The counsel for the defendant in error say, were permitted openly to conduct clairvoythat this instruction was properly refused, ant parlors for the purpose of operating conbecause the same benefit was given to the fidence games, and that many people were plaintiff in error by another instruction, swindled out of their money for large which stated that if the jury believed, from amounts in the aggregate by means of the the evidence, that any witness who had testi- confidence game, by the connivance and unfied as an accomplice had been promised the der the protection of the police. Complaints aid and assistance of the state's attorney in made to the police, and brought to the attenan application for a pardon, that fact might tion of the plaintiff in error through the be considered by the jury in determining the mayor and the chief of police, as well as by credibility of the witness. The promise of individuals, produced no effect. Other memassistance in an application for a pardon was bers of the police force knew of this condidifferent from a hope or expectation of escap- tion, and it cannot be supposed that the chief ing a term of imprisonment in the penitentia- of detectives, with all this information in his ry by other means. The instruction was in- files, was the only one on the force in igtended to cause the jury to consider another norance of the facts. Frank Ryan was ackind of expectation. It is argued that the tively protected from arrest by misinformainstruction was inaccurate and confusing, tion given to the police force in Boston. It because there were no witnesses in the case is true that the evidence of Bertsche and the who were in such a position that they might Ryans comes through crooked channels from hope or expect to escape a term of imprison- a corrupt source, and the testimony of the ment for the crime. Bertsche was the most actual payment of the $500 bribe comes from important witness for the people. At the them alone. An item of evidence corroborattime of the trial he had already escaped one ing their story of Halpin's connection with year of a term of imprisonment in the peni- the conspiracy as condemnatory as anything tentiary for the commission of a crime of in the case is that in regard to the receipt which he had been convicted, and in which of $100 by Halpin at Hot Springs, Ark., in the judgment of conviction had been affirmed March, 1913. Bertsche and James Ryan tesby the Supreme Court, and his testimony tified that Bertsche inclosed a $100 bill, with shows that he understood that the mandate a short note, in a special delivery letter mailfrom the Supreme Court had been held up by ed to Halpin at Hot Springs early in March, somebody in the state's attorney's office with 1913. The delivery of a special delivery letwhom he said he may have had a conversa-ter to him there was proved, and Halpin adtion about it, that he did not expect to be in the penitentiary at all, and that he was testifying under the hope and expectation that Hoyne would get him out. It thus appears that he expected to escape a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary, and that his experience in escaping one year of that term already, regardless of the law and the judgments of the courts and the duty of the officers charged with their execution, justified that expectation.

Error against the plaintiff in error occurred on the trial. Was it of such a character as to require a reversal of the judgment?

mitted receiving such a letter containing $100, but said that it was from one Corbett. Corbett was not called as a witness, and no explanation of his absence was made. This must have seemed extraordinary to the jury, and justified them in believing that the chief of detectives was receiving money from the chief of the clairvoyants. It seems to us that no other conclusion can be reached.

ment should not be reversed for the refusal of this instruction.

While the special instruction as to the credibility of the witnesses which has been discussed should have been given, the attention of the jury was called to this subject by the instruction which was given, and, The plaintiff in error was denied none of his though the latter instruction did not comconstitutional or statutory rights. The errors were errors of procedure, in the admis- pletely cover the case, it did caution the sion of evidence and instructing the jury. If jury as to the credibility of witnesses testithe correction of the errors might reasonably fying under hope of favor from the state's be expected to result in a different verdict, attorney. Under the circumstances, the judgthis judgment should be reversed. On the other hand, if the jury, acting reasonably on the competent evidence, under proper instructions, could have reached no other conclusion than that of guilt, the judgment ought not to be reversed, so that a better record may be made on another trial. The acts done after the termination of the alleged conspiracy, and those done not in carrying out the purposes of the conspiracy, were incompetent; but without considering them the evidence leaves no doubt of the existence of a conspiracy for a year prior to

The evidence, even considering the corrupt origin of much of it, carries with it an abiding conviction of the plaintiff in error's guilt, and the jury, acting on such evidence as was legally competent, under proper instructions, could have reached no other conclusion. The judgment will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

CARTER, J. (specially concurring). I concur in the conclusion reached in this opin

(276 Ill. 454)
BLOOMINGTON, D. & C. R. CO. v. INDUS-
TRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS et al.
(No. 10778.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1917.)

