provided (sec. 3, p. 409) that the chairman should receive from the state treasury the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars a year in monthly installments, and that the members of the commission should be allowed necessary mileage and traveling expenses on affidavit of the members claiming the same that the mileage and expenses were actually and necessarily incurred in official business. Held, that the act constiLegislative powers restricted. tuted a sufficient appropriation of the salary of the chairman: but, as it failed to prescrib› any maximum expenditure for traveling expenses, the act was void in so far as it authorized payment of such expenses by the s'ate. State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers, 29 Nev. 469, 473, 485 (16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630, 91 P. $19). 278. SEC: 20. The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases-That is to say: Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace and of Constables: For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors: Regulating the practice of courts of justice: Providing for changing the Venue in civil and criminal cases: Granting divorces: Changing the names of persons: Vacating roads, town plots, streets, alleys and public Squares: Summoning and empanneling grand and petit juries, and providing for their compensation: Regulating county and township business: Regulating the election of county and township officers: For the assessment and collection of taxes for State, County, and Township purposes: Providing for opening and conducting elections of State, County, or Township officers, and designating the places of voting: Providing for the sale of real estate belonging to Minors or other person [laboring]1 under legal disabilities: 2[Giving effect to invalid deeds, wills, or other instruments: Refunding money paid into the State Treasury, or into the treasury of any county: Releasing the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation, association, or person to the State, or to any county, town or city of this State; But nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the power of the Legislature, to establish and regulate the compensation and fees of county and township officers; to establish and regulate the rates of freight, passage toll, and charges of railroads, toll roads, ditch, flume and tunnel companies incorporated under the laws of this State or doing business therein.] T. C. C. pp. 110, 472. [As amended. Proposed and passed at the Twelfth Session of the Legislature, February 23, 1885, Statutes of 1885, page 152; agreed to and passed at the Thirteenth Session of the Legislature, March 3, 1887. Statutes of 1887, page 166, and approved and ratified by the people at a special election held February 11, 1889.] Section two of the act of 1869, providing for the transfer of certain records and suits from the county-seat of Lander County to the county-seat of White Pine County (Stats. 1869, 137), though local and special in its nature, does not provide for changing the venue in any case, and is therefore not in conflict with this section. To change the venue in a case is to direct the trial to be had in a different county from that where the venue is laid; but if a new county be created out of a portion of an old one, an act directing suits relating to property in the new one to be tried in the new county is not an act changing the venue of such suits. Where the County of White Pine was created out of a portion of the County of Lander, and certain records and suits relating to property in the new county were directed by legislative act to be transferred from the county-seat of Lander County to the county-seat of White Pine County, and to be tried in the district court of the eighth instead of the sixth judicial district: Held, that such act was not an act changing venue within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition of a legislative change of venue. This act is not an act regulating the 1 In original but not in amendment as adopted. 2 Added to original section by this amendment. practice of courts of justice. State ex rel. Hooten v. McKinney, 5 Nev. 194, 198, 201. The venue is the county from which the jury are to come who are to try the issue. That is, it is the county wherein the action is brought and the jury are to be obtained. State ex rel. Hooten v. McKinney, 5 Nev. 199. This section, so far as it forbids local or special laws "for the assessment and collection of taxes," was intended simply to inhibit local or special laws respecting or regulating the manner or mode of assessing and collecting taxes, and does not prevent the legislature from authorizing or directing county commissioners from levying a special tax by the passage of a local law. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284, 304, 305. The word "for" in this section which inhibits local or special laws "for the asessment and collection of taxes." means "with respect to," or "with regard to." Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284, 304. The act creating the County of White Pine and providing for its organization (Stats. 1869, 108) is not in conflict with sections twenty, twenty-one, or thirty-two. of this article. 81 CONSTITUTION OF NEVADA A "local" act is one operating over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of the state; a "special" act is one operating upon one or a portion of a class instead of upon all of a class. The above act as it refers to only one new county and its organization, instead of to all new counties, and to those only of a class or whole, occupying or proposing to occupy such county, is a local and special act. The word "elected" in its ordinary signification carries with it the idea of a vote, generally popular, but sometimes more restricted, and cannot be held the synonym of any other mode of filling a position. This act does not regulate the election of county and township officers, and is therefore not repugnant to this section. