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B. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. The Nashua and Lowell Railroad Corporation was incorporated by the

State of New ampshire June 23, 1835, “ to locate, construct and keep
in repair a railroad from any point in the southern line of the State
to some convenient place in or near Nashua,” seven persons being
named as incorporators. The Nashua and Lowell Railroad Corpora-
tion, (three out of the seven being named as incorporators,) was in-
corporated by the State of Massachusetts on the 16th of April, 1836,
“to locate, construct and finally complete a railroad from Lowell” “to
form a junction with the portion of said Nashua and Lowell Railroad
lying within the State of New Hampshire.” The legislature of Mas-
sachusetts, on the 10th of April, 1838, enacted that “the stockholders ”
of the New Hampshire Company “ are hereby constituted stockhold-
ers ” of the Massachusetts Company, " and the said two corporations
are hereby united into one corporation,” and further provided that the
act should “not take effect until the legislature of ... New
Hampshire shall have passed an act similar to this uniting the said
stockholders into one corporation, nor until the said acts have been
accepted by the said stockholders.” The legislature of New Hamp-
shire, on the 26th of June, 1838, enacted “ that the two corporations

are hereby authorized, from and after the time when this act
shall take effect, to unite said corporations, and from and after the
time said corporations shall be united, all property owned, acquired or
enjoyed by either shall be taken and accounted to be, the joint prop-
erty of the stockholders, for the time being, of the two corporations.”
A common stock was issued for the whole line, and for the forty-five
years which intervened the two properties were under the manage-
ment of one board of directors; but there was no other evidence that
the stockholders had acted on these statutes; Held, that the New
Hampshire Corporation, being a citizen of that State, was entitled to
go into the Circuit Court of Massachusetts, and bring its bill there
against a citizen of that State; and that its union or consolidation
with another corporation of the same name, organized under the laws
of Massachusetts, did not extinguish or modify its character as a citi-
zen of New Hampshire, or give it any such additional citizenship in
Massachusetts, as to defeat its right to go into that court. Nashua and
Lowell Railroad v. Boston and Lowell Railroad, 356.

See EXTRADITION, 2;

HABEAS CORPUS, 1.

C. OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

See HABEAS CORPUS, 3.

KENTUCKY.
The waters of the Ohio River, when Kentucky became a State, flowed in

a channel north of the tract known as Green River Island, and the

jurisdiction of Kentucky at that time extended, and ever since has
extended, to what was then low-water mark on the north side of that
channel, and the boundary between Kentucky and Indiana must run
on that line, as nearly as it can now be ascertained, after the channel
has been filled. Indiana v. Kentucky, 479.

See ConstitUTIONAL LAW, A, 11, 12,
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
See LOCAL LAW, 10.

LACHES.
A plaintiff who delays for fifteen years after an alleged fraud comes to his
vised Statutes of 1879; although another partner does not assent to the
mortgage and has previously authorized the making of a voluntary
assignment under the statute; and although the partner making the
mortgage procures a simultaneous appointment of a receiver of all the

knowledge before seeking relief in equity is guilty of laches, and his
bill should be dismissed. Norris v. Haggin, 386.

LOCAL LAW.
1. In Louisiana the holder of one or more of a series of notes, secured by

a concurrent mortgage of real estate, is entitled to a pro rata share in
the net proceeds, arising from a sale of the mortgaged property, at the
suit of a holder of any of the other notes; and an hypothecary action
lies to enforce such claim, based upon the obligation which the law
casts upon the purchaser to pay the pro rata share of the debt repre-
sented by the notes that were not the subject of the foreclosure suit.

