Page images
[ocr errors]

Cases not Otherwise Reported.

No. 1528. VINAL V. CONTINENTAL CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT COMPANY. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York. December 23, 1889: Docketed and dismissed, with costs, on motion of Mr. William A. McKenney for defendant in error.



Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. October 17, 1889: Dismissed, with costs, on motion of Mr. Linden Kent of counsel for appellant. Mr. John N. Staples and Mr. Linden Kent for appellant. No appearance for appellee.

No. 650. WARREN v. HENDERSON. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina. January 22, 1890: Dismissed, with costs, on motion of Mr. R. H. Battle for appellants. No appearance for appellee.



No. 21. WASHINGTON AND GEORGETOWN RAILROAD COMPANY v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. December 2, 1889: Judgment reversed, with costs, per stipulation, and on the authority of the decision of this court in the case of The Metropolitan Railroad Company v. The District of Columbia, No. 5 of October term, 1889, 132 U. S. 1; and cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendant on the demurrer to the pleas of the statute of limitations. Mr. Walter D. Davidge and Mr. Enoch Totten for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry E. Davis and Mr. A. G. Riddle for defendant in error.

[ocr errors]

No. 613. WESSELS v. STEAMSHIP ALENE, HER ENGINES, ETC. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. October 9, 1959: Dismissed pursuant to the 28th rule. Mr. James K. Ilill, Mr. Ilenry T.

Cases not Otherwise Reported.

Wing and Mr. Ilarrington Putnam for appellant. Mr. Everett P. Wheeler for appellee.

No. 208. WHEELOCK v. Shirk. (Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. July 29, 1889: Dismissed, with costs, pursuant to the 28th rule. Mr. Charles M. Osborn for appellants. Mr. John S. Miller for appellees.

No. 210. Wilson v. GRUNWELL. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. January 20, 1890: Dismissed, per stipulation, on motion of Mr. W. Willoughby for appellant. Mr. A. L. Merriman for appellee.

No. 265. WINE v. Mullin. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. March 10, 1990: Dismissed, per stipulation, on motion of Mr. Nathaniel Wilson, for appellant. Mr. L. S. Dixon for appellee.

No. 53. WORTS v. CITY OF WATERTOWN. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin. October 29, 1889: Dismissed, with costs, per stipulation. Mr. James G. Jenkins and Mr. F. C. Irinkler for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Daniel Hall for defendant in error.



1. At a special term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia a

judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff against a sole defend-
ant. The defendant appealed to the general term and gave sureties.
The general term affirmed the judgment below, and entered judgment
against the defendant and against the sureties. The defendant sued
out a writ of error to this judgment without joining the sureties. The
defendant in error moved to dismiss the writ for the non-joinder of
the sureties, and the writ was accordingly dismissed. The counsel for
the plaintiff in error then moved to rescind the judgment of dismissal,
and to restore the case to the docket. Briefs being filed on both sides ;
Held, that the motion should be granted, and the case should be re-

stored to the docket. Inland and Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 572.
2. A postmaster and the sureties on his official bond being sued jointly for

a breach of the bond, he and a part of the sureties appeared and de-
fended; the suit was abated as to one of the sureties who had died ;
and the other sureties made default, and judgment of default was
entered against them. On the trial a verdict was returned for the
plaintiff, whereupon judgment was entered against the principal and
all the sureties for the amount of the verdict. The sureties who had
appeared sued out a writ of error to this judgment without joining the
principal or the sureties who had made default. The plaintiff in error
moved to amend the writ of error by adding the omitted parties as
plaintiffs in error, or for a severance of those parties; Held, that the
motion must be denied. Mason v. United States, 581.

See PARTY, 2.



LOCAL LAW, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.


See CoxsTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 11, 12;



1. Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U. S. 581, affirmed and applied. In re Kemmler,

2. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 510, has never been questioned

and is again affirmed. District of Columbia v. Woolbury, 450.
3. Hartranft v. Oliver, 125 U. S. 525, affirmed and applied to this case.

