Then comes that part of the code which contains provisions intended for the preservation of peace. They would require, first, that there should be a simultaneous reduction of the enormous armaments which now weigh upon Europe; secondly, that if any disagreement or cause of complaint should arise between nations, the one aggrieved should give formal notice to the other, specifying in detail the cause of complaint and the redress sought; and that this complaint should be formally answered within a certain period. If such a course had been pursued by France and Germany before the fatal declaration of July, 1870, we should probably have been spared the last Franco-German war. A provision somewhat similar has already been inserted in treaties of the United States with Portugal, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, St. Salvador, and New Grenada. Thirdly, it is provided that when the parties do not otherwise agree, they shall appoint five members of a Joint High Commission, who shall meet, discuss the differences, and endeavour to reconcile them. If the reconciliation thus sought fail nevertheless, a high tribunal of arbitration is to be appointed in this manner-each nation joining in the code transmitting to the parties in controversy the names of four persons, and from the list of these the parties concerned alternately striking off one after another, until the number is reduced to seven, which seven is to constitute the tribunal. Is there anything chimerical or impracticable in this? Let me refer you to the last great arbitration at Geneva for an answer to this question. Let me go farther back and refer to the history of the American Confederation. We begin with arbitration. When the independence of the Colonies was declared, they formed articles of Confederation, one feature of which was that disputes between the States should be decided by Commissioners selected by the disputants; or, if they failed to select them, by commissioners chosen in this way; three to be named by Congress from each State, each disputant to be at liberty to strike off alternately one name till the number was reduced to thirteen, from which thirteen, not

more than nine, nor less than seven, as Congress might direct, were to be chosen by lot to constitute the Commission. A more perfect system was afterwards established under the present constitution, which created a supreme court as the ultimate arbiter between contending States. Controversies between the States have already been adjudged by this One between Rhoda Island and Massachusetts; one between Iowa and Mississippi; in which the court fixed the boundary between them, and enjoined each from exercising jurisdiction beyond it. A suit was begun by New Jersey against New York respecting the boundary along the Hudson, which was finally compromised by the agreement of 1833, entered into between the two States, with the sanction of Congress. Suits have been brought by New York against Connecticut; by Alabama and Florida, each against Georgia, and between Maryland and Virginia, and between New Jersey and Delaware.

Why could not the plan of arbitration be extended to Europe? This continent contains eighteen independent States, counting the little communities of San Marino, Monaco, and Andorra; and considering Sweden and Norway as one, and Germany as united, wanting only the Austrian province. Ten only of these States exceed in wealth and population the richest and most populous States of the American Union. These ten are the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, France, Germany, Russia in Europe, Austria, Italy, Spain, Turkey in Europe, Sweden, with Norway, and Belgium. The five States of Holland, Portugal, Switzerland, Denmark, and Greece, are each less in population than New York. Even Belgium has only 400,000 more, and Sweden and Norway together have only about a million more than New York. There can hardly be a sufficient reason why Holland, Portugal, Switzerland, Denmark, and Greece, should not submit their differences to arbitration or to a permanent court, as well as New York and Pennsylvania. And if these five European States should be made to do so, why not France and Germany? The only reason, if reason there be,

is that France and Germany are more powerful; that they would not consent to compromise in any respect their freedom of action, and that in case of refusal they could not be coerced. To this it may be answered that the rights of France and Germany are not more sacred than those of Switzerland and Portugal; that the constraint upon their independence and freedom of action, by a voluntary compact to submit their differences to arbitrament or judgment, is not more derogatory to their true honour, and is not more dangerous to their independence and freedom of action, than to a smaller State. Of the two, if there be any difference in that respect, the weaker State is in greater danger than the stronger. The American system binds and coerces populous and opulent States, sovereign in everything except as they have limited their sovereignty by their own free will, and for the advantage of their own people. New York has already nearly four millions and a half of inhabitants; Pennsylvania, three millions and a-half; and Ohio two and a-half millions. When New York is as densely peopled as England and Wales, it will contain 16,000,000 inhabitants. But there are seventeen States larger than New York; Texas, California, Nebraska, Oregon, Minnesota, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, Florida, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, and North Carolina. How much larger will appear when we place the 47,000 square miles of New York side by side with the 247,000 of Texas, or the 189,000 of California?

