landed
to guard the consulate of that empire must surely have
been an important, if not a decisive, factor in the events
which have given to Russia a share with Japan in the
suzerainty of the distracted Hermit kingdom. In fact,
the consequences arising from the admission of troops are
nowhere more strikingly illustrated than in the whole
course of proceedings in Corea from the moment that
Japan claimed the right of sending soldiers there. China's
treaty troops, Russian marines, detachments from a
miscellaneous collection of Western ships of war, all
combined to overshadow whatever genuine Government
Corea possessed.

It may be objected that these instances are all concerning
States which are outside the inner circle of European
diplomacy. Still, this does not affect the facts. The
proposition that the intrusion of an armed force for a
limited or temporary purpose is dangerously likely to lead
to its use as a political engine, or to result in the undue


prolongation of its visit, would remain the same if such States as Corea and Tunis—not to speak of Siam-had absolutely no rights at all. And the most narrow interpreters of the scope of International Law will scarcely refuse to these nations the right to exist.

To turn to the other side of the question, foreigners who visit a strange country have usually the option of remaining at home; they go, as a matter of fact, prepared to take the risks of travel and those of residence in a land of unfamiliar customs and uncertain tranquillity; or, if they rely on their knowledge of the place, and on their own favourable opinion of its safety, they can blame themselves alone, if their opinion turns out to be incorrect, and their knowledge limited. Such residents abroad have probably some idea that their own Government will do what it can to induce the authorities of the foreign State to treat them fairly, but they cannot expect that it will furnish them with direct protection by the use of force in the actual territory of the latter.

As to the protection of consulates similar remarks apply. These offices are, to a large extent, mere business agencies, and no harm can be done to them so serious as to justify the step of taking the duty of protecting them out of the hands of the territorial authority. The risk of confusing the limits of State jurisdiction which arises when organised bodies of foreign troops take it upon them to enforce order in a disturbed district, makes the advantages of such a proceeding seem small in comparison. The immediate effects of the presence of the force may be beneficial, but the ultimate results are anarchic.

Besides, foreign detachments might work without objection, under the supervision and at the orders of the executive authorities of the place. In this case they might be accompanied by the latter, or in some other open way make it clear that their action is

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