earth can restore to a family the loss of its member, or to the wounded and mutilated their health and vigour. Again, losses by capture of private property at sea, so far at least as they are exceptional, will generally fall upon wealthy traders who can very well bear them. And if such losses are to be apprehended, it is always easy to guard against them by proper insurances. Indeed, the moral principle involved in this whole question is a most serious one. It is of the utmost importance, unless we would abandon all pretensions to honour, patriotism and humanity, that the discomforts of war should not be borne by combatants alone, but should be diffused, as far as possible, throughout the entire community. Especially is this necessary in a country where political rights are widely diffused throughout all classes. Thus, every man who has anything to lose will be the more induced to hesitate before giving his voice for letting loose this terrible calamity among the nations of the world. There will be the less danger then of nations going to war with a light heart, and less likelihood of unjust and unnecessary wars. And if it be the deliberate conviction of a nation that a war upon which it is entering is just and necessary, then it becomes most incumbent upon all classes to feel that a grave crisis has arrived, and that it is the duty of all to unite in presence of a great national peril, and to have no interest but that of their common country. Mr. J. S. Mill, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of August, 1867, observed* :— "It would be a strange gain to humanity if the merchants, manufacturers and agriculturists of the world lost nothing by a state of war, and had no pecuniary interest in preventing it except the increase of their taxes-a motive which never yet kept a prosperous people out of war. How war is to be humanised by shooting at men's bodies instead of taking their property, I confess surprises me. The result would be that, as long as the tax-payers were willing, or could be compelled by their Governments to pay the cost of the game, nations would go on massacreing one another until the carnage was stopped by sheer impossibility of * Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 9, cols. 881, 882. getting any more soldiers to enlist, or of enforcing a conscription. That would be the amount of gain to humanity." And on the same occasion Lord Selborne (then Sir R. Palmer) observedt : "The notion of a mercantile peace, of exempting the commercial interests from the calamities of war, was one which might have some seduction for the mercantile interest, but which, when we were at war, we must renounee. Then all classes must throw in their stake together, all must bear the common burdens, and it would sap the very life-blood of the nation if we were for a moment to admit that the trade of the country could remain at peace whilst the nation itself was involved in hostilities." Nor is it out of place here to observe, that traders of a certain class have a direct pecuniary interest in a state of war, owing to the demand thereby created for their wares. As to the risks of capture, they are slight, and easily covered by insurance. At this point I cannot help adverting to the absurdity of distinguishing, for belligerent purposes, "public" from "private" property. The distinction is one which has reference to the municipal law of the State affected. If a private individual suffer in his property, it is quite competent for the State to compensate him out of the public purse. If public property is taken, compensation may and probably will be exacted in the shape of taxation from individuals. Public property is only another name for property belonging jointly to the private individuals, whose aggregate makes up what is called the public. The adjustment of burdens and benefits as between one citizen and another, and as between "the public " and "private individuals," is a matter to be regulated by the municipal jurisprudence of the State concerned. With such a matter the other belligerent can have nothing to do. If war is indeed to be regarded as a duel between Governments, and the distinction between a State and its citizens is for international purposes to be recognized, then the enforced conscription by a Government of its subjects ought to be prohibited by rule of International † Ibid., col, 891. Law, in order that the duel-between-Governments principle may be fairly carried out. At all events, we ought clearly to see our way before admitting a one-sided application of so novel and dangerous a principle. To conclude this part of the subject. If there be a class of citizens whose interests the State is bound before all others to consult, it is those who risk their lives in the quarrels of the State. If a cause of quarrel is so grave and serious as to induce a Government to lead hundreds and thousands of soldiers and sailors to slaughter in that cause; the Government owes it to them to neglect no independent available means for reducing the enemy to submission to the terms which it has felt itself compelled to demand at so terrible a sacrifice. A Government which fails in this duty says in effect that the lives of