nisi was granted; so that the question will not be decided for some time. (Gunn v. Roberts, Common Pleas.)

One of the cases heard this Term, in the Queen's Bench raised a curious question. A stable in which horses stood at livery was blown down by a violent storm of wind; but, in consequence, as was alleged of unsufficient construction, and the owner of a carriage at livery, which was injured, sued the livery stable-keeper for the damage. The judge at the trial directed a nonsuit, holding that if any one was liable, it was the builder, there being no evidence of personal negligence on the owner. The question was argued and the court took time to consider their judgment, although it was held a few years ago in the Exchequer that in such a case the builder is liable to a stranger, (Butler v. Hunter,

7

H. and N. 8, 21.,) and not the owner, so that unless the fact that the owner was bailee for hire makes a difference, the question has already been decided. (Searle v. Laverick. It has been held, however, by a court of error, that where a person receives here a reward for admission to a building, he warrants its safety. (Francis v. Cockerell 7 B and S, 950, 39 L J., Q. B. 291.)

At the end of the Term an important point came before two judges of the court, sitting in a second division, (Mr. Justice Lush and Mr. Justice Archibald) illustrating the difficulties created by complexity of jurisdictions created under various statutes. The Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1861, giving an enlarged jurisdiction to the court as to ships, whether the cause of suit arose on the high seas or not restricted, applied only to vessels propelled by oars. The subsequent court, which conferred an Admiralty jurisdiction, as the County Courts did not contain such restrictive words, and thus questions appeared to give the inferior courts-whence an appeal in Admiralty cases lay to the Admiralty-jurisdiction in some classes of cases in which the superior court would not have jurisdiction. The Privy Council, however, on appeal, held, contrary to the Common Pleas, that the statute had created this anomaly, and now the question arose in this

court. An action had been brought to recover for damage done to a ship by a barge, on the river Thames, within the boundary of a county, so that the Admiralty would have no jurisdiction, not at Common Law, for it was not at sea, nor by the Admiralty Act, for it was not damage done by a ship. Nevertheless it was contended that the action ought to have been brought in the County Court, as it clearly might have been, since the County Court had evidently jurisdiction, and that by the Act of 1861, might be exercised inpersonam as well as in rem. The argument of Mr. R. E. Webster to that effect, therefore, prevailed over the argument of Mr. Phillimore, and so the court decided. (Flower v. Purkiss).

An important point of constitutional law arose in the Court of Queen's Bench in an action for an alleged infringement of patent for the making of arms, in which the defendants pleaded that they were making the arms at the command of the Crown, against whom the patent right could not be enforced, and under a contract with the Secretary of State for War. The plaintiff applied at Chambers before Baron Martin for an inspection of the contract, which the defendants objected to disclose on the ground that public policy precluded a discovery of contracts with the Crown for the public service. The plaintiff applied to the Court, and the Attorney-General appeared on the part of the Crown, and supported the objection, on the ground that the Secretary of State was privileged to refuse to allow a document to be produced on the ground of public policy, even without showing that in point of fact it would be prejudicial to the public interest to disclose it. The Court appeared to doubt whether this ought not to be shewn, and took time to consider their judgment, giving the Attorney-General leave to file an affidavit on the point if he thought proper. He did not do so, and eventually waived the objection in the particular case, but reserved his right to insist upon it on any future occasion. (Dixon v. The London Small Arms Company.) [See Home v. Lord G. Bentinck, Queen's Bench, re-affirmed in the Court of Error in Dickson v. Lord Paulet.]

