should be allowed to the subjects of any other Government than should be granted to citizens of the United States." Most-favored-nation treatment was secured in the Treaty of 1844, with respect to which Caleb Cushing said: "Thus, whatever progress either Government makes in opening this vast Empire to the influence of foreign commerce is for the common good of each other and of all Christendom." Thus was laid the foundation for the policy of the Open Door, or equality of opportunity. When the great Powers took advantage of the weakness of China to obtain spheres of interest in order to facilitate exploitation and to restrict free commercial intercourse, this Government, through Secretary Hay, sought to establish by international accord the principle of the Open Door, and with this to obtain the recognition and preservation of the territorial and administrative integrity of China. Despite many obstacles, caused by the disregard of professions and the desire to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the progressive disintegration of China, this Government continued earnestly to press these principles, and at the recent Washington Conference the postulates of American policy were taken out of the unsatisfactory form of diplomatic notes and, with a more adequate and explicit statement, were incorporated into a solemn international engagement, signed by the nine Powers especially interested in the Far East. This Treaty has been ratified by all but one of these Powers, and it is hoped that ratification by that Power will not be long deferred.

While the diplomatic exchanges between the Powers, in which the Open Door policy was fully accepted, were not, of course, satisfactory and later became largely ineffective, they were so strongly supported by public opinion in this country as to make it clear that while we eschewed alliances we were ready to join in declarations of common principles where this method of cooperation would supply the best means of attaining the desired object. This was again illustrated by the resolutions adopted at the Washington Conference.

Again, through the Four-Power Treaty between the United

States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, which is to continue for ten years and thereafter subject to termination on twelve months' notice, we have established another form of cooperation with regard to insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is provided that if any controversy arises between any of the parties out of any Pacific question which can not be settled by diplomacy, with regard to their rights in relation to these possessions and dominions, they shall invite the other parties to the Treaty to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment. Also, if the rights sought to be safeguarded by the Treaty are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation. In giving assent to this Treaty the United States Senate made the reservation, which in no sense departed from the intent of the Treaty, that it should not be regarded as a commitment to armed force, or alliance, or obligation to join in any defense. Thus we have definitely adopted the policy for the protection of our insular possessions, and for the preservation of peace in the Pacific region, of conference and consultation with other Powers.

Limitation of naval armament has manifest relation to our policies in the region of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, but it has, of course, a much wider scope and expresses our strong desire to avoid extravagant outlays and the competition in armament which is provocative of war. In the proposals which our Government made to this end we were carrying forward an American principle which as early as 1794 Alexander Hamilton recommended for application to the Great Lakes and which was so applied in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. It had been the desire of our Government that the project of reduction or limitation of armament which failed in the First Conference at The Hague in 1899 should be taken up in the Second Conference in 1907. And we then

considered this matter, and we still consider it, so far as land armament is concerned, as "unfinished business," to use the phrase found in the instructions to our delegates at the Second Hague Conference.

Further, in support of this policy we were willing to agree to certain defined limitations as to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific Ocean, maintaining for fifteen years, or until 'the end of the year 1936, and thereafter subject to termination on two years' notice, the status quo with respect to fortifications or naval bases in the Philippines and Guam. This was sufficiently emphatic with respect to our non-aggressive and peaceful intentions in the East, and yet it merely confirmed the policy of Congress, which has never had the intention of fortifying either the Philippines or Guam. As indicative of this phase of our policy with respect to these possessions, which we acquired as the result of the Spanish War, let me repeat what Senator Lodge said in the course of the debate in the Senate on the recent naval treaty. With respect to Guam, he said: "We took that island in the Spanish-American War. . . . We have had so little interest in the island that we have never passed a line of legislation in regard to it or to provide for its government or to make any provision about it at all. . . . We have never fortified it, and nobody would vote to spend money in fortifying it." With respect to the Philippines, he said: "The Philippines will be in exactly the condition in which they now are and have been ever since they were taken. . . . We shall never fortify them. It would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to fortify them. . . . We are not going to do it."

How do these policies in the region of the Pacific Ocean square with the Monroe Doctrine? Is there any inconsistency? Has our entrance into this region as a World Power of first rank led us to violate our traditions? Manifestly not. We fought the Spanish War to put an end to an intolerable nuisance at our very door, and to establish and make secure the independence of Cuba, not to override it. And as a consequence of victory in that war we acquired distant possessions,

but not with the purpose of making these a basis for encroaching upon the territory or interfering with the political independence of the peoples of the eastern nations. In safeguarding the integrity of China, in securing equality of commercial opportunity, in endeavoring to forestall efforts at exploitation and aggression, in seeking to remove suspicion and allay apprehensions, and in enlarging through assured tranquillity the opportunities of peaceful commerce, we have been pursuing under different conditions the same aims of independence, security, and peace which determined the declaration of Monroe.

With respect to Europe, our policy has continued to be in the phrase of Jefferson: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." We entered the Great War, not violating our tradition, for the cause of liberty itself was at stake. We have emerged from the war, with the same general aims that we had before we went in. Though victors, we have sought neither territory nor general reparations. Our people have borne their own burdens and in large part we are bearing the burdens of others. We are not seeking to dictate to Europe or to deprive anyone of rights. But we do desire peace and economic recuperation in Europe. We contributed our arms in the interest of liberty and to destroy the menace of an autocratic power, but not to secure the economic prostration of a vanquished people. We have the deepest sympathy with the people of France; we warmly cherish their ancient friendship. We desire to see France prosperous and secure, with her wounds healed and her just demands satisfied. We desire to see a united and prosperous Germany, with a will to peace, making amends to the full extent of her power and obtaining the appropriate rewards of her labor and skill. We wish to see an end to the waste of military efforts and the easing of the burdens of unproductive expenditures. We wish to see the fires of hatred quenched. It is because of these earnest desires that we have hoped, as was stated in the recent communication to the British Government, that the solution of the present grave

problems would be sought in fair and comprehensive inquiry in which all interested might participate and which would be inspired by the determination to find means to restore the productive activities through which alone reparations can be paid, and to give opportunity for the reasonable contentment and amicable relations of industrious peoples through which alone peace and security can be assured.

The bitter controversy which followed the war showed with what tenacity we still hold to the principle of not meddling in the political strife of Europe. It is true that the spread of democratic ideas and the resulting change in Governments have removed the danger of organized effort to extend to this continent the European "political system" of 100 years ago. But Europe still has "a set of primary interests" which are not ours. As Washington said: "She must be engaged in political controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concern." Unity in war did not avail to change the divergent national aims and policies in peace. It is not that our interests may not be affected injuriously by such controversies. That was true in the days of Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe; indeed the effect of changes and developments is that we are far better able to bear such injuries today than we were then, as is sufficiently illustrated by our sufferings during the Napoleonic Wars. But it was, despite such injuries, the abiding conviction that we had better bear these ills than suffer the greater evils which would follow the sacrifice of our independent position. We still hold to that view. The preponderant thought among us undoubtedly is that our influence would not be increased by pooling it. The influence that is due to our detachment and impartiality could not long be maintained if we should substitute the rôle of a partisan in European quarrels, and the constant efforts of propagandists have brought vividly before us the fact that where the direct American interest is not clearly perceived foreign controversies afford abundant opportunity for the play among us of intense racial feeling. What was true in Monroe's day is even more true today in view of our vast