Decatur shops. The administratrix of his estate claimed compensation from the company, and, being refused, a committee of arbitration was appointed. On November 7, 1914, the committee heard the evidence of her claim and found for the company. No

1. MASTER AND SERVANT 404-WORKMAN'S tice of the decision was mailed from Chicago
COMPENSATION
TRANSCRIPT on November 12, 1914, and within the time
-CERTIFICATION.

HEARING

A transcript of the evidence taken on a previous hearing before the Industrial Board, though not authenticated by signatures of the parties, attorneys, or chairman of the board, but testified to be correct by the reporter and subsequent to its admission certified by the chairman of the arbitration committee, was properly admitted, since, if authentication was essential, time of authentication was not material.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. 404.]

2. MASTER AND SERVANT

403-WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION-BURDEN OF PROOF.

The burden of proving that deceased workman's death was accidental rested upon his administratrix, who sought compensation, and such proof must amount to something more than guess or conjecture.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. 403.] 3. MASTER AND SERVANT

403—INJURIES TO

SERVANT-PRESUMPTIONS. Where the evidence showed that the deceased workman had for 21 years been in perfect physi: cal condition, it is the reasonable presumption that his sudden death while at work was due to external efficient agency.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. 403.]

WORK

4. MASTER AND SERVANT ~417(7)
MAN'S COMPENSATION-APPEAL-SCOPE.
If there was credible testimony before the
Industrial Board which awarded compensation,
the court on writ of error cannot consider the
weight of the evidence, nor does the fact that
other persons testified differently authorize inter-
ference.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. 417(7).]

Farmer and Dunn, JJ., dissenting.

Error to Circuit Court, Macon County; William K. Whitfield, Judge.

Certiorari by the Bloomington, Decatur & Champaign Railroad Company to review a decision of the Industrial Board of Illinois awarding compensation to the administratrix of Henry Yanda for his alleged wrongful death. To review a judgment of the circuit court confirming the decision, the relator brings error. Affirmed.

Charles C. Le Forgee and Thomas W. Samuels, both of Decatur, and George W. Black, of Peoria, for plaintiff in error. A. R. Ivens and Whitley & Fitzgerald, all of Decatur, for defendant in error.

CARTWRIGHT, J. Henry Yanda was a carpenter in the employ of the Bloomington, Decatur & Champaign Railroad Company, which operated an interurban railroad, and on July 9, 1914, he died instantly while working, in company with George E. Albeitz, on top of one of the company's cars in the

fixed by the statute the administratrix filed a petition with the Industrial Board asking for a review of the decision and for time in which to file a stenographic report of the evidence.

On December 23, 1914, within the time extended for that purpose, the stenographic report was filed. At the hearing before the Industrial Board the attorney for the railroad company moved to dismiss the proceeding because the stenographic report was not filed within the time required by statute, and the attorney for the claimant replied that an extension had been granted, and this was not denied. The motion was then denied. A hearing was afterward had before the Iudustrial Board, resulting in a finding for the administratrix and fixing Weekly payments to be made to her. The the circuit court of Macon county, and the company sued out a writ of certiorari from circuit court, on a hearing, confirmed the decision and entered judgment accordingly. The court certified that the cause was one proper to be heard by this court, and the record is now under review by writ of error.

[1] At the hearing before the Iudustrial Board counsel for the company objected to the stenographic report or transcript of evidence taken on the previous hearing because not authenticated by the signatures of the parties or their attorneys or by the signature of the chairman of the board. The evidence was taken and transcribed by the official reporter of the circuit court, and was taken by him for both parties and paid for by both of them equally. The transcript was made and testified that it was correct, and his testipaid for by the company, and the reporter ceeded on the transcript of evidence so takmony was not disputed. The hearing proen and transcribed and additional evidence, and on June 10, 1915, before the decision of the Industrial Board, which was on October 20, 1915, the transcript was certified by the chairman of the arbitration committee. If the authentication was essential and the transcript could not be considered without it, the time was not essential and the certificate could lawfully be made at the time it was made.

The following facts were proved: Henry Yanda and George E. Albeitz were carpenters working on top of a car about 9 feet wide and 31 feet long. There were running boards laid lengthwise on top of the car, about 6 inches apart, and the roof of the car on each side was oval, making what was called a "turtle-back" car. There were a number of

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

the exceptions appear only in a bill of excep-
tions taken at a subsequent term, the matter
sought to be raised by that portion of the bill
stricken will not be considered on appeal.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and
Error, Cent. Dig. 88 2404, 2405; Dec. Dig.