Lovell v. Cragin, 130.
2. Such obligation, cast by law upon the purchaser, partakes of the nature

of a judicial mortgage, and, in order to be effective as to third persons,
(i.e. persons who are not parties to the act or the judgment on which
the mortgage is founded,) it must be inscribed with the recorder of

mortgages, and no lien arises until it is so registered. 1b.
3. Under the laws of Louisiana a claim for damages arising from alleged

wrongful acts of a party with respect to removing personal property
from a plantation while he bad possession of it, and for waste com-
mitted by him about the same time, are quasi-offences, and are pre-

scribed in one year. Ib.
4. Section 354 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879, concerning

voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors, does not invalidate
a deed of trust, in the nature of a mortgage, by an insolvent debtor,
of all his personal property to secure the payment of preferred debts
reserving a right of redemption. Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank,

223.
5. By the law of Missouri, one partner has power to bind his copartners by

a mortgage of all the personal property of the partnership to secure

the payment of particular debts of the partnership. 16.
6. By the law of Missouri, a mortgage by one partner of the personal prop-

erty of an insolvent partnership, to secure the payment of particular
debts of the partnership, is valid, and does not operate as a voluntary
assignment for the benefit of all its creditors under $ 354 of the Re-

partnership property. 16.
7. The filing of a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, and of

the assignee's bond, in a probate court, under the statutes of Ohio,
does not prevent a creditor, who is a citizen of another State, and has
not become a party to the proceedings in the state court, from suing in
equity in the Circuit Court of the United States to set aside a mort.
gage made by the debtor contemporaneously with the assignment.

Smith Middlings Purifier Co. v. McGroarty, 237.
8. In Ohio, a mortgage by an insolvent trading corporation to prefer some

of its creditors, having been held by the Supreme Court of the State
to be invalid, under its constitution and laws, against general creditors,
such a mortgage must be held invalid in the courts of the United

States. lb.
9. A and B intermarried in Arkansas in 1839, during which year a child

was born to them alive, capable of inheriting, but died in 1862. In
1864, C died, the owner of estate, real and personal in Arkansas,
leaving as sole heirs at law, his father, D, his brother, A, and a sister,
E. The two latter became the owners in common of decedent's
realty, subject to a life estate in D, their father. In 1870 D died,
after which in 1871, A and E agreed upon a partition. A desiring to
vest the title to his share in his wife — he being then solvent
veyed (his wife uniting with him to relinquish dower) to his sister
E, all his interest in the lands inherited from his brother. By deed
of date January 2, 1871, E (her husband joining her) conveyed to
A's wife what was regarded as one-half in value of the lands for-
merly owned by C, including those in dispute in this suit. This deed
was recorded May 24, 1875, in the county where A's wife then and
ever since resided. No other schedule of it, nor other record nor
intention to claim the lands in dispute as her separate property was
ever filed by her. After the date of the deed to A's wife, the lands in
dispute were cultivated by him as agent of his wife, and in her name,
for her and not in his own right. In 1884, his creditors obtained a
judgment against him, and another on a debt contracted in 1881,
sued out execution, and caused it to be levied upon the lands in
dispute, and advertised them to be sold. A's wife brought a suit in
equity to enjoin the sale upon the ground that the lands were not
subject to her husband's debts, and that a sale would create a cloud
upon her title; Held, (1) The constitution of Arkansas of 1868
placed property thereafter acquired by a married woman, whether by
gift, grant, inheritance or otherwise, as between herself and her hus-
band, under her exclusive control, with power to dispose of it or its
proceeds, as she pleased; (2) The deed by E and her husband to A's

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wife was subject to the constitution of 1868, which made any property
acquired by the wife, after it went into operation, her separate estate,
free from his control; (3) When the deed of 1871 was recorded in
1875, if not before, the lands in dispute became free from the debts
of A, and therefore were not liable for the debt contracted in 1881 ;
(4) Neither the constitution of 1868 nor that of 1874 could take from
the husband any rights vested in him prior to the adoption of either
instrument. But when the constitution of 1868 was adopted A had
no estate by the curtesy in these lands in virtue of his marriage; for
his wife had then no interest in them. In Arkansas, as at common
law, except when from the nature and circumstances of the real prop-
erty of the wife, she may be regarded as conclusively in possession,
marriage, actual seisin, issue and death of the wife are all requisite
to create an estate by the curtesy; (5) It is competent for a State,
in its fundamental law or by statute, to provide that all property
thereafter acquired by or coming to a married woman, shall constitute
her separate estate, not subject to the control, nor liable for the debts,
of the husband; (6) It is the right of those who have a clear, legal
and equitable title to land, connected with possession, to claim the
interference of a court of equity to give them peace or dissipate a

cloud on the title. Allen v. Hanks, 300.
10. Saloy, being the owner of a plantation in Louisiana, leased it to B. P.

