case; nor would the burden of the determination be rejected by anyone who rightly understood how much of the justice of the case between the parties turns on the question of costs. But, in any case, the absurdity of the present rule ought to bring about a reconsideration of the question, and the formation of a new and more reasonable system.

A few more words on this subject, and, in particular, as to the proposed new scale of costs. This is not an historical but a practical question; still, as the committee have referred in support of their proposal to the fact that " before the establishment of the county courts, cases in which the amount sought to be recovered was less than £20 were dealt with in an exceptional manner as respects costs and otherwise," it is as well to see how this matter really stands. By 3 & 4 Will 4, c. 62, s. 17, actions for liquidated demands under £20, but not for unliquidated demands, though arising out of a contract, might be sent for trial before the sheriff, except when they involved difficult questions of law or fact; and by direction to the taxing masters (the history of which need not be written in detail) costs in actions which might have been so sent for trial were to be taxed on a reduced scale. This direction was repeated in 1853; and the practice of sending such cases for trial to the sheriff continued until the section under which this was done was repealed by the County Court Act, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, s. 6. But before 1853, the practical effect of this direction had been almost taken away by the establishment of county courts, and by the more stringent statutory rule which, in a much wider class of actions, deprived the plaintiff of all costs when he sued in the superior courts. This, in brief, is the true history of this matter; and how little it resembles the proposal of the committee will appear at once on reading the terms of the 20th

resolution.

However, the use of a false analogy will not show the proposal to be wrong. If, after the abuse of interrogatories has been restrained, it is found necessary still to reduce the costs; and if a reduction of the scale of costs for actions below a certain value may be so effected as still to leave the conduct of business in the hands of respectable practitioners with the prospect of a reasonable remuneration, it ought not to be objected to. But there should certainly be, as the committee propose, an effectual extension to both the Queen's Bench and the Chancery Divisions of the same scale or scales, if both Divisions are still to subsist, and for so long as they do so; and, as a means to this end, and as a thing itself required on grounds of common sense, the absurd test now applied should be replaced by a more reasonable rule.

BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM.

[COMMUNICATED.] III.

BEFORE proceeding with the remaining clauses of the Government Bill of last session, we desire to supplement our remarks of last week upon the omission of the filing of a declaration of inability to pay as an act of bankruptcy, by calling attention to the form of a debtor's petition as provided by clause 9, sub-clause 1. That sub-clause provides that "a debtor's petition shall allege that the debtor is unable to pay his debts," &c. Now, there is a similar statement in the form of petition for liquidation or composition under the present Act, and it was in consequence thereof that the filing of a petition for liquidation or composition was held to constitute an act of bankruptcy, it being a declaration of inability to pay. In the case of Ex parte Fenning, Re Wilson (25 W. R. 185, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 455), this was carried still further, and it was held that, the first meeting having been adjourned until a date more than six months after the filing of the petition, a trustee could not then be appointed, such appointment being equivalent to the presentation of a bankruptcy petition, and the act of bankruptcy on which it was in the liquidation petition-having been committed more than six months founded-viz., the filing of the declaration of inability to pay contained before. If that fact be abolished as an act of bankruptcy, then we shall have, in adjudications made on debtors' own petitions, bankruptcies without any act of bankruptcy committed to support them! It would be somewhat curious to speculate upon the many nice questions this might give rise to upon which counsel might be called upon to exercise We will now proceed with the their ingenuity, and judges to decide. other clauses of the Bill. Clauses 11 to 15 are mostly new, and relate to proceedings after adjudication, and we will deal with the various clauses in rotation.

We believe that we have now dealt with all the main points of the report; and it is with regret that we find it less well considered, less carefully reasoned, less accurately expressed, and less practically conceived than might have been reasonably expected from the body on the occasion. To augment the dignity of the judges of the High Court and their officers, to fetter the Court of Appeal, and not merely to control but to absorb the functions and depress the position of those who practise before them, seem to have been too much, if not the leading ideas which have governed the deliberations of the committee, at least the end to which they have too exclusively tended; whilst, upon the other hand, suitors are to be protected, not only against one another but against themselves, by a system of paternal care, directed by that preternatural sagacity, undeviating justice, and disinterested and energetic benevolence, which are always supposed to characterize a despotism, but which have hitherto not been cordially accepted among this self-willed and troublesome race. Yet there are suggestions contained in the report on points of detail that we trust may be of value, if pains are taken to work them out with care and caution, and in such a way as that they may fall in with that system which, having been so lately established by the Judicature Acts and Orders, needs now to be consolidated and improved, but not to be upset and replaced by a new constitution.

