under the head or title of contingent, nor shall any officer or department of government receive any amount from the treasury for contingencies or for a contingent fund, and in several states1 a law making, containing or reviving an appropriation must distinctly specify the sum appropriated and it is not sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such sum. Itemizing appropriations is required in Louisiana.2 4 New York and Wisconsin, which ordinarily require a majority of each house to make a quorum, require three-fifths of nary Proced- the members elected to each house for the consideration of ap 204. Extraordi ure for Enactment of Appropriation Bills. 205. Veto of Items. propriation bills. Extraordinary majorities, usually two-thirds, are required by a few constitutions for the passage of appropriation bills. There are, also, a few requirements of especial precaution in recording the vote upon such bills. Appropriation bills are often exempted, wholly or partially, from its operation in those states which allow a referendum of legislative acts. 7 In thirty-five states the governor is authorized to veto one or more items in an appropriation bill while approving the remainder of the bill. In case the legislature reconsiders the items vetoed, it must in twelve states take up each one separately. In Texas1 if an appropriation bill containing several items is presented to the governor less than ten days, Sundays excepted, prior to adjournment, and is in his hands at the time of adjournment, he has twenty days thereafter within which to make his objection to any item of the bill and make proclamation thereof. In order that the governor may consider each item of the ordinary general appropriation bill, several weeks' time must be allowed him; hence the extraordinary periods needed for the 1e. g., Wash. VIII, 4. 255, 82. III, 25. 4VIII, 8. "Ark. V, 31; Ia. III, 31; Ky. 46; Mich. V, 24; Miss. IV, 64, 66; Nebr. III, 19; N. Y. III, 20; R. I. IV, 14; S. D. XII, 2; Va. IV, 50. Ga. III, sec. VII, 12; N. Y. III, 25; Tenn. II, 21; Va. IV, 50; Wis. VIII, 8. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Ida., Ill., Kan., Ky., La., Md., e. g., Cal. IV, 16; N. Y. IV, 9. 1IV, 14 consideration of appropriation bills. In New York2 the governor has thirty days after the adjournment of the legislature for the consideration of all bills left on his hands. 5 3 Continuance In a few states an appropriation act must refer to a limited 206. time only; as a rule two years. In one state the provision is of Appropriations. that the appropriation act may not continue in force "more than six months after the meeting of the legislature at its next regular session." The time of payment is also sometimes limited. Diversions of money appropriated may not be made by resolution in Illinois and Nebraska. About a dozen states forbid local or special legislation refunding money paid into the treasury. The provision that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon warrant of the proper officer is frequently met with, and the publication of accurate statements of expenditures is frequently required.9 7 8 6 Revenue Bills for raising state revenue have claimed less attention 207. from constitution-makers than have appropriation bills.1 There Bills. are a few regulations, however, for instance that no revenue bill can become law except by a vote of three-fifths of the members present and voting; and that matters "not immediately relating to and necessary for raising revenue" must not be "in any manner blended with or annexed to" revenue bills. Four states specifically require the legislature to provide sufficient revenue to defray current expenses, three of them including interest on the state debt and one the principal as well. Three others contain regulations concerning the collection of revenue, 2IV, 9. 5 Ark. V, 29; Kan. II, 24; La. 45; Mont. XII, 12; Ohio II, 22; Tex. VIII, 6. See also Ia. I, 14; Nev. I, 11; Va. XIII, 186. Limited to one year for support of militia,-Ala. I, 27. 4Miss. IV, 64, similar limitations, Ill. IV, 18; Nebr. III, 19. 5e. g., N. Y. III, 21; Okla. V, 55. 6IV, 17; III, 22. e. g., Cal. IV, 25; Ky. 59; Va. IV, 63. Also Md. III, 33, unless recommended by the governor or officers of the treasury department. se. g., Ill. IV, 17. 9e. g., La. 45; Md. III, 32; Tenn. II, 24. 1Concerning the manner of raising state revenue, which is very extensively treated, see infra, ch. 15. Bills for raising or spending pubile money must .sometimes originate in the lower house,-e. g., Nebr. III, 9; N. H. II, 17; Pa. III, 14. 2Miss. IV, 70. 3Del. VIII, 2. Bills from the operation of which revenue may incidentally arise are excepted from definition of revenue bill. 4Fla. IX. 2; Kan. XI, 3; 0. XII, 4; Ore. IX, 2. Revenue to be collected by the proper officers and paid into the state treasury. See, also, Md., VI, 3. 208. Accounting for Public Money. 209. Handling Public Money. 210. Budget- Exclusively and more than half the constitutions require the publication of statements setting forth receipts of public money. There are also numerous provisions concerned with correct accounting by officials entrusted with public money. In Michigan, for example, the legislature must provide by law for the keeping of accounts by all state officials, boards and institutions, and by all county officials; and shall also provide for the supervision and audit thereof by competent state authority and for uniform reports of all public accounts to such authority. Such systems of account shall provide for accurate records of all financial and other transactions and for checks upon all receipts and disbursements of all such officials, boards and institutions; and shall be uniform for all similar boards, institutions and county officials. All public accounts and the audit thereof shall be public records and open to inspection. 