DESERTION.

1. A husband left his wife, and the two immediately afterwards executed a separation deed. The husband soon ceased paying the allowance which he had covenanted to pay. Held, that the separation, being under the deed, was and continued voluntary, and was not desertion; and the husband's breach of his covenant did not make it so. Crabb v. Crabb, L. R. 1 P. & D. 601.

2. A husband and wife were cohabiting in Jamaica, where the husband held an appointment, when the wife was obliged to come to England for her health. Afterwards, in 1851, the husband asked her to return, and provided funds for her passage, but she wrote that her health did not permit it. In 1856, he made her an allowance, which he stopped in 1860. She had made no offer to return since refusing his request. Held, that he had not deserted her. - Keech v. Keech, L. R. 1 P. & D. 641.

DEVISE.

1. W. devised to his brothers, A., B., and C., thus: to A. "for life, and in default of his having issue living at the time of his death, to B. for life, and in default of his having issue living at the time of his death, to C. and his heirs; but in case A. should die leaving issue," to such issue in tail male. "And in case B. should come to the possession of the said estate herein before limited to him, and should die leaving issue, said issue to take in like manner" as before limited to the issue of A. B. died in the lifetime of A., leaving a son who survived A. A. died without issue. Held, that B.'s son took under the will. B.'s coming into possession was not a condition precedent. — Edgeworth v. Edgeworth, L. R. 4 H. L. 35.

2. Estates A. and B., subject to the same mortgage, were devised, A. specifically, and B. by a residuary clause. Held, that the residuary devise was specific, and that the two estates must bear the mortgage debt ratably.— Gibbins v. Eyden, L. R. 7 Eq. 371.

See CHARITY, 1, 2; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 4; FORFEITURE; LEGACY; PERPETUITY; WILL, 7-14.

1. A defendant who has answered cannot avoid discovery, for the purposes of the suit, on the sole ground that it is the same which is the only object of the suit. - Chichester v. Marquis of Donegal, L. R. 4 Ch. 416.

2. A. filed a bill against B., who had been his partner, alleging that B. had represented a good debt to be bad, and praying that the agreement of dissolution might be set aside, or that B. might be ordered to pay one half of his receipts on account of said debt, and also for an account. The interrogatories asked B. to set forth his said receipts and the partnership accounts. B. answered that a patent had been assigned to him on account of said debt, and that after much litigation at his own expense connected with the same, he expected to receive from it more than the amount of the debt; and as to the accounts, that they were very long, and could only be given by employing an accountant on the books, which were always open to A. Held, that the answer was sufficient. — Lockett v. Lockett, L. R. 4 Ch. 336.

If a man is imbecile on attaining his majority, and remains so continuously until his death, his father retains the right of choice of his domicile as long as he lives. Sharpe v. Crispin, L. R. 1 P. & D. 611.

DOWER.- See ELECTION.

DYING DECLARATIONS.-See EVIDENCE, 2.

EASEMENT.

A. sold land to plaintiff, reserving a rent, to secure which plaintiff covenanted to build, and built accordingly. A. afterwards sold adjoining land to defendant, who drained the same, in consequence of which plaintiff's land lost the support of subterranean water, and subsided. It would have done so even if it had been unbuilt upon. Held, that defendant was not liable. (Exch. Ch.) - Popplewell v. Hodkinson, L. R. 4 Exch. 248.

See LIGHT; NUISANCE, 3; STATUTE, 7; WAY.

ELECTION.

A testator left his wife, among other things, property to which she was entitled in her own right, and an annuity charged on the L. estate in lieu of dower. The wife during her life took what was given her by the will, but never elected to take under or against it. She died intestate, leaving four next of kin, three of whom elected to take under the will, while the fourth, the heir and administrator, elected against it. Held, that the election of the three did not bind the fourth, nor that of the fourth the three. In taking the accounts, the fourth was to bring in the annuity, and to be allowed one-fourth of the dower in lieu of which it was given. Fytche v. Fytche, L. R. 7 Eq. 494.

EQUITY. See ACCOUNT.

EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

Service of a petition for vesting in new trustees lands which had descended to the infant heirs of the former sole trustee, upon the guardian of said heirs, is unnecessary. — In re Little, L. R. 7 Eq. 323.

See DISCOVERY; EVIDENCE, 3; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 2; INTERPLEADER; MORTGAGE, 2; NUISANCE, 1, 2; PLEDGE; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; REVIVOR; WARD Of Court.

ERROR.

An arbitrator was required by the order referring the cause to him to state a case for the opinion of the Court of Exchequer, at the request of either party; he stated a case accordingly, which was heard and decided by the Court. Held, that this decision was not a judgment on which error could be brought. Courtauld v. Legh, L. R. 4 Exch. 187.

ESTOPPEL. See CHARITY, 3; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1

EVIDENCE.

1. A declaration or written entry by a deceased person, who had, at the time of making the same, occupied a house four years, that he was tenant of said house at so much rent, and had paid it, is admissible to prove the payment as well as the tenancy. The Queen v. Exeter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 341.

2. Thirteen hours before the death of a murdered person, she made a declaration upon oath. She was asked, "Is it with the fear of death before you that you make these statements? Have you any present hope of your recovery?" She said, "None." Her statements were written out, together with the above, but the word "present was omitted from before "hope." The written statement was then read to her, and, at her suggestion, the words "at present" were inserted, thus: "with no hope at present of my recovery." It was then signed by her. Held, that the declaration was not admissible. It did not appear that the deceased was absolutely without hope. - The Queen v. Jenkins, L. R. 1 C. C. 187.

3. When an affidavit is made before a notary abroad, the signature of the notary must be verified before the affidavit can be admitted. - In re Davis's Trusts, L. R. 8 Eq. 98.

See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 2.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

1. The court allowed one who had been appointed an executor, and had renounced that office, to take administration with the will annexed, notwithstanding a rule that no person who had renounced in one character should take a representation to the same deceased in another character. Goods of Russell, L. R. 1 P. & D. 634.

2. A female took administration of the estate of the deceased as a creditor, got in a large part of the estate and paid some of the debts, and then married and died. The husband had taken possession of leaseholds, part of said estate, but no fund had been set apart for the payment of the wife's debt. Held, that administration of the unadministered effects of the deceased could not be taken by the husband in his own right as a creditor, but only as representative of his wife.— Goods of Risdon, L. R. 1 P. & D. 637.

3. A testator made two persons his executors and also the trustees of the residue of his estate, part of which consisted of a bond given by the trustees of a minor. The latter on coming of age, within a year of testator's death, gave his bond to said executors jointly, in place of the bond of his trustees. Ten years afterwards, the obligor of the substituted bond paid part of the money to one of the obligees, who signed a receipt himself, and forged the signature of his coobligee, and embezzled the money. Held, (1) that the obligor was discharged by the receipt of one executor, though he meant to have that of both; (2) that the acceptance of the substituted bond by the executors was not a breach of trust; (3) that the lapse of ten years was not of itself notice to the obligor that the estate had been administered and the executors had become trustees. Charlton v. Earl of Durham, L. R. 4 Ch. 433.

4. A testator devised all his real estate upon certain trusts. Some of the gifts lapsed to the heir. The personalty was insufficient to pay the debts. Held, that

the lapsed shares must go first to pay the costs of administration. - Row v. Row, L. R. 7 Eq. 414.

See REVOCATION OF WILL, 2, 3.

EXECUTORY DEVISE. See FORFEITURE; PERPETUITY.

FORFEITURE.

A testator appointed some and devised other real estate to his wife and her assigns during her life, and, after her death, to his son in fee, with a proviso that if his wife should do any thing whereby she should be deprived of the control over the rents and profits, so that her receipt alone should not be a sufficient discharge for the same, her estate should determine as effectually as it would by her actual decease. By a first codicil, he appointed and devised his said estate, after the death of his wife, to his son for life, with remainders over. By a second, he gave his personal estate to his wife for life, for her separate use, independently of any future husband. The wife married again without making any settlement. Held, that her interest was forfeited, in spite of the word "assigns" and the allusion to a second husband, and that the remainders limited by the codicil, both in the appointed and devised estates, were accelerated. Craven v. Brady, L. R. 4 Ch. 296; s.c. L. R. 4 Eq. 209; 2 Am. Law Rev. 276.

