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"That there is a sufficient number of school children of school age in our neighborhood to form a school if a school building could be placed near the 'section corners of sections 2, 3, 10 and 11.

"We therefore respectfully ask that you take such action as will secure the location and erection of a school building at the corners of the sections above named and provide for a school to be held at that point."

The certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings of the board shows that "after much discussion it was decided to place the petition on the table until the next meeting of the board." From this decision J. E. Rush et al. appealed to the county superintendent. At the hearing before this officer a motion to dismiss the appeal was filed on the following ground, to-wit:

"That there is in the record no grounds shown for an appeal in this that the action complained of was simply a motion to lay the petition on the table-a matter from which no appeal can be taken."

Two other counts are assigned, but are not of importance in the determination of this appeal.

The county superintendent sustained the motion for the reason "that the action was not appealable," and dismissed the case. J. E. Rush and W. T. Roderick appeal to this department.

The main contention is: May appeal be taken from the decision to place the petition on the table.

In the case of Rogness v. District Township of Glenwood, appeal from Winneshiek county, this department held that the right of appeal from the vote of a board to lay a petition on the table can not be questioned, but like any other action must be regarded as subject to appeal.

In this opinion we find ourselves in accord. To hold otherwise under conditions such as are alleged to exist in this case would, we think, work great injury. The purpose of the board in laying the petition on the table is not apparent, but no other action upon their part could have more effectually prevented petitioners from obtaining relief. To sustain the decision of the county superintendent would, we think, at least be to encourage boards of directors in employing dilatory tactics instead of business methods in the transaction of educational affairs.

The law prescribes that boards of directors shall hold semi-annual meetings in September and March. By section 2801 authority is conferred upon boards of directors to divide the school township into subdistricts such as justice, equity, and the interests of the people require. This provision in the case of Donelon v. The District Township of Kniest, was held to mean that changes in boundaries of subdistricts could only be made at the regular September meeting or one called for that purpose before the following March.

The order of the board was that the petition be laid on the table "until the next meeting of the board," but the records fail to show that any time was fixed for the meeting.

It may be said that a special meeting could be called at any time. This is true, but the fact that no such meeting was held up to the time of hearing the appeal before the county superintendent on the nineteenth of December, and the further fact that appellees are now strenuously seeking to have this department affirm the decision, is presumptive that the board had no intention

of considering the interests of petitioners, prior to the annual meeting in March, if at all.

In view of the above we think the case should be heard upon its merits by the county superintendent. It is therefore ordered that he fix a time, giving due and proper notice to interested parties, and after hearing testimony for either party, render such decision as may be just and equitable.

Des Moines, Iowa, March 27, 1900.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

A. J. JONES V. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF OCHEYEDAN.

DISMISSAL OF TEACHER.

Appeal from Osceola County.

The board may not dismiss a teacher for refusing to

teach grades or classes other than those named in the contract.

SPECIAL MEETING.

A teacher may not be discharged at a special meeting called for the purpose of securing modification of his contract.

CONTRACT. A refusal of the teacher to agree to a change in a legal contract with the board is no ground for discharge.

On March 23, 1899, the appellant entered into a written contract in the usual form by the terms of which he was to "teach the high school and superintend the public school" in the Independent District of Ocheyedan for the term of twenty-four weeks, commencing in September, 1899, and was to receive for such service the sum of seventy-five dollars per school month.

On September 11, the opening day of the term, the board of directors at a special meeting convened at the schoolhouse passed the following resolution: "WHEREAS, The principal, A. J. Jones, has refused to accede to the request of the board in regard to the eighth grade being advanced to the high school room, he is hereby dismissed as principal and superintendent of the Ocheyedan public schools from this date, and his contract is hereby annulled."

From the order of the board appeal was taken to the county superintendent, who affirmed the action of the board, and the appellant now seeks relief in this department.

Appellant asks a reversal chiefly on two grounds, viz.:

(1) That the eighth grade was no part of the high school and for that reason it was no part of his duty to teach it.

(2) That he was not accorded that full and fair investigation contemplated by the law as set forth in section 2782.

These two points will be considered in the order presented.

1. We find from the transcript that at a meeting of the board of directors, held October 10, 1898, the appellant was requested to prepare a three years' course of study for the high school, and also a set of rules and regulations for the government of the schools.

Appellees earnestly contend that the power to prescribe a course of study and rules and regulations, rests with the board, and that in the absence of delegated

authority to re-delegate such power, no power exists to thus delegate, and any attempt to do so is void. This question we need not determine, as no action of the board shows that it attempted to delegate any authority to appellant.

A reasonable construction of the board's action providing that the principal prepare a course of study, is that he might make such course as would in his judgment meet the needs of the schools under his supervision, and submit his report to the board for approval, modification or rejection. This method is that usually adopted by boards, and the principle has indirectly been approved by the supreme court. (Hall v. Ind. District Aplington, 82 Iowa, 686).

At a special meeting of the board on October 15, 1898, the course prepared by appellant, together with rules and regulations, was adopted, and according to the testimony of Mr.. Underhill was, so far as completed, printed by him on the order of the board in November following. It must, we think, be conceded that the board adopted the course of study with suitable regulations. We are led to this conclusion by the further fact that the board on September 11, 1899, voted to rescind the action of October 15, 1898, in reference to the course of study. The query naturally arises, why this action if no course were adopted? The contract entered into by the board with appellant was made in March following the adoption of the course, and, as above stated, provided that he should teach the high school, which, according to the classification adopted October 15th, consisted of the ninth, tenth and eleventh grades.

Did the board have the right to dismiss appellant for refusing to teach grades or classes other than those named in the contract? We think not. To answer affirmatively would be equivalent to stating that boards of directors have abrogative power relating to contracts with teachers. To allow them to repudiate contracts and force other parties to perform duties not agreed upon would, we think, be to encourage a breach of contract and a breach of faith.