9 Notwithstanding their far-reaching importance, provisions governing the estimate, control and handling of public incomes are infrequent in the state constitutions, and really vital and important ones are totally lacking. One or two states, however, provide that the treasurer shall receive all moneys belonging to the state,10 or allow the legislature to prescribe by law the manner in which the treasurer shall receive state moneys.1 A few constitutions regulate the deposit of public money in A few other regulations concerning the handling of money have already been mentioned. The striking and significant thing about the financial practice which has grown up under the state constitutions is the complete control and exclusive responsibility of the legislature. This is consonant with the general supremacy of the legislaa Legislative ture in American government and, so far as it gives the legislature the sole power to raise money by taxation and to loosen the purse strings, it is in harmony with the above-described idea of a scientific budget system. It departs from the idea completely when it devolves upon the legislature the duty not only Function. e. g., Ark. XIX, 12; Ind. X, 4; Ky. 230; La. 45; Tenn. II, 24. Several of these have already been mentioned, supra, p. 249. For provisions relating to the manner of raising revenue through taxation, see infra, ch. 15. Conn., IV, 17; Md., VI, 3. 10There are many provisions concerning particular funds, as the school fund. There are some provisions regulating the use of specific sources of revenue,— e. g., Ill. Amend. 1870-Ill. Cent. R. R. 2e. g., Cal., XI, 162. of passing upon financial proposals, but of originally constructing them from such reports and other information as may come into the possession of its financial committees during the brief period when the legislature is in session. 211. A legislative committee is essentially a transitory and irre- Faults of the sponsible body. Its members are in the very nature of things System. unacquainted with the actual needs of the administrative branches of the government and are unable, consequently, either to plan constructively, so as to initiate and execute a comprehensive financial program, or to fit the details to the requirements. The more permanent administrative officials are infinitely better equipped to make up the financial program of the state and the governor, who, unlike any legislator or member of a legislative committee, is responsible to the entire electorate of the state, should be the responsible spokesman for that program. The legislature should reject it if it seems unwise or may reduce its items if it seems extravagant, but should not attempt to construct when its capabilities extend only to critical supervision. Such is the doctrine of the scientific budget. "When the president of a large business corporation goes before the annual meeting of his stockholders or directors," says a prominent banker,3 he makes a statement of 'the assets, the liabilities, the surplus and the profits of the year. The figures are so displayed that they tell their own story and show the results of the year's operations. He states what his plans are for the next year's work; whether he wishes to expand or contract the business; what he wishes to spend in permanent improvements; what new capital he needs, and how he proposes to raise it. He is ready to answer questions and to explain his plans and policies. That statement is his "budget." If approved, it becomes his program for next year's work. If the natural businesslike relation which exists between the head of a private business and his directors and stockholders can be created between the governor and the legislature, and if this relation can be defined in the constitution of the state, a budget system will certainly be the logical outcome. At the present time our federal, state and municipal charters and constitutions have surrounded government executives with fantastic regulations which, if applied in private business, Charles D. Norton, V. P. First Nat. Bank, New York,-Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, V, 189-190. 212. Some Efforts at Reform. would certainly wreck an enterprise dependent for its existence on yearly profits.* Several of the states, indeed, have already begun to make efforts in this direction. In California during the last few years, a harmonious political party, led by a strong governor and in complete control of both the legislative and the administrative departments of the government, has instituted the custom of preparing a plan of appropriations, drawn by the popularly-elected comptroller and the board of control appointed by the governor, and vouchsafed for by the governor himself, for presentation to the legislature, which has habitually enacted it into law without material alteration. Waste, graft and log-rolling are said to have been eliminated. But special appropriation bills, introduced by individual legislators, have not always been turned down by the committees and, of course, in the absence of constitutional requirements for the new method, it may cease should the party in power fail of reelection. 8 In Illinois, to cite another interesting example, according to statutory provision," the newly-created legislative reference bureau is required to compile for the legislature a budget from the requests for appropriations submitted by the various departments and state institutions. Soon after the opening of the 1915 session the bureau laid before the legislature a printed compilation, voluminous in extent, carefully itemized under a general scheme of classification. Under such an arrangement, however, there is entire lack of responsibility for recommendations. 4In this connection the remark of the late Senator Aldrich that if he could run the federal government as he would a private. business he could save $300,000,000 a year may be appropriately remembered. See also Ford, H. J., The Cost of Our National Government. The report of President Taft's efficiency and economy commission, on the need of a national budget, which discussed thoroughly the financial administration of the federal government, was printed as House Document 854, 62nd Congress, 2nd session. "See articles by Jno. S. Chambers, state comptroller, in the Proceedings of the Ninth National Conference of the National Tax Association, 1915 (p. 32), and by Jno. F. Neylan, chairman of the board of control in the Annals, op. cit., 69. See articles in the Annals, op. cit., by Finley F. Bell, secretary of Ill. Legislative Reference Bureau, and by Prof. Jno. A. Fairlie of the Univ. of Ill. "Laws of Ill., 1913, p. 391 (392). 8Concerning the typical financial and accounting conditions recently existing in Illinois, see various sub-reports in the Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee, Ill., 1915. |