STREET IMPROVEMENTS-ORDINANCES. An ordinance, providing for the paving and improving of portions of a street, and providing improvement, but shall be improved and paid that other portions shall not be included in the for in accordance with the provisions of another ordinance, is not open to objection by properground that it did not describe the nature, exty owners assessed for the improvement on the tent, and character of the improvement not included.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 812; Dec. Dig. 304(10).]

direct, and positive terms than the requirement that the agreed statement of facts or stenographic report, duly authenticated, shall be filed within 20 days after notice of filing the decision, or within such further time, not exceeding 30 days, as the board may for suf-537.] ficient cause grant. The plain, unambiguous 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 304(10) language of the statute is that the decision of the committee of arbitration shall become the decision of the Industrial Board unless a petition for review and agreed statement of facts or stenographic report, authenticated, shall be filed within the time prescribed. Both are required to give the board jurisdiction to review the decision, and it certainly cannot be said to be a compliance with the statute to file a transcript of what purports to be the evidence heard before the committee of arbitration, unauthenticated. As we understand the statute, the decision of the committee of arbitration becomes the decision of the Industrial Board, and canAn ordinance, providing for curbing resting not be reviewed unless the authenticated re- on concrete of specified dimensions and backport, as well as the petition for review, is ed by concrete of specified dimensions, is not filed within the time prescribed. The au- include the cost of the concrete footing and backopen to the objection that the estimate did not thentication of the report is made essential ing, where the estimate contained an item for by the statute, and no provision is made for the number of lineal feet of curb set in confiling or authenticating it after the time lim-crete complete, and stated that it included laited has expired. There does not seem to be include the foundation and backing. bor and material; this item being sufficient to any such ambiguity in the statute as to authorize giving it any other meaning than that which its language imports. The Legislature has said what is necessary to be done to secure a review of the decision of the committee of arbitration by the Industrial Board, and that should govern.

(276 Ill. 490)

CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS v. VOGEL et al. (No. 10842.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916. Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1917.)

1. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF 43(2)—SIGNINGDELAY OF JUDGE.

Where a bill of exceptions is presented to the trial judge at such time that it could be filed within the time provided by order of court, the party will not be prejudiced by the neglect or delay of the judge to sign the bill in time.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Exceptions, Bill of, Cent. Dig. § 722; Dec. Dig. 43(2).1 2. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF 44-SIGNING FILING NUNC PRO TUNC.

Where a bill of exceptions is presented to the judge in proper time for filing and through the delay or neglect of the judge to sign the bill, it is not signed until after the expiration of the time for filing, a nunc pro tunc order to file the bill of exceptions is unnecessary, and the signature of the judge must be regarded as authenticating it and authorizing it to be filed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Exceptions, Bill of, Cent. Dig. § 73; Dec. Dig. 44.]

3. APPEAL AND ERROR

OF EXCEPTIONS.

537-RECORD-BILL

Where a part of the bill of exceptions, referring to proceedings at a prior term, has been expunged on the ground that no bill of exceptions to the rulings was taken at such term and

CORPORATIONS

304(6)

5. MUNICIPAL
STREET IMPROVEMENTS-ORDINANCES-ESTI-
MATES.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 812; Dec. Dig. 304(6).]

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS mm 296(2) STREET IMPROVEMENTS ESTIMATES-SUFFICIENCY.

An engineer's estimate of cost of street improvements is sufficiently itemized, so far as rights of assessed property owners are concerned, if it is specific enough to give them a general idea of cost of substantial elements of improvement.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 793; Dec. Dig. 296(2).]

7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 304(2) STREET IMPROVEMENTS DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS.

1

An ordinance for a street improvement is not open to the objection that it improperly delegates power to a board of local improvements because it does not set forth in minute detail every particular of the improvement and every circumstance of the work, a substantial compliance with statute being all that is necessary, and discretion as to the details of the work being properly left to the board of local improvements.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 812; Dec. Dig. 304(2).]

8.

--

REVIEW

APPEAL AND ERROR 548(1) EVIDENCE-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. What is a local improvement is a question of law, but whether the circumstances attending the widening of a bridge over a drainage canal make it a public improvement, payable out of general taxes, is a question of fact for the determination of the municipal authorities in the first instance, and their conclusion will not be reviewed, where the evidence on which it was based is not contained in a bill of exceptions.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2433-2435, 2438; Dec. Dig. 548(1).]

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1052; Dec. Dig. properly granted, but it is insisted that the 438.]