Sherman v. Robertson, 570.
4. Wright v. Roseberry, 121 C. S. 488, affirmed and applied to this case.
the rate of six per cent a year, payable half-yearly “from the date of
this bond and until the principal be paid, on surrendering the proper
coupons hereto annexed;” and issued by the Governor and Treasurer
of the State under the statute of December 22, 1852, c. 10, which pro-
vides that the principal of such bonds shall be made payable on a day
named therein, that coupons of interest shall be attached thereto, and
that both bonds and coupons shall be made payable at some bank or
place in the city of New York, or at the public treasury in the capital
of the State, and makes no mention of interest after the date at which
the principal is payable; the State is not liable to pay interest after

Iruin v. San Francisco Union, 578.
5. Glenn v. Fant, 134 U. S. 398; Raimond v. Terrebonne Parish, 132 U. S.

192; Andes v. Slauson, 1:30 U. S. 135; and Bond v. Dustin, 112 C. S.
604; affirmed and applied to the stipulation filed in this case by coun-
sel, the jury being waived. Darenport v. Paris, 580.


See LOCAL LAW, 11.


1. An agency of a line of railroad between Chicago and New York, estab-

lished in San Francisco for the purpose of inducing passengers
going from San Francisco to New York to take that line at Chicago,
but not engaged in selling tickets for the route, or receiving or paying
out money on account of it, is an agency engaged in interstate com-
merce; and a license-tax imposed upon the agent for the privilege of
doing business in San Francisco is a tax upon interstate commerce,

and is unconstitutional. McCall v. California, 104.
2. A railroad which is a link in a through line of road by which passengers

and freight are carried into a State from other States and from that
State to other States, is engaged in the business of interstate commerce;
and a tax imposed by such State upon the corporation owning such
road for the privilege of keeping an office in the State, for the use of
its officers, stockholders, agents and employés (it being a corporation
created by another State) is a tax upon commerce among the States,
and as such is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

Norfolk and Western Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114.
3. A State is not liable to pay interest on its debts, unless its consent to

pay it has been manifested by an act of its legislature, or by a lawful
contract of its executive officers. United States v. North Carolina,

4. On bonds of the State of North Carolina, expressed to be redeemable

on a day certain at a bank in the city of New York, with interest at

that date. 1b.
5. The statute of Minnesota approved April 16, 1889, entitled “ an act for

the protection of the public health by providing for inspection, before
slaughtering, of cattle, sheep and swine designed for slaughter for hu-
man food,” is unconstitutional and void so far as it requires, as a con-
dition of sales in Minnesota of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork,
for human food, that the animals, from which such meats are taken,
shall have been inspected in that State before being slaughtered.

Minnesota v. Barber, 314.
6. In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be

determined by its natural and reasonable effect; and the presumption
that it was enacted in good faith, for the purpose expressed in the title,
cannot control the determination of the question whether it is, or is

not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. 16.
7. This statute of Minnesota by its necessary operation, practically excludes

from the Minnesota market all fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork,
in whatever form, and although entirely sound, healthy and fit for hu-
man food, taken from animals slaughtered in other States; and as it
thus directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals, whose meat
is to be sold in Minnesota for human food, to those engaged in such
business in that State, it makes such discrimination against the prod-
ucts and business of other States in favor of the products and busi-
ness of Minnesota, as interferes with and burdens commerce among

the several States. Ib.
8. A law providing for the inspection of animals, whose meats are designed

for hunian food, cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the police
power of the State, if the inspection prescribed is of such a character,
or is burdened with such conditions, as will prevent the introduction
into the State of sound meats, the product of animals slaughtered in

other States. Ib.
9. A burden imposed upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained sim-

ply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all

the States, including the people of the State enacting it. Ib.
10. Chapter 489 of the Laws of New York of 1888, which provides that

“ the punishment of death must in every case be inflicted by causing
to pass through the body of a convict a current of electricity of suffi-


« PreviousContinue »