the registry law was unconstitutional, and that as the registry agents could not alter or modify it so as to leave out the objectionable part, the entire oath must fall. Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369, 371, 373, 374.

A statute which makes the enjoyment of a constitutional right depend upon an impossible condition, or upon the doing of that which cannot legally be done, is equivalent to an absolute denial of the right under any condition. The effect, and not the language of the statute in such case, must determine its constitutionality. Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369, 372.

Any person possessing the qualifications of an elector as defined by this section is entitled to the right of suffrage. It is not within the power of the legislature to deny, abridge, extend or change the qualifications of an elector as prescribed in the constitution. State v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, 199, 201 (19 A. S. 346, 19 P. 241).

The act prescribing the qualifications of electors (Stats. 1887, 106) prohibiting Mormons from voting and requiring applicants for registration to take an oath that they are not members of the Mormon church is in direct violation of this section, and is not authorized by sec. 6, art. 2, requiring provisions to be made by law for registration. State v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, 199, 201 (19 A. S. 346, 19 P. 241).

The qualifications of an elector are those prescribed by the constitution, and they cannot be altered or impaired by the legislature. Registration is not an electoral qualification, but is only a means for ascertaining and determining in a uniform mode whether the voter possesses the qualifications required by the constitution, and to secure in an orderly and convenient manner the right of voting. State ex rel. Boyle v. Board of Examiners, 21 Nev. 67, 69, 70 (9 L. R. A. 385, 24 P. 614).

Residence defined.

Section 34 of the act incorporating the town of Reno, requiring for the determination of certain questions, a majority of the votes cast by the qualified electors of a city, as shown by the last official registration, is not in violation of this section as being a disfranchisement of qualified electors who have become so since the last election. State v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 260 (52 P. 274). Cited, State v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 170, 176 (83 A. S. 573, 58 P. 284).

The right to vote conferred by this section is a mere political privilege, and not an inherent, unqualified personal or political right. This section applies to the election of public officers, and not to the selection of party nominees. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400 (109 P. 444).

This section defines the qualifications of an elector, but the legislature may prescribe reasonable qualifications for an elector who may desire to become a candidate. providing such qualifications are not in conflict with some constitutional provisions. The qualifications required by the primary law are not, as we view the constitution. violative of any such requirement. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400 (109 P. 455, 456).

Under the provisions of the constitution of this state, all necessary state, county and township officers must be elected by the people of the locality immediately concerned. State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412 (4 P. 735).

The constitutionality of the direct primary law of March 23, 1909 (Stats. 1909, c. 198), can be questioned on the ground that it precludes a qualified elector and candidate from appearing on the official ballot, or precludes any qualified elector from voting for any qualified candidate only by one deprived of such right. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400 (109 P. 444, 445).

T. C. C. pp. 66, 407, 465, 503.

See "Residence" post.

Soldiers and sailors may vote.

T. C. C. pp. 66, 407, 503.

See State v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131 (58 P. 284, 83 A. S. 573).

Civil process suspended.

T. C. C. pp. 64, 465.

Elections by ballot.

Electors registered.

T. C. C. pp. 66, 502.

The oath required by section 5 of the registry law (Stats. 1865, 141) "being in terms in addition to the qualifications of an elector, which are now or hereafter may be prescribed by law." cannot be regarded as "a test of electoral qualification" within the meaning of this section, and is therefore unconstitutional. Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64, 67.

Under this section, the legislature can prescribe what oath or oaths may be necessary as a test of electoral qualifications, but it cannot impede or trammel the right of suffrage by adding new qualifications. Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64, 67, 68.

This section required the legislature to make provision for the registration of electors so as "to preserve the purity of elections," the provisions of the registry law when necessary to accomplish this purpose should be strictly pursued. Stinson v. Sweeney, 17 Nev. 314 (30 P.

997).

Where a non-compliance with the provisions of the registry or election laws, upon the part of the registry agent or officers of the elections, are not essential "to preserve the purity of elections," the courts recognizing the fact that the will of the people, when fairly expressed, should be the law of the land, have universally declared that the qualified electors should not, on that account, be deprived of their yotes. Stinson v. Sweeney, 17 Nev. 315 (30 P. 997).

The act prescribing the qualifications of elecfors (Stats. 1887, 106) prohibiting Mormons from voting and requiring applicants for registration to take an oath that they are not members of the Mormon Church is in direct violation of section 2, article 2 of the constitution, and is not authorized by the above section. State v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, 201 (19 A. S. 346, 19 P. 241).

While the legislature cannot directly deprive the elector of his privilege of voting, this section specially authorizes it to enact laws for the registration of electors, to preserve the purity of elections, and to regulate the manner of holding and making returns of the same. Such laws will necessarily sometimes have the effect of preventing the elector from voting. For instance, a law for the registration of voters, to be effectual, must provide that one not registered, shall not vote; and to guard the purity of elections, it may require him to make his

ballot in a certain way, and to comply with many other conditions. But in all these matters the voter had the privilege of voting, by a compliance with the law, and his failure to do so is somewhat owing to his own negligence, or misfortune. Lynip v. Buckner, 22 Nev. 438 (30 L. R. A. 354, 41 P. 762).