The St. James's Gazette understands that Sir Montague Smith has resigned the office of a paid judge of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which he has filled with great ability since 1871, but that he hopes to give occasional attendance upon the sittings of the Judicial Committee, of which he is still a member.

“Clause 11.—(1.) On an order being made by a court adjudging a person bankrupt (in this and the principal Act referred to as an order of adjudication), the property of the bankrupt shall vest in the official receiver of the court, to be appointed as bereinafter mentioned, and shall become divisible among the creditors of the bankrupt in proportion to the debts proved by them in the bankruptcy.

(2.) Where more than one official receiver is attached to the court, such one of them as is for the time being apppointed by the court for any particular estate shall be the official receiver for the purposes of that estate."

This clause introduces the official receiver of the court. As to whether the attaching of such an official to each court will be an improvement upon the present law or not, we shall not discuss at any length. It appears to be a cardinal point in the Bill, and only experience of its working will decide its utility. So far as this section is concerned, however, it appears only to substitute the official receiver for the registrar of the the change will be one in name only. court, and in practice this alteration will not make any difference, and

"Clause 12.-Any creditor or creditors may at the time of adjudication, or at any time thereafter, and before the appointment of a trustee in the bankruptcy, apply to the court for the appointment of a special receiver or manager, and thereupon the court may, if in the opinion of the court the interests of the creditors require it, appoint a special receiver and manager of the bankrupt's estate, or continue any special receiver and manager previously appointed.

We

This clause, it is to be feared, will give rise to great uncertainty, and will decidedly be very differently acted upon in different courts. In some courts we shall find a repugnance on the part of the officials (especially if the registrar should be also the official receiver, and he should be paid by salary instead of by fees) to retain or assume any responsibility that can be avoided, whilst others will make an invariable practice not to supersede the official receiver. The fact of such a diversity of practice being possible will for the appointment of a special receiver, we shall find cases of this being in itself be a great evil. Then if any creditor is to be at liberty to apply done by friendly creditors solely in the interests of the debtor. think one uniform practice would be preferable to this, and this could be done as it was under the Act of 1861, when the official assignee through the messenger of the court took possession of all bankrupts' estates up to the first meeting, if it were not that by the Bill bankruptcy proceedings are the only ones to be recognized in the first instance. In the case of a failure, where the great majority of the speedily, these complicated proceedings and the intervention of an official creditors are favourable to a composition arrangement being carried receiver would very much injure, and in many cases destroy, the possibility of carrying through such an arrangement. If therefore the principle of the Bill, that all arrangements with creditors to be binding on any non-assenting minority shall be carried only through an adjudication in bankruptcy, is to be insisted upon, then some modification which will allow a receiver other than the official receiver of the court to be

appointed must of necessity be introduced, so that in this view this clause In any event, however, the right of creditors to apply for the appointor some other provision of a similar nature is absolutely necessary. ment of a special receiver ought to be fenced round with greater safeguards than are provided by this section, so as to prevent the right being abused in the interests of debtors or by some sharp practitioner acting

for an isolated creditor. For instance, a certain proportion in number and value of the creditors should be required to make the application, and the nominee of a majority in value of the creditors ought to be appointed unless objected to by the Board of Trade, as in the case of a trustee, and upon his giving satisfactory security. This latter point does not appear to have been provided for at all in the case of receivers. "Clause 13.-(1.) A receiver or manager under this Act shall have the same powers as if he were a receiver or manager appointed by the High Court of Justice, but shall account to the Board of Trade instead of to the court. "(2.) A receiver or manager shall not, unless the board or court otherwise order, incur any expense beyond such as is requisite for the protection of the debtor's property.

"(3.) A receiver or manager may apply to the court for advice and direction.

"(4.) A receiver or manager shall, as far as is practicable, consult the wishes of the creditors with respect to the administration of the debtor's property, and for that purpose may, if he thinks it advisable, summon meetings of the persons claiming to be creditors."

