110.

Cabinet Government Contrasted with Government of Separated Powers.

sumers as a better means of achieving the highest economic efficiency. Influenced by the Darwinians, men look for and expect changes and they find their governments organized not for change but for the maintenance of the status quo. The economic idea of coöperation furnishes a background for the political ideas of coöperation among the departments of government to achieve the ends which the very fact of coöperation in business makes pertinent and necessary-namely, social legislation of various kinds from anti-trust laws to laws rendering the employe's position less hazardous and his bargain with his employer less unequal.

The desire for an enormously increased variety and volume of novel legislation has, these writers believe, proven conclusively the utter inadequacy of present legislative methods. Many sympathize with Mr. H. G. Wells, when, looking back from a fancied future, he says:

Government was an obstructive business of energetic factions, progress went on outside of and in spite of public activities, and legislation was the last crippling recognition of needs so clamorous and imperative and facts so aggressively established as to invade even the dingy seclusions of the judges and threaten the very existence of the otherwise inattentive political machine.1

The government of England,2 representing the parliamentary or cabinet type, with its executive officials at the same time the leaders of and responsible to the legislature is set over against the American type of separated, checked and balanced government, with its legislative business left to numerous irresponsible committees. The English constitution, consisting of evolving principles instead of the highly inflexible language of a single written instrument, leaves the parliament free to adopt whatever measures the needs of the present dictate, which measures are accepted by the courts as the supreme law of the land. Parliament consists, indeed, of two houses, but the House of Lords can only check temporarily not finally defeat the House of Commons. The execution of the laws is entrusted to the

The World Set Free, p. 57.

Ogg, Governments of Europe, pp. 1 seq.; Lowell, The Government of England. The king has ceased to be a power and the House of Commons is no longer in any sense balanced against him.

heads of the various departments, the most important of whom make up the ministry or cabinet, a body consisting as a rule of upwards of thirty individuals, the recognized leaders of the majority party in the House of Commons. Whenever the House votes disapprovingly of any important action taken by the ministry or to which it is committed, its members at once either resign or force a dissolution of parliament, that the electorate may, through the choice of a new House decide whether the ministry shall be sustained or its opponents succeed to their places. It is becoming customary also, before passing upon questions of very great importance, to hold an election that will result in a popular verdict more or less directly upon the point at issue.

The essential feature of the system, and the one which distinguishes it from the American system of separated, checked and balanced powers, is harmony of legislature and executive, effected by absolute responsibility of the executive to the legis lature and the direct recognized leadership in law-making of men who are having experience in executing laws and must execute those about to be passed. "Nothing, indeed," said Burke,

will appear more certain, on any tolerable consideration of this matter, than that every sort of government ought to have its administration correspondent to its legislature.

"In England," says Wilson,

we have complete leadership in legislation intrusted to the ministers, and to complete leadership is added complete responsibility. In France we have partial leadership (financial matters being excluded) with entire responsibility. In Prussia, leadership without responsibility; and in Switzerland the same. Under our own system we have isolation plus irresponsibility,-isolation and therefore irresponsibility. At this point more widely than at any other our government differs from the other governments of the world. Other Executives lead; our Executive obeys."

"Cabinet government," the same authority says elsewhere," "is a device for bringing the executive and legislative branches into harmony and cooperation without uniting or confusing their functions," and he mentions approvingly such of its at

4Quoted by Wilson, op. cit., 242.

"The State, 1906 Ed., 570-1. For account of the other governments mentioned, see Ogg, The Governments of Europe. Congressional Government, 1900 Ed., 118.

111.

Suggestions

tributes as (1) "perfected party government"; (2) party responsibility and accountability for all legislation; (3) necessity for real debate on public questions, bringing the administrative experience of the cabinet members to the advice and assistance of the lawmakers and assuring their interest in and keen inquiry concerning the administration of public affairs; and (4) liability of the ministers to lose the backing of the Commons and with it their offices."

Discussed and interrogated administration is the only pure and efficient administration, but, more than that, the only really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its administration.

On the other hand, the American type of government, exemplified by Congress, embodies such disadvantages as (1) lack of any real guiding leadership,-the nominal leaders being many, with little power and less responsibility; (2) the resulting complexity of organization; (3) hurry and consequent carelessness in doing business; (4) curtailment of debate; and hence (5) habitual neglect of discussion, which is shifted to the privacy of committee rooms; (6) obstructionist tactics under the rules; (7) infrequency of purely party measures; (8) discordance of committee chairmen and scramble among them for the attention of the house; (9) possibility of divergence in party between the legislature and executive. The extra-legal party caucus necessarily becomes the agency depended upon to shape a legislative program and direct its passage into law. These features may be said to inhere in the legislatures of the states with little less potent reality than in Congress.

