ments on other points can be reached, to consider it in a preliminary way. I hope that will be one of the directions in which our efforts will be further developed in the future. A clear pronouncement on this point would be an enormous advance in limitation and economy. After working for some time on these lines we found ourselves in marked disagreement with the American Delegation on the subject of cruisers. We had been told that "our respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with National Security," and we proceeded to explain quite plainly what was our problem in this respect. We said that it was numbers that we required, and that if a limit could be put upon the number of large cruisers, and a low maximum size on the smaller cruiser, we would arrive at a much lower total tonnage than would be possible if other countries demanded an unlimited number of ships of 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns. But we found that the American Delegation were unwilling to put a limit within the total tonnage to the number of cruisers carrying 8-inch guns. Although we stated our reason for wanting a number of small cruisers, we do not understand what are their reasons for demanding so many large cruisers or so many with weapons of such high offensive power as the 8-inch gun. We have stated that the geographical position of our Mother Country and of the Dominions must be borne in mind. We said so in accepting President Coolidge's invitation and we have frequently repeated that a number of small cruisers are of vital necessity to an Empire whose widely scattered parts are divided from each other by seas and oceans and whose most populous parts are dependent for their daily bread on sea-borne trade, and would perish if we failed to protect it. No doubt it is not easy for countries differently placed fully to realise our feelings in this matter. But no Briton who was at home during the war, at its most anxious time, will forget the feeling that the situation brought home to us. Month by month we found our rations of bread, meat and sugar and other articles being lowered, and we could see the spectre of starvation slowly approaching. Is it to be wondered at that every one of us feels that it is a duty to make what provision we can to protect ourselves and our children against a recurrence of such a danger. Though we are carrying a heavy burden of taxation and though we are suffering from industrial depression, you will find few people in Great Britain who will demur to providing the money which is necessary to keep open the waterways of our food and raw materials. We regard it as an insurance against a terrible risk, and like other insurances it is a provision against unforeseen disaster and not a provision against danger from any particular country, or against any present menace. A sufficient proof that we are not nervous about any danger from American action lies in the fact that we have made no complaint as to the American superiority in destroyers and submarines or shown any desire to build up to equality in those classes. We have, as I say, made no concealment of our needs, or of the reasons for our requirements. No one could have put the case more clearly than did Mr. French, Chairman of the House Naval Committee, in presenting the Naval Estimates in the American House of Representatives on January 4th last: "Stop the lanes of the sea to the ships of Great Britain and suffering would be brought to the people of the British Isles within a period of weeks . . Turn to the United States. Our country could be cut off from the rest of the world and there would be food for our people; there would be fuel oil for our use; there would be materials of all kinds for our service. The lanes of the seas might be closed to us for weeks or for years. Should the necessity arise, the United States within her own territory, could sustain her people without suffering, and could produce the material to meet whatever emergency naval necessities might require." At the same time, without delay, we set to work to fix the tonnage of our requirements at the lowest possible figure. Though we had 114 cruisers just before the war and many more some ten years earlier, we are only asking for a maximum of 70 now. No one can say we have not gone far in reducing our requirements. It was pointed out at the last plenary session that one obstacle to a settlement was, that we could not reconcile our differences with Japan-that if some basis could be found which was mutually acceptable to the British and Japanese Delegations it would be possible for the American Delegation to make the Agreement complete. We have consequently made a great effort to put our requirements into a form which will be acceptable to the Japanese Delegation, and we have been met by at least an equally strong attempt on the part of the Japanese Delegation to the same end. The proposals which were published a few days ago embody the result of those efforts. We understand that these proposals, in the main, would not meet with opposition from the Japanese Delegation. These, together with the other proposals we have made, would bring about in the near future a very sensible limitation of naval armament. This scheme, as was carefully explained by Sir Austen Chamberlain in a statement made in the House of Commons on the 27th July, the full text of which I am circulating to the Conference, is a temporary arrangement intended to last till 1936, the date of the expiration of the Washington Agreement. I am also circulating the draft proposals contained in this scheme with a brief explanation of the various clauses (App. I. and II.). To sum them up. The British Delegation's proposals entail savings far in excess of any other scheme before the Conference. Our proposals for reductions in size, tonnage and calibre of guns and extension of life of Capital Ships would save over £50 million to the British Empire during the period of replacement and proportionately large savings for other countries. Our cruiser proposals would save £1,000,000 on every cruiser to be constructed in future after the ratio in large cruisers has been attained. For destroyers and submarines they would stop the everincreasing tendency to raise the size and cost of these vessels. In each case we should have eliminated competitive building. In each case we should have effected economy. In each case we were considering security and banishing aggression from our