The Board of Trade is introduced by this clause as the governing body for the management of bankrupts' estates. This seems to be another cardinal principle of the Bill, and will no doubt be well discussed in Committee (if it should re-appear in the future Bill of the Government) by members of Parliament who are better able than we are to express an opinion as to whether the provision will work well or not, and we do not propose in these remarks to discuss that question at any length. It is quite clear that some governing body should be appointed to see that estates are properly administered, and the point is whether the Board of Trade, with its already large functions, can better perform that duty than the court or some other independent body. No doubt there will be two widely differing opinions as to this, but there cannot be any doubt that with the present President of the Board of Trade, with his great experience in commercial matters and in organization generally, at the head of that department of the State, every effort would be used to make the experiment a successful one. Whether it will be so really depends upon the ability of the officials intrusted with the carrying out of the scheme.

"Clause 14.-(1.) The bankrupt shall give to the official receiver of his estate such information with respect to the estate as he may be required to give under section 19 of the principal Act, and in particular shall within three days after the adjudication, or within such extended time as the court may for special reasons allow, make out and submit to the official receiver a statement verified by affidavit, and showing, as far as practicable, the particulars of the bankrupt's assets, debts, and liabilities, the names, residences, and occupations of his creditors, and the securities held by them respectively; but where any such statement is prepared by a person nominated by the bankrupt, the costs of the preparation shall not be allowed out of the bankrupt's estate, except with the approval of an ordinary resolution of creditors. (2.) Any person stating himself in writing to be a creditor of the bankrupt may, personally or by agent, inspect this statement at all reasonable times, and take any copy thereof or extract therefrom.'

66

Sub-clause 1.-We consider it a wise proposal to compel a bankrupt to give all information as to his estate and liabilities at the earliest practicable moment. But as to the cost of preparing the statement, we think this might well be left to the discretion of the court and not to the caprice of the creditors. The court would be a more independent tribunal to determine such a question, and in matters of this kind the power should not be placed in the hands of the creditors, who are too apt to be influenced by personal feeling.

Sub-clause 2.-As a greater check upon the evil of "touting" we would suggest that before a creditor or his agent is allowed to obtain an inspection of, or extract from, a bankrupt's statement, he should be required either to prove his debt or make an affidavit that he is a creditor. This is required, under the present law, by many courts throughout the country, and would, we think, be a more effectual check than the mere requirement that he should state such a fact in writing. In any event some penalty ought to attach to a person untruthfully representing himself to be a creditor for the purpose of getting a copy of the statement-say that he should be guilty of a contempt of court, and punishable accordingly on the application of the trustee, receiver, or any creditor.

"Clause 15.-(1.) The official receiver shall summon the first meeting of creditors for a day not later than seven days after the adjudication, unless the court, for any special reason, deem it expedient that the meeting be summoned for a later day. "(2.) He may, subject to the directions of the court, adjourn the first meeting from time to time and from place to place.

66

(3.) The bankrupt shall, unless prevented by sickness or other cause satisfactory to the meeting, attend the first and other meetings of his creditors and any adjourned meeting, and shall produce to his creditors at each of such meetings a statement of his affairs in the prescribed form, and shall submit to such examination and give such information as the meetings respectively require, and if he fails to do so he shall be deemed guilty of a contempt of court."

Sub-clause 1.-The mode of summoning the first meeting should, we think, be prescribed. And the place where it is to be held should also be prescribed. The general feeling amongst commercial people is, we believe, that it should be held in the place where the bulk of the trade creditors

reside, and this would probably give the greatest amount of satisfaction, as it would enable the greater number of creditors to attend personally instead of appointing proxies.

Sub-clause 2.-The creditors ought also, in our opinion, to have the power they have at present to adjourn the first meeting.

Sub-clause 3.—Surely if the bankrupt furnishes to the receiver, under clause 14, sub-clause 1, a statement of his affairs, the receiver might be required to file it with the proceedings, so that it could be produced to every meeting without requiring the bankrupt to furnish a fresh copy at each meeting, which appears a needless expense. Provision, however, might be made for his amending same if he should discover any mistake or error in the original statement, or if he should be required to do so by the court, and also for his furnishing further accounts as to his dealings with his estate and accounting for his deficiency, if any, if so required.

