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Opinion, per DONAHUE, J.
In view of the fact, however, that Section 12972 specifically prohibits the employment of a child under sixteen years of age in a place dangerous to its life, limb or health, or where its morals are likely to be impaired or depraved, further legislation upon that subject would be useless and unnecessary. This latter section covers the whole subject matter, and protects a child under sixteen years of age from these dangers, regardless of whether he has or has not procured the age and schooling certificate.
The issue as to whether the employment of Steve Korens was in violation of Section 12972, General Code, was fairly presented by the pleadings in this case, but, the court having properly excluded the record in the original case, no other evidence was offered on the part of the defendant in the trial court to maintain this issue.
The phrase, “the age and schooling certificate provided by law,” found in Section 12975, must receive the same construction as heretofore given that language in Section 12994. Section 12975 in this respect contains practically the same language found in Section 4022-2, Revised Statutes, which was originally a part of the compulsory-education laws of the state. The fact, that in the subdivision of that original section by the codifying commission this part of it was placed under its present sectional numbering in the chapter relating to offenses against minors, cannot affect its construction, even if the legislature had not declared the purpose of making these laws conform to the compulsory-education laws of the state.
Statement of the Case.
The legislative intent further appears in the act of May 10, 1910 (101 O. L., 310), wherein Sections 7765, 7766 and 12975 were amended in one and the same act.
The defendant having admitted that the items of the account contained in the amended petition were correct, there was no disputed question of fact to be submitted to the jury, and the trial court properly directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
Judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and that of the common pleas court affirmed.
Judgment of the court of appeals reversed and that of the court of common pleas affirmed.
Nichols, C. J., Jones and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
THE WINOUS POINT SHOOTING CLUB V.
SLAUGHTERBECK ET AL. Right of public to fish — In waters of Lake Erie and its bays
Not limited to navigable portions. 1. The right of the public to fish in the waters of Lake Erie and
its bays, is as fixed and complete as if those waters were subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. (Sloan v. Biemiller, 34
Ohio St., 492, approved and followed.) 2. The public rights of fishing in the waters of the open navigable
public bays of Lake Erie, are not limited, within such public bays, to the particular portions thereof which are navigable.
(No. 15367 — Decided April 3, 1917.)
ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Ottawa county.
The plaintiff in error, a corporation organized under the laws of Ohio, for the purposes, among
Statement of the Case.
others, of hunting, fishing, trapping and the protection of fish and game, and for lawful shooting purposes, brought suit against the defendants in error in the court of common pleas of Ottawa.
In its petition it alleges that in furtherance of said purposes it has purchased, at large expense, large tracts of land in Sandusky and Ottawa counties, Ohio, and is, and has been for many years, the owner in fee simple and in possession thereof (the lands being described in a general way in the petition); that said lands are marsh lands, in large part covered by water, and are wholly unsuited for agricultural purposes, but during a large portion of each year great numbers of wild ducks, wild geese, muskrats and other wild game and animals resort thither and remain and feed upon the same; that said marsh lands are breeding grounds for wild ducks, frogs, turtles and other wild game and animals, and the waters thereof contain large quantities of fish for food and adapted to the sport of angling, and contain large quantities of frogs and turtles for food; that said lands derive their chief value from their adaptation to the sport of hunting and fishing and to the harboring and protection of fish and game; and that during each spring and autumn said premises are the resort of wild ducks, wild geese and other wild fowl, and during the fall season plaintiff's members hunt and fish thereon and therein in such manner as to protect the fish and game while deriving sport in the pursuit thereof.
The petition further alleges that defendants claim some estate or interest in the aforesaid
Statement of the Case.
premises adverse to the plaintiff's right, the exact nature and extent of which the plaintiff is uninformed, but they claim the right to fish at will with seines in the nonnavigable waters covering the premises of plaintiff, and with other fishing devices upon the lands of plaintiff, and to place their shanty boats and other boats upon the lands of plaintiff and in the nonnavigable waters thereon; that in the exercise of said pretended rights defendants destroy, and have destroyed, the feeding and breeding grounds of said wild game, and scare and drive the same away, and enter upon said nonnavigable waters in the night season and remove the fish from said waters and scare and drive all the game from said premises; and that if said acts are persisted in they will permanently drive away and destroy the fish and wild fowl upon plaintiff's said premises and cause plaintiff irreparable injury.
The prayer of the petition is that the defendants and each of them be enjoined from entering on the said premises of the plaintiff and upon the nonnavigable waters thereof and upon the marshes, rivers and creeks upon the premises of the plaintiff, and from destroying and injuring the breeding grounds of said wild game and fish, and from setting, placing and drawing seines, fish nets or other fishing devices for catching fish, turtles or other animals upon said premises.
In their answer the defendants allege “that all those waters described in plaintiff's petition, lying west of the line drawn from Slade's Point or Slate's Point to a point at the east end of Eagle Island, and thence to South Point and between Squaw Island,
Statement of the Case.
on the south and Horseshoe Island on the west and the shore line on the north, and lying between the shores aforesaid, form part of a public bay connected with Sandusky Bay and not part of Sandusky River and Mud Creek, and that the same is navigable in part and since the settlement of the country in that vicinity by white people, has been continuously and uninterruptedly used by the public for fishing and without objection until the plaintiff claimed the right to convert said public water into a private duck pond for the exclusive use and enjoyment of its members, and to exclude the public from the privileges of fishing therein.” Defendants admit "that they claim the right of fishing at will within the portion of the premises described in plaintiff's petition herein set forth wherever covered by water to an extent that marketable fish may be found therein, and
that the plaintiff is the owner of all the balance of the premises described in plaintiff's petition and they deny that they have fished or intended to fish or have asserted any claim to any other part of the premises described in plaintiff's petition.”
In its reply the plaintiff denies that the place where the defendants were fishing is covered by navigable water, and denies that the defendants were fishing in public waters, and that the public right of fishing exists therein. Furthermore, it alleges that by consideration of the circuit court of Ottawa county, Ohio, in 1895, and of the supreme court of Ohio, in 1897, the plaintiff was decreed to be the owner of said premises, and the public without right to fish thereon, except in the navigable