its soldiers and sailors are dirt cheap in comparison with bales of merchandise: since the cause for which the former are to be ruthlessly sacrificed is too trivial to disturb the sanctity of the latter. I now come to consider the question as it bears upon this country. It must be obvious that a nation whose principal strength is in her navy has a greater interest in the maintenance of the right of capture by sea than a purely military power. A treaty between a naval and a military power which should forbid or restrain the use of the naval arm, without any corresponding restraint upon the military power, would be clearly one-sided. To use the language of Sir F. Goldsmid*: "If a tiger and an elephant were about to fight, it would be absurd for the backers of the tiger to propose that it should not use its claws and teeth, or for the backers of the elephant to recommend that it should not use its trunk." And the policy of this country was, until recently, in conformity with its obvious interest. But, on the breaking out of the war with Russia in 1854, this country renounced the right of capturing Russian goods Speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 2nd of March, 1866. in neutral vessels: and in 1856 we joined with other European powers in the famous declaration of Paris, by which neutral property was declared exempt from capture in enemy's ships, while enemy's property was declared exempt from capture in neutral ships; with the exception, in either case, of contraband of war. I propose now to consider objections which are raised against the belligerent right to capture goods.* I will begin with the objection which is based on the alleged interest of this country. 1. It is urged that if this country has a greater naval power than any other, it has also a greater mercantile marine. Hence, it is argued, if we have more powerful engines of attack, we have also more exposed points. Whether, in case this country should unhappily become involved in war, the amount of British goods captured by the ships of war of the enemy would exceed in value the amount of enemy's goods captured by the ships of war of this country, is a matter of mere conjecture as to which it were idle to speculate. But this is not the point; the point is whether the losses inflicted by this country upon the enemy would or would not be felt more than the losses inflicted by the enemy upon this country. And the larger the actual commerce of the country, the less will any fixed and definite amount of loss be felt by the entire nation. 2. It is urged that the present state of things would be dangerous, in the event of war, to the continued integrity of our colonial empire. Our colonies would find their commerce endangered by the breaking out of a war in which they had had no voice, and upon a matter they did not understand; and hence would arise a demand for independence and separation. This argument deserves the greatest sympathy; for no patriotic Englishman can These objections are taken from the debate in the House of Commons, March 2nd, 1866, on Mr. Gregory's motion. See Hansard, 3rd Series, Vol. 181, cols. 1407-1480. contemplate without dismay the prospect of colonial disruption. Still, if the principle of exempting enemy's goods from capture be so evil as we have attempted to show that it is, no consideration of consequences ought to induce us to adopt it. The true solution of the suggested difficulty as regards the colonies lies in another direction. But to suggest that solution would be beyond the scope and purpose of the present Letter. 3. It is urged that, as a matter of fact, the capture of of enemies' goods would not have the effect of shortening the war. It is said, for instance*, that, in the American Civil War, the ravages of Confederate vessels had not the slightest effect in intimidating the Northern States, or checking the progress of the war. With equal pertinency it might be alleged that the slaughter of United States' soldiers in the field had not the slightest effect upon the progress of the war. The fact is, the people of the Northern States felt that a great principle was at stake, and that their national unity and integrity were lost for ever, unless they would oppose a most determined resistance to the pretensions of the Confederates. The Confederates, on the other hand, were equally sanguine that theirs was a war of national independence against aggression. Can it be wondered that, under such circumstances, the war was fought out to the bitter end? The calamities suffered by each party, even assuming they served no other purpose, served at least this, to test the faith of each party in the goodness of their cause. But, apart from this particular instance, we submit that there is a grave mistake in considering certain of the operations of war apart from the rest, and saying that such and such operations had no effect in checking the progress of the war. It would be equally pertinent to urge that the loss of such and such a regiment had no effect upon the war. The assumption which underlies the objection we are now considering is that the slaughter of men must under all circumstances have an Hansard, 3rd Series, Vol. 181, col. 1415. |