REVIEWS.

BILLS OF SALE.

AN APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS AND THE LAW OF BILLS OF SALE, WITH STATUTES. THIRD EDITION. By GEORGE EDWARD LYON and JOSEPH HAWORTH REDMAN, Barristers-at-Law. Reeves & Turner.

This useful little treatise upon a subject of great and still increasing importance, has the merit of being clear, intelligent, and fairly concise. Whether the style could be improved by further condensation is a question upon which opinions might perhaps differ. Some of the especial difficulties of English law spring from the co-existence of several enactments bearing more or less closely upon the same matter. Where amending statutes are piled one upon another, the result is merely a cumbrousness which might be removed by judicious codification. But in some cases the existing body of the law cannot so easily be reduced to a common measure; where confusion has been introduced by applying several partial and partly over-lapping remedies to several mischiefs, having a community of character without being identical. A remarkable example of this complexity is found in the grounds upon which bills of sale may be set aside in favour of creditors. It not unfrequently happens that two (or more) of these causes coincide; whence has arisen so much confusion between them, that the degree of clearness with which they are discriminated is a good test of the subject's successful treatment. If we think that in this respect Messrs. Lyon and Redman's work is capable of improvement, we find in it more to praise than to blame. We may remark that the case of Ex parte Harrison (p. 107) came before the Court of Appeal in April last year (as Ex parte Butters, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 265), and that the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Bacon was reversed. There may be some doubt whether the objection to the jurisdiction upon which the ViceChancellor had relied, was expressly overruled; but there can be no doubt that, for all practical purposes, its authority has been destroyed. Upon the whole, we are able to commend the present work to the favourable attention of our readers. We think that the questions, what constitutes a bill of sale, and what persons are "traders" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, and the subject of "reputed ownership" as bearing upon bills of sale, are treated with considerable care and intelligence.

PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT.

PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT: BEING A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IN THE LAW OF ENGLAND. THIRD EDITION. By FREDERICK POLLOCK, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons.

This edition has been largely remodelled by the author, among the most important of the alterations being the adoption and development of the views expressed by Mr. Justice Stephen in the case of Alderson v. Maddison (29 W. R. 105) with reference to the notion of a representation which, although neither a contract nor part of a contract, may

have the effect of binding the person who makes it as much as if it were a contract. It will be remembered that the Court of Appeal reversed Mr. Justice Stephen's decision on another ground (29 W. R. 556), and did not discuss this question. Mr. Pollock gives in an appendix a full review of the cases, of which Traill v. Baring (4 De G. J. & S. 318) is the most difficult to deal with; and he comes to the conclusion that, "notwithstanding the difficulties presented by the form in which many statements of more or less authority have been made, the view propounded by Mr. Justice Stephen is the correct one." Our own opinion, which we expressed on the decision of Alderson v. Maddison, is strongly in favour of that view, but we doubt whether the difficulties raised by the cases will be got rid of quite so easily as Mr. Pollock thinks, and we are disposed to question the advisability, under existing circumstances, of taking so strong a line in a work which professes to state the prin ciples of the law as it is, and not as it ought to be. For the rest, we The material recent cases have have nothing but praise for this edition. been added, and the whole work has been carefully revised.

STONE'S JUSTICES' MANUAL.

THE JUSTICES' MANUAL; OR, GUIDE TO THE ORDINARY DUTIES OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. By the late SAMUEL STONE, Esq. TWENTYFIRST EDITION. Edited by GEORGE B. KENNETT, Esq., Solicitor and Clerk to the Justices of Norwich. Shaw & Sons.

