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168. The Secretary of State.

the order of succession is usually the president pro tempore of the senate. Frequently there is provision for a third,-the speaker of the lower house or the secretary of state. Death, resignation, removal from office, absence from the state and disability are the most usual causes for succession, but there are various others.

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About a dozen states, chiefly of those whose governors are elected for four years, have provisions for filling vacancies by special election. Thus in West Virginia, if a vacancy occurs before the expiration of the first three years of the term, an election must be held to fill the vacancy.1

The vast numbers of administrative officers that have in recent years appeared are, as has been said, for the most part creatures of statute law. Unless appointed and removable by the governor or placed under his direct supervision, they tend to diffuse executive power and to make the governor's authority and responsibility less pronounced. A number of the administrative offices, usually the older and more important ones, are, however, provided for in the constitutions.

In more than two-thirds of the states the secretary of state is a constitutional officer. He is chosen by the electorate in twenty-seven states, by joint vote of the legislature in three3 and appointed by the governor with the consent of a majority or more members of the senate in five. His specified term

Other examples: In Wash. the order is (1) Lieutenant-governor; (2) secretary of state; (3) treasurer; (4) auditor; (5) attorney-general; (6) superintendent of public instruction; (7) commissioner of public lands. In Ariz. and Wyo. the secretary of state is the only successor named and he is first choice in Ore. and Utah. Sometimes the legislature is authorized to add to the constitutional succession. In Md. (II, 6, 7) the legislature, if in session, elects the

successor.

See, e. g., Ala., V, 127-8: Miss., V., 131 Mont., VII, 14. In Miss, should doubt arise as to whether vacancy has occurred in office of governor or other disability exists or has ended, the secretary of state is to submit the question to judges of the highest court who, or a majority of whom, shall investigate and determine the question, and furnish to the secretary of state their opinion in writing, which shall be final and conclusive.

"VII, 16. See also, e. g., Ala., V, 127; Ky.. 85.

In Me., N. H. and Mass. associated with the governor are councils of state, composed of, respectively, seven, five and eight members elected by the people. (Me., V, Pt. II, 1, 2; IX, 4. N. H., II, 59, 60, 64, 65; Mass. Amend XVI, Pt. II, ch. II, sec. II, 2). In N. C. (III, 114), also, there is a council or cabinet composed of the secretary of state, auditor, treasurer and superintendent of public instruction. The function of the council is, generally speaking, to advise and check the governor. For instance, in Mass. the advice of the council is necessary in order that the governor may issue pardons. Survivals of colonial days when the power of the governor was jealously regarded, they cannot be said to be of practical importance now.

2c. g., Ala., Cal.

Me., N. H., Tenn.

'Del., Md., N. J., Pa., Tex.

varies from one to five years; in many states he serves also until his successor qualifies. In some states he serves during the pleasure of the governor. Generally the legislature pre

scribes his duties or most of them."

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The

A comptroller or auditor is provided for in forty-three con- 169. stitutions. Four of them prescribe also a state examiner, Auditor or Comptroller. whose general duty is to check up public accounts, and, in Oklahoma, to prescribe a uniform system of book-keeping for state and county treasurers. The auditor or comptroller is chosen by the electorate in forty states, by the legislature in three. His term of office is from one to four years, and a number of constitutions provide that he shall serve until his successor qualifies. His powers and duties are almost invariably left to the legislature.

170.

The
Treasurer.

Every constitution prescribes a state treasurer, who is chosen by the electorate in all except five states, where he is chosen by the legislature. His term of office varies from one to four years. His duties are for the most part unspecified. The attorney general is a constitutional officer in forty-four The Attorney states.2 In most of these he is chosen by the electorate; but in General

a few by joint vote of the legislature, by the judges of the high

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est court, by the governor and senate or by the governor and council. His term of office varies from ones to eight years." In

"Mass.

N. J.

e. g., Ala.

Del., Pa. See, also, Tex. (IV, 21) and Md. (II, 22).

"e. g., Ala., V, 134; also Ariz., V, 1, 9. For examples of constitutionally prescribed duties, see Fla., IV, 21; N. H., II, 67; N. J., Art. VI, VIII, 1; Tex., IV, 21. All except Me., N. H., Ore., R. I., Wis. Called comptroller in 11, auditor in 32. In Ore. and Wis. the secretary of state is auditor ex officio; so, also, in N. J., which has also a comptroller.

Ariz., Mont. and Wyo. by appointment of governor and senate; Okla. by popular election.

3VI, 19.

"N. J., Tenn., Va.
"Mass., Amend. 17.
e. g., Ala., V, 116.

1e. g., Ark., VI, 1.

Me., Md., N. H., N. J., Tenn.

"Mass.

1e. g., Ala., V, 16. Frequently, also, until his successor qualifies.

2All except Ind., Ore., Vt., Wyo.

e. g., Ala., Wis.

'Me.

"Tenn.

N. J., Pa.

171.

