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Dec. 13.-Messrs. BAKER & SONS, at Ilford, at 6 for 7 p.m., Freehold Building
Plots (see advertisement, Nov. 27, p. 4).

Dec. 14.-Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, FARMER, & BRIDGEWATER, at the Mart,
at 2 p.m., Life Interest (see advertisement, Nov. 20, p. 4).

Dec. 15.-Messrs. HOBSON, RICHARDS, & Co., at the Mart, at 2 p.m., Freehold
Estate (see advertisement, Nov. 13, p. 4).

Dec. 16.-Messrs. GLASIER & SONS, at the Mart, at 2 p.m., Leasehold Ground-
Rents (see advertisement, this week, p. 4).

Dec. 17.-Messrs. BAKER & SONS, at 2 p.m., Leasehold Property (see advertise-
ment, this week, p. 4).

SCHWEITZER'S COCOATINA

Arti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powder. Guaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of the Finest Quality with the excess of fat extracted.

The Faculty pronounce it "the most nutritious, perfectly digestible beverage for Breakfast, Luncheon, or Supper, and invaluable for Invalids and Children."

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Made instantaneously with iling water, a teaspoonful
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COCOATINA A LA VANILLE is the most delicate, digestible,
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In tins at 1s. 6d., 38., 58. 6d., &c., by Chemists and
Grocers.

Charities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprietor,

H. SCHWEITZEE & Co., 10, Adam-st.. Strand, London, W.C

YORK.-TOWN CLERKSHIP.

CITY of Corporation of York invite applications

for the office of Town Clerk of that city. The gentleman selected must be a duly qualified solicitor, and will be required to devote the whole of his time to the duties of his office and not to engage in private practice. In addition to the ordinary duties of a Town Clerk he will also have to act as Clerk to the

Urban Sanitaryho the Ouse Navigation

Committee, and the

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Attendance Committee. Salary £500 per annum. The corporation will provide offices and the requisite staff of clerks for the department. - Applications in writing, stating age, qualifications, and references. with testmonials (not exceeding six) to be sent in not later than 12 o'clock at noon on Monday, the 20th December instant, addressed"TOWN CLERK'S DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE," Town Clerk's Office, York.

York, 8th December, 1856.

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Tsolicitor who has prepared, or any person who Any can give any information respecting the Will of the above-named deceased, is requested to communicate at once with Messrs. ARKCOLL & COCKELL, Solicitors, 41 and 42, Tooley-street, Southwark.

AJOR

MA

HALLETT'S PEDIGREE CEREALS, Free to any Railway Station in Great Britain.-HALLETT'S PEDIGREE SEED COMPANY, LIMITED, Brighton. Telegraphic Address, " Pedigree, Brighton."

LAWYERS' PRAYER UNION. It is

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

BIRTHS.

BROWNE.-Dec. 7, at 45, Argyll-road, Kensington, the wife of William Moxon
Browne. barrister-at-law, of a son.

DISNEY.-Dec. 6, at 1, Newbridge-avenue, Sandymount, Dublin, the wife of
H. R. E. Disney, solicitor, of a daughter.
ROSHER.-Dec. 6, at 55, Bedford-gardens, Kensington, the wife of George
Brenchley Rosher, barrister-at-law, of a son.

MARRIAGE.

TADMAN-MORSE.-Dec. 7, at the church of St. Augustine, Kilburn, Edwin T.
Tadman, of Gray's-inn, solicitor, to Helen M. Morse, of Camberwell.
DEATH.

DAVY.-Dec. 5, at 11, Pavilion-square, Scarborough, Alfred Davy, solicitor, of
Leeds, aged 48.

All letters intended for publication in the “Solicitors' Journal" must te authenticated by the name of the writer.

CONTENTS.

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The Object of this College is to enable Students at the earliest practicable age, and at a moderate cost, to take the University Degree in Arts, Law, or Medicine.

Students are admitted at 16, and a Degree may be taken at 19.

The College Charges for Lodging and Board (with
an Extra Term in the Long Vacation), including all
necessary expenses of tuition for the B.A. Degree,
are £84 per annum.

For further information apply to the WARDEN,
Cavendish College, Cambridge.

CHORNE COLLEGE, near Winslow.

