APPENDIX A. THE MERCHANT MARINE AS AN AUXILIARY TO THE NAVY. GENERAL BOARD, NAVY DEPARTMENT. Washington, November 23, 1905. SIR: In compliance with the Department's indorsement dated October 20, 1905, referring to the general board for report and recommendation a letter from Senator Gallinger, chairman of the Merchant Marine Commission, to the Secretary of the Navy, in relation to the extent and character of the merchant marine that this nation should possess to supply its possible needs in time of war, as viewed from a military standpoint alone, the general board has the honor to submit the following: 2. The need of auxiliary vessels in time of war for military service is felt both by the Army and the Navy. The need of vessels by the Army being for the transportation of men and supplies, the number needed would be altogether dependent on the location of the field of operations of the army forces. In case of operations of a large nature over seas the needs of the Army would be great, and the existence of a large fleet of American-owned merchant vessels available at once for conversion into transports or supply ships would undoubtedly be of great importance in expediting the departure of the troops and in supplying them after departure. England, at the time of the Boer war, and Japan in its recent war with Russia, undoubtedly benefited by the existence of a large merchant marine. 3. The general board does not attempt to enter into the question of the extent and character of the merchant marine desirable from an army standpoint, as it does not understand that such is the desire of the Merchant Marine Commission, as expressed by Senator Gallinger, but reserves its comments solely to the question as viewed from a naval standpoint. 4. Vessels other than the fighting fleet which would be needed by the Navy Department in time of war, and which would largely be drawn from the merchant marine, may be classed as follows: Scouts, colliers, ammunition ships, supply and refrigerating ships, distilling ships or tank steamers, hospital ships, repair and torpedo depot ships, transports, dispatch vessels, tugs. 5. The most important service which merchant vessels can perform for the Navy in time of war is as scouts. Vessels for this duty should be as fast, or faster, than any seagoing vessels which will be used by the enemy, and should have a large steaming radius. Size is an important factor in vessels of this type, as the scouts must be capable of keeping the sea and of making good speed in any weather, and none but large vessels fulfill these combined requirements. The general board believes that approximately one vessel of this type would be needed in time of war for each battle ship. Vessels of less than 20 knots sustained sea speed would be of little value for this service. The general board believes that the passage of a bill which would encourage the building of such vessels as fast or faster than those built in any foreign country, their services in time of war to be assured to the Government, would materially aid the national defense, inasmuch as it would assure to the Navy the services of a most important type of vessel and such as it would be impossible to obtain abroad at the outbreak of war, as all vessels of this nature built abroad are either subsidized or subventioned. A list of all vessels of this type now built, showing nationality, size, speed, etc., is inclosed herewithInclosure "I." Attention is invited to the fact that vessels of 23 and even 24 knots sustained sea speed are being built abroad. 6. The Navy would need a number of colliers with a cargo capacity of at least 5,000 tons each and with sufficient speed and steaming radius to enable S. Rep. 10, 59-1——3* 33 them to accompany a squadron of battle ships. There should be five such colliers for each squadron of eight battle ships with its attendant cruisers. A number of colliers of less speed and carrying capacity would also be needed for the purpose of keeping the coal supply replenished at the various coal depots and for other purposes. The existence of a large United States merchant marine, from which the colliers could be drawn, especially the fast colliers, would be of great advantage to the Navy. 7. Ammunition ships of about 4,000 tons carrying capacity would be required for the purpose of replenishing the ammunition supply of the fleet and for accompanying the fleet with reserve ammunition in case of a contemplated action. These vessels should have sufficient speed and steaming radius to enable them to accompany a squadron of battle ships. There should be one such vessel for each squadron of eight battle ships with its attendant cruisers. 8. One of each of the following types of ships would be required for each squadron of eight battle ships with its attendant cruisers, destroyers, etc.: Supply ship with cargo capacity of from 4,000 to 5,000 tons; tank or distilling ship with capacity of 1,000,000 gallons fresh water; hospital ship; repair and torpedo depot ship. Speed would not be an essential in these vessels, as they would not ordinarily accompany the fleet when cruising at full speed, but would habitually lie at an advanced naval base of operations convenient to the fighting fleet or cruise by themselves between ports. These vessels should, however, have a sustained sea speed of at least 12 knots. In case of a long voyage by a large fleet, such as Admiral Rojestvensky's, vessels of this type would accompany the fleet. 9. A number of transports would also be needed by the Navy Department for the transportation of a force of marines for the establishment and defense of advanced naval bases. Each transport should be capable of carrying at least one battalion of marines (about 500 men) with complete outfit of field and camp equipage and should have not less than 12 knots speed. 10. It will also probably be found necessary to procure a number of small fast vessels for duty as dispatch boats, as district scouts off the coasts of the United States, and for harbor-entrance patrol in cases where the channels are mined, etc., as well as a number of tugs and steam lighters. 11. It is of course impossible to foretell the extent of the needs of the Navy in any future war, they being dependent altogether on the size of the United States Navy at that time and the nature of the campaign to be carried out; but summarizing the above, the number of auxiliary vessels necessary for naval purposes would be, roughly, as follows, basing the number upon a squadron of eight battle ships with attendant cruisers, torpedo-boat destroyers, etc.: 20-knot scouts, 8 for each squadron. 15-knot squadron colliers, 5 for each squadron. Slower colliers, dependent upon circumstances. Say, roughly, 5 for each squadron. 15-knot ammunition ships, 1 for each squadron. 