Mr. Kennett is very severe in his preface on the "novel system of hurried legislation" which he says was "commenced in the last session of Parliament." It is probably true that there have been few sessions in which so many ill-drafted measures were passed as the last. But although the system may, perhaps, have culminated, we do not think it had its commencement in the last session, as witness the Acts relating to wild birds. We are approaching a time in which the parliamentary draftsman will look upon an amending Act as a usual and proper supplement to his efforts. As the last edition of this book was published last year only, the changes in the law to be incorporated in the present edition are not extensive. We can testify, however, to the care with which they have been incorporated. Thus Reg. v. Lovell (50 L. J. M. C. 91), as to demanding with threats an exorbitant sum for services, is not only stated at p. 471, under the head of Larceny Defined,' but is also referred to, at p. 475, under the heading of "Larceny by Trick or Fraud." In fact, the only criticism we have to offer as regards the recent cases is to express a doubt whether the statement at p. 561 of Reg. v. Salmon (29 W. R. 246) is sufficiently full. It would be convenient if, in the index of cases, some means were adopted of distinguishing different cases having the same name. There might be added a short statement, between brackets, of the matters to which each of such cases relates.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, and CHEQUES. By M. D. CHALMERS, Barrister-at-Law. SECOND EDITION. Stevens & Sons.

The new edition of this admirable book is rendered more complete by the addition (perhaps owing to a suggestion made by us in reviewing the former edition) of a chapter on securities for bills of exchange, dealing, among other matters, with the rule in Ex parte Waring. The recent cases have been carefully added, and the provisions of the Crossed Cheques Act, 1876, have been added as articles to the Digest.

CORRESPONDENCE.

TAXATION OF COSTS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,-In July last I entered a cause for trial in an action for damages against a railway company for personal injuries to a client, and during the Long Vacation I got up the evidence for the plaintiffs, prepared the briefs, and issued subpœnas.

About the 25th of September the plaintiffs' solicitors suggested a reference to two physicians; and about the end of October an order of reference was accordingly made referring the cause to the award of the said physicians, and that the costs of the cause should abide the event, and that the costs of the reference and award and the arbitrator's fees should be paid by the defendants in any event.

On taxation the master disallowed the costs of the brief and many other legitimate charges, and in fact reduced the bill of costs by more than one-half.

Can any of your readers inform me when a plaintiff is entitled to commence to get up evidence and prepare brief for trial? Is it usual for masters on taxation to disallow counsels' fees for settling special particulars of claim against a railway company in an action for damages, pursuant to an order of one of the masters, and also to advise as to sufficiency of answers to interrogatories; also for examining proof for printer, and printer's charges for printing answers to interrogatories where the document is ten folios ?

It is high time that there should be some uniformity of practice in this respect. What one master allows in taxation another master disallows.

JUDGES' CHAMBERS.

JUSTITIA.

I and my opponent, who is equally anxious with me for the queries to be settled, have hitherto been unable to catch the master, or, in his absence, to procure an appointment. The result of this is that my employer thinks I am neglecting my duty to him, and the client cannot understand why there should be so much delay in disposing of the few trifling questions which remain to be determined.

The matter is of some importance, as there is some question as to the solvency of the party by whom the costs will have to be paid.

I venture to suggest that if the attention of the Lord Chancellor could be drawn by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society to this, as well as to other evils which still prevail at judges' chambers, some remedy A MANAGING CLERK. would be devised.

Dec. 13.

THE INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I observe that one of your contemporaries, circulating amongst law students, complains of the questions which were required to be

answered at the last Michaelmas examination under heads 2 and 3.

on

On referring to one of the books of questions and answers "Stephen's Commentaries" prepared for the use of candidates for this examination, I find that all the questions of which complaint is made are to be found in the book in question, together with the correct answers, though the language of the questions at the last examination was to some extent necessarily varied. It therefore seems to me that the complaint in question has no foundation. It ought not to be allowed to remain unnoticed, lest the assistant examiners and the council should be deterred from framing questions in future upon the Commentaries the answers to which will tend to show that not only has the candidate read the guides prepared for his assistance, and which are in most cases so much studied, but also the Commentaries themselves. A SOLICITOR. December 14.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