A Church School for One Hundred Sons of
Clergymen, Army and Navy Men, Lawyers, and the

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UNTEARABLE LETTER
COPYING BOOKS.

(HOWARD'S PATENT.)

1000 Leaf Book, 5s. 6d. ; 500 Leaf Book, 3s. 6d. English made.

THE BEST LETTER COPYING BOOK OUT.

WODDERSPOON & CO.,

7, SERLE STREET, AND 1, PORTUGAL STREET, LINCOLN'S INN, W.O.

HE NEW ZEALAND LAND MORT-
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THE

Capital £2,000,000, fully subscribed. £200,000 paid up. Reserve Fund, £5,000. The Company's loans are limited to first-class freehold mortgages. The Debenture issue is limited to the uncalled capital.

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H. J. BRISTOW, Esq.
W. K. GRAHAM, Esq.
FALCONER LARKWORTHY,
Esq.

ARTHUR M. MITCHISON,
Esq.

Sir WILLIAM T. POWER,
K.C.B.
Esq.

THOS. RUSSELL,
C.M.G.

Sir EDWARD W. STAF-
FORD, K.C.M.G.
Chairman of Colonial Board-
The Hon. Sir FREDK. WHITAKER, K.C.M.G., M.L.C.,
late Premier of New Zealand.

The Directors are issuing Terminable Debentures bearing interest at 4 per cent. for three years, and 43 per cent. for five years and upwards. Interest halfyearly by Coupons.

Leadenhall-buildings, Leadenhall-st., London, E.C
A. M. MITCHISON, Managing Director.

SCHO
like. Masters mostly University Men. Thirty LA

guineas per annum; entrance fee, five guineas.-Ad-
dress, Rev. Dr. JAMES.

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Loans granted on security of Policies, Life
Interests, Reversions, and Borough and County
Rates, as well as on other approved Securities.
Life Interests and Reversions are purchased.
Claims paid immediately on proof of death and
title.

Commission allowed to Solicitors and others on
Assurances effected through their introduction.
Prospectus and Form of Proposal sent on applica-
tion to the Actuary.

Meeting in London for Barristers and Solicitors, and
their Clerks only, on Thursday Evening, December
16th, 1886. Mr. J. H. Gresham in the chair. Any
gentlemen in the legal profession, or their clerks, who
desire to attend or will assist in inviting others, are
requested to apply to Mr. H. C. NISBET, 35, Lincoln's-
inn-fields.

ing in Lon to hold another Social and Religious LONDON ASSURANCE CORPORATION.

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AW UNION FIRE and LIFE INSU
RANCE COMPANY.

ESTABLISHED IN THE YEAR 1854.
The only Law Insurance Office in the United Kingdom
which transacts both Fire and Life Insurance Busi-

ness.

Chier Office

216, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W.C. The Funds in hand and Capital Subscribed amount to £1,900,000 sterling.

Chairman-JAMES CUDDON, Esq., of the Middle
Temple, Barrister-at-Law.

Deputy-Chairman-CHARLES PEMBERTON, Esq. (Lee
& Pembertons), Solicitor, 44, Lincoln's-inn-fields.
The Directors invite attention to the New Form of
Life Policy, which is free from all conditions.
Policies of Insurance granted against the contin-
gency of Issue at moderate rates of Premium.

The Company ADVANCES Money on Mortgage of Life Interests and Reversions, whether absolute or contingent.

The Company also purchases Reversions. Prospectuses, copies of the Directors' Report and Annual Balance Sheet, and every information, sent post-free on application to

FRANK MCGEDY, Actuary and Secretary.

NORTHERN ASSURANCE COMPANY.

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THE HOUSE OF LORDS last week affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and of a divisional court in the important case of Wakelin v. London and South-Western Railway Co., in which the jury had found for the plaintiff in an action for negligence, but the court had set the verdict aside. The facts were, shortly, that the plaintiff's husband had been killed by a train on a level crossing late in the evening, the crossing, which was specially dangerous, having been left unguarded; and the grounds for the interference of the court appear to have been that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants conducing to the accident. We propose to consider the case in detail at some future time, but must at once point out that the rule laid down by Lord ESHER, M.R., in Davey v. London and South-Western Railway Co. (12 Q. B. D. 70), that in an action for negligence the plaintiff must prove, not only the negligence of the defendant in the affirmative, but the absence of contributory negligence on his own part in the negative, which was adhered to by that learned judge in Wakelin's case, and not dissented from by the other two judges of the Court of Appeal, does not appear from the report before us to have been expressly dissented from by any member of the House of Lords, except Lord WATSON. We cannot think the rule to be a right one, and it will be matter of regret if it should prove that the House

