BIRD, EDWIN, Birmingham, Shop Fitter Birmingham Pet Dec 18 Ord Dec 18 BISHOP, GEORGE, Skipton, Yorks, Cycle Manufacturer Bradford Pet Nov 9 Ord Nov 19 BROWNE, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, Abergele, Denbighs, Commission Agent Bangor Pet Dec 17 Ord Dec 17 CHARLTON, EDWARD JAMES, Basingstoke, Hants chester Pet Dec 17 Ord Dec 17 Win COUPLAND, ROBERT, Accrington, Draper Blackburn Pet Dec 7 Ord Dec 17 DAVIES, DAVID, Ruabon, Denbighs, Grocer Wrexham Pet Dec 18 Ord Dec 18 DUNN, JOHN HINDMAS, Bradford, Draper Bradford Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 GROVE, EDWARD, Leicester, Boot Manufacturer Leicester HIRSCH, HERMAN CHARLES CESAR, Southwark, Egg Mer- JONES, DAVID, Aberdare, Boot Dealer Aberdare Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 JORDAN, ALFRED JOHN, Brighton, Carlier Dec 17 Brighton Ord KINCH, FREDERICK, Kingston upon Hull, Corn Merchant LEWIS, SIMON Jous, Bedminster Wells Pet Dec 16 Ord LOCKWOOD, GEORGE, Rawcliffe, rr Goole, Yorks, Saddler MOUNCE, HENRY, Newport, Mon, Baker Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 High Court Pet Newport, Mon NIGHTINGALE, FREDERICK RICHARD, and JOHN NIGHTINGALE, Newcastle on Tyne, Hairdressers Newcastle on Tyne Pet Dec 14 Ord Dec 15 NOBLE, GEORGE, Camborne, Cornwall, Fruiterer Truro NORTH, CHARLES EDWARD, Bradford, Agent Bradford Pet Dec 17 Ord Dec 17 PEARSON, SAMUEL, Wollescote, nr Stourbridge, Ironworker Stourbridge Pet Dec 13 Ord Dec 13 ROBERTSON, ELLEN EMMA, Wakefield Wakefield Pet Dec 15 Ord Dec 15 SCALES, THOMAS ROBERT, Bridlington Quay, Yorks, Butcher Scarborough Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 SINCLAIR, EDWARD, North Cowton, Yorks, Clerk Northallerton Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 SMITH, FRED, Kingston upon Hull, Baker Kingston upon SPRINGTHORPE, JOSEPH, Newbold Moor, Derby, Draper WHITFIELD, WILLIAM STOREY, Newcastle on Tyne New- BAKER, HORACE CHARLES WILLIAM, Mincing In, Merchant BROWN, GEORGE WILLIAM, Rochdale, Boot Dealer Dec 31 at 11.15 Townhall, Rochdale BURN, ALBERT FREDERICK, Kingston upon Hull, Butcher Dec 31 at 11 Off Rec, Trinity House In, Hull CHAMBERS, WILLIAM, Leeds Park row, Leeds Dec 30 at 11 Off Rec, 22, CHARLTON, EDWARD JAMES, Basingstoke, Hants Jan 7 at 3 Off Rec, Southampton CHARLTON, SAMUEL, Nunney, Somerset, Baker Jan 5 at 12.30 Off Rec, Baldwin st, Bristol COYNE, HAROLD, CHRISTIAN DENNIS COYNE, and ARTHUR COYNE, Strand, Bootmakers Dec 29 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st DARMARO, ENRICO, Clifton, Professor of Music Jan 5 at 11.30 Off Rec, Baldwin st, Bristol DENT, WILLIAM ARTHUR BURGOYNE, Newport, Mon, Butcher Jan 4 at 12.30 Off Rec, Gloucester Bank chmbrs, Newport, Mon EDMUNDS, WILLIAM, Aberdare, Innkeeper Dec 31 at 2 65, High st, Merthyr Tidfil FREUND, JOHANN PHILIPP, Stoke Newington, Boot Manufacturer Dec 29 at 2.30 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st GAMBLE, BEN, Fleckney, Leicesters, Builder Jan 4 at 3 Off Rec, 1, Berridge st, Leicester GIBBS, ERNEST WILLIAM CECIL, Tulse Hill Dec 29 at 12.30 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st Dec 29 at 12 GIBBS, FREDERICK THOMAS MEADE, Kilburn KEANE, GEORGINA ALICE, Eastbourne Jan 4 at 1.30 Coles LECHMERE, EDWARD, Pimlico, Dental Surgeon Dec 29 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st LEWIS, SIMON JOHN, Bedminster Jan 5 at 1 Off Rec Baldwin st, Bristol MACKIE, FRANK HECTOR, Kirstead, Norfolk, Upholsterer's Salesman Dec 31 at 12 Off Rec, 8, King st Norwich MESILLA VALLEY IRRIGATION COLONY, Victoria st, Westminster Dec 30 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st NEWBY, JOSEPHI WAKERLEY, Syston, Leicestershire, Wheelwright Dec 29 at 12.30 Off Rec, 1, Berridge st, Leicester NUGENT, HENRY WALTER JOHN, Gloucester, Portry Farmer Jan 4 at 12 Off Rec, Gloucester Bank chmbrs, Newport, Mon PAGE, THOMAS, Swansea, Wheelwright Dec 30 at 12 Off Rec, 31, Alexandra rd, Swansea PEARSON, SAMUEL, Wollescote, nr Stourbridge, Ironworker Dec 30 at 3.15 W S Mobberley, Solicitor, High st, Stourbridge PHILBRICK, HORACE, Southampton, Solicitor Dec 30 at 3.30 Off Rec, Southampton PIERPOINT, FREDERICK ERNEST, Dorking Dec 29 at 12.30 SMITH, HEDLEY MASON, Islington, Ironmonger Dec 30 at Dolphin Hotel, Chichester TAYLOR, JAMES H, Hatch, nr Taunton Dec 30 at 3 Dec 30 at 1 Off Rec, City chmbrs, Endless st, Salisbury VINALL, FREDERICK JOHN, Liverpool, Licensed Victualler Jan 4 at 12 Off Rec, 35, Victoria st, Liverpool WEARMOUTH, JOHN WALTON, Bishop Auckland, Insurance Agent Dec 28 at 4 Off Rec, 25, John st, Sunderland WIKELEY, GEORGE, Stilling.on, Yorks, Thrashing Machine Pronietor Jan 3 at 12.15 Off Rec, 