Federalism: Hearing Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session, Hearing Held in Washington, DC, March 5, 1996, Volume 4 |
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104th Congress 10th amendment action aid reductions American appropriate Arizona authority balance Becky Norton Dunlop believe benefits bill billion block grants budget bureaucrats California central government Chairman KASICH challenge citizens Clean Clean Air Act Clean Water Act commerce clause committee Congress costs deficit devolution dollars DUNLOP effects eral example Federal aid Federal courts Federal funding Federal Government Federal legislation Federal programs Federal role Federal system Federalist fiscal flexibility Framers going GOLD Goldwater Institute Governor Allen illegal immigrants imposed increase issue KOLBE legislatures limit localities LUND Madison mandate-relief Medicaid Medicare ment officials one-size-fits-all percent problems proposed question raise taxes recession reduce reform regulations require responsibility revenue SABO Senate SHADEGG SMITH OF MICHIGAN spending Superfund Supreme Court things tion unfunded Federal mandates unfunded mandates veto Virginia vote waiver Washington welfare
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Page 5 - ... are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce ; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.
Page 33 - By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests ; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects.
Page 11 - I am opposed ; because when all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington, as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated.
Page 30 - ... with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures.
Page 25 - The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite.
Page 8 - The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people: and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.
Page 33 - It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests...
Page 7 - But ambitious encroachments of the Federal Government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every Government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted.
Page 33 - If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
Page 25 - Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments, are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war. peace, negotiation, and, foreign commerce ; with which last the power of taxation will for the most part be connected.