The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter. of Lords has neither affirmed it nor disaffirmed it; for judges at

LONDON, DECEMBER 18, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

UP TO THURSDAY afternoon there was no authority for the statement which appeared in the morning papers of that day as to the arrangements for the Christmas Vacation, but we believe that one of the Vacation Judges will sit in the Queen's Bench judges' chambers on two days in each week after the offices are opened on the 28th inst., and that the arrangements for pressing business in the Chancery Division will be practically as usual.

IT HAS FOR SOME TIME been understood that Lord BLACKBURN was desirous of resigning his position as Lord of Appeal, and the announcement of his resignation which has appeared this week, if not authorised, is probably only in advance of the fact. According to a rumour which has been prevalent in well-informed circles, his successor is to be Lord Justice COTTON-an appointment which would be equally matter of congratulation to suitors in the House of Lords and matter of regret to suitors in the Court of Appeal.

A RUMOUR is current, which is believed to be not altogether without foundation, that a proposal has been set on foot for enlarging the hours for keeping open some of the offices in the Royal Courts of Justice. The proposal is said to apply to the offices of the chief clerks of the chancery judges, and to be that those offices should be open from 10 to 5, instead of from 10 to 4. It is difficult to believe that solicitors in general desire such a change. Appointments at chambers which last up to 4 o'clock leave but a limited time before the post closes for the necessary work of correspondence, and if solicitors, or their clerks, were called upon to attend at chambers so late as 5 o'clock the greatest inconvenience would arise. Moreover, the officials are entitled to some consideration. It will be observed that the proposal relates to the time during which the offices are to be open to the public, and not to the attendance of the officers. With the offices closed to the public at 4 o'clock, as at present, the officials are able to devote as much time as is required to finishing up the day's work, and it is notorious that they not only remain for a considerable time after 4 o'clock, but that many of them take home work to do in the evenings. This may be gathered from the evidence given before Lord SELBORNE's Committee, which was printed early in this year. If the officials have to keep their offices open to the public until 5 o'clock, the completion of the clearing up of the work of the day must be postponed. But, putting this question of the officers on one side, it may, we think, be asserted that there is no general demand for the change stated to be in contemplation.

Nisi Prius should know how to direct juries in actions for negligence, in which, of course, contributory negligence is the defence most frequently set up. A full report of the judgments may perhaps contain some passages affording a guide in the

matter.

MR. JUSTICE CHITTY, in deciding the case of Re Lambert, of Tuesday last, may, at first sight, appear to have carried somewhat far the law as to the admissibility of declarations by deceased witnesses as to questions of pedigree. The question in the case was as to the existence of a marriage between two persons, both of whom were dead, and evidence was admitted of a draft will, in which the alleged husband had described his alleged wife by her maiden name, and as passing as his wife, there being no signaturė or attestation. It was contended that this was not a statement by the husband, but only an intended statement. The learned judge's ruling that the draft was admissible appears, however, to be entirely within well-known decisions of the House of Lords. In The Sussex Peerage case (11 Cl. & F. 85) the question was as to the admissibility of an entry made in a Prayer-book. Lady AUGUSTA had made an unsigned entry in the book to the effect that it was the Prayer-book by which she was married to the Duke of SUSSEX at Rome on a certain day, the entry itself not being dated; and the House of Lords admitted the entry, not as proving the marriage, but as a declaration by one of the parties that there had been a marriage. In The Berkeley Peerage case (4 Camp. 401), a question was raised as to the admissibility of an entry in a Bible by the deceased father of the person whose illegitimacy was in issue, to the effect that the latter was his eldest son, and born in lawful wedlock on a particular date. Although it was proved that the father had declared that he had made the entry for the express purpose of establishing his son's legitimacy if it should ever come in question, the law lords, after consulting the judges, held that the entry was evidence of the son's legitimacy. Chief Justice MANSFIELD, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the judges, held that the motive with which the entry was made did not render it inadmissible, atlhough "its particularity would be a strong circumstance of suspicion"; but Lord ELLENBOROUGH expressed a doubt whether every declaration of a parent, howsoever made, before any In the recent dispute appears to have subsisted, is admissible." case Mr.Justice CHITTY pointed out that the objections to the form of the declaration put in evidence referred to its weight, not to its admissibility; and he acted on the general principle that, upon a question of pedigree, any declaration by any member of the family is admissible for what it is worth.

