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advance of $20,000 over their cost to him. Held, that this amount was not taxable as “gains, profits, or income ” of the owner, for the year in which the sale was made (CHASE, C. J., CLIFFORD and BRADLEY, JJ., dissenting). - Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 63.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3, 8, 9; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 7.
TENANT IN COMMON. 1. A. agreed with B. to save from a wrecked vessel, the property of B., as much of the cargo as possible, and to receive for his services a certain proportion of the property saved; the division to be made in presence of a third person. Some of the cargo having been landed, in pursuance of the agreement, but not divided, held, that it belonged to A. and B. in common. — Boylston Ins. Co. v. Davis, 68 N. C. 17.
2. One tenant in common of chattels naturally severable, such as grain, may sever and take away his share without the consent of the other; and may sue alone for an unlawful severance and removal of the same by a third person. Newton v. Howe, 29 Wis. 531.
TENDER. — See INSURANCE (LIFE), 2.
TROVER. — See LORD's Day, 1.
USAGE. — See EVIDENCE, 4.
See APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5; SURETY.
VERDICT. 1. A verdict on an indictment for composing, writing, printing, and publishing a libel, that the defendant is “guilty of publishing as alleged in the indictment, and not guilty as to the residue,” is equivalent to a general verdict of guilty. — Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199.
2. When an indictment is sufficient to support a conviction of homicide in any degree, a verdict of “guilty," specifying no degree, is bad, and no judgment can be rendered on it. — Hogan v. The State, 30 W is. 428. See AIDER BY VERDICT ; AUTREFOIS ACQUIT. Vis MAJOR. — See AGENT, 4; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2;
Martial Law. VOID AND VOIDABLE. - See Bills AND NOTES, 2; DEED, 2; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 1; LUNATIC.
VOTER. At an election A. and B. were candidates for an office for which A. was duly qualified, but for which B. was disqualified by holding an office made incompatible with the former by statute. B. had the majority of votes. Held, (1) that B. was not elected; (2) that A. was not elected, in the absence of proof that those who voted for B. did so with notice of his disqualification; (3) that there was no presumption of such notice, from the fact that the disqualification was created by a public statute. — People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451.
WAR. A debt was due before the war from a citizen of Kansas to a citizen of Virginia. After the war the creditor, who had always remained in Virginia, brought suit in Kansas to recover the debt, with interest. Held, (1) that the running of the Kansas Statute of Limitations against the creditor was suspended during the continuation of the war in Virginia, viz., from April 27, 1861, to April 2, 1866; (2) that the accumulation of interest was suspended during the same period. — Brown v. Hiatt, 15 Wall. 177.
See AGENT, 4. — CONSIDERATION; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1, 2; INSURANCE (LIFE), 1, 2; MARTIAL LAW.
WARRANT. — See EVIDENCE, 2.
. WARRANTY. 1. There is no implied warranty of value in an assignment of a claim or account. — Shirts v. Irons, 37 Ind. 98.
2. Testatrix devised to her daughter and sole heir, S., for life; “but if the said S. should have a child to cry," then to such child; and if such child should die, then over. S. and her husband conveyed the estate with warranty to P., and four months after their child W. was born alive. Held, (1) that the life estate of S., under the will, was not merged by the descent of the fee ; (2) that the remainder was vested in W., who was en ventre sa mere at the time of the conveyance; (3) that he was not barred by the warranty of his parents. — Crisfield v. Stort, 36 Md. 129.
WATERCOURSE. — See EVIDENCE, 4.
Way. 1. A conveyance of a piece of land “to be used for a road, and for no other purpose whatever," passes the fee, and not merely an easement. - Coburn v. Coxeter, 51 N. H. 158.
2. Abuttors on a street, owning the fee therein, can maintain no action for the obstruction thereof by a horse railway. – Kellinger v. Forly-second Street R.R. Co., 50 N. Y. 206.
WAY. - See BANKRUPTCY, 1; DEDICATION.
WIFE. — See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
WILL. 1. A direction in a will to divide real estate among certain persons does not authorize the administrator to sell it for the purpose of division. — McDowell 1. White, 68 N. C. 65.
2. Devise to testator's “ nieces and nephows, children of S.," held, not to include a step-daughter of S., who was also a niece of the testator. - Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis. 226. See POWER.
WITNESS. The purchaser of liquor, sold in violation of a statute, is not guilty of a criminal offence, and cannot be excused from testifying as to such purchase. State v. Rand, 51 N. H. 361.
See GRAND JURY; PREROGATIVE, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 3.
" Children.” — See WILL, 2.
“ Currency at its specie value." — See MONEY. "
“ Die by his own hand.” — See INSURANCE (LIFE), 3. “ Due process of law.” — See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, State, 8. " Elective franchise, or any other right." — See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, STATE, 4.
“Gains, profits, or income.” — See Tax, 2.
“Loss." — See CARRIER, 1.
“ To be used for a road.” — See Way, 1.
WRIT. - See SEAL.