12-knot supply and refrigerating ships, 1 for each squadron. 12-knot tank and distilling ships, 1 for each squadron. 12-knot hospital ships, 1 for each squadron. 12-knot repair and torpedo depot ships, 1 for each squadron. 18-knot dispatch boats, district scouts, etc., 2 for each squadron; 5 for each naval district (10 naval districts). 12-knot transports, 6. Tugs and steam lighters, 2 for each squadron. Tugs, 100 for navy-yards and naval districts. 12. If the United States should go to war when the vessels now authorized by Congress are completed the Navy would then possess 27 battle ships in addition to cruisers, coast-defense vessels, torpedo boats, etc., and with the following auxiliaries now built or building: Three scout cruisers, 2 squadron colliers, 16 slow colliers, 3 supply ships, 1 tank ship, 2 hospital ships, 1 repair and distilling ship, 6 transports, 23 dispatch boats and yachts, and 43 tugs. It is thus seen that the Navy Department would be compelled to secure from the merchant marine, following the proportion of auxiliaries given above, 24 scouts, 16 squadron colliers, 2 slow colliers, 5 ammunition ships, 2 supply and refrigerating ships, 4 tank and distilling ships, 2 hospital ships, 4 repair and torpedo depot ships, 34 dispatch boats, district scouts, etc., and 78 tugs. In order to be sure that this number of vessels would be available for immediate purchase or charter by the Navy Department at the outbreak of war, the number of American-owned merchant vessels of each type should be largely in excess of the number here given, as some vessels would be abroad when needed, some under repairs, and some should be left for carrying on their regular commercial runs and as a reserve from which to draw in case of necessity. 13. The number of auxiliary vessels obtained by the Navy Department by purchase, charter, or loan at the time of the Spanish war is shown below: Some of these vessels have been employed and are retained for service different from that for which they were originally acquired. 14. The following information relative to each of the above vessels is given in separate tables inclosed herewith (inclosure "2"): Name of vessel on United States Navy list, gross tonnage, speed in knots, date of purchase, purchase price, previous owners, where built, first commissioned in United States Navy, disposition at close of the war. 15. The number of auxiliary vessels which will be needed for naval purposes in any future war will undoubtedly be greater than in the Spanish war, both on account of the increased size of the navy and the probability that a future war will be of longer duration and require more extensive improvements of the fighting fleet than did the late war. 16. Referring to Senator Gallinger's request that the general board "specifically tell of the difficulty and delay encountered in the year 1898 in the purchase of vessel from abroad," the general board regrets that details of particular difficulties such as it is assumed that the Merchant Marine Commission desires are not readily obtainable. The general history of the purchase of the vessels of the auxiliary navy was as follows: March 9, 1898, Congress passed the emergency bill for $50,000,000. March 12, 1898, a board was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy and directed to communicate with the owners of vessels and obtain terms on which they were willing to sell or charter and to make thorough examination of such vessels as might be desirable for purchase as auxiliary naval vessels. This board immediately entered into communication with ship owners and obtained vessels within the times as shown below. April 20, 1898, Northern Patrol Squadron (Commodore Howell) organized, consisting of San Francisco and 4 converted vessels as auxiliary cruisers, Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, Yosemite. April 21, 1898, war declared. May 26, 1898, joint resolution of Congress approved for organization of auxiliary naval force (coast patrol). Ten yachts and 5 tugs were purchased out of the appropriation of $3,000,000 carried by the joint resolution. 17. It is seen from the above that 29 vessels were obtained for auxiliary purposes within approximately one month from the time the board was ordered. Considering the unpreparedness of the Navy Department at this time as regards outlined plans for the procurement and fitting out of auxiliary vessels in time of war, the time within which this auxiliary fleet was obtained was highly commendable to the board charged with this duty, but the commanders in chief of the fighting fleets were embarrassed for lack of fast scouts and colliers, which embarrassment would have been still greater if the operations of war had been more unexpected than they were and against a more active enemy. 18. Summarizing, the general board considers that, from a military standpoint, a bill which would encourage the building of large fast vessels suitable as auxiliary cruisers, scouts, and squadron colliers would be of great advantage as assuring to the Navy Department means of obtaining necessary auxiliaries in time of war important as affecting the operations of the fighting fleet. A bill in which this feature of speed is omitted is not of material advantage from a military standpoint in the opinion of the general board, as it is probable that without such a bill a sufficient number of the comparatively slow vessels could be obtained without difficulty or much delay. 19. As to the question "as to the marked increase in ocean freight rates upon the approach of war, and, therefore, the disinclination, at such times, of every foreign shipowner to dispose of any efficient vessel of considerable size, due to the fact that the earning capacity of the ship then increases in a very rapid manner," the general board is not in a position to give information. It seems highly probable, however, that such would be the case and that the prices asked by foreign shipowners for their vessels would increase at that time. 20. In the case of war against an enemy possessed of many fast auxiliary cruisers and inclined to carry on operations of a commerce-destroying nature against American shipping, the reverse would probably be the case with American shipowners, as insurance rates would rise abnormally and the risk of loss of vessels be sufficient to cause shipowners to wish to sell or charter to the Government at a reasonable rate. 21. Another benefit which would accrue to the Navy from a large fleet of Americanowned merchant vessels would lie in the large number of experienced seagoing men, engineers and firemen accustomed to marine engines and boilers, who would form a valuable reserve from which to draw the men for manning the auxiliaries. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. GEORGE DEWEY, Admiral of the Navy, President General Board. |