If the population of Texas were ever to equal in density that of England and Wales, it would amount to 85,000,000, and that of California, under the like circumstances, to 65,000,000.

Americans are confident that their constitution is strong enough to control their largest States with all the population and resources of which their magnificent future gives them the promise. Measuring the future by the past, the next half-century will see some of the States as powerful as the larger European States; and unless it be supposed that

the American is more patient of control, and more obedient to law than his European brother, it should seem to be no harder a problem how to bring European States to submit their differences to the arbitrament of reason and law, than it is how to make American States do the same thing. Great Britain and Ireland have 30,000,000 of people; France has 38,000,000; Germany, 39,000,000; Russia in Europe, 68,000,000; Austria, 35,000,000; Italy, 25,000,000; Spain, 16,000,000; Turkey in Europe, 5,000,000; Sweden and Norway, 5,897,000; and Belgium, 4,839,000. The ratio of increase in America is about 35 per cent. every ten years. This ratio will give America a population as large as the whole of Europe in a little over fifty years. At the present ratio of increase, New York will contain in 1880 more people than Belgium, and in 1890 more than Sweden and Norway. If Texas and California are not subdivided, the time will come when they will have a population as great as any European State saving perhaps Russia. Texas, it is said, has as large a proportion of fertile land as Italy, and capable of sustaining relatively as great a population. Italy has 25,000,000 of inhabitants; Texas, as densely peopled, would have 57,000,000; and California 43,000,000. There is therefore nothing in the size, or strength, or riches of European nations to prevent their entering into and being permanently bound by a compact to settle their dispute by arbitration.

I do not mean to say that every claim which one nation may make upon another should be submitted to arbitration. There may be claims which no self-respecting nation would submit to any arbiter, such as those which touch its equality or independence. To put an extreme case. Suppose Spain were to claim the sovereignty of Holland, pretending that it had been lost by Phillip II. or by any of his successors, I would not have Holland submit such a claim to the decision of any arbiter or of any human power. It is not difficult, I think, to draw the line between questions which may not, and those which may be submitted, and it is the latter.

only which fall within the category of disputable and referable questions according to my view of them.

After the provisions respecting the preservation of peace which I have mentioned, the code proceeds to the subject of private international law, making uniform provisions respecting private rights and the administration of justice. Here are grouped together regulations concerning personal capacity, social condition, the validity and interpretation of contracts, the effect of foreign marriages and divorces, the devolution of property at death, the administration of justice, procedure and evidence, as they apply to the persons and property of foreigners.

The second general division relates to war in its effect upon the rights and duties of belligerents, allies, and neutrals. In respect to belligerents, there are regulations respecting the commencement, the conduct, and the termination of war. The general design has been to confine war to persons in military service, and their operations against property to that which is public. Private war and public war upon private property are alike prohibited. The provisions of modern treaties forbidding the use of certain deadly weapons, and exempting hospital surgeons and nurses, are taken and extended. The bombardment of defenceless places is absolutely prohibited. The various chapters are entitled thusOf those who may wage hostilities; against whom hostilities may be waged; the instruments and modes of hostilities; truce and armistice; medical and religious service; prisoners; hostilities against property; contraband of war; visitation, search, and capture; blockade; prize; and the effect of war upon the obligations of nations and their members, upon the intercourse and the administration of justice. In respect of neutrals, the absolute right of a nation to remain neutral while others are at war is asserted in the strongest terms. England has often acted upon this principle, and never with greater effect than with respect to Belgium during the last great war. What is neutrality? What may a neutral nation do? what ought it to do? and what ought it not to