minds. What have we done to try to meet the objections to our original plan? We have frankly stated our needs and given our reasons for holding them, and explained our conception of national security. We have agreed to try and fix total tonnages, provided that there is a proper division of classes and a maximum fixed for each type. This, we understood, to be agreed by the American Delegation at the Preparatory Disarmament Conference, and we had presumed that it would be welcomed here. We have made repeated efforts to put our total tonnage at the lowest figure compatible with security and our final effort is embodied in our latest proposals. But we had to raise the maximum figures for limiting the size of destroyers and submarines to meet the wishes of the other parties, thereby increasing the tonnage we should have liked in these cases to diminish. We have offered to agree upon a maximum building programme over a period of years, so that each Nation should have complete knowledge of the position of others. But that has not proved acceptable. After the war, like the United States, we have scrapped a very large number of warships, amounting to a tonnage of the enormous figure of 1,797,000 tons in battleships, cruisers and destroyers, in the interest of limitation. In the same way now, no impartial critic, we think, can say we have not made our full share of concessions as a contribution towards arriving at an agreement. I am given to understand that the American Delegation object to the limitation in second-class cruisers to a 6-inch gun calibre, and insist on freedom to mount any gun up to 8-inch in these ships. Whilst we are unable fully to understand their objection, I can assure them that our attitude is not due to the fear of any unfriendly action on their part. It is due to the feeling that, as we came here to try to agree to the limitation of armaments in the future, we cannot append our signature to a clause which would violate the three cardinal points laid down at the outset of our Conference by the American Delegation. We believe it I could have no other effect than that of a considerable increase in the offensive strength of the Fleets of the World. It is obvious that without any agreement and without calling a Conference, America has the power and the means to build as many cruisers within the limit of 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns as she pleases. We hoped that in the endeavour to bring about effective limitation she would have been willing to join us in setting a lower standard for future cruiser construction which would have been an example to all nations. It is a great disappointment to part without arriving at a comprehensive agreement, and we should have been glad of an agreement even if it had only included those items on which there seems to be no difference of opinion. I made a formal suggestion to this effect, which was, however, found to be unacceptable. I am circulating a copy of its text (Appendix III.). But if it is now found impossible to agree upon a formula which is acceptable to all parties, that would not indicate a spirit of antagonism between the three Powers; still less would it mean that we intended to enter upon a competition in new construction. We shall not then disperse in a spirit of bitterness or despair. The peace of the world does not depend so much upon a comprehensive form of words and mathematical tables suitable to the various needs of each Power, as on the friendly and peaceable spirit of the great nations. No formula could succeed in insuring peace, if the spirit of peace was not present, and no failure to find a formula is disastrous if the nations concerned still hold fast to the will for peace and the detestation of aggression, to which I am convinced all present to-day adhere as steadfastly as we did before we met. I am speaking to-day not only for His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, and the Government of India, which I represent at this Conference, but I am authorised by the delegates representing His Majesty's Governments in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to say that they are in agreement with the statement of the case which I have had the honour to make. APPENDICES to Speech of 4th August. APPENDIX I. BRITISH PROPOSALS OF JULY 28TH 1927. The British proposals in respect of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, for incorporation in a Treaty to remain in force until 1936, referred to above, are as follows:- 1. The combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines below the age limit for replacement is not to exceed : (a) For British Empire and U.S.A. 590,000 2. In addition, each Power may retain 25 per cent. of the total tonnages given in paragraph 1 (a) and (b), in vessels over age. 3. Age limits before which replacement cannot take 10,000-ton cruisers Destroyers place : Submarines 4. The following vessels over 6,000 tons to be retained in their respective fleets :— 66 British Empire 4" Hawkins United States of class, carrying 7.5-inch guns, The "York," carrying 8-inch guns. 66 2 Emerald class, carrying 6-inch guns. 10" Omaha" class, carrying 6-inch guns. America. 4" Furutaka class, carrying 8-inch guns. NOTE. The general intention of this proposal is to provide for the retention of existing ships which, though still in full efficiency, fall neither within the 10,000-ton 8-inch class or the contemplated class with a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and maximum armament of 6-inch guns. The British Delegation, recognising that this proposal would leave the United States of America with no 8-inch gun cruisers in this class, are prepared to agree to the construction by the United States of vessels which, in the opinion of the Naval Advisers of the three Delegations, would equalise the strength of the British Empire and the United States of America in this class. 5. All other cruisers to be divided into two classes :(a) 10,000-ton cruisers. (b) Smaller cruisers of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and mounting a gun not exceeding 6 inches in calibre. 6. 10,000-ton cruisers to be limited in number for British Empire and U.S.A. 8. That of the total tonnage in the destroyer class, 100 per cent. may be used for vessels of 1,500 tons and under; but not more than 16 per cent. of the total may be used for the flotilla leader class, i.e., vessels above 1,500 tons and limited to a maximum of 1,850. |