Toward changing the American state governments with a view to making them more efficient and responsible, much carefor Reorgan- ful thought has recently been given. President Goodnow and Professor Henry Jones Ford were leaders away from the theory of the tripartite division of governmental functions,

ization of

State Governments.

claiming that the function of government is two-fold-the expression and execution of the popular will-and that the body that wills must, in the nature of things, control the body that executes, if government is to be efficient."

Tib., 117, seq.; 249.

sib. Passages scattered through the book.
"Beard, Politics, 22.

A number of publicists would make far-reaching changes in the functioning of the state governments without making the governor responsible to the legislature. Their proposals vary in detail and in the extent they are willing to depart from present practice. "What practical and immediate changes," asked Mr. E. M. Sait,10

might be made in existing practice without the danger of dislocating governmental machinery or incurring the charge of leze majesty?

First as to the message. Would it not receive new force and dignity if delivered orally before both houses in joint session? Would it not make a stronger impression both upon the legislature and upon the constituencies outside? The experience of President Wilson and Governor La Follette indicates that it would. This practice might very properly be regulated by the constitution.

The message should be followed by bills for accomplishing the governor's recommendations. The governor

alone should frame money bills; and the legislature, while free to reduce the proposed grants, should not be permitted to increase them or to alter their destination.

Administration measures should have precedence over all other business, and in case of a deadlock between the governor and legislature over their passage, the matter might be submitted to the people at a referendum election. A settlement by the people, however, would not help matters for the future. A better proposal is that the governor and the leading administrative officials shall

be permitted to appear in both houses not only to explain and defend administration measures, but also to answer questions relative to public business.*

19Of faculty. Columbia University. Participation of the Executive in Legislation, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, V, 1, 128. 1914.

'Administration bills are not, indeed, entirely unknown in present practice. 2ib.. 129. "This is the system which prevails in England and in the selfgoverning colonies, and which has proved such an effective check upon log-rolling and extravagance. It is substantially the system which prevails in New York city." See ch. 14.

This is a rule in the Illinois House of Representatives.

ib., 131. "Under an Oregon plan, defeated by the voters in 1912, it was even proposed to seat defeated candidates for the office of governor as leaders of the opposition. In any European country today it would be regarded as absurd to exclude the executive from free intercourse with the legislature. Madison cites the case of New Hampshire, where the doctrine of separation was laid down and the chief executive made a member of the senate with the right to vote, and advised by a council composed of members of the legislature." (Const. 1784.)

The commission form of government, which has so largely superseded the old municipal legislative councils, has been earnestly recommended for states also. Mr. Frederick C. Howe said in a recent address,

The legislature should consist of a single chamber of a relatively small size. A legislative body composed of one representative from each congressional district would be adequate for all purposes. It should be in continued session all the year, as is the Congress of the United States. Surely, if the needs of the smallest town require the attention of its council for twelve months in the year, the legislative body of a commonwealth of 10,000,000 people, more than three times the population of the United States when the constitution was adopted, requires the same continuous legislative service. . . . The governor should appoint the members of his cabinet, including the attorney-general, the secretary of state and the executive heads of other departments. The governor and each member of the cabinet should have a seat in the legislature, with the right to discuss all measures, but not to vote."

Furthermore, the governor should be entrusted

with the appointment and easy removal of the directors of all executive departments, whose relations to the governor should be somewhat similar to those of the department heads in a great city [to the mayor].

Mr. Charles Fremont Taylor, also, recommends

a unicameral legislative body of few members, carefully chosen, with long terms, ample salary, in constant service, kept conscious of their duties with the possibility of recall.

Perhaps the most interesting of all the suggestions for reorganizing the state governments is the so-called Oregon plan, drafted by Mr. W. S. U'Ren and other Oregon citizens.' It provides (1) that the governor shall be elected for a six-year term and be ineligible for reëlection; (2) that he shall appoint a cabinet consisting of an attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, state printer, superintendent of public instruction,

The last provision is found in many city charters. Proceedings of Academy of Pol. Sc., V, 15, 16. 1914.

"Editor of Equity. Proceedings of Academy of Political Science, 89 (97). 1914. See Senate Document No. 603, 61st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 145 seq. Reprinted by Beard & Shultz, Select Documents on the State-wide Initiative Refernaun and Recall, pp. 349 seq.