The Law Journal has had an article on a recent decision of Vice-Chancellor Malins declining to send a case for trial before a jury, to which we shall have occasion to advert hereafter. Our contemporary appears to imagine that the Vice-Chancellor's view is at variance with the principles of the Judicature Act, but as we read the Act it is quite in accordance with the Vice-Chancellor's view.

Attention is being called in the Law Times to that important part of the Judicature Act which relates to the local courts, and the local institution of suits in the Superior Courts by means of the Registrars of the County Courts, who appear to be the points of connection and contact between the two systems of the local and Superior Courts. In the meantime the consolidation of the County Courts is proceeding, and has given rise to some dissatisfaction in the districts apparently deprived of the benefit of local courts for small debts.

We have to thank our contemporaries for their kind and handsome notices of our new editorship; but we venture to correct an error of our contemporary, the Law Times, in imagining that the Editor is not aided by other contributors. He will see in our present number more than one very honoured name; and we can assure him that we have the assistance of very learned and able contributors, though their modesty may sometimes prevent them from putting their names to their contributions.

Our contemporary, the Irish Law Times, has had a very able series of papers on the County Courts; the effect of which appears to be to adopt and enforce the view taken by Mr. Lascelles, a member of the English Bar, in his recent pamphlet entitled, "The Expansion of the County Courts, the true basis of Legal Reform." At all events, our contemporary is of opinion that to render a judicial system complete and effective, the County Courts ought to be improved and brought into close connection with the superior courts, and in this we entirely agree. Our contemporary, also, has had some valuable articles on the subject of "Land Transfer," which may be studied with advantage by those who take an interest on that subject; especially as in Ireland they have had the benefit of a great deal of practical experience under the Encumbered Estates Act, and the Land Act of 1870, with respect to the transfer of land, and especially with reference to title. These are the subjects which are greatly elucidated by such discussions in print.

The Scotish Journal of Jurisprudence is very ably conducted, and the last number contains some articles of interest, especially on the Judicature Act. We shall return to it.

The July number of the American Law Review contains an article on " Dumpor's Case," which has some interest with reference to the history of law. As Story observed, the courts in America were less fettered than are ours by the rigid rules of the common law, and were more at liberty to give them a literal and sensible construction. Nevertheless as they adopted the common law of England they were often embarrassed by its technical rules, the results of the scholastic spirit of the Middle Ages. This was peculiarly the case with the "rule in Shelley's case," which Lord Mansfield reprobated as the result of feudal notions, and the "rule in Dumpor's case," which is a mere piece of technical absurdity. The courts in America were rather embarrassed between their respect for the traditions of England and their sense as to the unfitness of these rules in modern times. We believe Shelley's rule has been little observed, and a history of its operation in England and America would be of some interest. The article in the Review now before us gives the history of Dumpor's case in the English and American courts, and it is written with great learning and clearness; and it is of great interest to those who wish to study the history of law. On the whole, the case does not seem to have had much influence in America, and the principles of the most recent decisions appear to get rid of it entirely. There is a philosophical article-a continuation of a former one-on the theory of Torts. The present essay is directed merely to the theory on which the jury takes a part in the decision of cases, and is directed to show it depends on the decision of the court whether they should be appealed to or not, and whether, having clearly decided to the satisfaction of the court, this view would be still taken of the same questions raised again or accepted as law, according to the view of the able writer of the article, the verdicts of juries form one of the sources of law, and no doubt in a certain sense, this is true. It illustrates the truth of Maine's remark of ancient law, that it was the gradual generalization of particular judicial decisions. The writer thinks that the legal liabilities defined by a book on torts are divided into those in which culpability is an element and those in which it is not, but that the latter are divided into cases were the facts which fix the liability are distinctly ascertained, and those were the boundary line is in course of ascertainment, or, from motives of policy, is kept purposely indefinite. He seems to us, however, too much to confound torts with breach of duty, and speaks of an assault, for instance, as a breach of duty, so he speaks of a duty not to defraud. But surely a tort is an act per se wrongful, as a slander,

an assault or a fraud, all of which are wrongful without reference to duty. But negligence necessarily implies a precedent duty or obligation to do some act or to do it in a particular way, or with reasonable care. This is the substantial distinction to be deduced from the authorities of our law, and the sound sense of the subject. The article, however, is written in a philosophic spirit, and will well repay perusal, by exciting the mind to reflection on the principles of law. There are also interesting papers on accident insurances and the abuses of bankruptcy law.

