sincerity or aim, to write without thinking, and judge without knowing. Such were the evils which our author exposed with equal sprightliness and energy in his letters; and for these and the like evils he essayed, in his Esprit des Lois, to discover and to make known a fitting remedy and cure.

Now what remedy or cure promised to be more efficacious than one which was derived both from the nature of mankind themselves as modified by the circumstances of their existence in the social state, and from a general induction based upon the entire experience of all the various nations of the past? Philosophy and history in combination were to provide the remedy, a combination, which although now familiar to statesmen, was a novel and original idea to our author; and in his happy conception of the mutual assistance, which those two sciences lend each other in their reflex action and re-action, consists one of his most original merits, as the pioneer of a true system of morality and policy.

Secondly, with regard to the work as a whole and the design of the author in giving it to the world.

Departing from a definition of law in its most general sense, as a necessary relation arising from the nature of things, a sense in which the Deity has his laws, nature its laws, the angels their laws, mankind theirs, and the inferior animals theirs also, and which is afterwards explained to mean the relation subsisting between a certain primitive reason and the different beings together with the relations of the latter to and amongst each other, he formulates the great principle, that before laws were made there were relations of possible justice; and to say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws is the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not equal. It is necessary therefore to acknowledge relations of justice antecedent to the positive law by which they are expressed.

But the intelligent world (meaning thereby, the human race) is far from being so well governed as the physical world. For although both worlds have their laws, which of their

own nature are invariable, the intelligent world does not conform to them so exactly as the physical world, intelligence being finite, and not only therefore liable but also prone to error. Man as a physical being is, like other physical bodies, governed by invariable laws; but as an intelligent being he incessantly transgresses the laws established by God, and changes even those of his own instituting. And being exposed to this liability and proneness to error, God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of religion, and philosophy provides against the same weakness by the laws of morality, and legislation provides against it by political and civil laws.

In a state of nature the only feelings of the individual man are those of weakness and of want; but so soon as he enters into a state of society or of combination, he loses these feelings of weakness and of want, and in their stead begins to feel the contrary feelings of strength and the desire of acquisition; whence the first social condition is one of war, as well in their external as in their internal relations. And this propensity of the original social state wants therefore to be guided, controlled, and utilized. Whence the necessity that there is for the three varieties of human laws, namely,the Law of Nations, the Politic Law, and the Civil Law,the Ist variety relating to the mutual intercourse of states, the 2nd to the support of the state as a body politic, and the 3rd to the maintenance of the requisite relation between the component members of the State.

And, first, with reference to the law of nations; that law is founded on this principle, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good they can, and in time of war as little injury as possible, consistently with the assertion of their real interests. Secondly and thirdly, the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied, and should be relative to the following principal and secondary circumstances:(1.) The nature and principle of each Government, accordas it is Republican, Monarchical, or Despotic.

(2.) The climate and situation, and extent of each country. (3.) The soil of each country, and the principal occupation of the inhabitants, whether agricultural, nomadic, or pastoral.

(4.) The degree of liberty which the Constitution will bear, and which varies with each form of Government.

(5.) The religion of the inhabitants, and generally the inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs of the country.

It is these several relations which constitute what our author calls, the spirit of laws, and it is these relations which he undertakes to examine. And with what abundance of labour and felicity of illustration does he not examine the same! and for a purpose how beneficent!

It is a common reproach to Montesquieu's derivation of laws from an examination of these relations, that it attributes everything to cold and heat. Now, if this origin were the true derivation of laws, the intentional reproach would only be an unintentional eulogy of the author, who does not despise the truthful, because to our ordinary notions it should happen to be mean. But, in point of fact, the reproach, like other similar criticisms, is unjust, as becomes at once conclusively apparent from even a slight perusal of our author's treatment of the effects attributable to climate. He says, in effect, Nobody doubts but that the climate has an influence upon the habitual disposition of the bodies, and consequently on the characters, of men, on which account laws ought to be framed that are agreeable to the nature of the climate in different regions, and which shall also resist its bad effects. Thus, in countries where the use of wine is hurtful, that law which forbids it is a good one; in countries where the heat of the climate inclines people to laziness, that law which encourages labour is a very proper one. It is, therefore, one of the duties and also one of the attainable ends of Government to correct the effects of climate; although, at the same time, it is true that the legislature ought to allow for climate, and laws as they are a bad method of changing even the manners and customs of a people, so are they a still worse method of altering the climate.

And now, in conclusion, one word for the design with which the author wrote the "Esprit des Lols." In the Preface, he says, "Could I but succeed so far as to afford new reasons to every man to love his prince, his country, and his laws; new reasons to render him more sensible in every nation and government of the blessings which he enjoys, I should think myself the most happy of mortals."

And again, "Could I but succeed so as to persuade those who command to increase their knowledge in what they ought to command, and those who obey to find a new pleasure resulting from obedience, I should think myself the most happy of mortals. The most happy of mortals should I think myself, could I contribute to make mankind recover from their prejudices.”

And, probably, in the minds of most of us the echoing answer will arise that the countrymen of Montesquieu would have been the happiest of mortals also, if they had made our author such by following his precepts, living in contentment with their government, and with themselves and others--rejoicing in that moderate liberty which he inculcated as the most convenient for human nature.

As regards the style of Montesquieu, its elegance has sometimes been supposed to detract something from its vigour. But, in our opinion, this is a mistake, and perhaps no other style could have secured for the subjects treated of one-half of the universality of reception which they have received, and which it was necessary for their utility they should receive, amidst persons of politer character and station. It is possible from these writings to imbibe a nobility and manliness of taste, a dignity of sentiment, and a refined conception of civil liberty, which are at once the requisites for and the certain causes of public distinction, usefulness, and admiration. Lord Chesterfield, no mean teacher of the avenues to success in life, has said of Montesquieu, "His virtues did honour to human nature; his writings, justice. A friend to mankind, he asserted their undoubted and inalienable rights and liberties, even in his own country, whose prejudice in matters of religion

and government he had long lamented, and endeavoured (not without some success) to remove. He well knew, and justly admired, the happy Constitution of England, where fixed and known laws restrain Monarchy from tyranny, and liberty from licentiousness. His works will illustrate his name, and survive him as long as right reason, moral obligation, and the true spirit of laws shall be understood, respected, and maintained."

ON THE LAND TRANSFER BILLS.*

BY GEORGE Sweet.

HETHER we shall regulate the sale and transfer of

WHE

land by a public registry, either of assurances or of title, has ceased to be an open question. The energy with which the Land Transfer Bill has been revised and passed through the preliminary stages, and its favourable reception by the House of Lords, justify the expectation that either in its present or some modified form it will become law before the session closes, unless it is previously shown to be impracticable or irremediably defective. From mere inertia it has nothing to fear. Many conveyancers thought that the Bill of 1873, notwithstanding its grave defects, could be made the basis of a working measure, and that opinion is now sanctioned by the great authority of Sir Charles Hall, who has allowed his name to be associated with the revised edition of the Bill.

We have now for the first time a measure of registration of title for England, which has been critically examined and virtually guaranteed to be sufficient by a conveyancer of acknowledged ability and great and varied experience. In dealing with a subject so purely technical it would perhaps

* Read at a Meeting of the Law Amendment Society on the 4th inst.