28, Stonegate, York WOLFENDEN, ROBERT, Cheshunt, Hers, Solicitor Dec 30 at 11 Bar'uptcy bldgs, Carey st WRIGHT, JAMES, Brierley Hill, Staffs, Ea. henware Manufacturer Dec 30 at 11.30 Dudley Arms Hotel, Dudley WRIGHT, JOHN WILLIAM, Nottingham Jan 3 at 12 Off Rec, 4, Castle pl, Park st, Nottingham PEDLEY, FREDERICK WILLIAM, West Hartlepool, Plumber ADJUDICATIONS. ASH, WALTER, and FRANK ASH, Southampton, Wholesale Fruiterers Southampton Pet Nov 17 Ord Dec 17 BARKER, ANNE, Leicester, Milliner Leicester Pet Sept 18 Ord Dec 15 BURNETT, JAMES, Bristol, Boot Manufacturer Bristol Pet Nov 30 Ord Dec 16 CHAPPELL, ALBERT, and SIDNEY CHAPPELL, Cardiff Cardiff Pet Sept 13 Ord Dec 15 DARMARO, ENRICO, Clifton, Bristol, Professor of Music Bristol Pet Dee 13 Ord Dec 15 DAVIES, DAVID, Ruabon, Denbigh, Grocer Wrexham Pet Dec 18 Ord Dec 18 DUNN, JOHN HINDMAS, Bradford, Draper Bradford Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 FRITH, EDWARD PHILLIP, Lombard ct, Accountant High Court Pet Oct 12 Ord Dec 15 GARTON, WILLIAM, Muscovy ct, Tower Hill, Cocoa Merchant High Court Pet Nov 17 Ord Dec 15 GRANT, ANNIE MARIA, Polruan, Cornwall, Baker Plymouth Pet Nov 20 Ord Dec 17 GROVE, EDWARD, Leicester, Boot Manufacturer Leicester Pet Dec 15 Ord Dec 16 HUGHES, OWEN, Llanrwst, Denbighshire, Grocer Portmadoc Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 18 HYDE, FREDERICK, Birmingham, Wholesale Fruiterer Birmingham Pet Dec 8 Ord Dec 16 JINKS, ALFRED, Worthing, Jobmaster Brighton Pet Nov 18 Ord Dec 16 JONES, DAVID, Aberdare, Boot Dealer Aberdare Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 KEANE, GEORGINA ALICE, Eastbourne Eastbourne Pet KITCHEN, JOSEPH HENRY, Rinsey, Breage, Cornwall, LECHMERE, EDWARD, Pimlico, Dental Surgeon High Court LEWIS, SIMON JOHN, Bedminster Wells Pet Dec 15 Ord Dec 16 LOCKWOOD, GEORGE, Rawcliffe, nr Goole, Yorks, Saddler LUCAS, JOSEPH, Wollaston, Northamptons, Engineer NOBLE, GEORGE, Camborne, Cornwall, Fruiterer Truro Pet Dec 17 Ord Dec 17 PAYNE, RICHARD, Wandsworth, Butcher Wandsworth Pet Nov 23 Ord Dec 18 PEARSON, SAMUEL, Wollescote, nr Stourbridge, Ironworker Stourbridge Pet Dec 13 Ord Dec 13 ROBERT JON, ELLEN EMMA, Wakefield Wakefield Pet Dec 15 Ord Dec 15 SCALES, THOMAS ROBERT, Bridlington Quay, Yorks, Journeyman Butcher Scarborough Pet Dec 16 Ord Dec 16 SINCLAIR, EDWARD, North Cowton, Yorks, Clerk Northallerton Pet Dec 15 Ord Den 16 SMITH, FRED, Kingston upon Hull, Baker Kingston upon STEWART, CHARLES NIGEL, Victoria st, Westminster High TOWLER, HERBERT JOHN, Birmingham, Grocer Birmingham Pet Nov 22 Ord Dec 17 VINALL, FREDERICK JOHN, Liverpool, Licensed Victualler Liverpool Pet Nov 18 Ord Dec 17 WAITE, THOMAS BUSHBY, Albrighton, Salop, Schoolmaster WATKINSON, THOMAS, Gt Preston, Woodlesford, Yorks WHITFIELD, WILLIAM STOREY, Newcastle on Tyne New- Suitable clauses, settled by Counsel, can be obtained on application to THE LICENSES INSURANCE CORPORATION AND GUARANTEE FUND, LIMITED, 24, MOORGATE STREET, LONDON, E.C. Mortgages Guaranteed on Licensed Properties promptly, without special valuation and at low rates. ALLIANCE ASSURANCE COMPANY. Established 1824. Capital, £5,000,000 Sterling. THE PAINFULLY sudden death of Mr. CHARLES HARRISON comes as a singular sequel to the death of Sir FRANK LOCK LONDON BRANCHES : 1, ST. JAMES'S ST., S.W.; 63, CHANCERY LANE, W.C.; WOOD, at whose funeral Mr. HARRISON caught a chill. Mr. Life Policies free from Restrictions, with Perfect Security and Liberal Bonuses. Special forms of Policies have been prepared to provide for payment of ESTATE DUTIES. LEASEHOLD AND SINKING FUND POLICIES. Full Prospectuses on application. HARRISON had been in practice in London for close on forty years, and, in addition to the demands made on him by his business, he found time to take an active part in London municipal matters, and, for the last two years, to represent Plymouth in the House of Commons. WE PRINT elsewhere a letter in which Mr. J. S. RUBINSTEIN very effectively criticizes the "Statement of the Methods and Results of Registration of Title to Land" which, it appears, the Land Registry Office has sent to the local governing bodies of the metropolis. The touch of humour in the official reference to "the natural claim of the metropolis to precedence in enjoying the benefit of the Act" is inimitable. WE HAVE received from the Land Registry Office a set of rules under the Land Transfer Acts, 1875 and 1897, which are to be known as the Provisional Land Transfer Rules, 1897, and which will be found printed elsewhere. We are also informed that a short summary of the changes in Land Registry practice which will be entailed by the Act and Rules is