66

THE QUESTION whether Campbell v. Campbell (No. 2) and similar cases ought or ought not to be heard in camera has been

a

so much discussed of late that it is well to draw attention to a | affirmative evidence of any particular defendant having been once curious distinction in Divorce Court practice. It is settled beyond Christian, has never to our knowledge been raised, but we imagine doubt by C. v. C. (1 P. & D. 640) that the court has no that the ordinary rule by which the burden of proof is thrown power to hear a suit for dissolution of marriage in camera; but upon a prosecutor would apply, although we think also that very the judgment in that case recognizes as lawful the frequent slight evidence would have to be adduced in ordinary cases. The practice of so hearing suits for nullity of marriage, and the punishment for common law blasphemy is fine or imprisonment or reporter's head-note, though not the judgment, recognizes as both at the discretion of the judge; whereas it will be observed equally lawful the not so frequent practice of so hearing suits for that the punishment for apostacy is different, and no discretion judicial separation, of which Campbell v. Campbell (No. 1) furnished whatever is left to the court. an instance. This distinction is based on section 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), by which "in all suits and proceedings, other than proceedings to dissolve any marriage, the said court (of Divorce) shall proceed and act and give relief on principles and rules which, in the opinion of the said court, shall be as nearly as may be conformable to the principles on which the ecclesiastical courts have heretofore acted and given relief," and it was a common practice of such courts to hear in camera suits for nullity on physical grounds and for divorce a menså et thoro (corresponding to judicial separation). Not only does the section expressly exclude suits for dissolution, but, as it appears from C V. C. (ubi supra), in one of the amendment Bills a clause which had been introduced giving the general power to hear in camera was rejected by the Legislature, and, as was held in H. v. C. (29 L. J. P. & M. 81) without express power in that behalf, the public cannot be excluded, even by consent of parties, and in the latter case the court, not having its attention called to section 22 of the Act of 1857 (which, it must be admitted, has been rather liberally construed in favour of exclusion), went so far as to refuse to hear a suit for nullity in camera. We may observe that the customary exclusion of women and boys from trials for rape and the like cannot be legally enforced (being a mere notification rather than a compulsory exclusion), and that a clause giving the judge power to exclude the public, or some portion of it, from such trials was rejected when the Criminal Law Amendment Act was before Parliament in 1885. As to the general principle, we think that there is only a choice of evils, and that the actual exclusion of the public from a trial is a greater evil than the possible contamination of some by becoming acquainted with offensive details.

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IN THE RECENT CASE of Pankhurst v. Sowler the court, and especially Mr. Baron HUDDLESTON, took occasion to throw doubt upon the correctness of the law of blasphemy as laid down by Lord COLERIDGE in his celebrated and exhaustive exposition in Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote (15 Cox C. C. 231). We have referred to the report of that exposition, and think that passages in it may be open to exception, though, as a whole, it fairly represents the law. But one very material point should not be lost sight of, and that is the distinction between the law of blasphemy, which rests mainly on the common law, and the law of apostacy, which is purely the creature of the statute 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 32. By this statute "if any person having been educated in, or at any time having made profession of, the Christian religion, shall by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking deny the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of Divine authority," and shall be convicted on indictment, such person is for the first offence disabled from having or enjoying any office, ecclesiastical, civil, or military, and for the second offence is subjected to further disabilities and also to "imprisonment for the space of three years without bail or main prize." There are passages in Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote which bear the interpretation that the statute is obsolete and could not be acted on, and such passages are, we think, beyond doubt, incorrect (see R. v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161; R. v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26). But Messrs. RAMSAY and FOOTE were indicted, not as apostates-for the indictment appears to have contained no averment that they had been once Christians-but as blasphemers, contumelious blasphemers; and their offence, if offence it was, could have been committed by a Jew or Mahometan, whereas the statutory offence under 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 32, can only be committed by one who has been once a Christian. The question on whom the burden of proof is thrown, whether the prosecutor is entitled to assume that every person has been once a Christian until the contrary is proved or whether he must give

QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE with regard to the payment by executors of death duties become increasingly important as time runs on from the death of a testator, as interest on any unpaid duty can be required to be paid. Attention can hardly be too forcibly drawn to section 6 of 36 Geo. 3, c. 52, the substance of which may be stated as follows:-"If an executor retains legacies without paying the duty, or, on payment of legacies, deducts, without paying, the duty, it shall be a debt from him. If he pays legacies without deducting duty it shall be a debt from the executor and from the legatee." In a recent case which has come to our knowledge a residuary account was passed nearly sixty years ago, in which account the executors retained a large sum (since distributed) on which duty was stated to be not then payable. The last undivided portion of the estate being in court and about to be divided, it was discovered that no duty had been paid on the sum retained sixty years ago, and the persons entitled to the fund in court successfully contended that, as the fund in court was not part of the sum retained when duty was paid on "the residuary estate," the duty and interest on the sum retained was a debt due from the executors personally, and could not be required to be paid out of the fund in court.

THE RIGHT OF SUPPORT TO BUILDINGS FROM
ADJOINING BUILDINGS.

OUR attention has been recently called to a pamphlet by Mr.
George G. Gray, of the Middle Temple, the subject of which is
the much-vexed question of the right to support for buildings from
adjacent land or buildings, and we propose to make a few observa-
tions on this topic which have been suggested to us by what he has
written. The pamphlet is, in substance, an elaborate and inter-
esting criticism of the decision of Hall, V.C., in Lemaitre v. Davis
(30 W. R. 360, 19 Ch. D. 281), which the author conceives to be
wrong, and to have been founded on an erroneous view of the
effect of the celebrated case of Angus v. Dalton (27 W. R. 623,
30 W. R. 191, 3 Q. B. D. 85, 4 Q. B. D. 162, 6 App. Cas. 740).
The Vice-Chancellor appears to have held that the decision in
Angus v. Dalton applied to a case of support to a building from
another building. The authorities on the question are reviewed in
the pamphlet at considerable length, and the conclusion is arrived
at by the author that the right to support for buildings by build-
ings stands on a different footing entirely from the right to support
for buildings by adjacent land. To discuss at length the argu-
ments used by the author, and his views of the effect of the
different authorities respectively, would require a far larger
amount of space than we can command. We should, moreover, be
sorry to pronounce any judgment on the question which he raises
without the most careful consideration and research. We think,
however, that his pamphlet makes out a very fair case for the
conclusion that that question cannot be considered as finally settled
by the decision in Lemaitre v. Davis, which we must admit does
seem to assume, in a somewhat offhand way, that the decision in
Angus v. Dalton applies to the case of support to buildings by
buildings. What we propose briefly to do is to give the heads of
his argument as far as possible in his own words, and then to
indicate the points where the chain of argument appears to us to
be weakest, without pretending to enunciate any very definite
conclusion for ourselves. The question is altogether too big to be
knocked off within the limits of a short article.

The Right to Lateral Support from Land and Buildings. By George G. Gray, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons.]

The author, at the close of a long discussion of the cases, formulates the following conclusions:-1. The lateral support to land from the adjacent soil is an inherent right of property. 2. The right of ownership includes a right to build to the extremity of one's land, and the law, after the enjoyment of lateral support for such building from the adjacent soil during a probationary period of twenty years, protects such enjoyment as a right of property. 3. The right of support to a building from an adjoining building is a negative easement. 4. The enjoyment of such easement is incapable of being reasonably interrupted, and therefore is not within the Prescription Act, which, except in the case of light, is confined to positive easements. 5. The circumstances (apart from contract) under which a building usually requires support are not such as to call for, or justify, a protection of such encroachment or burden by the law. The result is, as we understand, the conclusion that the right to support for buildings from adjacent buildings cannot be acquired by mere enjoyment. The most important step in the reasoning is that contained in proposition 2 The author seeks to shew that the right to support for buildings by land is a right of property, like the natural right of support for land by adjacent land.

the natural right properly so-called. The right to a certain amount of support from adjacent land-i.e., that which would be sufficient to support the surface unbuilt upon-is a strictly natural right. We cannot understand how a right that requires to be acquired, whether by enjoyment or otherwise, can be said to be a natural right or a right of property in the proper sense of the term.

