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The late Mr. Gouverneur Morris, who was one of the most able, splendid, and efficient of the statesmen that framed the Federal Constitution, in a private letter, written to a friend towards the close of his life, expresses himself thus: "Those who formed our constitution were not blind to its defects: they believed a republican government to be the best; they believed a monarchial form to be neither solid nor durable; they conceived it to be vigorous or feeble, active or slothful, wise or foolish, mild or cruel, just or unjust, according to the personal character of the prince. It is a dupery to cite the duration of the French monarchy at eight centuries. In that period, the provinces which lately composed it passed, by various fortune, from their subjection to Rome, through the conquests of barbarians, the ferociousness of feudal aristocracy, and the horrors of anarchy and civil war, to their union under the Bourbons. That union was not consolidated until the soaring spirit of Richlieu, and the flexible temper of Mazarin, had tamed an indignant nobility to the yoke of obedience. By the vanity, the ambition, and the talents of Louis the Fourteenth, France became the terror of Eu rope. By the facile immorality of the Regent, and the lasciviousness and feebleness of Louis the Fifteenth, she sunk almost into contempt. After a few years of distempered existence, under the mild and virtuous Louis the Sixteenth, the lamp of that boasted monarchy was extinguished in his blood."-There are also some very shrewd and sensible remarks, on the probable duration of our confederated republic, in "Letters from the South," a work lately published.

The general, or Federal Constitution of the United States was framed by a convention of deputies from the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, at a session, begun May 25th, and ended September 17th, 1787. It first went into operation on the 4th of March, 1789. Its provisions are, in substance, these:-All legislative powers, granted by the Constitu

tion, are vested in a Congress of the United States, consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives. The representatives are chosen every second year by the people of the several states; the electors in each state having the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. The representative must be twenty-five years old, have been a citizen of the United States seven years, and be an inhabitant of the state in which he is chosen. Representatives and direct taxes are apportioned among the several states, according to their respective numbers, determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration of the people is to be made every ten years, in the mode directed by Congress; the number of representatives not exceeding one in thirty thousand: only, each state shall have at least one representative. When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the State Executive issues writs of election to fill them. The House of Representatives choose their speaker, and have the sole power of impeachment.

On this portion of the Federal Constitution it may be observed, that the mode of electing the members of the lower house of Congress varies in the different states according to the various modes of electing their own representatives, established by the laws of the several states. In some, the whole number to which the state is entitled is elected by the whole people of the state; in others, they are distributed into election districts; in some, a majority of all the votes is requisite; in others, only a plurality; in some, residence of the candidate in the district is required; in others, not. The mode by districts, and plurality of votes with residence of the candidate, is most general throughout the Union.

The frequent recurrence to the people, by the frequency of elections, is a radical imperfection which pervades all the American constitutions, both state and

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federal. It has a direct tendency to make the representatives too local in their policy, and to induce them rather to aim at pleasing their own immediate constituents than to advance the general good of the nation at large; a measure which sometimes requires an apparent sacrifice of the local interest of the peculiar district which they represent. When once seated in Congress, the members should recollect that they represent the United States, as one great empire, and not merely the little district of any particular state, whether of Virginia, or of Rhode-Island, of New-York, or of Delaware. A triennial election is quite frequent enough for the general government of so extensive a country, and such a rapidly-increasing population. This frequency of elec tion, however, is praised as the consummation of political excellence, by many writers and speakers on the art of government; yet it seems to have an immediate tendency to throw great obstacles in the way of national improvement and prosperity. The elections, both of senators and representatives, as well in the general as in the state governments, recur too often, particularly of the lower branch of the legislature. South Carolina and Tennessee are the only two states in the Union whose representatives are elected for so long a term as two years; in Connecticut and Rhode-Island, the elections are semi-annual; in all the other states, yearly.

The almost necessary consequence of these frequent elections is, that the representatives feel themselves too dependent upon the will of their constituents; whereas, they ought to be left entirely free to exercise the power delegated to them, at their own discretion, and to the best of their judgment, for the good of the country at large. The people also are incessantly exposed to corruption, amidst the perpetual intrigue and turmoil of frequently recurring elections; whence incapable members are too liable to be returned to the legislature. It is a notorious fact, that in many districts of the Union, unless a representative follows and obeys the current opinions, prejudices, and passions of the day, he will not be re-elected, owing to the running of the popular tide

against him, whatever may be his other qualifications. Add to this, that in consequence of the short period of public service, it is not easy to investigate and annul spurious elections, before the session itself be at an end; whence, there is a danger, that if a return can be obtained, no matter by what improper means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, shall hold it quite long enough to answer all his purposes of legislation. What is this in effect, but offering a high bounty by law, for the employment of electioneering intrigue and fraud, in order to obtain a return? Such a system, having an unavoidable tendency to bewilder and corrupt the people, and to induce them to elect unworthy representatives, almost ensures the production of a legislature, not the best qualified by talents, learning, wealth, probity, and character, to discharge so solemn and important a duty, as that of framing laws for the wellbeing of an extensive, powerful, and fast-growing commonwealth.

A great part of every year, in every place throughout the Union, is literally consumed in cabals and intrigues, carried on between the candidates of the several parties and the people, in order to prepare and accomplish all the various manoeuvres of electioneering tactics, which are put in constant requisition, by the frequent recurrence of elections for representatives, both of the separate and of the United States. Whence, a large portion of the time which the people ought to employ in productive industry, is expended in prosecuting the unprofitable trade of politics. The experience of history shows, that the democratic forms of government are also in themselves liable to these inconveniences; namely, that they are too tedious in coming to any public resolution, and seldom sufficiently alert and expeditious in carrying their resolutions into effect; that as various minds are successively employed, they are necessarily wavering and unsteady, and scarcely ever persevere to the accomplishment of the measures which they resolve to pursue; that they are often involved in factions, which expose the nation to

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be made the instrument, if not the victim, of foreign powers. Now, frequent elections cannot fail of rendering a government too dilatory in its resolves; because, under such circumstances, no prudent administration would ever venture upon any important national measure, until it had felt the pulse, not only of the legislature, but of the people also.

The experience of history equally proves, that the great body of the people, in every country, are prone to be too much elated by temporary success, and too much dejected by occasional misfortune. This disposition alone renders them perpetually wavering in their opinions about affairs of state, and prevents the possibility of their ever long continuing steadily fixed to any one point. And as the House of Representatives is chosen by the voice of the general people, a choice so often renewed, almost ensures the legislature to be as wavering and unsteady in their councils, as the people themselves are in their sentiments. And it being impossible to carry on the public affairs of the executive government, without the concurrence of the lower house, the administration is always obliged to comply with the notions of the leading members of that house; and, consequently, obliged to change its measures as often as the populace change their minds. Whence, it is impossible to lay down, and steadily prosecute, any plan for the gradual developement of the national resources, and the gradual growth of the country, in prosperity, wealth, power, and influence,

Besides, in all democratic governments, faction is continually springing up from the delusions perpetually played off upon the collective wisdom of the multitude. While the essential principles of human nature remain the same, as they ever have been, there always will be, in every country, and under every possible form of vernment, many unquiet, turbulent, and unprincipled spirits, who can never be at rest, whether in or out of power. When in possession of the government, they require every one to submit entirely to their direction and control; in words, they profess to be the exclusive

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