See MORTGAGE, 3.

See BOND; COMPANY, 1, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 1; WILL, 12.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

1. When a man executed an antenuptial settlement and married a woman with whom he had previously cohabited, with intent to defraud his creditors, the wife being implicated in the transaction: Held, that the settlement was void as against creditors. Bulmer v. Hunter, L. R. 8 Eq. 46.

2. January 23, 1867, an examination of defendant's conduct as chairman was begun. February 13, he settled all his property on his children, with power to the trustees to pay him such part of the income as they might think fit. May 6, an order was made against him. Held, that the conveyance might be set aside at the suit of creditors having no lien on or order charging the property conveyed, the bill to be brought on behalf of all the creditors. Independent proceedings were necessary for the creditors to have execution against such property. - Reese River Silver Mining Co. v. Atwell, L. R. 7 Eq. 347.

3. Land was settled on A. for life, remainder to his son B. in fee, if living at A.'s death, with power to A. and B. to revoke the above and appoint new uses. B. becoming insolvent, A. and B. by deed revoked the uses in B.'s favor and appointed the estate to such uses as A. should appoint, and, in default of appointment, to the use of B. absolutely. B. was afterwards adjudicated bankrupt, and the assignees sought to set aside said deed as fraudulent. A. was enjoined, on motion, from exercising his power under said deed in favor of a purchaser for value, but not from doing so in favor of volunteers. - Beyfus v. Bullock, L. R. 7 Eq. 391.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1.
GOVERNOR. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.

GUARANTY. - See BANKRUPTCY, 6; SALE, 2.

GUARDIAN.-See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE; REVOCATION OF WILL, 2. HEIR AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. - See MARSHALLING OF ASSETS;

POWER.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.-See ALIMONY; DEATH, 1; DIVORCE; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 1, 2; SEPARATION DEED; WARD OF COURT; WIFE'S EQUITY.

IGNORANCE. See BOND.

ILLEGAL CONTRACT.

Property pledged to the keeper of a brothel to secure payment for wine, &c., consumed in a debauch in said brothel, cannot be recovered by the pledgor of the pledgee. — Taylor v. Chester, L. R. 4. Q. B. 309.

IMPLIED GRANT OR RESERVATION.-See EASEMENT; WAY.

INDEMNITY, ACT OF. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.

The publication of any document which would destroy property, whether consisting of money or reputation, may be restrained in equity.

An injunction was granted against the publication of a notice stating that a merchant was a partner in a bankrupt firm. - Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488. See BOND; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 3; INTERPLEADER; LIGHT; NUISANCE, 1, 2.

INSANITY.-See DOMICILE.

INSURANCE.

1. Meat shipped at Hamburgh for London was delayed on the voyage by tempestuous weather, and solely by reason of such delay became putrid, and was necessarily thrown overboard at sea. Held, not a loss by perils of the sea, or within the words "all other perils, losses, and misfortunes," &c., in a policy of insurance on said meat. — Taylor v. Dunbar, L. R. 4 C. P. 206.

2. An assurance company lent W. £1000 on a mortgage for that sum and on a policy on his life for the same amount, which he effected with them for the purpose. The policy contained a condition, that if W. should die by his own hands, &c., it should be void, "except to the extent of any bona fide interest therein which, at the time of such death, should be vested in any other person. . . for a sufficient pecuniary or other consideration." W. committed suicide while insane, the policy being still in the hands of the company. Held, that the company came within the above exception to the condition, and that the policy was valid to the extent of the debt to them. The mortgage was ordered to be reassigned.— White v. British Empire Mutual Life Assurance Co., L. R. 7 Eq. 394.

The plaintiff's affidavit of no collusion in an interpleader suit cannot be rebutted before the hearing by a counter affidavit, although the plaintiff has filed additional affidavits in reply. In such a case, an order was made for the payment of the