We pointed out, in commenting on Angus v. Dalton at the time, that to some extent the cases as to support for buildings appeared to involve the idea of the protection of ancient enjoyment, apart from any notion of a right created by acquiescence in a wrong. We would, in passing, point out that the applicability or non-applicability of the Prescription Act, though, of course, material, is not conclusive of the question in general, for, after all, the Prescription Act did not alter the basis upon which easements rest. It only substituted shorter periods for time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. The prescriptive right of support for buildings by adjacent land, which must now be taken to have been established somehow, must, in our opinion, really rest on the basis of mere length of enjoyment. We are not at present convinced that the same considerations do not apply to support of It will be readily perceived that it is very essential to the buildings by buildings, or that, as a matter of justice and expediargument that a fundamental distinction should be established ency, long enjoyment de facto ought not in that case also to be between the character of the right of support for building by protected. It is easy to say that an easement ought not to be building, and that of support for building by adjacent land. The obtained where there is no power to resist its acquisition; but, if author, therefore, endeavours to shew that the latter is a sort of the matter be carefully considered, we do not so clearly see why. enhanced natural right, for on perusal of the context it is obvious the fact of the possibility of resistance makes so much difference. that the distinction is between natural rights and easements. It It is difficult to see how it adds one grain's weight of merit or is vital to make out that one of the rights is a natural or quasi-justice to the case of the owner of the dominant tenement. The natural right of property, and the other an easement, for if they fact that a person has enjoyed an advantage wrongfully for twenty are both to be considered easements it is somewhat difficult to years does not seem to us to tell more in favour of his right to distinguish the one case from the other. The great argument protection than if he had enjoyed it for that period lawfully. The against the existence of the easement of support from mere enjoy-only way in which it works is as reducing the hardship involved ment is the absence of any power of resistance to the acquisition of to the owners of the servient tenement, because, if a man acquithe right by the owners of the servient tenement. If this con- esces, it may be presumed he does not object to his neighbours sideration is not fatal to the existence, through long enjoyment, of having the right. The philosophical basis of easements seems to the easement of support for buildings by adjacent land, it is us in truth to be mainly the fact of undisturbed enjoyment by difficult to see how it can be fatal to the existence, through long the owner of the dominant tenement, whether rightful or wrongenjoyment, of the easement of support for buildings by adjacent ful, rather than the acquiescence of the owner of the servient buildings if such right be an easement. So far as we can perceive, tenement. We do not say that this is always their legal basis, if they are both easements, they stand on much the same footing. because in most cases no doubt both elements exist, and the fact It may be urged that, in the one case, the enjoyment of the right of acquiescence has been relied upon as an essential element. But would generally be clam, whereas in the other it is not, because in considering how far a right which cannot depend on acquiescence it is more or less obvious that adjacent land supports a building. should be considered to extend, it is admissible to look to the But it does not seem to us that the question whether the enjoy- underlying justice and expediency of the case. We cannot ment is clam or not can be very material when the easement does undertake to weigh in the balance together the conflicting connot depend on acquiescence or default in resisting its acquisition. siderations which exist in practice for or against the conclusion It is very clear to us, we must say, that the easement of support that the easement of support for buildings by buildings can be for buildings by adjacent land cannot depend on acquiescence. obtained by length of enjoyment. But we cannot help thinking Therefore it does not seem to us that any sound distinction exists that, where two buildings have existed for a very long time side in this respect. by side, and the owner of one of them alters the existing state of things, there is a natural tendency to the conclusion that on him should fall the responsibility for damage thus done to the other. The truth is, that a long-existing state of things approximates, for this purpose, to a natural state of things, and the same conside rations appear more or less to apply to both.

