followed, it was interpreted by those who put two and two together as the first deliberate act in a joint plan for war. Recent revelations indeed show that the Intelligence Department of the Russian General Staff had informed their correspondent in the Serbian General Staff that the interview at Konopischt had resulted in plans for an attack upon Serbia, and this information led an officer of the general staff of Serbia—a man subsequently discredited and finally executed -to arm the two young lads who slew the Archduke. What greater service to peace could be offered than the elimination of such incidents of intrigue and the menace of war?

Misconstruction of relatively innocent incidents may have consequences almost as serious so long as the atmosphere of suspicion surrounds diplomacy. For instance, the visit of King George to Paris in the spring of 1914, and especially Sir Edward Grey's negotiations with Russia concerning naval preparedness, confirmed the Government in Berlin in its apprehensions of a growing danger. Suspicion led to exaggeration and the implication of evil motives. One need not elaborate the point; for the whole history of diplomacy is full of such illustrations. What should be kept in mind here is that the consequences lead inevitably if not to war at least to continued and increasing armament.

The Réquin plan does not deal directly with this problem, but if it has any merit at all, it is surely in the indirect bearing upon the lessening of secret engagements. It attempts to do this by placing a premium upon public instead of secret diplomacy. The premium has to be a high one, the highest, indeed, that can be devised, for there are such obvious advantages in secrecy. Now the only premium high enough to be an effective inducement is, increased security. This is just what is offered. In cases covered by the known engagements of a treaty, the parties to it are free to act automatically and at once when the danger arises. They do not have to await the assembling of any council or court, defenceless meanwhile in the face of the advancing enemy. On the other hand, for this freedom of action in known contingencies,

they bind themselves to submit all other issues to the judgment of the Court or to the good offices of the League. The privilege offered-freedom to save one's self in the hour of danger by direct defensive action-is one which, after all would be assumed in almost every such case by the powers concerned. But the frank admission of their right to do so is now be to coupled by two limitations: first, their open statement of their policies of defence, and secondly, the reference of all other questions to arbitration or a court of international justice.

But, if we admit that there is no real harm in forming an entente or making an alliance so long as it does not create an enemy or empoison the atmosphere of friendly relations with others, is it really clear that Colonel Réquin's plan provides adequate safeguards that the second part of the proposal,— namely, to submit other cases to the council and the court,— would be carried out? Suppose, for instance, that the treaty of alliance between France and Czecho-Slovakia, which has just been announced, were published by registry with the League of Nations; and that an unforeseen incident occurred which was not covered by its terms but grave enough to involve the vital interests of either or both, such as the murder of their high officials in Berlin, would they refer the case to the Court as they had promised to do? A clue to the answer is in the action of Italy over the murder of its officers on the Greek frontier, and the refusal to submit the case for adjudication. But not all the answer in that instance was given at Corfu. The mobilization of a world opinion on the subject, seen best in the attitude of smaller nations, was not without an effect upon the immediate settlement and might, if given proper expression, have a cautionary influence upon responsible statesmen in the future. Frankly, there is no way to make sure that such incidents will not be settled by force. All we can do is to make it more and more probable that such I will be the case. If we really want "law not war" we must see to it that in each specific case there is a mobilization of public opinion to support, in this regard, if no further, the

action of the institutions which have been erected for that purpose, the only institutions which there are of the kind,— the League of Nations and the World Court.

There is still another criticism which may be directed against the plan we are considering. It is likely that international disputes will arise, not as to whether the provocative incidents are of this or that kind, but whether they have really taken place or not. Thus the Germans claim, as a casus belli, that French airplanes flew over German territory, -an incident which was later disproved. The Réquin plan provides no safeguard against incidents of this kind; but then, no other plan does either.

VIII

The Treaty of Mutual Assistance of the Temporary Mixed Commission

The Requin plan as presented to the League of Nations was obviously not enough by itself. The Temporary Mixed Commission and the Committee of the Assembly which considered it (under the presidency of Minister Beneš) recognized this by inserting the French proposal as a part only of the proposed "Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance." This Draft Treaty, largely a compromise between the two points of view, the British and the French, represents the farthest step that has yet been taken toward the limitation of armaments. In it, therefore, one may see exactly what has been achieved so far. "Achieved" is, perhaps, hardly the word; for all that the Assembly of 1923 did was to refer the treaty back to the various governments for their criticism or comment so that the Assembly of 1924 should be able to take definite action. Article I of the Draft Treaty reads as follows:-*

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission."

*The text of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance is given in the Appendix page 000

This article was recast by the jurists of the League so as to be consonant with the terms of the Covenant, since the term "aggressive war" is not used in the Covenant and is a term which had not yet been defined in international law. The revised wording of the clause proposed by the committee of jurists is "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that a war entered into contrary to the provisions of the Covenant constitutes an international crime and they severally undertake that none of them will be guilty of its commission." This clause alone, is in itself a summary of all the law and the commandments,-provided that the League is universal and that its purposes are lived up to! If, for instance, Germany were a party to that pact of non-aggression, it would seem that the rest of the agreement would merely provide the ways and means for carrying out the main purpose of the League, as stated here.

Article II, in the words of the committee of jurists, states that "The High Contracting Parties jointly and severally undertake to furnish assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, to any one of their number which, after having reduced its armaments in accordance with the present Treaty, may be the object of a war forbidden by the Covenant of the League of Nations either on account of its origin or of its object." Articles III, IV and V develop still further the way in which the machinery of the League can be set in motion to carry out the purposes of the Treaty as already outlined in its opening article.

It is in this setting that we come upon the Réquin plan embodied in the Draft Treaty (Articles VI, VII and VIII). In the ninth article, however, we come upon an important enlargement of the Réquin plan:

"In order to facilitate the application of the present Treaty, any High Contracting Party may negotiate through the agency of the Council, with one or more neighbouring countries for the establishment of demilitarized zones".

In later articles provision is made for the exchange of military

or other information with reference to existing armaments, both in extent and in cost.

Here we have a hint of a policy which should be followed further. The Réquin plan is limited solely to relations between friendly powers. Provision should be made on a similar line for agreements between neighbours which are potential enemies, and this suggestion of local limitations along frontiers is but part of a larger problem. Limited pacts of non-aggression are surely as necessary as alliances. Above all there should be a frank attempt to develop further the method of international agreement through arbitration treaties.

The fact that the reduction of armaments according to a fixed ratio, is limited in its application, does not make it any less important or valid so far as it goes. Apart from its posible further use in naval armaments, there is no reason why agreements of this kind should not be entered into to lessen conscription or standing armies by international agreement. Since the experience of the World War this is perhaps not so vital an issue as it was once thought to be, for we know now that in the next war all citizens will be mobilized and all industry pertinent to defence taken under government control. Yet as an indication of good intentions and a register of the sense of international security, it will be of value in relieving suspicion. Again a limited reduction of armament may be worked out on an agreed numerical basis along certain strips of territory, especially tending towards a neutralization of frontier zones. With the recent great development of aircraft limited territorial neutralization is of less importance technically than it would seem to the average citizen, but because it does seem important to the citizen, it should also be tried out and the zones extended as far as possible.

In none of the above cases, however, is it possible to proceed by general formula that would be applicable to all countries at any one time. This is where the whole procedure breaks down every time. The only way to develop a reduction by a fixed numerical ratio is by agreements between those powers which have a common interest in the same

matter.