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111, 119, 121. The legislature has full and complete control of the entire subject of counties and county-seats, save where prohibited by constitutional provisions. The act of February 17, 1871, fixing the county-seat of Washoe County at Reno (Stats. 1871, 59) is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision against special and local legislation. As the legislature has no authority to enact a local or special law when a general one can be made applicable, it is competent for the courts, in case of a special or local act properly presented to them, to inquire whether or not a general law could have been made applicable. It appearing that the constitutional provision against special and local legislation was borrowed from Indiana, and that previous thereto the Indiana courts had decided that a special or local law could not be enacted when a general one could be made applicable, and that a general law could be made applicable to the subject of the removal of county-seats: Held, that the construction of the Indiana courts as to the meaning of the provision was adopted, but not their application of it to the subject of county-seats. The decision as to whether a special or local law can Where, notwithstanding the existence of a general Under the constitutional provision against the passage The policy of the constitution is local management of local affairs, regulated by general laws of uniform application throughout the state. Williams v. Bidleman. 7 Nev. 68, 70, 73. Sections 20 and 21 of this article were intended to prohibit the legislature from passing any local or special law in any of the cases enumerated in section 20 and in all other cases where a general law would be applicable-that is, adapted to the wants of the people, suitable to the just purposes of legislation or to effect the object sought to be accomplished. These provisions recognize the fact that cases would arise in the ordinary course of legislation requiring local or special laws to be passed-cases where a general law might be applicable to the general subject but not applicable to the particular case. A general law should always be construed to be "applicable" in the constitutional sense, where the entire people of the state have an interest in the subject, such as regulating interest, the statutes of frauds and limitations, but where only a portion of the people are affected. as in locating a county-seat, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case whether such a law would be applicable. Where a local or special law has been passed in reference to a matter affecting a portion only of the people, it will be presumed to be valid until facts are presented showing beyond any reasonable doubt that a general law is applicable. The mere fact that a general law has been passed providing for the removal of county-seats is not proof that it is applicable to a particular case; and if a special act be passed for the particular case, the presumption of the applicability of the general law is overcome by the pre 6 Sec. 278 sumption, in favor of the special act, that the general act was not applicable in that case. If, when an unconstitutional portion of a statute is stricken out, that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, 333, 334. The statutes of 1867 and 1869, creating a fund and providing for the redemption in a certain manner of outstanding indebtedness of Esmeralda County (Stats. 1867, 76; 1869, 58), are not in violation of this constitutional provision against "special and local laws regulating county business"; nor do they impair the obligation of contracts. A statute prescribing the manner in which the payment of the indebtedness of a county shall be conducted is a law regulating county business. The words "public or general" on the one hand, and "private or special" on the other, as applied to statutes. are convertible terms; so that the word "special" when used is as much the antithesis of "public" as it is of "general." A statute, to be general, must be operative alike upon all persons similarly situated; but it need not be applicable to all counties in the state. The above statutes are applicable to all persons sustaining the relation of creditors to Esmeralda County, and are therefore general as contradistinguished from special laws. As in expounding a constitutional provision such construction should be employed as will prevent any clause, sentence or word from being superfluous, void or insignificant; full and distinct meaning should be given to each of the words "local" and "special" in the constitutional provision against "local and special laws regulating county business." A statute may be special and not local, or it may be local and not special. A local law is one relating, belonging or confined to a particular place as distinguished from general, personal or transitory. The said statutes, as they embrace all persons holding a certain species of property irrespective of locality, and operate as to such property as well without as within Esmeralda County, are not local laws. Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212, 217, 222, 223, 224. The constitutionality of the act funding the indebtedness of Lincoln County (1873, 54) sustained upon the authority of Youngs v. Hall (9 Nev. 212). Odd Fellows Savings and Commercial Bank v. Quillen, 11 Nev. 109, 115. The provision of the act creating the office of city recorder has no reference to the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The offices are distinct, though under the act of incorporation both offices may be held by the same person. State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128. 140. A law which applies only to an individual or to a number of individuals selected out of the class to which they belong, is a special law. State v. California M. Co., 15 Nev. 234, 248, 249. Sections 2 and 4 of the "Act to discontinue litigation touching inequitable claims for taxes and penalties" (Stats. 1879, 143) are unconstitutional, being a special law for the "collection of taxes for state, county, and township purposes" in violation of this section. The" Act prescribing an additional penalty for the nonpayment of taxes in certain cases after suit" (Stat. 1873, 169), is constitutional, it being a general law imposing the same burdens upon all persons similarly situated and belonging to the same class. State v. Con. Virginia M. Co., 16 Nev. 432, 438, 443, 444, 445, 447, 448. Section 2 of the statute of 1883, 123, extending the of the legislature to pass local or special laws regulating An act to restrict gaming providing that certain games should not be carried on in any room of the first floor or story of any building, nor a license issued therefor in any county where more than 1,500 votes were cast at the general election last preceding the application, is not in violation of this section, although at the time the application was made there was only one county in the state to which the law could apply. State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, 78, 80 (15 P. 783). The act of the legislature (Stats. 1887, p. 126) regulating the fees and compensation of the officers of Ormsby County is not unconstitutional as being local or special legislation. The Comstock Mill and Mining Co. v. Allen, 21 Nev. 325, 330 (31 P. 434). The act of 1891, page 56, is simply an exercise of the right of the legislature to classify property for the purpose of taxation, and as in authorizing the board to assess property it applies to all railroads in the state, it is a general law, and not in conflict with this section forbidding special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 391, 398 (32 P. 437). A law, though not applicable to all counties in the state, may be of a general nature by reason of the fact that localities and objects upon which it acts are distinguished from others by a peculiar relation to the legislative purpose. Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91. 94 (35 P. 833). The act of the legislature entitled "An act fixing the salary of the justice of the peace in and for Eureka township, Eureka County, State of Nevada" (Statutes, Nevada, 1891, p. 35). by terms of which the justice of the peace in the township named was allowed a salary of $60 per month in lieu of fees from the county, though a special and local act, is not unconstitutional and is therefore valid. The former constitutional restriction upon the legislature concerning the subject of compensation of county and township officers was, prior to the year 1891, removed in terms by the amendment of this section by the exception to the provision restricting the legislature concerning the passing of special and local laws regulating county and township business (as amended February 11. 1889). State ex rel. McNamee v. Spinner, 22 Nev. 213. 217 (37 P. 837). The act of the legislature of March 15, 1895 (Stats. 1895. p. 73), entitled "An act to incorporate Storey County and to provide for the government thereof," is a local and special act regulating county business, and consequently in conflict with this section. Schweiss v. First Judicial District Court, 23 Nev. 226, 230, 232 (34 L. R. A. 602, 45 P. 289). The act approved March 6. 1897 (Stats. 1897, p. 47) providing for the payment of the indebtedness of Lincoln County, is not in violation of the constitutional provision against "special and local laws regulating county business." In this case, the court having passed upon the point involved in two other cases, the legislature having Laws general and uniform. passed a number of acts of the same character, and it having been the recognized law of the state for a number of years, the question must be considered as settled. Thompson v. Turner, 24 Nev. 292, 293 (53 P. 178). This section prohibits the legislature from passing local or special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes. As held by this court in Ex Parte Robinson, 12 Nev. 263, 28 Am. Rep. 794, and Ex Parte Cohn, 13 Nev. 427, these limitations apply to taxes, and not to licenses. leaving the legislature to regulate the latter with a free hand where they do not encroach and discriminate in relation to taxes as properly and ordinarily understood, and without other restraint except the responsibility of the legislators to their constituents. Wallace v. Mayor of Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 77 (103 A. S. 747, 63 L. R. A. 337, 73 P. 528). Cited, Ex Parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 352, 353, 358, 359 (65 L. R. A. 47, 75 P. 1). The act of March 29, 1907, making it a crime to receive bank deposits knowing the bank to be insolvent, is not unconstitutional, as being a special law for the punishment of offenses. Neither is the law objectionable as class legislation. Ex Parte Pittman, 31 Nev. 44, 47 (22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 266, 99 P. 700). The act of March 26, 1907, authorizing a particular county to issue bonds to build a court-house and a jail, is not unconstitutional under this section, which inhibits local or special laws regulating county business, nor under sections 21 and 25 requiring the county government system to be uniform. and all laws to be general and of uniform operation throughout the state, where general laws can be made applicable. State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67, 68, 69 (99 P. 853). The act of March 26, 1907 (Stats. 