in course of preparation and will be available shortly. THE MOST important matters with which the new Land Transfer Rules deal are the first registration of settled land, the transfer of land into settlement, the transmission of land on death, and notice of deposit of land certificates. Under section 6 of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, settled land may, at the option of the tenant for life, be registered either in the name of the tenant for life, or, where there are trustees with power of sale, in the names of those trustees; and there are to be entered on the register such restrictions or inhibitions as may be prescribed, or may be expedient, for the protection of the rights of the persons beneficially interested in the land. Under the rules it is provided that application for registration of settled land may be made by any person capable of being registered as proprietor, with the consent of the other persons (if any) whose consent or concurrence is necessary to a sale by that person. The extent of the restrictions and inhibitions that are be to registered is governed by rule 4. In framing these it is not to be the duty of the trustees or of the registrar to protect the interests of any person who would not have been a necessary party to a sale or mortgage if the land had been unregistered. But the trustees, or, in the absence of trustees, the registrar, are to give notice of the restrictions and inhibitions to such of the beneficiaries as the registrar directs; and any such person can, if he wishes, lodge a caution or apply for an inhibition. This rule does no more than follow the policy of the Settled Land Acts, which secure the interests of the beneficiaries by requiring the tenant for life to exercise the powers of the Acts as a trustee for them. When land is transferred into settlement the instrument of transfer (forms for which are given in the schedule to the rules) is to contain the proper restrictions or inhibitions to be entered on the register according to the principles stated in rule 4 (rule 7); but it will be for the registrar to determine (subject to an appeal to the court) whether such restrictions or inhibitions are proper to be registered, and for this purpose he may require the production of the settlement and any further evidence that may be necessary (rule 9). Otherwise it will not be the duty of the registrar to inquire into the terms of the settlement. Similar provision is made for the case where a settlement is created by will (rules 16-19). Ordinarily on production of probate or letters of administration of a sole registered proprietor of land, dying after 1897, the personal representative will be registered as proprietor with the addition of words shewing his representative capacity (rule 14). But, although the rules are not quite clear on the point, it seems that the devisee or legatee may be registered immediately, on production of the probate and of an instrument of assent or appropriation signed by the executors (rule 15). IT is one of the objects of the revised system of registration to make the production of the land certificate necessary upon all dealings with registered land. By section 8 of the Act of 1897 it is provided that so long as a land certificate or certificate of charge is outstanding, it shall be produced to the registrar on every entry in the register of a disposition by the registered proprietor of the land or charge to which it relates, and also on every registered transmission or rectification of the register. A new land certificate or certificate of charge is not to be granted by the registrar in the place of a certificate which has been lost or destroyed, unless the applicant has filed with the registrar a statutory declaration and such other evidence of the loss or destruction as the registrar thinks necessary, and until after the prescribed advertisements and the giving of proper indemnity. Further provision is made by the new rules for the safety of persons with whom a certificate is deposited. Any person with whom a land certificate or certificate of charge is deposited as security for money may by writing give notice of the deposit to the registrar, and the registrar will enter the deposit in the register (r. 38). So long as such notice is on the register no new certificate will be issued without notice to the depositee (r. 39). The forms in the schedule to the rules are to be adopted so far as practicable, but with such modifications as the parties may desire and the registrar approve. ON THE first day of a New Year it usually happens that important Acts of Parliament come into force. This