Reeves's History of the English Law, from the time of the Romans to the end of the
reign of Elizabeth. A new edition, with numerous notes, and an introductory dissertation by W. F. Finlason, Esq. London, 1869.'
In less than two decades a century will have elapsed since the appearance of the first edition of Reeves's History of the English Law. If a new edition of the work has seemed desirable, it is because the interval since 1787 has produced no book fitted to replace Reeves's. Crabb's History of the English Law, which has received the unmerited compliment of a German translation, is but a superficial extract from Reeves, of no independent worth, and becomes, from the period where its predecessor ends, dry and concise to the last degree. The valuable works published during the present century upon special periods and special subjects of English law could not of course render superfluous a comprehensive view of English legal history. Reeves has continued up to the present time to be the only serviceable book of this nature.
This book, in view of the time when it was written, merits very high commendation, especially when compared with contemporaneous German works upon legal history. Reeves used the sources which were then accessible in the most thorough and comprehensive manner. A gratifying soberness of criticism guarded him from extreme hypotheses and vague generalizations. The exposition is throughout clear and transparent.
It should be said, on the other hand, that Reeves did not fully understand the growth and development of the individual legal institutions, and that for the periods into which his material is distributed he paraphrased or excerpted more or less the main sources. This dependence upon the sources betrays itself especially in this, that he makes them the basis of his arrangement according to periods.
It was not to be anticipated that a new edition, provided in the English fashion with “editor's notes," would give to this solid work the form demanded by a genuine historical conception. We had a right to expect, however, that the learned book of 1787 would represent in point of matter the present state of legal knowledge. Those of us who were inclined to be sanguine took up Finlason's edition in the hope that the essential relations connecting the development of English law with German and Franko-Norman law would be indicated with references to the sources, that the German works upon English and Anglo-Saxon law, that Gneist, Gundermann, Biener, Marquardsen, Reinhold Schmid, Konrad Maurer, and others, would be noticed, and that the results of German investigation into the importance of Roman law in England would be mentioned. It was a truly modest claim, on the other hand, to demand that the English editor of an English work should
1 Translated for the American Law Review from a notice by Heinrich Brunner in XI. Kritische Vierteljahrschrift.
have exhausted, or at least noticed, the late special English works, and the numerous publications of historico-legal sources issued by the Record Commission.
Not to mince matters, Finlason's.edition of Reeves has not accomplished the object for which it should have been published, and disappoints even the slightest hopes which we were naturally justified in entertaining.
We find nothing to commend in the undertaking beyond the purpose expressed in the preface, of reprinting Reeves unadulterated, and of prudently avoiding all modifications of the text which, if we may judge from Finlason's notes, would indeed have turned out sadly. On the other hand, the editor has taken liberties in the distribution of his material, which ought not to pass unrebuked. That he has put into three volumes what Reeves put into five is a matter of small moment, since the individual chapters remain unchanged. But it was an unhappy thought to change the headings of several chapters. Reeves gives, for instance, to Chapters II., III., and IV., of the first book, the common heading, “ William the Conqueror to John." Glanville's treatise, a law book of Henry II.'s time, is the fundamental authority for this period, and the matter is divided among the three chapters, according to subjects. Finlason, proud of the discovery that a new period should properly begin with Henry II., rechristened these chapters so that Chapter II. is entitled “William to Henry II.," Chapter III., “ Henry II.,” Chapter IV., “ Henry II. to John." By way of justification, he alleges that Chapter III. deals exclusively with matters belonging to the reign of Henry II. Let us see what is gained by this change, which fortunately is not accompanied by any alteration of the text. We find at once in Chapter II. a discussion of Henry II.'s regulations about the justices in Eyre, and the introduction of the assizes by the same king, of the constitutions of Clarendon, and the quarrels of Henry II. with Thomas à Becket. That is the chapter which Finlason entitles “ William I. to Henry II.” (exclusive). Chapter III. deals with dower, dowry, wardship, descent, and other matters of law which, for the most part, were transplanted from Normandy to England at the time of the Conquest, consequently long before Henry II., to whom exclusively Finlason devotes this chapter. Chapter IV. gives a sketch of the possessory assizes, which of course belong to Henry II.'s reforms in procedure, and contains at the end a summary of the sources for the whole period from William to John, discussing therefore the laws of the Conqueror, Domesday Book, the early statutes, and Glanville's treatise. If, in spite of all that, Finlason claims this chapter for the time from Henry II. (exclusive) to John (inclusive), his is indeed that kind of logic against which even the gods strive in vain.
Independently of the changes in arrangement wherein, as appears from the preceding example, Finlason has not shown himself precisely clever, the new edition contains a double addition to the original Reeves, viz., a lengthy "Introduction to the present edition " (128 pages), and a long string of somewhat obtrusive notes, from the hand of the editor.
The - Introduction,” which Finlason regards as an essential supplement to the History of the English Law, is devoted to Roman law and its influence upon the development of English law. Gratifying as it is to see in England, at the present time, a growing appreciation of the Roman law, it seems as if the