1907, p. 232, c. 119), section 10, is not open to the objection of being special legislation because providing for appointment of receivers for insolvent banks only; banks being a subject which may be legislated on alone. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank and Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 465, 471, 472, 473 (103 P. 407). See Wolf v. Humboldt County, 32 Nev. 174 (105 P. 286, 287), under section 21 of this article. The act of February 27, 1883, regulating the fees of officers in the state, including sheriffs and constables, and providing that the act shall not affect the fees of officers of any county wherein the total vote does not exceed 800, and the same shall apply to all future elections, etc., does not conflict with this or section 21 of this article, since a general law fixing the compensation of officers of counties cannot be enacted, as it would result in making the compensation of officers inadequate in the small counties and exorbitant in the larger counties. Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304 (107 P. 890, 892). Nevada Cons. Deb. & Pro.. pp. 146, 147, 152, cited in State v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 251, 252, (9 P. 123), with reference to this section. 279. SEC: 21. In all cases enumerated in the preceding section, and in all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the State. T. C. C. pp. 15, 112, 462. See State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111, 119, 120, under sec. 20 of this article. A general law to be" applicable," in the sense in which the word is used in this section, must answer the just purpose of legislation, that is, best subserve the interest of the people of the state, or such class or portion as the particular legislation is intended to affect. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111, 119, 120, 121. The legislative fund, act of 1869 (Stats. 1869, 54), does not violate this section, because no general law could be made applicable to its subject-matter. State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15, 23. The statute providing for the admission to probate of the unattested will of Henry Sticknoth (Stats. 1871, 129) was held not objectionable as a special act in case where a general law could be made applicable. In re Stick noth, 7 Nev, 224, 233. In construing section 6 of the act of 1875, p. 47, which provides that it shall not apply "to those who have practiced medicine or surgery in this state for a period of ten years next preceding the passage of this act": Held, that said provision is not in violation of this section. Held, that there is some reason for requiring ten years' practice in this state as a qualification for the continued practice of medicine or surgery; but there is no sort of reason for requiring that practice to have extended over the particular ten years immediately preceding the enactment of the law, and to this extent the law is unconstitutional, because in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution; but omitting the words "next preceding the passage of this act," leaves a good and perfect statute. (By Beatty, J.) Held, that said section is not in conflict with any of the provisions of the state or federal constitution. (By Hawley, C. J.) Ex Parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323, 329, 330, 332, 337. The act incorporating Carson City (Stats. 1875, 87) is not in violation of the provisions of this section. (Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 323, affirmed). State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 129, 141. It is made the duty of the legislature to regulate the election of township and county officers by general laws. State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 418, 419(4 P. 735). The act of February 23, 1903 (Stats. 1903, p. 33, c. 10), providing an eight-hour day for workingmen in mines, smelters, and mills for the reduction of ores, is not void, under section 1 of article 1 of our constitution, nor is the statute in conflict with this section. Ex Parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 352, 353, 358, 359 (65 L. R. A. 47. 75 P. 1). The clause of the act of February 18. 1893 (Stats. 1893, p. 30, c. 31), providing for an attorney's fee in favor of the party recovering damages against one unlawfully herding or grazing stock on his land is a proper police regulation and is constitutional. Pyramid Land and Stock Company v. Pierce, 30 Nev. 237, 256 (95 P. 210). See Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, 107 P. 891. under section 20 of this article. Section 20 prohibits the legislature from passing local or special laws "regulating the jurisdiction and duties of the justices of the peace and of constables, and for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors, regulating county and township business." Section 21 provides that "in all cases enumerated in the preceding section and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state." Section 25 provides that "the Legislature shall establish a system of county and township government which shall be uniform throughout the state." Act of the Legislature approved March 13, 1903 (Stats, 1903, p. 98, c. 71), provides that the commissioners of H. County could provide that persons charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor in the western townships of said county may be imprisoned in the branch county jail of said county, instead of the county Jail. Held, that such act was unconstitutional, as being a special act upon a subject that could be covered by a general act. Wolf v. Humboldt County, 32 Nev. 174 (105 P. 286, 287). Cited. State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, 33 Nev.