DAMAGES

INJUNCTION. On the 6th inst. the Court of Appeal (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., PATENT SLANDER OF TITLE-ALLEGATION OF INFRINGEMENT and BAGGALLAY and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of JESSEL, M.R., in the case of Halsey v. Brotherhood (29 W. R. 9, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 514). The plaintiff was the owner of a patent, and the defendant was the owner of a patent of prior date for a cognate subject-matter. The action was brought claiming damages from the defendant, on the ground that he had wrongfully stated and represented to customers of the plaintiff, and other persons intending to deal with him, that the articles manufactured by the plaintiff were an infringement of the defendant's patent, and that he had threatened such customers and other persons with actions if they purchased or used the plaintiff's articles. The plaintiff also asked in his claim for general relief for an injunction. The defendant by his statement of defence denied the validity of the plaintiff's patent, and asserted that the articles made by the plaintiff were an infringement of the defendant's patent. He admitted that he had represented to various persons that the plaintiff had infringed his patent, but denied that he had threatened them with legal proceedings. And he said that the statement which he had made had been made bona fide, in the full and honest belief in his rights as a patentee, and with the intention to follow up the same, if necessary, by proper proceedings in support of his patent rights. The defendant had not, however, in fact, taken any proceedings to contest the validity of the plaintiff's patent, or to restrain him from infringing the defendant's patent. JESSEL, M.R., held that a patent, so long as it subsisted, was prima facie valid, and that the owner of it was not bound to assert his supposed legal rights under it against supposed infringers by action, but was entitled, if he did so bona fide, to give notice to them that they were infringing his rights, and was not liable in damages for the injury caused by his notices to the person who was selling the article which he alleged to be an infringement of his patent, even though he was, in fact, in error in believing his patent to be valid. An action for damages could not be maintained unless the notices were issued mala fide. And his lordship also held that, if it was proved in the action for an injunction that the defendant's allegation of infringement, though made bona fide, was, in fact, untrue, the defendant might be restrained from continuing to issue the notices. In the present case his lordship held that the action was in substance only an action for damages; and junction. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on substantially be therefore dismissed it, but without prejudice to a new action for an inthe same grounds.-SOLICITORS, Sandom, Kersey, & Knight; Cope & Co.

WILL-REVOCATION-EXERCISE OF GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT— WILLS ACT (1 VICT. c. 26), s. 27.—In a case of Sotheran v. Dening, before the Court of Appeal on the 7th inst., the question arose whether an exercise of a power by will had been revoked by a subsequent will. By a settlement made in 1870 real estate was vested in trustees upon trust for such persons as C., whether covert or sole, should by will appoint, with remainder in default appointment to E. in fee. In 1871 C. made a will by which, in exercise of

of

the power, she appointed the real estate to S. in fee. In 1877 C. made a second will, commencing with the words, "I revoke all former wills," which contained a general devise of all her real estate to G., but did not in terms refer to the power of appointment. In 1878 C. made a third will, which,

though it did not, in terms, purport to deal only with personal estate, did, in fact, make only dispositions of personal estate. This will concluded with the words, "Hereby revoking all former or other wills, I declare this to be my last will and testament." The question was to whom the real estate subject to the power of appointment belonged. S. claimed it on the ground that the appointment contained in the first will was not affected by either of the later wills. G. claimed it on the ground that the first will was revoked by the second, and that the general devise contained therein operated as an exercise of the power, and that the second will was not affected by the third. E. claimed the property on the ground that the third will revoked the appointments contained in the first and second wills, and, that, consequently, the property passed in default of appointment. Jessel, M.R., held (25 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 317) that the latter view was the correct one, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Lord COLERidge, C.J., and LUSH and LINDLEY, L.JJ.).-SOLICITORS, Emmet & Son; J. W. Smith.