In the Albany Law Journal (Nov. 29) there is a varied judgment on the question of damages, the measure of damages for the conversion of stock, which as our contemporary observes: 66 presents a very full and able consideration of the rule as to damages in cases of this class;" that is, where the plaintiff had not an absolute property, but only a contingent or speculative interest in it. There is also an able article on "Recent Telegraph cases," in which the English and American cases on the subject are noticed; a very good illustration of the advantages of legal journalism. Our contemporary, has also (Nov. 15) an elaborate and able article on that head of the law of carriers, which relates to their power of limiting their liability by tickets, and especially with reference to the passes given to drovers of cattle. Our contemporary arrives at a conclusion in which we heartily concur, that the Railway Traffic Act, 1854, was substantially a return to the principle of the common law, as in reality, there is no assent to the term of the tickets, there being no real power of dissent, or that they ought to have no legal operation or effect beyond what is legally reasonable, and would be implied by law without any express stipulation, where the street obligation of common carriers does not apply. Our contemporary has an article on International law, especially with reference to the recent efforts of publicity and jurists at Ghent and at Brussels, on behalf of an international code and of arbitration, and the labours of Dudley Field. It observes, though not very sanguine as to results:

"We are far from saying or believing that no good results are likely to flow from these movements of the jurists. The literature of the law of nations is exceedingly obscure and undefined. Juridical science can undoubtedly do much to clear it up. There are many points now in doubt that all governments would be glad to have settled on any fair basis. Among these are questions of domicile, of allegiance, of maritime collision, of blockade, of disposition by will, &c. Probably, also, much can be done toward inducing civilized countries to adopt some common method of dealing with such questions as shipping, railways, telegraphs, postal service, copyright, patents, money and the

like. This would be a great gain for justice and peace. These conferences of the jurists can initiate a movement which may, as Count Sclopis said, 'make the voice of public opinion ring n the ears of the governments, and so create what Montesquies terms a common feeling. This will result in their deciding to do something positive.' But it is chimerical to expect that a Code or Arbitration can be made obligatory on nations."

Our contemporary has an admirable article on Blackstone and our critics, and which we cordially concur in his view of the great commentator, supported as it is by the opinion of Mansfield and Bentham, and by such eminent men as Sir William Jones, Chancellor Kent, and Lord Campbell. Alluding to the shallow idea that his law is now obsolete, our contemporary makes an excellent observation :-"The student of law should always bear in mind that the obsolete may be quite as important to him as the active. Every lawyer should seek not only to know the law, but the reason of the law, and the reason is frequently to be found only in that which has gone into disuse."

This reminds us of a passage from Meyer's "Institution Judiciaries," in which it is observed that the English law is so ancient in its origin that it cannot really be understood without the study of its history. Our contemporary as an excellent article (No. 22) on the "Study of Law as a mental discipline," which we did not see until we had written our opening article, but which on some points takes a similar view and supports it by one or two of the authorities we had cited. It is curious and interesting, and one of the advantages of legal journalism to observe this concurrence of opinions and ideas in the minds of members of the profession far distant, but thinking on the same subject in entire harmony in consequence of their having imbibed from the same sources the works and writings of our greatest thinkers, the same spirit and the same general principles, and pursuing, it may be added, the same object-the advancement of the study of the law as a science, the elevation and improvement of its practice as a profession. Our contemporary alludes to an article in the Law Magazine, with reference to the influence on the mind of the study of law, and entirely agrees in our general conclusion, on the necessity for enlarging the mind by other studies, especially metaphysics or mental philosophy. We venture to add, moral philosophy, and especially moral theology; for we are of the opinion of old Bacton, that the only solid and enduring basis for law is natural justice.

THE

LAW MAGAZINE AND REVIEW.

No. III.-VOL. III.-MARCH, 1874.

I. MICHAELMAS TERM AND SITTINGS.

WE continue and conclude our review of the business in

all the Courts during last Michaelmas Term and Sittings. Resuming our review of the business in the Courts of Common Law, in the course of the Term more than one of those cases arose which touch upon the province of international law. Thus, the charterer of a ship having had his attached in the District Court at Philadelphia, until the master, to release her, paid a sum of money; the owner sued the charterer here for damages, but the Court held the action not maintainable as the seizure of the ship was the act of the American Court, and though it was put in motion by the defendant, that did not render him liable, as the Court had jurisdiction, and it did not appear that there was an utter absence of reasonable cause, the plaintiff not having appeared or appealed. (Taylor v. Ford, Queen's Bench). In another case a ship chandler at Quebec sued a shipowner at Liverpool for necessaries supplied to the ship, on the order of the captain, who had ample funds, but had misappropriated them. The jury found that the plaintiff did not know what was the fact, that the owner had an agent at Quebec, but might have ascertained it on enquiry; and they found for the plaintiff, the things supplied being necessaries. The verdict was assailed for misdirection in leaving that to them as the question, and also on the ground that it was against evidence, and a rule