If a board has a right to modify, without consent, a contract to the extent of requiring a principal to teach an eighth grade not contemplated when the contract was made, there would appear to be no limit; and a hostile board could demand that a teacher under contract to give instruction in high school branches should teach primary pupils, or vice versa; and upon failure to execute in a satisfactory manner the demands of the board, discharge him for incompetency.

2. This case differs from that usually presented. There are no charges of incompetency, inattention to duty, partiality, or immorality. The testimony and the record show that appellant began his school September 11th at the usual hour of opening.

The board of directors met on the afternoon of September 11th and after rescinding the action of October 15th, 1898, whereby a course of study was adopted, "adjourned to meet at the schoolhouse at once." Here the appellant was discharged, as stated in the resolution above given.

Was the meeting such as the law contemplates shall be held in cases of this kind? The law wisely provides that a teacher may only be discharged after an impartial trial held for that purpose. In all the testimony, there is no disagreement as to the purpose of the meeting. It was for the purpose of getting the appellant to modify the contract by accepting the eighth grade, and not for

the purpose of discharging him. He was called into the presence of the board and informed of its purpose.

Appellant stated in his reply, which was written, and which he was asked to give at once, that he was ready to fulfill his contract; that if the board had rescinded its action in regard to a course of study he would like to know what the course of study for the high school should be, and the duties of the superintendent under the same. He expressed a willingness also to teach even the eighth grade for a reasonable amount of additional salary.

In view of this expressed willingness of appellant to do that which seems reasonable, we are unable to justify the action of the board. We think a compromise might well have been attempted, and proven at least reasonably satisfactory to both parties. The whole case has been given most earnest attention, and we can not find that appellant was discharged for good and sufficient cause, after that impartial investigation contemplated. His dismissal under all the circumstances revealed by the record can not be approved. REVERSED.

Des Moines, Iowa, May 12, 1900.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

J. W. LYTLE V. SCHOOL TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON.

Appeal from Story County.

INDEPENDENT DISTRICT BOUNDARIES. It is mandatory upon the board of a school township to include in a proposed independent district all of the territory within the corporate limits of the town.

INCORPORATED TOWN. In the formation of an independent district under section 2794 of the Code, all the town must be included in the proposed district, notwithstanding the fact that said town was formerly located partly in a school township and partly in a rural independent district.

BOUNDARIES. The extension of the boundaries of a municipal corporation extends the boundaries of the independent district of said municipal corporation.

On February 17, 1900, at a special meeting of the board of directors of the school township of Washington there was presented a petition of thirty-three citizens of the town of Kelly, asking the establishment of an independent district, including therein all of the incorporated town.

After discussion, the matter was deferred for a week in order that the board might more thoroughly investigate and obtain an opinion of the county superintendent, county attorney, and other unbiased counsel, if deemed necessary. At the date fixed the board met and established the boundary lines for the new district, as requested by petitioners.

On March 6, 1900, J. W. Lytle et al appealed from the order of the board to the county superintendent, who reversed its action.

From the plat submitted, it is shown that the town of Kelley is situated on the township line in the townships of Washington and Palestine, and includes the following territory:

The south three-fourths of section thirty-one (31), and the south three-fourths of section thirty-two (32), west one-half of section thirty-three (33), range thirty-three (33), township twenty-four (24), in Washington township; the northwest quarter (4), of section four (4), north one-half (2) of section five (5), and north one-half (2) of section six (6), in Palestine township, range eightyfour (84), township twenty-four (24).

The chief point in controversy is, has the board of directors of a school township authority in establishing the boundary lines of a proposed independent district to include in the new district any part of the territory of adjacent rural independent districts? Generally speaking, such territory can not be included.

Section 2794 of the code provides, however, that "upon the written petition of any ten voters of a city, town or village of over one hundred residents, to the board of the school township in which the portion of the town plat having the largest number of voters is situated, such board shall establish the boundaries of the proposed independent district, including therein all of the city, town or village."

The section clearly indicates that it is mandatory upon the board to include in the proposed district all of the territory within the corporate limits of the town, regardless of whether or not the territory in part belongs to rural independent districts. Failure to do so would, we think, be a plain violation of law.

It is true, as held by the county superintendent in his opinion, that no independent district may, in the formation of a new district, be subdivided so as to contain less than four sections of land, except in certain instances enumerated in section 2798. It is also true that "the independent district from which territory is detached shall, after the change, contain not less than four government see tions of land," etc. (Section 2793.) We are of the opinion that these limitations apply to the cases set forth in the sections cited, and are not applicable when it is proposed to form an independent district containing an incorporated town, located largely in a school township, and in adjacent rural independent districts.

On March 23, 1899, in answer to the question: "Does the law as found in chapter eighty-nine (89), acts of the twenty-seventh general assembly, contemplate that 'when the corporate limits of any city or town are extended outside of the existing independent districts or districts, the boundaries of said independent district or districts shall be also correspondingly extended,' without regard to township or county lines, manner of organization of the district or districts from which territory is taken, or the condition in which such district or districts will be left after the territory has been taken?" Hon. Milton Remley, Battorney-general, in concluding his official opinion to the department said:

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"My conclusion is that the extension of the boundaries of a municipal corporation made in the manner required by law, extends the boundaries of the independent districts of said municipal corporation, without any action on the part of the school districts or their officers, and regardless of the effect of such change upon the district from which territory is taken."

Thus it appears that while section 2794 makes it the duty of the board to include all of the territory of the city, town or village in the formation of a new independent district, chapter eighty-nine (89) provides for the enlargement of the boundaries of the independent district, whenever the corporate limits are legally extended. So broad is this provision that the extension of the boundaries

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