The constitution has committed the subject of registration of electors to the legislature for the purpose of determining who are qualified voters, and laws of this description must be calculated to facilitate and secure, rather than to subvert or impede, the exercise of the right to vote. The adoption by the legislature of the registry lists of the general election of 1888 for the special election held three months later in 1889 is not obnoxious to constitutional requirements, but on the contrary is commendable as being calculated to facilitate, rather than impede, the exercise of the right to vote. ex rel. Boyle v. Board of County Commissioners. 21 Nev. 68 (9 L. R. A. 385, 24 P. 614).

State

The great constitutional right of an elector, of voting and having the vote counted, is not to be taken from him upon any doubtful construction of a statute. Lynip v. Buckner, 22 Nev. 439.

This section authorizes and requires the legislature to provide by law for the registration of all persons who possess the prescribed qualifications of electors, but it does not authorize the legislature to impose any condition on the right of registration, other than the prescribed qualifications of electors. And when the legislature does so, it exceeds its authority. v. Wilson, 24 Nev. 308, 309.

State

The legislature can add qualifications to electors desiring to become candidates for specified offices if the qualifications are reasonable. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400 (109 P. 445).

In these provisions of our constitution, we find full authority granted the legislature to pass all necessary legislation for general elections; and a further examination of our constitution will disclose no prohibition to enact a direct primary law so long as the act conforms in other respects to our constitution. As to the inherent right of the legislature under our constitution to enact a primary election law there can be no question. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400 (109 p. 448).

T. C. C. p. 375.

The revenue laws of the state imposing a capitation tax of one dollar on all passengers carried out of the state is not a poll tax. and

Ex

does not conflict with the constitutional provision limiting the poll tax to four dollars. Parte Crandell, 1 Nev. 294, 313.

T. C. C. pp. 68, 465.

Each department of the state governmentlegislative, executive, and judicial-is supreme within its respective sphere. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284; State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, 33 Nev. (113 P. 106).

Under the constitution of this state, the naming in the act of incorporation of the persons who were to constitute a provisional or initiatory board of trustees was not the exercise of a power intrinsically executive. Clarke v. Irwin (5 Nev. 111) affirmed. State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128.

The action of a judicial officer in regard to matters which are exclusively executive or administrative in their nature, even when the act of the legislature requiring such duties to be performed is in violation of a constitutional provision, cannot be reviewed by certiorari. Esmeralda County v. District Court, 18 Nev. BS (5 P. 64).

Under the laws of this state, the supreme court is only authorized to review the record and proceedings of inferior court officers or tribunals acting in a judicial capacity and exercising judicial functions. Esmeralda County 1. District Court, 18 Nev. 438 (5 P. 64).

This article, dividing the state government into three great departments, does not prohibit one department from exercising powers of the rature of those belonging to one of the other departments unless that power is either expressly or impliedly conferred upon the other department by the constitution. This article only refers to the state government as created by the constitution. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390,396 (32 P. 437).

The contention of the lieutenant and acting governor that the acceptance as directed by the statute of repudiated bonds of a sister state, tendered to this state as a donation, would disurb the harmonious relations existing between The two states, and that for certain legal reasons the bonds cannot be collected, raises a question for the legislature in the first instance aud for the judiciary in the second, neither of which is within the functions of the executive or justifies his refusal to accept the bonds. State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, 33 Nev.(113 P. 106, 108).

Cited. State ex rel. Josephs v. Douglass, 33 Nev. - (110 P. 180).

The act of March 4, 1871 (Stats, 1871, 129) said to be a clear encroachment of the legislature upon the judicial function. Per Whitman. J.. dissenting. In re Estate of Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 236.

The exercise of the functions of the board of County commissioners in the discharge of a Supplemental assessment under the statutes providing therefor (Stats. 1867, 111) is not obnoxious to this article. State v. County Commissioners of Ormsby County, 7 Nev. 392, 396.

Where a statute provided for gift concerts and distribution of prizes among ticket holders by raffle, and especially provided that "nothing in this act contained shall be con

strued as authorizing a lottery in this state or as allowing the sale of lottery tickets contrary to the provisions of the constitution" (Stats. 187, 110); Held, that the construction of such act was for the courts alone and that the attempted exercise of this power by the legislature was an unconstitutional assumption of the functions of the judiciary. Ex Parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101, 104.

The act incorporating Carson City (Stats. 1875, 87) is not in conflict with this article, or sections 1 and 8 of article 4, or section 10 of article 15 of the constitution. State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128.

In construing the provisions of the act providing for the payment of outstanding indebtedness of Virginia City (Stats. 1864-5, 325); Held, that said act, in so far as it undertakes to definitely fix the amount due to the persons therein named, is an attempt upon the part of the legislature to exercise judicial powers, and is therefore repugnant to this article. State v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 439, 442.