The first case of any importance which came before the Court of Common Pleas, after the new Lord Chief Justice had taken his seat, was one which strongly illustrated the value of a chief able to take an enlarged and comprehensive view of legal subjects, rather in harmony with the spirit of modern legislation and the dictates of reason, than the mere letter of narrow rules of law. It was an application on the part of the French Government for an order to examine witnesses whose depositions were required in a criminal trial in France. The application was under the Extradition Act of 1870, which extended to criminal proceedings, not of a political character; the provisions of the Act of 1856, enabling evidence to be taken here in civil actions abroad, just as under the Act of William IV. examinations may be taken abroad in such actions in this country. And, of course, in such cases the accused is necessarily abroad; and, further, the Extradition Act of last year provided that the Secretary of State may order the examination of witnesses for the purpose of a criminal trial abroad, even in the absence of the person charged, although of course in extradition cases the accused person is always in this country. Yet Mr. Justice Denman at chambers hesitated to make the order, his difficulty being that the former Act, under which the application was made, did not expressly provide that the examination could be in the absence of the accused, (as if it could ever be otherwise). Nevertheless, when the matter came before the court composed of that learned judge, with Mr. Justice Keating, Mr. Justice Brett, and Mr. Justice Grove, they appeared unable to get over the difficulty concerning it contrary to “a fundamental rule of English law" to take evidence in the absence of the accused. Even if it were so, still as Sir John Karslake pointed out; the statute was plain, and moreover the court were not called upon to sanction the use of the depositions as evidence on any English trial, and the rule of law referred to any applies to English trials, and the trial of English subject, and has no reference to the trials of foreigners in foreign countries. Nevertheless, the court could not see their

way to making the order until a day or two afterwards, when the new Lord Chief Justice took his seat, and he at once saw that by the scope of the statute, the matter was free from doubt; he pointed out there could be no necessity for an express position that the examination might be taken in the absence of the accused, as an extradition case. Since, otherwise, the statute would have no application at all. Since the accused, against whom the examinations are to be taken, is always of course abroad. (In re Ferrand.)

One of the cases heard this Term in the Common Pleas raised the vexed question as to the effect of a supposed usage of the Stock Exchange to allow a jobber of shares to transfer them to a party who is really fictitious, which would be equally contrary to justice and legal principle, and contrary to the opinions of the judges in Law and Equity. In the present case the jury found that there was no such usage or fact. The judge, Mr. Justice Brett, approved of the finding, and directed the verdict for the plaintiff, which this court upheld. (Dent v. Nickalls, Common Pleas). There was afterwards a decision of the Vice-Chancellor, in a case arising out of the same transaction to the same effect, already mentioned Vide ante.

In an action against the Times, tried before the late Lord Chief Justice, the question was raised whether the court can determine in an action for libel that there is not a libel without its being left to the jury. It is of course understoood that the Court cannot decide that there is a libel without the verdict of a jury, but it appears that it is otherwise if it appears to the Court, on the face of the publication, that it cannot be a libel. The Times had published of the plaintiff that he was not a captain in the Artillery, and that he was "erroneously described" to be. It was suggested that this meant that he was an impostor, and had falsely represented himself as a captain in the Artillery. The late Lord Chief Justice held that there was nothing to sustain the action, and directed a non-suit, reserving the question of law whether he was right. Three

judges, Justices Keating, Brett, and Grove held that he was, and refused even to entertain the question by granting a rule. Had there been any doubt, they said, as to the meaning of the words used the case should have gone to the jury, but they were not reasonably capable of sustaining the meaning suggested. There was, therefore, nothing to leave to the jury. (Hunt v. Goodlake). This decision, which corresponds with one in the Exchequer, may be taken to overrule the "Bag of Bags" case, in which Mr. Justice Mellor, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Justice Lush, held that it ought to go to the jury whether it was a libel to say it was a foolish description to give of a bag! So in another case when the question was as to whether words were defamatory and actionable, there was a rule nisi, and the case is pending. (Miller v. Decond). In an action of slander, the question being whether the words were defamatory, the Court of Exchequer apparently took the same view as the Court of Common Pleas, that they had to decide whether the words were such as could not be defamatory. The action was against Mr. Leeman, M.P., for words spoken in a speech at a railway company's meeting, in reply to one by the plaintiff, reflecting on the conduct of the plaintiff, on the issue of debentures. The jury found that the issue of the debentures were unjustifiable, but that there was no intention to defraud, and they gave merely nominal damages. The question was reserved whether the speaking the words, assuming them to be defamatory, was not protected, and Sir John Karslake obtained a rule to raise that question, and also on the ground that the words were not defamatory in their nature as they did not impute an indictable offence. (Jackson v. Leeman.)

In the course of the Term there were some few points of law decided as to the law of husband and wife, of which one was this that where a husband and wife are living apart, under a separation deed, he making her an allowance, it is not necessary for the husband in order to relieve himself from future liability to the tradesmen, with whom she may have