government, the degree of home rule granted is naturally somewhat less than in the case of cities; and home-rule charters, besides being subject to the ratification of the legislature, must provide for the following matters,

1. For boards of supervisors and for the constitution, regulation and government thereof, for the times at which and the terms for which the members of said board shall be elected, for the number of members, not less than three, that shall constitute such boards, for their compensation and for their election, either by the electors of the counties at large or by districts; provided, that in any event said board shall consist of one member for each district, who must be a qualified elector thereof; and

2. For sheriffs, county clerks, treasurers, recorders, license collectors, tax collectors, public administrators, coroners, surveyors, district attorneys, auditors, assessors and superintendents of schools, for the election or appointment of said officers, or any of them, for the times at which and the terms for which, said officers shall be elected or appointed, and for their compensation, or for the fixing of such compensation by boards of supervisors, and, if appointed, for the manner of their appointment; and

3. For the number of justices of the peace and constables for each township, or for the number of such judges and other officers of such inferior courts as may be provided by the Constitution or general law, for the election or appointment of said officers, for the times at which and the terms for which said officers shall be elected or appointed, and for their compensation, or for the fixing of such compensation by boards of supervisors, and if appointed, for the manner of their appointment; and

4. For the powers and duties of boards of supervisors and all other county officers, for their removal and for the consolidation and segregation of county offices, and for the manner of filling all vacancies occurring therein; provided, that the provisions of such charters relating to the powers and duties of boards of supervisors and all other county officers shall be subject to and controlled by general laws; and

4. For the assumption and discharge by county officers of certain of the municipal functions of the cities and towns within the county, whenever, in the case of cities and towns incorporated under general laws, the discharge by county officers of such municipal functions is authorized by general law, or whenever, in the case of cities and towns organized under section eight of this article," the discharge by county officers of such municipal functions is authorized by provisions of the charters, or by amendments thereto, of such cities or towns.

5. For the fixing and regulation by boards of supervisors, by ordinance, of the appointment and number of assistants, deputies, clerks, XI, permitting certain cities or cities and counties to frame charters.

304. Commission Government.

attaches and other persons to be employed, from time to time, in the several offices of the county, and for the prescribing and regulating by such boards of the powers, duties, qualifications and compensation of such persons, the times at which, and terms for which they shall be appointed, and the manner of their appointment and removal; and

6. For the compensation of such fish and game wardens, probation and other officers as may be provided by general law, or for the fixing of such compensation by boards of supervisors.1

These regulations, though of statute-like proportions, furnish no such obstacle to the counties as does the necessity for frequently seeking special enactments from the legislature. Moreover, they are constitutionally fixed and so not subject to legislative alteration by means of laws general in form but local in application. The first home-rule charter adopted, that of Los Angeles County, set an example of brevity without sacrificing completeness and aimed at efficient and responsible government by thorough civil service regulations and a notable reduction in the number of elective officials.2

The effort to obtain responsible governments for counties as for other political units directs itself, indeed, chiefly toward the centering of authority in a few carefully chosen representatives of the people, who shall have the power of appointing all other officials and be answerable for their own and their subordinates' conduct. Competitive civil service examinations form the best known method of selecting subordinate officials.

Attempts have been made, indeed, notably in Indiana,3 to solve the evils of the complex and unwieldly system of county government by adding to its complexity to the extent of checking the existing county board by the addition of another, charged with certain specified powers, as to financial control. The result, naturally, has not been encouraging. Whenever the county board or court contains more than five members, there develops a question of reducing it to three or five and electing it not by districts or townships, but upon a general county ticket; only in this way, so the argument runs, can the people know just whom to blame for misgovernment and praise for good government. Having obtained a responsible body, the ap

1Const. as published by the state, 1915, pp. 100-101.

2Works, L. R., County Home-Rule in California: The Los Angeles Charter, The Annals, op. cit., 229.

Lapp, Jno. A., Checks on County Government, The Annals, op. cit., 248.

pointment of the county officers, sheriff, clerk, register, treasurer and others can safely be left to its discriminating care, and the people can be left free to concentrate all of their attention upon the election of the board.

Just as in the case of the city, the advocacy of commission government for counties has developed in some places into a demand for a county manager-a single individual instead of a board-charged with the general superintendency of county business. It should be repeated and emphasized that county, like city, government, save in a more marked degree, involves little or nothing of a policy-determining character. Its functions are mostly administrative and even should the state turn over to it the duty of deciding those things that are now usually provided for by its own special acts, the county's legislative functions would be so simple as to be readily determinable by the commission, or by the board provided to select the manager, -subject, perhaps, to a referendum by the people.

305.

Concern.

Some writers believe that the state should directly control Matters those officers who, like the sheriff and public prosecutor, are of State especially charged with the enforcement of the state's laws." There are also other functions, like the assessment of property for both state and local taxes, building of roads and maintenance of educational and eleemosynary institutions that can more economically and more effectually be performed by central agencies for the whole state. In fact, so many of the incidents of county government can be surrendered to the state or left to the townships or other subdivisions of the counties that one prominent writer has intimated that the theoretically perfect county is the county that is non-existent.