year, however, there appear to be only two, the Land Transfer Act, 1897, and the Infant Life Protection Act, 1897. It is of great consequence to the community that the provisions of the latter Act should become widely known as soon as possible, for it creates several new offences, and perfectly well-meaning and upright persons may easily find themselves liable to penalties under the new law entirely through ignorance of its existence. There is so much danger of this that the Act itself provides that boards of guardians shall give public notice of the provisions of the Act. The Act is aimed at the cruelty and neglect of little children so often exposed in the case of what are called "babyfarms." It provides that notice must be given to the local authority by any person who receives for money more than one infant under five years of age in order to nurse or maintain the infant apart from its parents. It is the duty of the local authority, which outside London is the board of guardians for the district, to inquire what persons within the district receive such infants for hire, and power is given to the authority to limit the number of infants which may be kept in any one house. Infants kept in houses unfit for the purpose, or by persons unfit to have their care, may be removed. If any infant respecting whom notice has to be given dies, notice of the death must be given to the coroner of the district within twentyfour hours, and it is provided that the coroner must hold an inquest unless there is produced to him a satisfactory medical certificate shewing that a registered practitioner has personally attended the child, and shewing the cause of death. The Act does not apply to the relatives or guardians of any infant, nor to hospitals or homes conducted for religious or charitable purposes. THE MOST important feature of the new year will be the appearance of the Real Representative. Whenever any landowner is so inconsiderate as to die after the 1st of January, and before the Land Transfer Act, 1897, has been amended, he will leave his successors a legacy of doubts and difficulties in winding up his estate such as have not hitherto been experienced. We discussed in detail the questions which are likely to arise under the present statutory provisions as to the Real Representative (ante, pp. 42, 61), and we need not refer to them further at present; but we propose at an early date to sum up briefly for the benefit of our readers the practical considerations relative to the powers and duties of this new legal personage. IN A LETTER to the Times of the 29th ult. Mr. THOMAS SNOW raises again the question of the expediency of the double appeal involved in the existing appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords. He advocates the plan mooted when the Judicature Act, 1873, was under consideration of having only one Court of Appeal, such court, however, to be connected with the House of Lords by the fact that all its members would also ex officio be members of the House. The plan has two defects. It overlooks the positive advantages of a second Court of Appeal, and it assumes that there is some importance for judicial purposes in the circumstance of the House of Lords as a judicial body being also a member of the Legislative body. This connection between the Legislature and the judiciary is of course merely a historical accident. It may, perhaps, add to the dignity of the final Court of Appeal that it is in theory identical with the House of Lords, but for the purpose of the work it actually has to do the connection is meaningless. All the experience of recent years, however, shews that a second court of appeal is of the utmost value for correcting the mistakes into which the ordinary Court of Appeal, with its more rapid method of working, is apt to fall. We by no means desire to underrate the work of the latter court, but the conditions under which cases are heard in the House of Lords, and the character of its members, give the decisions of that body a peculiar weight and importance. It would be a great mistake to forfeit this advantage for the sake of conferring life peerages on all the members of the existing Court of Appeal, and ranking them with the judicial members of the House of Lords. BY VIRTUE of the Stannaries Court (Abolition) Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 45), s. 1, the court of the Vice-Warden of the Stannaries ceased to exist, save for the purpose of continuing and concluding pending proceedings therein, as from the 1st of January, 1897, from which date all jurisdiction and powers of the said court were transferred to and vested in the county