THE CENTENARY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE AT PHILADELPHIA, NOVEMBER 30, 1923

Foreign policies are not built upon abstractions. They are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective. When long maintained, they express the hopes and fears, the aims of security or aggrandizement, which have become dominant in the national consciousness and thus transcend party divisions and make negligible such opposition as may come from particular groups. They inevit ably control the machinery of international accord which works only within the narrow field not closed by divergent national ambitions or as interest yields to apprehension or obtains compensation through give and take. Statesmen who carry the burdens of empire do not for a moment lose sight of imperial purposes and requirements. When a balance of power is deemed essential to national security you can not conjure it away by any form of words. The best of diplomatic instruments, the conference, has no magical potency to dispose of these strongly held national convictions.

We are fortunate in our detachment from many difficulties and dangers which oppress the imagination of other peoples, but we should resist the tendency to indulge in self-praise. When we have a clear sense of our own interests, we are just as inflexible as others. The great advantage we have had is that, coming to independence in a world afflicted with the long rivalries of military powers, the traditions of conquest, and the dreams of empire, we sought simply the assurance of freedom, and our national instinct has been opposed to aggression and intervention. The Monroe Doctrine was the embodiment of this sentiment. Through the one hundred

years since its announcement, despite the strife of parties and opposing convictions as to domestic issues, it has been a unifying principle, contributing not only to our security and peace but to our dignity and prestige as a Power capable of thus asserting and maintaining a vigorous independent policy. The attitude of American statesmen toward this Doctrine, with few exceptions, has been that expressed in the familiar words of Daniel Webster: "I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a hright page in our history. I will neither help to erase it or tear it out; nor shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted."

The anxiety to escape the toils of European politics and intrigues was early manifested. John Adams in 1782 wrote in his diary," "You are afraid,' says Mr. Oswald today, 'of being made the tools of the Powers of Europe.' 'Indeed I am,' says 1.What Powers?' said he. 'All of them,' said I. 'It is obvious that all the Powers of Europe will be continuously maneuvering with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. . . . Indeed it is not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle.' We were not isolated and could not be. The European Powers were at our doors; their conflicts had embroiled the New World from the beginning. There was no thought of escaping constant dealings with these Powers, whose rivalries menaced our peace, but upon what basis should these dealings be had? We had the choice of seeking the protection of alliances, or the more difficult course of maintaining independence. With splendid courage no less than with profound wisdom the Fathers chose the latter course at once conserving our safety and enhancing our influence. It was the choice of an infant nation, but of a nation conscious of the promise of its influence as a World Power.

This was the admonition of the Farewell Address: "Observe good faith and justice toward all Nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, in extending our commer

cial relations, and have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concern. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities. . . . Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?"

As our paramount interest dictated abstention from participation in European politics, so it also required that the machinations of foreign Powers should not have increased opportunity [here, and when the independence achieved by the Spanish colonies in this hemisphere was threatened by the imposing combination of European sovereigns, styled the Holy Alliance, this correlative policy found emphatic expression in Monroe's message: "We should consider," said he, "any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and have maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." And on the same occasion, in response to Russian pretensions, it was announced with equal emphasis "that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers."

These are the two points of the Monroe Doctrine. The most

significant circumstance connected with the form of the declaration of the non-intervention principle was that it was made by the United States alone. The British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, had proposed a joint declaration with Great Britain, and this was favored by both Jefferson and Madison. But, with the advice of John Quincy Adams and in view of the fact that Great Britain had not recognized the new Republics, Monroe decided upon a separate declaration on our sole responsibility and joined with it the statement of the non-colonization principle, which not only had not been suggested by Canning, but was wholly opposed to his views.

It is not my intention to repeat what I have said in a recent address with respect to the Doctrine but rather, restating its true content, to inquire as to its place in the scheme of the foreign policies of the United States as a World Power in the twentieth century with respect to the region of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, to Europe, and to this hemisphere.

Certainly, after one hundred years, there should be no hesitancy in defining what we mean by the Monroe Doctrine and this, despite those critics who seek to disparage it by professing to be unable to understand it, and those prophets of a new era who would thrust it aside, and those zealots who would use it as a convenient warrant for any sort of action they may favor in this part of the world, is, after all, not a very difficult task. In the original declaration there were, as I have said, two points stating the opposition of this Government, first, to any action by European Powers to extend their system to this hemisphere, or to any interposition by them for the purpose of oppressing or controlling the destiny of the new American republics, and, second, to the future colonization by European Powers of the American continents. In all that has been said or done since the declaration of Monroe it can be regarded as modified in only two particulars. What was said with Europe exclusively in view must be deemed equally applicable to all non-American Powers; and the opposition to the extension of colonization was not

dependent upon the particular method of securing territorial control, and, at least since Polk's time, may be deemed to embrace opposition to acquisition of additional territory through transfer of dominion or sovereignty. Neither of these modifications changes the Doctrine in its essentials and it may thus be summarized, as I have elsewhere stated, as being opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American Power. How does the Doctrine thus defined stand in the present scheme of American policy? And by policy I do not mean the proposals of any party or group, but those principles and aims which have been supported either by definite action of the Executive within his authority or of the treaty-making power, or by a sentiment so preponderant and long cherished that it may be called the opinion of the country. The changes of one hundred years in population, extent of territory, and developed resources, and our military potency are obvious enough and need no recital. But have the changes altered our policy or has it become inconsistent with the Doctrine?

In relation to the Pacific Ocean and the Far East we have developed the policies of (1) the Open Door, (2) the maintenance of the integrity of China, (3) cooperation with other Powers in the declaration of common principles, (4) cooperation with other Powers by conference and consultation in the interests of peace, (5) limitation of naval armament, and (6) the limitation of fortifications and naval bases.

The Empress of China, fitted out by Robert Morris and others, sailed to Canton in 1784, and by the year 1805 thirtyseven American vessels cleared for that port. In 1843 Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, instructing Caleb Cushing as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China, said: "You will signify, in decided terms and a positive manner, that the Government of the United States would find it impossible to remain on terms of friendship and regard with the Emperor if greater privileges or commercial facilities