Consolida

and County.

There remains to be mentioned only the consolidation of 306. county and city where their activities would otherwise be du- tion of City plicated or in conflict. Even where city and county have the same area as in the case of Philadelphia or where the city includes several counties as in New York, satisfactory consolidation has not always been effected. Though there seems no rea

'See, e. g., articles by M. L. Requa and W. S. U'Ren, The Annals, op. cit., pp. 237 and 271.

e. g., Buck, G. S., The Organization of County Government, Proceedings of Academy of Political Science, V, 342 (346).

"Childs, R. S., A Theoretically Perfect County, The Annals, op. cit., 274.

The

son why, in such cases, one government should not suffice for every requirement, vestiges of the old separation remain. Michigan constitutions ordains that

when any city has attained a population of one hundred thousand inhabitants, the legislature may organize it into a separate county without reference to geographical extent, if a majority of the electors of such city and of the remainder of the county in which such city may be situated voting on the question shall each determine in favor of organizing said city into a separate county.

California takes more advanced ground in the following clause,❞—

City and county governments may be merged and consolidated into one municipal government, with one set of officers, and may be incorporated under general laws providing for the incorporation and organization of corporations for municipal purposes. The provisions of this Constitution applicable to cities, and also those applicable to counties, so far as not inconsistent or prohibited to cities, shall be applicable to such consolidated government.

Under this provision San Francisco performs the duties and exercises the privileges of both a city and a county, under one government. The same is true in Denver, under a special provision of the Colorado constitution.1

County government, both actual and proposed, stands in interesting contrast to the governments of the states because of the absence of almost all suggestion of the separation of powers. The people have never feared their local governments and such powers as they have conferred upon them they have not thought necessary to guard with checks and balances. Unfortunately, however, efficient organization has likewise been neglected. Probably no state administrative problem today is of greater importance than that of correlating the numerous county officials into a definite working system that can adequately transact local business and perform such state functions as may be delegated to it.

Gradually they will, no doubt, be eliminated.

SVIII, 2.

XI, 7.

ΧΧ, 1. For an interesting account of the problems of a county containing several rival cities and a more or less antagonistic rural population, see The Government of Alameda County, California, by M. L. Requa, The Annals, op. cit.,

TENNESSEE NOTE.-More than one-eighth of the constitution of Tennessee is consumed by its provisions for counties, county officers and county finances.2

The legislature is given power to authorize the counties to levy taxes, under the restrictions of the constitution applying to state taxation, and under such additional regulations as may be prescribed by law. The assent of three-fourths of the qualified voters of a county must be obtained to authorize it to loan its credit to or become a stockholder in any private enterprise. Clerks of the various courts, justices of the peace, constables and the sheriff, trustee, register, coroner and ranger are recognized as county officers and made compulsory for each county. For crimes and misdemeanors in office these officers are liable to indictment in such courts as the legislature may direct and, on conviction, to removal from office. Elections and the filling of vacancies are regulated. The division of counties into districts is prescribed and the establishment of new counties is lengthily provided for.

The governmental functions of the counties are entrusted chiefly to the county courts. The constitution of 1834 did not contain the words "county court" and in the constitution of 1870 they occur only once, in the final section, which forbids county offices to be filled otherwise than by the people or the county court. Yet because the court is in practice composed of the justices of the peace, who are constitutional officers and accorded certain constitutional functions, it has always been held that the legislature cannot abolish it and put in its place some other form of county government. The legislature may alter the number of civil districts-by which the justices are elected— and so reduce the size of the court to the usual size of a commission." Though the legislature cannot destroy the county court' the latter has no inherent powers and so can perform only those functions expressly authorized by the legislature. In prescribing these functions the legislature is restrained not only by the general constitutional principle that it cannot delegate its legislative powers, but also by the constitutional provisions intended to prevent laws applying to only a portion of the state.

2II, 28, 29; V, 5; VI, 13, 15; VII, 1, 2, 5; X, 4, 5; XI, 8, 17. See Acts of 1915, ch. 11.

Popularly elected county officials, both statutory and constitutional, are, of course, independent of the county court.

Pope v. Phifer, 50 Tenn., 682, declared invalid Acts of 1868, ch. 65, creating boards of commissioners for Madison and White Counties, appointed by the gov ernor and having the powers of the justices in the county courts. This case is

not good authority for the proposition that the legislature might not, for all the counties of the state, establish commission government. See Const. 1796, VI, 1. "State v. Atkin, 112 Tenn., 603.

Nor can it destroy a county,-James Co. v. Hamilton Co., 89 Tenn., 237. Burnett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn., 697.

"Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1890 Ed.), pp. 137, seq. 1XI, 8.