COMPOSITION-SECURED CREDITOR-VALUATION OF SECURITIES-SECURITIES ON JOINT AND ON SEPARATE ESTATE-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 16BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 272.—In a case of Couldery v. Bartrum, before the Court of Appeal on the 8th inst., a question arose as to the liability of a secured creditor of a compounding debtor who has proved his debt, valuing his security in his proof, and has received the composition on the balance of the debt after deducting the value of the security, to account to the debtor for any surplus which the security may afterwards realized in excess of the valuation. Two petitioners filed a liquidation petition under which their joint creditors resolved to accept a composition of 10s. in the pound payable in instalments. One of the joint creditors who voted in favour of the composition held a security for his debt on joint property of the debtors, and also another security on separate property of one of the partners. His debt amounted to £2,400, and in his proof he set forth in detail both his securities, and concluded by assessing the value of his security at £800, and claiming to stand as a creditor for the balance of £1,600, and he voted at the meetings as a creditor for £1,600. The composition was duly carried out, and he received the composition upon £1,600. He afterwards realized his joint security, and thereby received more than £800. The debtors, four years after the completion of the payment of the composition, brought this action, claiming the surplus of the proceeds of the joint security, and the whole of the separate security, and Jessel, M. R. (25 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 95), decided in favour of the claim. It was contended that, inasmuch as in a bankruptcy or a liquidation by arrangement the creditor would not have been bound on making hia proof to deduct the value of his security on the separate estate, but would have been entitled, notwithstanding his proof, to retain that security until his debt was paid in full, the same rule must apply to composition, and he could not be prejudiced by the mistake which he had made in deducting the value of the separate security. The court (BAGGALLAY, LUSH, and LINDLEY, L.JJ.), however, affirmed the decision of the Master of the Rolls, on the ground that the composition arrangement proceeded upon the basis that the creditor was to receive the composition upon £1,600 only, and that the surplus of the property comprised in both securities beyond the £800 should go to the debtors to enable them to pay the composition. BAGGALLAY, L.J., said that the language of the creditor's proof clearly indicated that he valued his compound security, his security on the separate property as well as his security on the joint property. No doubt be was not bound to value his separate security. But, so far from there having been any mistake about it, the whole thing was clearly present to his mind. And, in his answer to interrogatories in the present action, the creditor said that his sole object in making the valuation was to enable the debtors to know what was the amount of the liabilities for which they would have to provide. The effect of an alteration in the proof would have been to increase the amount of the balance on which the debtors would have to provide the composition, and at the same time to diminish the amount of the assets which would enable them to pay it. The composition arrangement proceeded on the faith that the representations made by the creditor in his proof would be binding on him, and it was too late now to disturb it. LUSH, L.J., said that a secured creditor was not bound to take any part in the composition proceedings. But, if he valued his security and proved for the balance of his debt above the amount of the valuation, he was bound by the valuation, whatever might be the result of the realization. In the present case the creditor clearly intended to value both his joint and his separate security. He was not bound to deduct the value of the separate security, but he did deduct it, and the consequence was that the security was redeemable at the price which he had put on it. The proof was put in before the composition was accepted. The debtors agreed to pay 10s. in the pound. If the creditor had valued his joint security only, the amount of the debts upon which the composition would have to be paid would to that extent have been increased, and for aught that appeared the debtors would not have been able to pay the composition on the larger amount. At any rate, the arrangement proceeeded on the footing that they would only have to provide the composition for the secured creditor on £1,600, and it was too late now to disturb it. LINDLEY, L.J., said that it would be inequitable now to allow the creditor to fall back on the separate security which he had given up, the composition proceeding on the footing of his so doing.-SOLICITORS, C. Butcher; Tatham, Oblein, & Nash.

MINE-TRESPASS—UNAUTHORIZED WORKING-ACCOUNT-ALLOWANCESCOST OF BRINGING TO BANK.-In a case of Joicey v. Dickinson, before the Court of Appeal on the 10th inst., a question arose as to the allowances which ought to be made to a person who had knowingly taken minerals out of a mine belonging to a neighbouring owner, in taking an account against the wrongdoer of the value of the minerals which he had thus abstracted. Jessel, M.R., had disallowed the defendant (the wrongdoer) not only the costs of severing the minerals, but also the costs of raising them to the surface,