-(113 P. 107). Suit may be brought against the State. See State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67-69 (99 P. 855) under sec. 20 of this article. An act of the legislature provided that after May 1, 1911, the county commissioners of Lyon County should remove the offices and archives and other movable property from Dayton to Yerington. The general act of 1877 (Stats. 1877, c. 84), provides for the removal of countyseats by a majority of the voters at an election called on petition of three-fifths of the taxpayers who are electors. Prior to the last general election the courthouse at Dayton was destroyed by fire. Held, that the special act was justified on the ground that an emergency existed, calling for prompt action. If a special act be passed for a particular case, the presumption of the applicability of the general law is overcome by the presumption in favor of the special act that the general act was not applicable. The legislature in the first instance is the judge as to whether a law on any subject not enumerated in the constitution can be made general and applicable to the whole state, and the judgment of the legislature as to whether a general law is applicable or special, or local laws are required regarding subjects not so enumerated, is presumed to be correct, but is subject to review by the courts. In locating a county-seat, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether a special law is applicable. Quilici v. Strosnider, 33 Nev.- (115 P. 177, 178). 280. SEC: 22. Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the State as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution. T. C. C. pp. 404, 501. Enacting clause. 281. SEC: 23. The enacting clause of every law shall be as follows: "The people of the State of Nevada, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows." and no law shall be enacted except by bill. T. C. C. pp. 74, 90. This provison is mandatory. The omission of the words "Senate and" from the enacting clause of an act of the legislature, renders the act unconstitutional and void. The above provision of the constitution is an imperafive mandate of the people in their sovereign capacity, Lottery inhibited. 282. to the legislature, requiring that all laws, to be binding upon them, shall upon their face express the authority by which they were enacted, and an act without such authority appearing upon its face is not a law. State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, 252, 256, 257, 260 (21 A. R. 738). SEC: 24. No lottery shall be authorized by this State nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed. T. C. C. pp. 125, 472. The act of March 3, 1871, to aid the Nevada Benevolent Association in providing means to erect an insane asylum 'Stats. 1871, 110) in so far as it authorized a lottery or alowed the sale of lottery tickets in this state, was unconstitutional. Ex Parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101, 104. The act to aid the Nevada Benevolent Association in providing means for the care and maintenance of the insane of Nevada (Stats. 1881, 166) provides that it shall County government. be lawful for the association to give public entertainments, to sell tickets of admission, to distribute among the ticket-holders personal property, and to regulate the distribution by raffle or other schemes of like character: Held, that the scheme or enterprise in which the association is engaged is a lottery, and that the act is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Murphy v. Overton, 16 Nev. 136, 146, 148, 149. 283. SEC: 25. The Legislature shall establish a system of County and Township Government which shall be uniform throughout the State. T. C. C. pp. 246, 500. A law, though not applicable to all counties in the state. may be of a general nature by reason of the fact that localities and objects upon which it acts are distinguishable from others by a peculiar relation to the egislative purpose. Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91 94 101 (35 P. 833). The act of the legislature of March 15, 1895 (Stats. 1-95. p. 73), entitled "An act to incorporate Storey County and provide for the government thereof," is void because in conflict with this section in many particulars. Schweiss v. First Judicial District Court, 23 Nev. 226, 26272 (34 L. R. A. 602, 45 P. 289). See Wolf v. Humboldt County, 32 Nev. 174 (105 P. 286. 27 under section 21 of this article. See State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton. 31 Nev. 67, 68, 69, under section 20 of this article (99 P. 3). The legislature is required to make a uniform system of county government and to provide for a uniform sys tem of public schools. In carrying out these provisions, they may abolish any county offices other than those specially created by the constitution. State v. Tilford, 1 Nev. 240, 245. It was the intention of the legislature to classify the counties by a voting population at the general election, and to give to each county polling four thousand or more votes five commissioners, and all other counties three, for a period of two years, commencing on the first Monday in January after the general election, in pursuance of the provisions of this section. State ex rel. Copeland v. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 338, 340, 344 (30 P. 1006). The act fixing the salaries of county officers in certain counties (Stats. 1883, 73), is illusory, because some of its provisions are applicable only to Washoe County and others only to Esmeralda County, and the basis of the classification as made in section 10 is unconstitutional, because in its practical operation it is applicable only to two counties and can never affect any other county. In order to observe the uniformity required by this section, the classification of counties must be based upon reasonable and actual differences; the legislation must be appropriate to the classification, and embrace all within the class. The requirement that the system of county government shall be uniform, is not considered to impart universality to the operation of the law. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 44, 46 (5 P. 735). State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, related to the provisions of County government. the act of 1883 attempting to make the treasurer of Washoe County ex officio assessor, and it was decided that the act, in so far as it established a difference in the government of Washoe County from that of the other counties in the state, violates the uniformity contemplated by this section. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 254 (9 P. 123). Cited, ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Commissioners of Humboldt County, 21 Nev. 239. 284. SEC: 26. The Legislature shall provide by law, for the election of a Board of County Commissioners in each County, and such County Commissioners shall jointly and individually perform such duties as may be prescribed by law. T. C. C. pp. 248, 500. The board of county commissioners is not a court as courts are defined in the constitution. And such bodies may lawfully meet and transact business on the first day of January. Brumfield v. Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County, 2 Nev. 65, 67. There are certain county offices designated in the constitution. These offices cannot be abolished without a constitutional change, nor the incumbents removed prior to January, 1867.Other county offices can be created or abolished at the will of the legislature. State v. Tilford, 1 Nev. 240, 244. The constitutional provision relating to county commissioners seems to have been adopted from California: and it may be lawfully presumed to have been taken Who may be excused from juries. with the judicial interpretation attached to it in that state. State ex rel. Mason v. Board of County Commissioners of Ormsby County, 7 Nev. 392, 397. This section does not prevent the legislature, after the board has been once created, from increasing or decreasing the number of commissioners that shall constitute the board. State ex rel. Copeland v. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 337, 341 (30 P. 1006). Cited, State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 416. 419 (4 P. 735). The words " election," in this section, and "election by the people," in section thirty-two, of this article, contemplate the same mode of election and imply a popular vote. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111, 121, 125. 285. SEC: 27. Laws shall be made to exclude from serving on juries, all persons not qualified electors of this State, and all persons who shall have been convicted of bribery, perjury, foregery [forgery], larceny or other high crimes, unless restored to civil rights; and laws shall be passed regulating elections, and prohibiting under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereon from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice. T. C. C. p. 406. Salaries fixed by law not increased or diminished. 286. SEC: 28. No money shall be drawn from the State Treasury as salary or compensation to any Officer or Employee of the Legislature, or either branch thereof, except in cases where such Salary or compensation has been fixed by a law in force prior to the election or appointment of such Officer or Employee; and the Salary or Compensation so fixed, shall neither be increased nor diminished so as to apply to any Officer or Employee of the Legislature, or either branch thereof at such Session; Provided, that this restriction shall not apply to the first session of the Legislature. T. C. C. p. 97. Cited, State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 31. 32. It is said that the salaries and compensation exempted by the constitution must be those that have been settled by preexisting law. Had such been the intention, apt words would have been employed. For instance: This section provides (reciting same). The language used shows that its framers intended that no question should Legislative session limited. arise touching the meaning that should be attached to it, and it is probable that if any restriction or qualification had been intended to apply to this section, it would have been fairly expressed, and not left to implication or conjecture. State ex rel. Cutting v. LaGrave. 23 Nev. 390 (48 P. 370). 287. SEC: 29. The first regular Session of the Legislature under this Constitution, may extend to Ninety days, but no subsequent regular Session shall exceed Sixty days, nor any Special Session, convened by the Governor, exceed twenty days. T. C. C. p. 81. Homestead exempt from forced sale. 288. SEC: 30. A homestead, as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife when that relation exists; but no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes or for the payment of obligations con |