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172. Study of Scientific Administra

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one state1 he serves during the pleasure of the governor. His powers and duties are left, as a rule, to be prescribed by law.2

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Other administrative officers and boards find recognition in the state constitutions, a few of which provide for a considerable number of such officers. The superintendent of public instruction, who in more than half the states is chosen directly by the electorate, should be especially mentioned.

The study of scientific administration, long known in Germany and France, had scarcely begun in America a generation ago, and even now is only just beginning to be widespread and effective. The simplicity of American government, the abundance of American wealth, and the carelessness of method tolerated by American habit of thought long delayed the demand for such study. But the vast expansion of wants to be satisfied by public instead of private activity, characteristic of the present, has hastened the necessity for a change in administrative methods which increasing population and complexity of social life were rapidly producing.

Against the effort of reformers to reorganize state administration the cry of "officialism" and "bureaucracy" is frequently heard; but, as Woodrow Wilson says,"

bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the common political life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic. It would be difficult to point out any examples of impudent exclusiveness and arbitrariness on the part of officials doing business under a chief of department who really served the people, as all our chiefs of departments must be made to do. It would be easy on the other hand, to adduce other instances, like that of the influence of Stein in Prussia, where the leadership of one statesman imbued with true public spirit transformed arrogant and perfunctory bureaux into public-spirited instruments of just government.

1Pa.

e. g., N. C., III, 13. He is, however, the conservator of peace throughout the state in Delaware, is sometimes expressly made legal adviser to the governor and other officers, or required to furnish written opinions to executive or legislative officers. (Tex., IV, 22; Md., V. 3.) Reportorial duties (e. g., Tenn., VI, 5) and the function of state prosecutor and defender (e. g., Md., V, 3), and the duty to inquire into charter rights and take action in courts to prevent corporations from exercising power or collecting taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law, and seek forfeiture of charters of corporations, are also found (Tex., IV, 22). 3See, supra, pp. 209-10.

*Wilson, op. cit., 197.
Op. cit., 217.

Ideal for America, he continues, is

civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought by means of elections and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the question.

It is better to be untrained and free than to be servile and systematic. Still there is no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit and proficient in practice.

"If," he says, further on in the same article,

I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my republican spots. He may serve his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well as he serves his."

The prejudices and preconceived opinions of the people which influence them against administrative reform in their governments, may, he says, be aptly compared to the "favorites" amongst hangers-on at court who used to poison the ears of monarchs.

Though reorganization of administrative departments lags, civil service reform makes steady progress. The need for persons especially trained for the various branches of administrative work is more and more obtaining recognition. Lawyers have always been employed when judges were wanted, and only physicians are commonly recognized as fitted to become health officers, but the assessment of taxes, for instance, and the control of the state's finances have usually been considered functions which any intelligent person can perform. In regard to countless other offices the same opinion has prevailed, but these functions have long been administered in an exceedingly unsatisfactory manner and the feeling grows apace that whilst, as President Wilson once said, government by experts would doubtless be narrow and lacking in vision, experts to advise the

Op. cit., 207.

Op. cit., 221.

"In a presidential campaign speech. See Chicago Public, Vol. XV (1912). Compare On Being Human, p. 10.

173.

Efficiency in
Democracy.

174. Administration and Distribution of Constitutional Authority.

governmental officers-the samples of the ordinary publicwho voice the general desires of the people but do not know the technical means of effecting them, are becoming more and more indispensable. As President Lowell says,

if democracy is to be conducted with the efficiency needed in a complex modern society it must overcome its prejudice against permanent expert officials as undemocratic. It might as well be alleged that skilled engineers and modern inventions were undemocratic in war, that a true republic ought to go into battle with bows and arrows against machine guns worked by trained soldiers. In fact, the disadvantage at which our cities fight with great public service corporations is largely due to the difference in the calibre of the officials employed. What chance, for example, has a city represented by a solicitor, who is perhaps changed at every election, and is paid a small salary, against a great corporation which retains the best legal talent and pays for it many times as much? And what is true in a legal contest is true also of comparative efficiency in all directions. A democracy, like every other community, needs the best tools that it can find, and the expert of high grade is the best living tool of modern civilization.1

These administrative questions, as already indicated, are questions for legislative rather than constitutional solution. There is, however, as President Wilson has pointed out, one place

at which administrative studies touch on constitutional ground-or at least upon what seems constitutional ground. The study of administration philosophically viewed, is closely connected with the study of the proper distribution of constitutional authority. To be efficient it must discover the simplest arrangements by which responsibility can be unmistakably fixed upon officials; the best way of dividing authority without hampering it, and responsibility without obscuring it. And this question of the distribution of authority, where taken into the sphere of the higher, the originating functions of government, is obviously a central constitutional question. If administrative study can discover the best principles upon which to base such distribution, it will have done constitutional study an invaluable service.2

Public opinion, he says, should, in the conduct of administration, "play the part of authoritative critic." In order that popular criticism may be effective, some method must be pro

See Lowell, A. L., Public Opinion and Popular Government, p. 240.
lib., 276-7.

2Wilson, op. cit., 213.

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