courts of Cornwall by order of the Lord Chancellor, made under the Act, and dated the 16th of December, 1896. No express provision with regard to appeals is, however, contained either in the Act itself or in the rules made thereunder, and, therefore, this question arises-namely, whether the practice as to appeals prior to the Act still prevails in cases under the Stannaries jurisdiction, or whether it has ceased to be operative. Upon the whole, we think that, though the Stannaries Court (Abolition) Act, 1896, does not expressly repeal sub section (3) of section 18 of the Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 | (ante, p. 11) turned rather upon the complicated facts of the case Vict. c. 66), whereby the appellate jurisdiction in Stannaries cases was vested in the Court of Appeal, it must be taken to have done so by implication, and that, consequently, the appeal in such cases is, as in other county court cases, to the Queen's Bench Division in the first instance. In support of this view it should be mentioned that the Stannaries Court (Abolition) Act, 1896, expressly repeals section 32 of the Stannaries Act, 1869, which requires a deposit of £20 to be made on all appeals from the Vice-Warden, and, moreover, provides that the Stannaries jurisdiction, now vested in the county courts as aforesaid, shall "be exercised subject to and in accordance with rules of court for regulating the procedure in county courts" (section 1); while the rules of the 15th of February, 1897, framed under the Act, prescribe that "subject to the foregoing rules the proceedings in an action commenced under the Stannaries jurisdiction shall be regulated by the statutory provisions and rules for the time being in force regulating the proceedings in actions in the county courts" (rule 24); and that "where no other provision is made by the statutory provisions or rules for the time being in force, the practice and procedure in force in the High Court of Justice shall apply to proceedings commenced in a county court under the Stannaries jurisdiction" (rule 25). IT is not only in connection with registration of title and conveyancing generally that questions arise as to the best means of defining boundaries. Alterations of areas of local government have become increasingly frequent of late years. In places with a growing population new urban districts are constantly being formed and the areas of existing urban districts are being extended; and every such operation involves an alteration and definition of the boundaries both of urban and rural districts and of parishes. It is manifestly important that the new boundaries should be so accurately defined that questions of conflicting jurisdiction between local authorities should be rendered impossible. These changes are for the most part effected by means of orders of county councils, made under section 57 of the Local Government Act, 1888, and confirmed, with or without modification, by the Local Government Board. Until recently it was the practice to set out, in a schedule to the order, a minute verbal description of the boundaries of the districts and parishes formed by the order, and to supplement this description by a reference to boundary lines shewn upon an annexed map. The danger of inconsistency between the verbal description and the map is obvious, and probably the Local Government Board have exercised a wise discretion in deciding during the past year that new boundaries shall be defined by a map only. This must now be taken to be the settled practice; the Board have for some time past eliminated all verbal descriptions of boundaries from orders coming before them for confirmation; the map is to be conclusive; everything within the outer edge of the boundary line shewn on the map, and nothing without it, is to be the new district or parish as the case may be. It is to be hoped that the maps are always prepared with the utmost care. The Board of Agriculture have also been concerned in the method of defining these local government boundaries; copies of these orders of county councils are always sent to this Board, as well as to the Local Government Board; and here, again, there has been some uncertainty as to the requirements of the department. Until recently the authority in St. James's-square have required the insertion in the reference to the map of a statement that where the boundary is shewn as being the boundary between two enclosures, the actual line appearing upon the map is to be understood as being the boundary intended, and not the property boundary. These words are no longer deemed necessary, and will no longer be inserted upon