We must confess that we are not altogether satisfied with the author's second proposition, or the arguments by which he defends it. We always imagined that the distinction was between natural rights incidental to ownership, which are inherent in the idea of ownership, and which exist without any necessity for any period of enjoyment, and easements, which must be in some way added to the incidental rights of ownership and arise from grant or prescription. It is well known that originally this distinction was not clearly drawn by the English law, and that natural rights were often spoken of as easements. But the distinction is now wellestablished, and the essence of it seems to be that the one class of rights is natural, the other acquired. In one class or the other every such right must come, and we have considerable difficulty in understanding how any particular period of enjoyment can be necessary for the acquisition of a natural right properly so-called, or how a natural right can, as such, be enhanced by enjoyment. We must confess that we cannot exactly comprehend the classification by which the author endeavours to separate the two rights of support in question. We doubt whether, in discussing the cases, the author has quite appreciated another point-viz., that the properly so-called natural right of support for land by adjacent land may give a right to damages for injury to buildings by the withdrawal of such support when the surface would have been let down even if there had been no building upon it. So, when the action is for damages to buildings, the basis of the claim may be

CONCERNING SEARCHES.
(XVIII.) JUDGMENTS.

II. THE MODERN LAW OF JUDGMENTS (continued).
Lands within the jurisdictions of the Palatine Courts of Lan
caster and Durham.-By 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 19, the Durham palatine
jurisdiction was severed from the bishoprics of Durham, and vested
as a separate franchise and royalty in the Crown. Section 7 of the
Act defines the extent of the county of Durham as comprising
"the county of Durham and Sadberge, including the detached
parts of Craikshire, Bedlingtonshire, Norhamshire, Allertonshire,
and Islandshire, and all other places heretofore within the juris-
diction of the bishopric of Durham in right of the said county
palatine."

Lands within the counties palatine are affected-first, by judg. ments of the High Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction extends into the counties palatine (2 Wms. Saund. 194; 1 Jarm. Conv. 110; 1

Cr. M. & R. 597, 848; Dart. V. & P. 486), and, therefore, the like searches in the register of judgments in the Central Office are necessary, as in the case of other lands. But by 18 Vict. c. 15, s. 2, "no judgment, decree, order, or rule of any court shall bind lands, &c., in the counties palatine respectively," as against purchasers, unless and until registered with the prothonotaries of the respective palatine courts. Secondly, they are affected by judgments and decrees of the palatine courts. The common law courts of Lancaster and Durham have (ante, pp. 105, 106) been abolished; and as to decrees and orders of the palatine chancery courts, we have pointed out above (p. 106) that it appears to be necessary that they should be registered and re-registered in the Central Office in London in order to affect purchasers of "any lands," including lands in the palatine counties.

Registration and re-registration with the prothonotaries or deputy-prothonotaries of palatine courts were also required. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 21, applied the provisions of that Act, as to the operation of judgments, to the common law courts of Lancaster and Durham, and required them to be registered in the palatine registries. The provisions of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, as to registration and notice were declared to extend and apply mutatis mutandis to the Chancery Court of Lancaster by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 43, s. 24, and to common law palatinate courts and the Chancery Court of Durham by 18 Vict. c. 15, ss. 2, 3, and 9, so far as regards the lands within their respective jurisdictions, and provision was made for registration in the palatine registries. The terms of the lastmentioned Act (fection 3) appear to shew that it is intended to apply its own provisions to the common law and chancery courts of both Lancaster and Durham. The result of this legislation (Prid. on Judgm., 4th ed., App. 2, p. 4n) was to place decrees, orders, and rules of the palatine courts on the footing of judgments of the common law palatine courts; to require them to be registered and re-registered in the palatine registries in order to affect purchasers of lands within the palatine counties, with the like protection in respect of notice or absence of notice, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as in the case of judgments of the High Court of Justice. The 2nd section of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38 applied the provisions of that Act (ante, p. 73) in regard to writs of execution and the registry thereof mutatis mutandis to judgments of the common law courts of Lancaster and Durham.

It thus appears that, to affect purchasers of lands in either of the palatine counties, judgments of the High Court must be registered and re-registered both in the Central Office and in the respective palatine registries, and judgments of the palatine courts themselves must certainly be registered and re-registered in the palatine registries, and probably also in the Central Office. The palatine registries for Lancaster and Durham are at Preston and Durham respectively (but as to Durham, see ante, p. 106).

