effect upon the war, but that the taking of goods can have none. This is an assumption we cannot admit, without proof the most convincing and satisfactory. The fact is, the arguments against the capture of enemies' goods, and especially the one we are just now considering, are in fact arguments against war altogether. Except as arguments against war altogether, they have no validity. Now we are quite ready to admit that the arguments against war are overwhelming. Hardly anyone will dispute that. The difficulty is, in finding some practicable substitute for war for the settlement of international disputes. And, by diminishing the minor inconveniences of war, we not only do not approach the desired goal, but retreat farther from it.

4. Then it is said,* that "the mercantile community ought not to be made the especial victims whenever Government chooses to draw the sword." The first remark to be made upon this, though by no means a conclusive reply, is that the mercantile community have no small influence in deciding whether Government shall draw the sword or not; and if the mercantile community, in their own interests, would rather that the Government should not draw the sword, it is open to them to throw their influence into the scale of peace. And I cannot protest too strongly against the idea which seems to underlie the words I have quoted, that Government is at liberty to "draw the sword" whenever it pleases, at its own caprice and fancy, and is guilty of no crime against humanity in doing so; and that no one, except the traders whose goods are jeopardized thereby, has any particular right to object. And, indeed, the way in which the objection is put in the words I have quoted is, I venture to submit, one of the strongest arguments-perhaps the strongest argument-for the maintenance, to the uttermost, of the belligerent rights of capture. It is of the utmost importance to humanity that nations and governments should

* Hausard, 3rd Series, Vol. 181, col. 1436.

understand that war cannot, without wholesale murder, be undertaken "because Government chooses to draw the sword." A Government which, under an anxious sense of responsibility and an impending national peril, is impelled to draw the sword, may be acquitted in doing so. But "to draw the sword" with a light heart, is as foul a crime as man can possibly commit against his fellow-man.

Secondly,

I would now proceed to reply more directly to the objection I am considering, as to the mercantile community being the especial victims of war. First of all, they are not the especial victims of war. Soldiers and sailors, their wives and families, are the especial victims of war. even admitting for the sake of argument that the mercantile community ought not, as between themselves and other civilians, to be the especial victims of war, it is, as I have submitted above, quite competent for the supreme legislature of the State whose merchants have so suffered to indemnify them for their losses out of the public treasury. It is monstrous to invoke a change in International Maritime Law to remedy an alleged evil which may be equally well remedied by Act of Parliament. Thirdly, what right have the mercantile community to complain because they happen to be subject to the risks legally incident to their calling? A person who enters upon the calling of a merchant or shipowner may be presumed, when he does so, to have contemplated those risks, and chosen the calling in spite of them. Every special trade or profession is subject to risks from which other trades and professions are exempt, whether by the natural course of things or the operation of positive law. And the risk of loss of goods, unlike some other risks, may be guarded against by proper insurances. So that a merchant, so far from having more right to complain, has in fact less right than other persons who might be more seriously endangered. But, lastly, is it seriously contended that we should, at whatever cost, endeavour to make war tell with exact or at least approximate equality upon all classes? That the war should, as far as possible, be felt by

all members of the community engaged in it, is quite right; to attempt to make it felt equally by all classes, would be utterly ridiculous, except in those cases where it may be judged desirable to do this by pecuniary compensation.

5. Then it is said, that our shipowners would lose all their carrying trade on the breaking out of war, and would not easily recover it: and that that would be a grievous national calamity. This argument is based, of course, on the state of things which has arisen since the Declaration of Paris.* As, by that Declaration, enemies goods are exempt from capture in neutral vessels, it will of course follow that the merchants of the belligerent State will prefer the neutral vessels, where their goods will be safe, to the vessels of their own country, where their goods will be liable to capture. A deplorable picture is drawn of the transfer of the ships and seamen of this country to foreign countries.

