sideration would warrant an affirmance of a board's action in expelling a pupil for a reasonable time, if jurisdiction were not questioned.

Inasmuch as there was no school and consequently no scholars we can only find that Julius Bacon was not subject to the authority of the board of directors of the school corporation of West Des Moines and could not therefore be expelled.

The decision of the county superintendent is

Des Moines, Ia., March 18, 1899.

REVERSED.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

E. F. BACON V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WEST DES MOINES.

Appeal from Polk County.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING.

ORAL ARGUMENT. The failure of counsel for appellee to present oral argument, after being informed of the hearing, will not justify a reopening of the case. REHEARING. To warrant the superintendent of public instruction in granting a rehearing it must be shown that some very serious error has been made.

The attorney for the appellee comes now and asks for a rehearing in the above cause for the reason "that the sole question considered by the state superintendent was one upon which this appellee was not heard in oral argument before him."

For many years it has been the custom of the department of public instruction in hearing appeal cases to notify interested parties. The office record shows that both appellant and counsel for appellee were notified of the time set for final hearing. The failure of counsel for appellee to present oral argument after being duly informed of the hearing will not justify the department in reopening the case.

It is somewhat doubtful whether under the law a rehearing is contemplated or possible. An examination of the statute fails to reveal any direct provision authorizing the same, while section 2820 relating to appeals to the superintendent of public instruction says: "The decision when made shall be final." Doubtless, upon being convinced that a decision rendered was erroneous, either the county superintendent or superintendent of public instruction might recall the same and reverse or modify former holdings. To warrant either of these officers in reopening a case, it must be shown that some very serious error has been made, or that some additional testimony has been discovered which could not have been presented at the former hearing by using reasonable diligence. See case of Mary Grey v. Independent District of Boyle, S. L. 1897. In response to the application for a rehearing a willingness to receive and consider a written argument which counsel for appellee might submit touching the point determined in our former decision was expressed by the superintendent of public instruction. Before rendering our decision of March 18, 1899, all of the material points suggested were fully and carefully considered. Since

the receipt of counsel's argument we have reviewed the case and read with care the cases cited, and believe that nothing would be accomplished by a rehearing. The application is DENIED.

Des Moines, Iowa, June 1, 1899.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

W. H. MESSNER AND FOSTER RIGLER V. THE SCHOOL TOWNSHIP OF BEAR Grove.

Appeal from Guthrie County.

BOND FOR COSTS. The law does not require the filing of a bond for costs or the giving of security therefor as a condition necessary to perfect an appeal.

EXPENSE OF APPEALS. It is the evident intent of the law to make it possible for aggrieved parties to have a hearing with the least possible delay and annoyance, and at the lowest expense.

This case arises from the action of the board of directors of the school township of Bear Grove to redistrict the same.

From the board's action the appellants appealed to the county superintendent. In accordance with the statute the secretary of the board of directors filed a transcript of the board's proceedings March 15th. On the twenty-second of March the county superintendent notified appellants that the appeal was not perfected, and that unless bonds for the costs were executed, filed and approved within twenty days from the date of notice the appeal would be dismissed and the action of the board of directors affirmed. On the eleventh of April, the appellants having failed to comply with the order of the county superintendent the appeal was dismissed and the order of the board redistricting the township affirmed. From this order appeal is now taken to this department.

Appellants appeal from the ruling of the county superintendent in dismissing the appeal case, affirming the action of the board, and in requiring them to give bonds for costs:

1. Because the county superintendent erred in requiring appellants to give bond for costs.

2. Because said ruling and action is, in fact, a denial of justice, in that it prevents appellants from having a trial and hearing as provided by law.

An examination of the law relating to the taking of appeals from the action if a board of directors to the county superintendent fails to show any requirement demanding a bond for costs from any of the parties in controversy. So far as we are able to learn, the only reference to costs in cases appealed to the county superintendent, is that contained in section 2821, which reads: "But if the superintendent is of the opinion that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause therefor, or if, in case of an appeal, it shall not be sustained, he shall enter such findings in the record and tax all costs to the party responsible therefor."

The general provisions of law touching the question of costs are in no sense applicable to cases of appeal to the county superintendent or the department of public instruction. On the contrary, the law provides that any person aggrieved

by any order or decision of the board of directors may appeal therefrom to the county superintendent, and the basis of the proceedings shall be an affidavit filed with the county superintendent, within the time for taking the appeal. Nowhere can we find that the county superintendent is authorized to establish a different basis such as the giving of bonds for the security of costs. The evident intent of the law relating to appeals appears to be to make it possible for aggrieved parties to have a hearing with the least possible delay and annoyance and at the lowest expense.

Believing that the law does not require the filing of a bond for costs or the giving of security therefor as a condition necessary to perfect an appeal taken from the action of the board of directors, the decision of the county superintendent is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to fix an early date for hearing the same upon merit. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

June 26, 1899.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

NORA OELKE v. R. C. SPENCER, COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT.

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER.

Appeal from Audubon County.

The county superintendent should require proof that the applicant for a certificate possesses good moral character, unless he has personal knowledge of the same.

REFUSAL OF CERTIFICATE. Good moral character being one of the essential qualifications of a teacher, the county superintendent is fully justified in refusing a certificate to an applicant who fails to furnish satisfactory evidence of such character.

