dealt on cash, to give notice to them of the separation, though it might be necessary if she had dealt with his authority or credit. (Coulter v. Biddick.)

In the course of the Term, a case arose in the Exchequer, which raised the old and oft recurring question whether a provision in an agreement that the party, upon treating it, shall pay such a sum as shall be found due after arbitration, is invalid, according to what Lord Campbell, in the House of Lords, truly called the "preposterous notion" that agreements for references of disputes to arbitration are still, in spite of repeated statutes to encourage and enforce them, "contrary to the policy of the law." The Court, not without hesitation on the part of Baron Bramwell, adopted the subtle and absurd distinction drawn in Scott v. Avery, and held it good as a condition precedent to a right of action, not as a reference to arbitration. (Dawson v. Lord Fitzgerald.)

In the Court of Exchequer another point was decided bearing upon the law of husband and wife, especially with reference to separation. A wife separated from her husband was assaulted by him, and she employed attorneys to prosecute a suit for judicial separation, which ended in a separation by deed, and for the costs the attorneys sued the husband and recovered, the jury finding that he had been guilty of legal cruelty, and the court upholding the verdict, holding that the wife had taken steps necessary for her protection rendered necessary by the husband's misconduct, and that, therefore, she had an implied authority to pledge his credit for reasonable expenses. (Stocken v. Pattrick). A curious. point arose in an action on a separation deed in which the husband covenanted to "pay so long as they should be apart." There was a deeree for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of adultery by the wife during the separation. But on demurrer, the court held this no bar to the action. (Charlesworth v. Holt, Ex Sedquare) for was not the covenant in consideration of the status of marriage dissolved through the fault of the wife? In another case, where a man had agreed to pay a woman an annuity so long as she should maintain

his children by her, it was held not within the statute of frauds, as a contract not to be performed within a year because he was at liberty to terminate it at pleasure. (Knowlman v. Brett). This also has been doubted and discussed in the pages of our contemporary, the Law Journal.

Another case also came before the Court of Exchequer which illustrates the absurdity and inconsistency of our local courts of jurisdiction. It was a case from the Passage Court of Liverpool, one of those Borough Courts, which, like the Mayor's Court, in London, and the Tolsey, in Bristol, and the Court of Exeter, is not limited in jurisdiction by amount. The point of law which arose was one under the Carriers Act, which might involve a question of hundreds of pounds, as to the nature of articles which require to be declared under the Act. The court thought that it meant articles made up, and not mere materials, but that the application of the phrase was for the jury (Payne v. The London and North Western Railway Company). There was a case from the Mayor's Court, London, which afforded another similar illustration. Here the amount was only for £7, but raised a question of some novelty and difficulty (as to the validity of contracts for the exchange of votes for charities) on which the court took time for consideration. (Bolton v. Maddan, Queen's Bench, November 25th). The question would not have been more difficult for trial had it involved £7,000 instead of £7, and after all had it been tried in a superior court, the question of law would not have been decided at the trial, but would have been reserved.

Another case in the Exchequer illustrated the absurdity of the limitation of County Court jurisdiction by pecuniary amount. It was an action in the Supreme Court, ordered to be tried in the County Court, where there was a verdict for the plaintiff for £12. There was then a motion in the Supreme Court to increase the amount of the verdict to £22, and on the other side there was a motion to set aside the verdict, altogether, and enter it for the defendant. The question entirely turned upon a point of law of some im

portance, and apparently of some difficulty, as four counsel were heard upon it, before a court of four judges. The question was whether a Local Board could charge for the expenses of its fire-engines when used within its district. In the result, the court held that it could not, a decision of universal application. Yet the case came, in respect of amount, within the jurisdiction of the County Court, and it was clear that the facts could be as well ascertained there as in the Superior court, for the Superior court had sent it there for trial. And had it been sent there, the question could as well have been raised by appeal, and at far less expense. Hence it is manifest that had it involved £1,200 instead of £12, the suit might just as well have been brought in the County Court. (Local Board of Bridlington v. Bower.)