"Our shipowners," it is said, "would transfer their vessels to foreign owners, and, worst of all, our sailors would follow the ships, for they would be attracted by the enormous wages which would be given them, and that strength upon which we relied in time of war would fail us."t

It is not very easy to follow this argument; and it is further complicated by the fact, that the Declaration of Paris is not of universal application. Suppose (1) this country to be engaged in war with one of the powers who were parties to the Declaration of Paris. Then, privateering being abolished, our mercantile marine cannot help us in any case. Whether the sailors of our mercantile navy serve in British or in foreign vessels will be quite immaterial for the purposes of the war. What the speaker probably meant to say was, that the mercantile marine forms a nursery for the Royal Navy: that on the breaking out of war, or even upon the apprehension of war, British shipowners would at once.

* We do not, of course, intend to say that the Declaration of Paris has not left this country in a worse state than before. See post, pp. 17-24. All that we are concerned to maintain at present is, that we should fare still worse if we surrender all right to capture private property at sea.

Mr. Gregory's Speech in the House of Commons, Hansard, 3rd Series, Vol. 181, col. 1412.

transfer their ships to foreign owners; that the seamen would go too, attracted by the prospect of increased wages, and that an economical Government would find far greater difficulty in attracting them to the Royal Navy from the foreign merchant service than from the British merchant service. The argument is certainly not flattering to the patriotism of British sailors or shipowners, or to the liberality of British Governments. And the reference to "enormous wages" seems to us to make the whole argument irrelevant, as it assigns an independent reason for the apprehended calamity. (2) If this country were engaged in war with the United States, or other State not party to the Declaration of Paris, the argument about shipowners losing their carrying trade falls to the ground. Neutral goods would be exempt from capture everywhere. British goods would be exposed to capture everywhere.

Independently of these considerations, is there no way by which merchant ships, deprived of their custom by the breaking out of war, might be utilized by the Government? Surely, under such circumstances, the shipowners would not be very exacting in their prices. But this is a point on which, of course, I cannot presume to offer an opinion. But what I would, at the risk of repeating myself, insist upon most strongly, is this:—that however great the national calamity arising from the loss of the carrying trade of British shipowners (and a good deal which is said on this subject seems to me to be pure speculation), yet a Government which "draws the sword" must be prepared to face great national calamities. War is one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest, of national calamities; and the fact that it brings minor evils in its train is no additional objection to it.

6. It is said that peace is promoted by the social communications of commercial intercourse. This may very likely be the case when commercial intercourse is threatened by war. But we cannot argue therefrom that this will continue to be the case when commercial intercourse is allowed to go on in spite of war.

7. I now proceed to consider the argument to which the opponents of the right of capture apparently attach the greatest weight. It is said that private property

on land is respected in time of war; why, then, should not private property at sea be equally respected? To this we reply, first, that assuming that private property on land is respected in time of war, that in no reason why a similar immunity should be extended to private property at sea. It is quite as competent for us to argue that private property on land ought not to be respected, because private property at sea is not respected, as for our opponents to argue that private property at sea ought to be respected, because private property on land is respected. We shall presently enter upon those considerations which have led to the partial sparing of private property on land. But we assert unhesitatingly, that where such considerations do not apply, the sparing of private property on land, so far from deserving the name of mercy or forbearance, is most unjustifiable and ill-timed leniency. But, secondly, is it the fact that private property on land is spared? On this point we cannot do better than quote the following from Manning's Commentary on the Law of Nations, published in 1839.

"It is undeniable, as a general rule, that an enemy has a right to capture the property of his adversary. This right, as we have seen, † has been modified by custom in regard to wars by land.

"As far as right goes, a belligerent, according to the jurists, and according to the ancient practice of Europe, has a complete right over all the private property of the subjects of his enemy, and even in wars by land. But this right has been gradually modified, and private property on land is usually respected by belligerents, as long as requisitions for their troops are complied with. This lenity has, however, been merely introduced by usage. It probably had its origin in its being the interest of conquerors to attempt to reconcile a vanquished nation to a change of sovereignty, according to the maxim, as old as Machiavel, that 'men sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.' Even

Pages 205, 206. + Pages 124, 132.