confirmation of an order. In fact, now that the new boundaries are defined simply by means of a distinct coloured line upon the map, any reference to a property boundary which may or may not tally with the coloured line would be superfluous and misleading. THE DECISION of the Court of Appeal given recently in The London Freehold and Leasehold Property Co. (Limited) v. Baron Suffield than upon any nice question of law, though incidentally the opinion was expressed that for a deed to operate as an escrow it is not necessary for it to be delivered to a stranger-that is, to a person who does not take under it. Where, for instance, there are several grantees, and one of them is solicitor for the grantor, evidence would be admissible to show that the solicitor received it as an escrow. In fact, however, this question had not to be decided, since the deed in dispute was held to have been delivered as a perfect deed. The plaintiff company had given mortgages on property at 5 per cent. interest which they were desirous of replacing by other mortgages at a lower rate of interest. Certain trustees, known in the case as the Arthur trustees, of whom the defendant, Lord SUFFIELD, was one, had £9,000 which they desired to invest. With reference to these two parties, Mr. L. M. WYNNE, the defaulting solicitor, filled a number of positions. He was one of the Arthur trustees, and his firm were solicitors to the trustees and had the £9,000 in their hands. He was managing director of the company, and his firm were bankers of the company, and also the company's solicitor. It was arranged that the £9,000 which the trustees had to invest should be advanced to the company upon a mortgage to take the place of one of the existing mortgages which was to be paid off, and under the 1st of June, 1893, there was an entry in the books of WYNNE'S firm showing a transfer of £9,000 from their account with the trustees to the credit of the company. Apparently this money was not applied in paying off any existing mortgage, nor did the company actually have the benefit of it. But later in the month a mortgage in favour of the Arthur trustees was prepared and submitted to the directors of the company, and was by them ordered to be sealed. This was done and the deed left with WYNNE. The company have now sought to set aside the deed on the grounds that it was delivered only as an escrow, and that the company never received any consideration for it. On the first point, as already intimated, the Court of Appeal were against the plaintiffs. On the second it was held that since WYNNE'S firm held the money of the trustees and were bankers for the company, a mere transfer in their books from one party to the other was a good payment, and on this point too they were against the company. Hence the judgment of KEKEWICH, J., refusing to set the deed aside was affirmed. Under the circumstances it would have been difficult, perhaps, to arrive at any other result. COVENANTS FOR QUIET ENJOYMENT. THE obligation of a lessor to secure to his lessee the undisturbed enjoyment of the demised premises is, as a general principle, well established, but the exact extent of the obligation is still a matter of frequent litigation. The obligation may be either implied or express. An implied agreement for quiet enjoyment arises even upon a parol demise (Bandy v. Cartwright, 8 Ex. 913; Hall v. City of London Brewery Co., 2 B. & S. 737), and a fortiori a demise under seal implies a covenant for quiet enjoyment in whatever words the demise is made, although the word "demise" is necessary to imply also a covenant for title (Baynes v. Lloyd, 1895, 1 Q. B. 820). But this implied covenant is effectual only so long as the estate of the lessor lasts, and if he is a tenant for life (Ådams v. Gibney, 6 Bing. 656), or a lessee who has sub-let for a period in excess of the unexpired residue of his own term (Baynes v. Lloyd, 1895, 2 Q. B. 610), the lessee has no remedy upon eviction by the remainderman or the head lessor (Schwarz v. Locket, 61 L. T. 719). It was formerly the rule that the covenant was implied only from an actual demise, and not from an agreement to demise (Brashier v. Jackson, 6 M. & W. 549), but this distinction is probably not tenable in cases where the agreement is capable of specific performance, and is, therefore, placed on the footing of an actual demise under the doctrine of Walsh v. Lonsdale (21 Ch. D. 9). The implied covenant_extends to the acts of all persons, whether claiming under the lessor or by title paramount, and is thus more extensive than the ordinary express covenant, which extends only to the acts of the lessor and persons claiming under him. Hence it is important to notice that the implied covenant is restrained by an express is a covenant to secure title and possession, and it does not covenant (Nokes's case, 4 Rep. 80 b.; Merrill v. Frame, 4 Taunt. 