COURT FOR CONSIDERATION OF CROWN CASES RESErved. This Court sat several times during Term, on the 15th and 22nd November. At the first sitting before the Lord Chief Baron, Mr. Justice Blackburn, Mr. Justice Lush, Mr. Baron Pollock, and Mr. Justice Honyman, three cases were heard. One was reserved by Mr. Justice Honyman from the Central Criminal Court, and a question whether a letter to a broker enclosing a cheque "for payment of bonds" he had purchased amounted to a "written direction" for application of the cheque in payment, rendering him liable under the 24 Vict. 196, 375, for the misapplication of the money. The judges held that it clearly was so, and affirmed the conviction. (The Queen v. Christian.) Then there was a case of larceny by trick (Queen v. Turp), and a case as to the liability to repair a county bridge (Queen v. Kitchener). At the second sitting before the Lord Chief Baron, Mr. Justice Blackburn, Mr. Justice Lush, Mr. Justice Grove, and Mr. Baron Pollock, there were two cases, one raised a question whether an entry in the registry of births, coupled with the evidence of the girl's grandmother, that the child's name corresponded with the registry, was sufficient evidence of the age of a girl an indictment for an assault upon her being under 12. The Court held that it was. (Queen v. Weaver) In the other

case the Court held that a prisoner, however, could not be convicted of larceny under a count for receiving. (Queen v. Coggins.)

COURT OF ERROR.-At the end of Term the Courts of Error sat as usual for twelve days; the judges of two of the courts constituting themselves, in turn, courts of error for cases from the other court, so that a court of error for cases from such court sat about three days. Thus in the first instance, a court of error for cases from the Court of Queen's Bench was constituted of Sir J. Coleridge, Mr. Baron Bramwell, Mr. Justice Keating, Mr. Baron Cleasby, Mr. Justice Grove, Mr. Justice Denman, and Mr. Baron Pollock. One of the first cases heard illustrated the absurdity of the system. It raised a question under the Bill of Sales Act as to the validity of bills of sale given on renewal of each other within the period of 21 days, and within which registration is required. The Court of Common Pleas had lately held them valid. (Small v. Bun.) The Court of Queen's Bench, though in some hesitation, followed the decision, and now the question came before a Court chiefly composed of Common Pleas Judges, whether the decision in their court was right. The Court determined-not without hesitation on the part of one of the other judges-that in accordance with the decision of the Common Pleas, and no doubt upon grounds simply sufficient; nor can any one question the soundness of their decision. But still no one one can fail to see that for the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction such a constitution of the tribunal is far from satisfactory. (Ramsden v. Scepton, Nov. 27.) From want of judges it was found impossible to form a Court of Error for cases from the Common Pleas and the Exchequer, and therefore a Court of Error only sat for three days for cases from the Queen's Bench.

In two other cases the judgment of the Queen's Bench was affirmed. One was on the construction of a charter party (Merchant Shipping Company v. Armitage); another was as to the authority of a railway inspector to incur expenses for necessary assistance to persons injured in an

accident on his line. (Langton v. The Great Western Railway Company.)

NISI PRIUS SITTINGS.-These sittings were going on at short intervals during Term in each of the three courts before a single judge, and after Term for the statutory periods of twelve days at Westminster, and the same period at Guildhall before one or two judges in each of the courts, at least so far as was consistent with the other demands on the judges, as the Tichborne case, and the Winter Assizes. The Court of Queen's Bench, indeed, from the first could only have one court of Nisi Prius, and had to borrow a Baron for the purpose, three judges being absorbed in the Tichborne case, and the other three being required in Banco. Baron Piggott or Baron Pollock, therefore, sat during Term. At the first sittings in Term there were 37 cases for trial, of which 25 were remanets from last Term. They were as usual during Term common jury cases and were only fit for inferior courts. For instance, there was a breach of promise of marriage case, damages £80: an action for a £50 reward; an action on a bill of exchange, really without defence and so on, and Mr. Justice Quain tried an action. for the being bitten by the defendant's dog, damages £80.

In the Common Pleas, where Mr. Justice Honeyman and Mr. Justice Grove sat alternately, there were 13 cases at the first sitting, 11 for the second, and 34 for the third-altogether 58. In the Exchequer, where Baron Cleasby sat, there were 40 cases for the first sitting in Term, of which 13 were remanets, 20 for the second, and 51 for the third-altogether 84. The cases were of the same character, in one case for wrong dismissal of a servant, damages, £30; a breach of promise of marriage case, damages £25; a false imprisonment case, damages £20; a seduction case, damages £30; commission on the sale of a house, £51.

At the sittings after Term, in Westminster, in the Common Pleas, there were 97 cases, of which 42 were remanets, 42 were special juries, 35 common jury cases. Mr. Justice Brett sat, and Mr. Justice Honyman also sat to assist the