Held, that the state prison act (Stats. 1881, 109) in so far as it attempts to commute any portion of the sentence imposed by the courts prior to the time the act took effect, is inoperative and void, because it interferes with the judiciary. Ex Parte Darling, 16 Nev. 98, 99, 100 (40 A. R. 495); Ex Parte Woodburn, 32 Nev. 136 (104 P. 245).

The acts required by section 6 (Stats. 1883. 99) relating to the annexation of a part of Esmeralda County to Lyon County to be performed by the district judge in the event of a board of county commissioners failing to agree, are not of such a judicial nature and character as to authorize the supreme court to review them upon certiorari. Esmeralda County v. District Court, 18 Nev. 438 (5 P. 64).

The act of March 27, 1907 (Stats. 1907, p. 241, c. 125) relates to the incorporation of cities, section 2 providing for a petition for such incorporation by the majority of the qualified voters, and section 3 (p. 242) conferring on the district court authority to determine whether a majority of the qualified electors and taxpayers have made this application sufficiently describing the territory to be embraced in the city or corporate town with a map thereof containing the streets and alleys and the proposed name, and whether it is accompanied with satisfactory proof of the number of inhabitants. Held, that such act is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative powers to the judicial department. State ex rel. Williams v. District Court, 30 Nev. 225, 227, 228, 229, 234 (94 P. 70).

The act of March 26, 1907 (Stats. 1907, p. 232 c. 119), sec. 10, providing that on the determination by the bank commissioners that it is unsafe for a bank to continue business. they shall order the bank examiner to take possession of its property until the attorneygeneral shall begin action to enjoin it from

transacting business and, if, on a hearing, the court finds it solvent, the court may dismiss the action and order the bank restored to the possession of its property, does not confer judicial functions on an executive board. State ex rel. v. State Bank and Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 465, 471, 472, 473 (103 P. 407).

Banking act, Stats. 1911, 291, sec. 79, examined, and the provisions of this section held to be a clear invasion of the judicial powers in favor of the executive department and consequently this section is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 33 Nev. - (116 P. 595).

The provision in the act entitled "An act to require the acceptance and collection of grants, devises, bequests, donations and assignments to the State of Nevada," approved February 26, 1901 (Stats. 1901, c. 19), that "whenever

Legislative authority vested.

any grant, devise, bequest, donation or gift or assignment of money, bonds, or choses in action shall be made to this state, the governor is directed to receive and accept the same, so that the right and title to the same shall pass to the state," imposes a ministerial duty upon the governor which could have been conferred as well upon any other officer or person, and which in no way conflicts with or pertains to the constitutional powers or prerogatives of the governor. He is nowhere empowered to set aside the law because he may not agree with its policy. He is as much unauthorized to prevent the reception of the bonds as if the legislature had directed the state treasurer instead of the governor to accept them for the state. State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, 33 Nev. - (113 P. 105, 106).

T. C. C. pp. 74, 466.

The federal government was organized by the concession to it of such certain specified powers as were deemed necessary to secure and promote the general welfare of all the states, the residuum being retained by the people; and these reserved powers are supreme and absolute over life, liberty and property, except as restrained or limited by their own concessions through the federal constitution. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284.

The state legislature possesses legislative power unlimited except by the federal constitution, and such restrictions as are expressly placed upon it by the state constitution; it is within the sphere of legislation the exponent of the popular will, endowed with all the power in this respect which the people themselves possessed at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284, 292, 293, 294, 295, 298; State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 416 (4 P. 735).

The people, and through them the legislature, have supreme power in all matters of government where not restricted by constitutional limitations. Wallace v. Mayor and City Council of the City of Reno, 27 Nev. 71 (103 A. S. 747, 63 L. R. A. 337. 13 P. 528); Ex Parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 352 (65 L. R. A. 47. 75 P. 1).

The power to make the law must necessarily carry with it the right to judge of its expediency and justice. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284.

The possible abuse of legislative power is no argument against either its existence or

To convene, when.

appropriate exercise. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 112, 127, 128, 130, 131.

Since the legislature can pass any act not expressly prohibited by the state or the national constitution, an act is presumed to be constitutional until declared otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction. Questions of the wisdom, policy, or expediency of a law are for the legislature's determination, with which courts cannot interfere. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400 (109 P. 444, 445).

Courts will presume statutes to be valid and will not consider a question affecting their validity, unless essential to a determination of the case. The legislature, in the absence of special authorization in the constitution, may not abolish a constitutional office, or change, alter, or modify its constitutional powers and functions. State ex. rel. Josephs v. Douglass, 33 Nev. (110 P. 177).

The legislature, representing the people of the state, has the sole authority to enact and repeal statutes, and in this regard its power is supreme in all matters of government, where not prohibited by constitutional limitations, state or federal. Questions relating to the wisdom, policy, and expediency of statutes are for the people's representatives in legislature assembled, and not for the governor or the courts to determine. State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, 33 Nev. (113 P. 105, 106).

Under the guise of changing remedies the legislature cannot destroy the right. State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 33 Nev.- (116 P. 595).

T. C. C. pp. 81, 466.