Dragon and Athanase Dragon. The Dragons arranged with Bloch to
furnish them with goods, supplies and moneys necessary to carry on
the plantation, for which he was to have a factor's lien or privilege
on the crops, which were also to be consigned to him for sale. Saloy
contracted before the same notary as follows: “And here appeared
and intervened herein Bertrand Saloy, who, after having read and
taken cognizance of what is hereinbefore written, declared that he
consents and agrees that his claim and demands as lessor of the afore-
said Monsecours plantation shall be subordinate and inferior in
rank to the claims and privileges of said Bloch as the furnisher of
supplies or for advances furnished under this contract; and that said
Bloch shall be reimbursed from the crops of 1883 made on said place
the full amount of his advances hereunder without regard and in pref-
erence to the demands of said Saloy for the rental of said plantation;
provided, however, that three hundred and fifty sacks of seed rice
shall remain or be left on said plantation out of the crop of this year
for the purposes thereof for the year 1884;" Held, (1) That under
the laws of Louisiana the privilege or lien of the landlord over the
crops of the tenant was superior to that of the factor; (2) That the
effect of Saloy's agreement was only the waiver of that priority, and
that it did not commit him in any degree to the fulfilment by the
Dragons of their agreements with Bloch; (3) That if Saloy asserted
his privilege by taking possession of the crops, (which he did,) he
thereby became liable to account to Bloch, and that this liability

could be enforced by a suit in equity, to which the Dragons would be
necessary parties ; (4) But that he was not liable therefor to Bloch
in an action at law, to which the Dragons were not parties. Saloy v.

Bloch, 338.
11. In Louisiana a transfer of the estate of an insolvent debtor by judicial

operation is not binding upon the citizens and inhabitants of Louisiana,
or of any other State except the State in which the insolvent proceed-
ings have taken place — at least until the legal assignee has reduced the
property to possession, or done what is equivalent thereto. Reynolds
V. Adden, 318.
District of Columbia. See District of ColumBIA ;

STATUTE, A.
Illinois.

See PROMISSORY Note.

MARRIED WOMAN.

See Local LAW, 9.

MORMON CHURCH.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was incorporated Feb.

ruary, 1851, by an act of assembly of the so-called State of Deseret,
which was afterwards confirmed by act of the territorial legislature of
Utah, the corporation being a religious one, and its property and funds
held for the religious and charitable objects of the society, a prominent
object being the promotion and practice of polygamy, which was pro-
hibited by the laws of the United States. Congress, in 1887, passed an
act repealing the act of incorporation, and abrogating the charter; and
directing legal proceedings for seizing its property and winding up its

affairs : Held that,
(1) The power of Congress over the Territories is general and plenary,

arising from the right to acquire them; which right arises from the
power of the government to declare war and make treaties of peace,
and also, in part, arising from the power to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United

States;
(2). This plenary power extends to the acts of the legislatures of the Ter-

ritories, and is usually expressed in the organic act of each by an
express reservation of the right to disapprove and annul the acts of

the legislature thereof;
(3) Congress had the power to repeal the act of incorporation of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, not only by virtue of its
general power over the Territories, but by virtue of an express reser-
vation in the organic act of the Territory of Utah of the power to dis-

approve and annul the acts of its legislature;
(1) The act of incorporation being repealed, and the corporation dissolved,

its property in the absence of any other lawful owner, devolved to the
United States, subject to be disposed of according to the principles

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