Submarines not to carry a gun in excess of 5 inches. 10. The maximum tonnage to be devoted to submarines of either class of whatever age to be as follows: - of which total tonnage not more than two-thirds may be used for Class A Submarines. 11. Except for the restrictions imposed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 10, the total tonnage allocated to be used as each Power thinks best. APPENDIX II. EXPLANATORY NOTES ON BRITISH PROPOSALS OF The first clause fixes a total tonnage for all active cruisers, destroyers and submarines at a figure of 590,000 tons for the British Empire and U.S.A. and 385,000 for Japan. The second clause enables each Power to retain, in addition, 25 per cent. of vessels over age. As far as the British Empire is concerned, these are cruisers built before or during the war, which, owing to their lack of speed or sea-keeping qualities, would be of minor defensive value only. Clause 3 gives age-limits for large and small cruisers, destroyers and submarines which accord with those provisionally agreed by the Technical Committee. Clause 4 allows the retention of a class of cruiser already in existence which are above the limit of 6,000 tons with 6-inch guns proposed for small cruisers and below the type of 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns. This includes- 10 of the Omaha class, with 6-inch guns, belonging to the U.S.A. 4 of the "Furutaka " class, with 8-inch guns, belonging to Japan. 2 of the "Emerald" class, with 6-inch guns belonging to the British Empire. But, in view of the fact that the United States of America have no 8-inch gun cruisers in this class, we propose that there should be added for the United States of America vessels with 8-inch guns sufficient in the opinion of the Naval Advisers of the three Delegations to equalise their strength with the British Empire in this class. Clause 5 proposes a division of all other cruisers into two classes :(1) 10,000 ton cruisers, with 8-inch guns. (2) Smaller cruisers of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and mounting a gun not exceeding 6-inch. Clause 6 suggests a limit in the number of the larger cruisers to 12 for U.S.A and the British Empire and 8 for Japan. The object of these two clauses, as I have already explained, is to prevent a competition in building among the Naval Powers of the World, which would most certainly ensue if every country were able to build up to their limit in the larger size, and there is no other way of stopping this competition. We are prepared to lay down no more 10,000 ton cruisers, while America may proceed to build up to the number we now possess either built or building, and Japan up to a total of 8. Clause 7 fixes the maximum tonnage of destroyer flotilla leaders at 1,850 tons, and destroyers at 1,500 tons, and the size of the gun at 5-inch. Clause 8 enables any Power to use all its total tonnage in destroyers in the smaller class if it so desires, and restricts the tonnage of flotilla leaders to 16 per cent. of the whole. Clause 9 divides submarines into two classes: (1) between 1,000 and 1,800, and (2) below 600 tons, for the same reason which I have stated before, namely, the elimination of competition. It also fixes the size of the gun at 5-inch. I repeat here that in fixing the maximum displacement in destroyers and submarines we have taken, not our figures, but the higher figures which were desired by the other Powers. Clause 10 gives the maximum tonnage to be devoted to submarines as 90,000 for U.S.A. and British Empire and 60,000 for Japan, and restricts the construction of the larger class to two-thirds of that total. In Clause 11 it is explained that, except for the restrictions imposed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 10, the total tonnage allotted can be used as each Power thinks best. This gives a small margin of elasticity for transfer of tonnage from one class to another according to the special requirements of each country. APPENDIX III. BRITISH PROPOSALS-4TH AUGUST. Even if there is for the present no apparent prospect of coming to a complete agreement about small cruisers, it would be most unfortunate if the Conference were to separate without arriving at some international arrangements tending to economy. A large measure of agreement has already been reached with regard to 10,000-ton cruisers, flotilla leaders, destroyers and submarines. It seems to us that a similar agreement might well be reached with regard to battleships. These results are not all that had been hoped for, but they are of great value, and it would be an international misfortune if they were lost on the present occasion. Sooner than see the Conference wholly fail, we are authorised to sign an agreement even if it embodied only points on which provisional agreement has already been reached by the three Delegations. Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office Miscellaneous No. 5 (1927) League of Nations Committee of the Council on Article II of the Covenant REPORT OF THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs LONDON: PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses: Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120, George Street, Edinburgh; York Street, Manchester; 1, St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; 15, Donegall Square West, Belfast; or through any Bookseller Committee of the Council on Article 11 of the Covenant. Sir, Viscount Cecil to Sir Austen Chamberlain. Geneva, March 16, 1927. In You will remember that, at the first session of the Preparatory Committee on the Disarmament Conference in May 1926, the French representative submitted certain proposals for the rapid working of the organs of the League in cases of emergency, particularly with reference to articles 11 and 16 of the Covenant. September last the Council referred these proposals to the Committee of the Council for examination, and in December it approved the proposal of the Committee of the Council to make a special study of article 11. The Committee of the Council therefore charged a small sub-committee, consisting of the Belgian, British and Roumanian representatives, to meet in London in February and draft a report for consideration at its session fixed for the 14th March. 2. I transmit to you herewith a copy of this report as finally approved yesterday by the Committee of the Council. It will be seen that the committee has made certain changes in the draft originally submitted to it by the Sub-Committee of Three. 3. I do not think that any of the changes can be said to be of capital importance. A number of them are purely verbal emendations. In regard to the remainder, I would offer only the following observations: 4. The new passage in Chapter III (b) was inserted, after a laborious search for the correct formula, on the suggestion of the Secretary-General. Evidently at a time of crisis the presidency of the Council might be held by an interested party, and against that eventuality it was necessary to make some provision of this kind 5. It will be seen that Chapter III (d) has been practically redrafted. This was necessary in order to meet the views of certain representatives who feared that the original text was too much in the nature of a "règlement" which might tie the hands of the Council by prescribing a procedure from which they would be unable to depart. I considered these fears groundless myself; the point had not escaped the three members of the sub-committee in London, and they had inserted at various points passages which made it quite clear that they were anxious to avoid this difficulty. However, it was necessary to allay the fears and apprehensions of certain members, and the new text may be an improvement on the old. The passage inserted at the end of Chapter III (d) was drafted on the proposal of the Secretary-General. 6. The next difficulty of any serious kind that arose was in connection with the mention of air demonstrations in Chapter III (f). |