NORMAL INSTITUTE. The county superintendent may refuse to enroll such persons as members of the normal institute as he has reason to believe are morally deficient.

COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT. Has large discretionary power in the matter of issuing or withholding certificates, and his decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly shown that he was prompted by prejudice or ill-will, or acted with manifest injustice.

This case arises from the refusal of the county superintendent to grant Nora Oelke a certificate to teach in the public schools, and to enroll her as a member of the normal institute.

A hearing was had on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth days of August, 1899, before the superintendent, who affirmed his former decision. Nora Oelke appeals.

The law vests in the county superintendent large discretionary powers in the matter of issuing certificates. He must be fully satisfied that the applicant possesses scholarship, teaching ability, and good moral character. Of the last named qualification the law makes it his duty to require proof, unless he has personal knowledge of the same.

Too great stress can not be laid upon the value of character in the schoolroom. The teacher's character and public conduct should be without reproach. Section 2737 of the Code contemplates that the county superintendent, among other things, should find as a fact and so certify that the person to whom authority to teach is granted is of good moral character.

The county superintendent, being charged with this grave responsibility, is presumed to exercise his discretion justly and impartially. Not only is he the sole judge of the qualifications of those who desire to teach, but also of how fully he will give the applicant reasons for the refusal of a certificate. Walker v. Crawford, p. 42, S. L. Decisions, 1897.

There is no evidence in this case that the action of the county superintendent was prompted by prejudice or ill-will. He privately cautioned the appellant, as well as her father, against certain indiscretions upon her part which had become a matter of public gossip, without receiving any satisfactory explanation. The superintendent, being a near neighbor to the appellant, formed his judgment as to her fitness to teach in a measure from personal observation of her conduct. Although represented by counsel at the hearing before the county superintendent, the evidence offered in her behalf is very meager. So far as the record shows, no evidence whatever was offered to show that she is of good moral character.

The refusal of the county superintendent to permit appellant to enroll as a member of the normal institute, is also assigned as error.

Under the law the county superintendent has general charge and control of the normal institute. As its head he not only possesses the legal right, but in our opinion it becomes his duty to exclude from its membership persons who are intellectually or morally unfit to attend. Most educational institutions require testimonials as to character before students are admitted. This rule is a reasonable one, and the head of a college or normal institute would be justified in refusing to enroll such students as he has reason to believe are morally deficient.

Under the law we are compelled to give due weight to the acts of the county superintendent. His decision should not be reversed unless it is clearly shown that he violated the law, abused his discretion, or acted with manifest injustice. The evidence fails to disclose that such showing has been made. The decision of the county superintendent is therefore

Des Moines, December 15, 1899.

AFFIRMED.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

J. M. SUTTON V. THE INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF SHELBY.

Appeal from Shelby County.

LOCATION OF SCHOOLHOUSE SITE. In the location of a schoolhouse site the board is justified in considering the wishes of a majority of the people as indicated in the vote upon the issuance of bonds.

EXPENDITURE OF MONEY. Where money is voted by the electors for a specific purpose, or where they couple certain directions with their vote when authoriz

ing the expenditure of money, such directions or vote may not be disregarded by the board.

The board of directors, being about to erect a new building to be used for high school purposes, were petitioned to locate the same at a point east of the railroad track. From their action in refusing to grant the prayer of said petition, the plaintiff appealed to the county superintendent, who, on the twenty-first day of September, 1899, affirmed the action of the board. From that decision appeal is taken to this department.

It appears from the evidence that in March, 1899, the electors of the Independent District of Shelby voted to authorize the board to issue bonds in the sum of six thousand dollars, "for the purpose of erecting an additional school building, the same to be built of brick, and purchasing a steam heating plant and placing it therein and in the present building in said district, in such a manner as that both the new and the present school building shall be heated thereby.". It being subsequently found that the amount first voted would be insufficient, the electors on the third day of August voted an additional three thousand dollars upon the same condition as the first issue was voted.

We are unable to find that the board abused its discretion or violated law in rendering the decision complained of. The members of the board were evidently desirous of carrying out the wishes of the people as indicated in the vote upon the issuance of bonds. To our mind it is quite clear that the electors authorized the issuance of bonds with the understanding that the new building should be erected in close proximity to the present one. Any other theory renders the clause, "and placing a steam heating plant therein and in the present school building in such a manner as that both the new and the present buildings shall be heated thereby," practically meaningless.

This department, as well as the supreme court of our state, has held that where money is voted for a specific purpose, or where the electors couple certain directions with their vote when authorizing the expenditure of money, such directions or vote can not be disregarded.

The decision of the county superintendent is

Des Moines, December 14, 1899.

AFFIRMED.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

J. E. RUSH et al. v. SCHOOL TOWNSHIP OF FRANKLIN.

Appeal from Allamakee County.

APPEAL. An appeal may be taken from the decision of the board to place a petition on the table.

In this case the appellants presented the following petition to the board of directors of the school township of Franklin at the regular meeting of the board of directors in September:

"We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Franklin, in Allamakee county, Iowa, respectfully represent that they are without school advantages by reason of being so far from a schoolhouse that during the winter season nearly all of the small children in our neighborhood have to remain at home.