329; Line v. Stephenson, 4 Bing. N. C. 678, 5 ib. 183), though even where there is an express covenant the lessor may still be held liable for acts not included in it on the principle that he may not derogate from his own grant (Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton, 1894, 2 Q. B. 836). But though the implied covenant is thus extensive as to the persons whose acts are included, it is restricted, save as regards the covenantor, to such acts as are lawful. "Under a covenant in law," it was said in Hayes v. Bickerstaff (Vaughan 118), "the lessee is to enjoy his lease against the lawful entry, eviction, or interruption of any man, but not against tortious entries, evictions, or interruptions, and the reason of law is solid and clear, because against tortious acts the lessee has proper remedy against the wrongdoers." In the case, however, of the lessor himself, the implied covenant is wider in effect, and the term may be recovered under it in the event of the lessor's wrongful entry (Andrews' case, Cro. Eliz., 214). guarantee to the tenant that he may lawfully use the land for any purpose not expressly excepted. Hence, where an undertenant was restrained at the suit of the head-lessor from carrying on a business which was excluded by the head-lease, but not by the under-lease, it was held that there had been no such disturbance of the possession as to constitute a breach of covenant (Dennett v. Atherton, L. R. 7, Q. B. 316). But the extent of the operation of the covenant has been enlarged by the later authorities (see per LINDLEY, L.J., in Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D., p. 96), and the present rule is that it is "in every case a question of fact whether the quiet enjoyment of the land has or has not been interrupted; and where the ordinary and lawful enjoyment of the demised land is substantially interfered with by the acts of the lessor, or those lawfully claiming under him "that is, "claiming under him the right to do the acts which caused the interruption" (see per Lord ESHER, M.R., in Harrison v. Muncaster, 1891, 2 Q. B., p. 685)—"the covenant is broken, although neither the title to the land nor the possession In practice an express covenant for quiet enjoyment is always of the land may be otherwise affected" (Sanderson v. Mayor inserted, and this is limited to lawful interruption by the lessor of Berwick, supra). The interference with the enjoyment of the or persons claiming under him. The covenant does not enlarge demised premises may be the result of acts done off the prewhat is previously granted, but gives an additional remedy if mises, as where by quarrying above a demised mine water was the lessee cannot get that which has been previously professed caused to percolate into the mine (Shaw v. Stanton, 2 to be granted (Leech v. Schweder, 9 Ch. p. 474; see Potts v. H. & N. 858); but it has been held that there must Smith, 6 Eq. p. 317). But even without express restriction it be an actual physical interference. For an interference seems that it would not extend to tortious acts unless an which arises otherwise than physically, as by noise and intention to this effect is clearly expressed, as if the lessor disorder in adjacent premises, the remedy is in respect of the expressly covenants that the lessee shall enjoy his term without nuisance (Jenkins v. Jackson, 40 Ch. D. 71). It seems that an the entry or interruption of any person, whether such entry overheating of the demised premises in consequence of the heat or interruption be lawful or tortious (Hayes v. Bickerstaff, supra). required for a manufacture carried on upon adjoining premises "Where a man covenants to indemnify against all persons, would be a breach of the covenant if it rendered the demised this is," said Lord ELLENBOROUGH, Č.J., in Nash v. premises unfit for the purposes for which the lessor understood Palmer (5 M. & S. p. 379), "but a covenant to indemnify they were to be used (Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88). But against lawful title. And the reason is because, as it regards the covenant will not protect the lessee against damage which such acts as may arise from rightful claim, a man may well could not, if reasonable care had been exercised, have been be supposed to covenant against all the world; but it would be foreseen to be the consequence of the acts complained of, and on an extravagant extension of such a covenant if it were good this ground the inrush of water into a demised mine, caused by against all the acts which the folly or malice of strangers might the proper working of an adjoining mine, the existence of the suggest; and, therefore, the law has properly restrained it water not being suspected, was, in Harrison v. Muncaster (1891, within its reasonable import, that is, to rightful title ": see 2 Q. B. 680), held to constitute no breach of covenant. MoreDudley v. Folliott (3 T. R. 584; 2 Wms. Saund. 