Lands in Middlesex and Yorkshire. For an account of the Middlesex and Yorkshire Registry Acts, and of searches to be made in the registers, the reader is referred to the articles in 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, pp. 750, 760, where it is pointed out that the Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884 (section 20), makes provision for official searches, and for the issue of certificates of the results (section 21), which (section 23) protect solicitors, trustees, executors, agents, or other persons in a fiduciary position, from responsibility" for any loss or damage or injury that may arise from any error in" such certificates; but they are not made conclusive in favour of purchasers. Under these Acts a judgment does not at law affect purchasers until it is registered in the local register; but it was held in equity that the lands are bound in the hands of a purchaser who had notice of an unregistered judgment at the date of his contract-i.e., that notice supplies the want of registration (see 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, p. 751). And notice after contract, but before payment of purchase-money, would, it is apprehended, operate to give the judgment creditor a lien on the purchase-money (see ante, pp. 4, 73). But under the Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884 (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 760), s. 14, no person is to lose priority by actual or constructive notice, except in cases of actual fraud. The statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 did not repeal the Registry Acts, and they are to be read together with that statute. The effect is that (as to judgments which require registration under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110) a judgment must be registered both in the London Registry and in the local registry (Sugd. V. & P. 546),

and, if registered in London only, would affect the lands, as to purchasers, only from the time when it was also registered in the local registry (Westbrook v. Blythe, 3 E. & B. 737, 742; Hughes v. Lumley, 4 E. & B. 274)-i.e., as against purchasers without notice; for notice would supply the want of registration in the local registry, though not (see ante, p. 73) of registration in the London Registry under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. But the former Yorkshire Registry Acts allowed registration, if made within thirty days, as to lands in the West and East Ridings, and within twenty days as to the North Riding, to operate retrospectively, so as to bind the lands as from signing of judgment. The result was that a purchaser who contracted during those periods was bound, though he had no notice, provided the judgment was registered in the Court of Common Pleas before the contract, and was subsequently, within the twenty or thirty days, registered in the Yorkshire Registry. But, by virtue of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5, the purchaser being without notice, the lands would be liable only to the remedies given by the law before 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.

Therefore, it would seem that a purchaser with notice (actual, not constructive) would be bound (now as to Middlesex only) by a judgment registered in London but not in the local registry; but not bound if the judgment was registered in the local registry only and not in London (ante, p. 73); a purchaser without notice would not be bound unless the judgment was registered in both registries, and then would be bound only to the extent of the old law.

The result as to searches appears to be that a search in the central office alone will disclose all judgments which can affect lands in the registry counties. The Registry Acts do not provide for re-registration; and, therefore, a search in them would have to extend over the whole period for which it was formerly made in the Common Pleas Register. A purchaser who searched the local register alone would not be safe, for though he would not be bound by judgments not entered there (provided he had not notice of them) though registered in the London registry, yet it would be difficult on a resale to satisfy a purchaser of the absence of notice (Prid. Conv., vol. 1, p. 159, 11th ed.). Under the Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 54), ss 4, 5, any "'assurance "" may be registered; by section 3, assurance" includes "order of a court," and "order of a court" means any judgment, decree, writ of execution, or sequestration, or other order or process of or issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, whereby any interest in any land is or may be affected."

66

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As to judgments coming within 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112 respectively, those Acts must be applied and read together with the Registry Acts.

We alluded above (p. 25) to the statute 17 Car. 2, c. 8, whereby a judgment could be entered up against a defendant who died after verdict and before judgment, provided such judgment was entered up within two terms after verdict. This provision was re-enacted by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), s. 139. The statute 17 Car. 2, c. 8, was repealed by 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, as to the Supreme Court of Judicature in England, and generally by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49 (s. 3), but (section 7) with a saving so far as it applies, or may have been by Order in Council applied, to the court of the county palatine of Lancaster, or to any inferior court of civil jurisdiction. In R. S. C., 1883, XVII., 1, the provisions of 17 Car. 2, c. 8, above cited, are inserted (but without the limitation of two years).

p. 105), in the 5th paragraph, line 44, for "23 and 24 Vict. c. **In the article upon Judgments published last week (ante, 112" read "27 & 28 Vict. c. 112"; and in line 46, for "this Act" read "23 & 24 Vict. c. 38." On p. 106, 2nd column, in the last paragraph under the heading "Judgments of Inferior Courts," the words "and by the proviso. are misplaced. They should be inserted in the first paragraph of the heading after the words "judgments of the superior courts."

to the sheriff"

metropolitan police magistracy which has been offered to him by the It is stated that Mr. Montagu Williams has accepted the vacant Home Secretary.

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