though it did not appear that his lordship's attention had been especially called to the propriety of the latter disallowance. The Court of Appeal (BAGGALLAY, LUSH, and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) said that the rule of law was correctly laid down by Fry, J., in the recent case of Trotter v. Maclean (28 W. R. 244, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 574)-viz., that where the wrongful working has been merely by inadvertence, the wrongdoer will be allowed both the costs of severing the minerals and the costs of bringing them to bank. But, when the unauthorized working has been intentional, he will be allowed only the costs of bringing the minerals to bank. He will, however, be allowed those costs. The order of the Master of the Rolls was, therefore, varied in accordance with this rule.-SOLICITORS, T. W. Rossiter; Ullithorne, Currey, & Villiers.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTY-STATUTE OF FRAUDS (29 CAR. 2, c. 3), ss. 4, 5.—In a case of Shardlow v. Cotterell, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., the question arose whether, in a contract for the sale of land, the specific performance of which was sought by the purchaser, there was a sufficiently definite description of the property to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. On the 29th of March, 1880, property belonging to the defendant Cotterell at Pinxton in Derbyshire, consisting of a dwelling-house, stable, and other buildings connected therewith, was put up for sale by auction at the Sun Inn, Pinxton. At the sale conditions of sale were produced, but no particulars of the property. Posters had, however, been previously published in the neighbourhood containing a description of the property. The plaintiff was declared the highest bidder at £420, and after the sale the following memorandum, signed by the auctioneer and appended at the foot of the conditions of sale, was handed to the plaintiff :-"The property duly sold, to Mr. A. Shardlow, butcher, Pinxton, and deposit paid at close of sale." The auctioneer also gave the plaintiff the following receipt signed by him :-" Pinxton, March 29, 1880.-Received of Mr. A. Shardlow the sum of £21 as deposit on property purchased at £420 at Sun Inn, Pinxton, on the above date-Mr. George Cotterell, owner." The vendor afterwards refused to complete the purchase, and the purchaser brought the action for the specific performance of the contract. Kay, J., held (29 W. R. 737, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 280) that the receipt might be read with the memorandum (though the poster could not), but that the receipt and the memorandum together did not contain a sufficient description of the property to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and that consequently parol evidence could not be admitted to show what the property consisted of. He accordingly dismissed the action. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.), who held that the property was sufficiently described to satisfy the statute. JESSEL, M. R., thought that Kay, J., was right in holding that the memorandum and the receipt might be read together, but he was of opinion (if it was necessary to decide it) that the receipt alone was sufficient. There was no distinction between sections 4 and 5 of the Act as regarded a writing being required. Whether it was an agreement or a memorandum or a note thereof on the one hand, or a will on the other, there must be a writing, and it must be signed by the party sought to be charged. His lordship did not see how a description which would be sufficient within one section could be considered insufficient within the other. The question was whether there was a sufficient description of the thing sold or purchased, for there could not be a description in writing per se, which would entirely shut out all controversy. Even a map would not do that. No description in the world could be so complete as to cover all points and prevent any dispute from arising; and it was not the object of the Statute of Frauds to prevent the possibility of dispute, but by requiring a writing to be signed to impose & check and nothing more. There must of necessity be many things to be decided by parol evidence. If you had as a description "the estate of A. B., in the county of C.," the estate would be sufficiently described; or, again, if you had "the estate of A. B., which he purchased from C.," or "which was bequeathed to him by D.," that would do, and you might introduce parol evidence to show what the property was. In the present case the written documents stated that the property was on a given day sold at a given place to the plaintiff for the price of £420, and that the property belonged to the defendant. How could it be said that there was not an ample description of the subject-matter of the contract? It was quite true that there might be a dispute, as there might be about any thing, but here there was not only all that was required, but more than was required to identify the property. BAGGALLAY, L.J., and LUSH, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Berry & Binns ; Stevens & Co.

CHEMIST AND DRUGGIST.-In a case of Mitchell v. Walker, before Chitty, J., COVENANT-BREACH-INJUNCTION-COVENANT TO CARRY ON TRADE of

on the 13th inst., a motion was made to restrain the defendant from carrying on the business of a quack doctor in certain premises let to him, or any other business than that of a chemist and druggist. It was alleged that at the time the premises were let to the defendant it was understood that be was to carry on the business of a chemist and druggist only. It appeared that he had filled his window with advertisements of various quack medicines, and that he called his shop a medical repository. CHITTY, J., granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from using the premises otherwise than as a chemist and druggist. He considered, on the evidence, that there was an express condition they were to be used for that purpose only, and on the plaintiff's undertaking in damages, considered him entitled to the injunction until the trial. SOLICITORS, Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam.

INFANT WARD-RELIGIOUS BELIEF-RELIGION OF FATHER-CONTEMPT— INDUCING TO CHANGE RELIGION.-In a case of Hickman v. Hickman, before Chitty, J., on the 9th inst., a motion was made to restrain an infant ward from visiting a Roman Catholic chapel, and a Roman Catholic priest from writing to the infant. The infant was sent to a school, and the father, who