177a, n. (3)). over the act complained of must be an act (whether of commission But it is otherwise if the lessor covenants against the acts of a or omission) done after the granting of the lease (Anderson v. named person, for the covenant then extends to all interruptions Oppenheimer, 5 Q. B. D. 602). And it must be the act of the by such person, whether lawful or not: Foster v. Mapes (Cro. lessor or of some one of the persons for whom he covenants. It Eliz. 212); Nash v. Palmer (supra); Fowle v. Welch (1 B. & C. is not sufficient that the act of the evictor is the immediate 29). And it seems that the covenant extends to an unlawful result of the act or omission of the lessor or some one of such entry by the lessor, for as against the party himself the court persons. Hence it is no breach of the usual covenant for quiet will not consider the word "lawful," or drive the lessee to his enjoyment if the head-lessor recovers for non-payment of rent action of trespass: Crosse v. Young (2 Show. 425), Corus v. by the sub-lessor (Kelly v. Rogers, 1892, 1 Q. B. 910; Stanley Anon (Cro. Eliz. 544); but the disturbance must be under av. Hayes, 3 Q B. 105), or for non-observance by the sub-lessee claim of right by the lessor: Lloyd v. Tomkies (1 T. R. 671). Neither is it any less a breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment that the lessor has the right to do the act complained of: Andrews v. Paradise (8 Mod. 318). The distinction between a lawful and a tortious disturbance is well illustrated in the case of Sanderson v. Mayor of Berwick (13 Q. B. D. 547). The defendants were owners of various farms which were subject to a common system of drainage. They let one of these farms to A. with a covenant for quiet enjoyment against the acts of the lessors or any persons lawfully claiming through them. They had previously let another farm, adjoining A.'s and above it, to B. with a right to use the drains through A.'s land, so far as they were adequate to carry the water from B.'s farm. B., by an excessive user of the drainage, caused the water passing from his farm to overflow A.'s farm and damage the crops. It was held that, as B. had under his lease no lawful claim to use the drains to this extent, there had been no disturbance by a person lawfully claiming under the lessors, and consequently they were not liable. But damage had also been done to A.'s farm in consequence of the proper use by B. of a drain which had been improperly constructed, and as to this it was held that there was a disturbance by a person lawfully claiming under the lessors for which they were liable. According to the older cases a covenant for quiet enjoyment of a covenant in the head-lease of which the sub-lessor has omitted to inform him (Spencer v. Marriott, 1 B. & C. 457; Dennett v. Atherton, L. R. 7 Q. B. 316). It appears to be doubtful whether a lessee who cannot enter because the possession is held by someone who refuses to quit can maintain an action for breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. In Holder v. Taylor (Hob. 12) it was suggested that the action would not lie without actual entry and expulsion; on the other hand, in Cloake v. Hooper (Freem. 122) an action on the covenant was upheld, it being said that the lessee should not be forced to enter, and so subject himself to an action by a tortious act; and in Ludwell v. Newman (6 T. R. 458) it was said that the lessor's covenant for quiet enjoyment meant a legal entry and enjoyment without the permission of any other person, and it was broken by the subsistence of a prior lease. In Wallis v. Hands (41 W. R. 471; 1893, 2 Ch. p. 85), however, where no reference was made to these cases, it was said that a person having only an interesse termini must rely upon his action against the grantor of the term for not putting him into possession (see Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440). And at any rate the lessee cannot sue until he is entitled to possession (Ireland v. Bircham, 2 Bing. N. C. 90). Mr. Graham Hastings, Q.C., who has just retired from practice at the bar, has left London for an extended tour in Egypt. |
