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any other railroad or means of transporta- | to New York; charging more for the same tion."

class of goods carried from Gilman than from Peoria, the former being eighty-six miles nearer to New York than the latter, this difference being in the length of the line within the State of Illinois.

The same principle is settled by the English decisions.

London & N. W. R. Co. v. Evershed, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1029; Budd v. London & N. W. R. Co. 36 L. T. N. S. 802; 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 393: Thompson v. London etc. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 115; Greenoch v. S. E. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 319; Note, 16 Am. L. Rev. 833.

In a case arising under the Oregon Act of February 20, 1885, the court directed the receiver to charge "No more for the carriage of goods for a shorter haul than a longer one in the same direction, except to and from points where the rate attainable is affected by water transportation, in which case he may carry at as low a rate as the water craft do, without reference to the length of the haul."

Ex parte Koehler, 23 Fed. Rep. 529; S. C. 25 Fed. Rep. 73; 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 52-58.

As to construction of Illinois Statutes, see: Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Hill, 14 Bradw. (Ill. App.) 579; Wabash etc. R. Co. v. People (30 L. ed. 244); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31.

As to Massachusetts Statutes, see: Com. v. Worcester & N. R. Co. 124 Mass. 561.

The Statute of North Carolina (Code§ 1966), which imposes a penalty on any rail, road company which shall charge for transportation of any freight over its road a greater amount than shall be charged at the same time by it for an equal quantity of the same class of freight, transported in the same direction over any portion of the same railroad, of equal distance, is to be construed to mean that the compensation charged shippers for carrying an equal quantity of the same class of freight, going in the same direction, must be equal in amount for equal distances, no matter on what part of the road, at any time while its list of charges for carrying freight remains unchanged.

Hines . Wilmington & W. R. Co. 95 N. C. 434.

A lower rate should not be made for the transportation of goods intended for export trade.

Twells . Pa. R. Co. 3 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 728; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. L. R. 11 App. Cas. 97.

Carrying local passengers from one point on its line is not an identical service with that of carrying a through passenger from the same distance.

Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S. 117 U. S. 355 (29 L. ed. 920). See also Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2.

A Statute of Illinois enacts that if any railroad company shall, within that State, charge or receive for transporting passengers or freight of the same class, the same or a greater sum for any distance than it does for a longer distance, it shall be liable to a penalty for unjust discrimination. The defendant in this case made such discrimination in regard to goods transported over the same road or roads, from Peoria in Illinois and from Gilman in Illinois

Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Ill. 118 U. S. 557 (30 L. ed. 244); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31.

The Supreme Court of the United States follows the Supreme Court of Illinois in holding that the Statute of Illinois must be construed to include a transportation of goods under one contract and by one voyage from the interior of the State of Illinois to New York. Id.

And it held further that such a transportation is "commerce among the States," even as to that part of the voyage which lies within the State of Illinois, while it is not denied that there may be transportation of goods which is begun and ended within its limits and disconnected with any carriage outside of the State, which is not commerce among the States. Id.

The latter is subject to regulation by the State, and the Statute of Illinois is valid as applied to it. But the former is national in its character, and its regulation is confided to Congress exclusively, by that clause of the Constitution which empowers it to regulate commerce among the States. Id.

Notwithstanding what is said in Munn v. Illinois, and Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., in 94 U. S. 113, 164 (24 L. ed. 77, 97), the United States Supreme Court holds now, and has never consciously held otherwise, that a statute of a State, intended to regulate or to tax, or to impose any other restriction upon the transmission of persons or property or telegraphic messages from one State to another, is not within that class of legislation which the States may enact in the absence of legislation by Congress; and that such statutes are void even as to that part of such transmission which may be within the State. Id.

It follows that the Statute of Illinois, as construed by the Supreme Court of the State, and as applied to the transaction under consideration, is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States. Id.

The Commission has not been given a general dispensing power to relieve hardships under the Law, but its power in that regard is strictly limited.

Re Iowa Barb Steel Wire Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 605.

The Interstate Commerce Law contemplates that the cases in which the Commission is authorized to make orders for suspension of its operation are exceptional cases, and that where only general reasons operate, the general law shall be left to its general course, however serious the consequences in particular cases.

Jurisdiction of the Commission, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 73.

The mere probability that injury will result from the operation of the Act will not authorize the Commission to direct a suspension. Id. Incidental injuries under the Act must be borne for the public good until the Legislature provides a remedy. Id.

The prohibition in the fourth section of the Interstate Commerce Act against a greater charge for a shorter than for a longer distance

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over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance, as qualified therein, is limited to cases in which the circumstances and conditions are substantially similar.

Re Southern R. & Steamship Asso. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 278.

The phrase "under substantially similar circumstances," in the fourth section, is used in the same sense as in the second section; and under the qualified form of the prohibition in the fourth section carriers are required to judge in the first instance with regard to the similarity or dissimilarity of the circumstances and conditions that forbid or permit a greater charge for a shorter distance. Id.

The judgment of carriers in respect to the circumstances and conditions is not final, but is subject to the authority of the Commission and of the courts to decide whether error has been committed or whether the statute has been violated. And in case of complaint for violating the fourth section of the Act, the burden of proof is on the carrier to justify any departure from the general rule prescribed by the statute by showing that the circumstances and conditions are substantialy dissimilar. Id. The provisions of section 1, requiring charges to be reasonable and just, and of section 2, forbidding unjust discrimination, apply when exceptional charges are made under section 4, as they do in other cases.

Re Southern R. & Steamship Asso. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 278.

The existence of actual competition, which is of controlling force in respect to traffic important in amount, may make out the dissimilar circumstances and conditions, entitling the carrier to charge less for the longer than for the shorter haul over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer, in the following cases:

(a) When the competition is with carriers by water which are not subject to the provisions of the statute;

(b) When the competition is with foreign or other railroads which are not subject to the provisions of the statute;

(c) In rare and peculiar cases of competition between railroads which are subject to the statute, when a strict application of the general rule of the statute would be destructive of legitimate competition. Id.

When the greater charge in the aggregate is made for the transportation of passengers or the like kind of property for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer distance, it is not sufficient justification therefor that the traffic which is subjected to such greater charge is way or local traffic, and that which is given the more favorable rates is


(a) Nor is it sufficient justification for such greater charge that the short haul traffic is more expensive to the carrier, unless when the circumstances are such as to make it exceptionally expensive, or the long haul traffic exceptionally inexpensive, the difference being extraordinary and susceptible of definite proof;

(b) Nor that the lesser charge on the longer haul has for its motive the encouragement of

manufactures or some other branch of industry;

(c) Nor that it is designed to build up business or trade centers;

(d) Nor that the lesser charge on the longer haul is merely a continuation of the favorable rates under which trade centers or industrial establishments have been built up;

(e) The fact that long haul traffic will only bear certain rates is no reason for carrying it for less than cost at the expense of other traffic. Id. The fact that there is competition in the carriage of persons or property to or from a particular place is a circumstance that justifies a common carrier under section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act to charge less for a long haul to or from said place than a short one included therein.

Ex parte Koehler (U. S. C. C.) 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 317.

Passes to families of employees. Section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act in effect prohibits the giving of passes or free carriage to particular persons; and the exception allowed in section 22, in favor of officers and employees of the road, does not include the families of such persons. Id.

Defendant railway company has two lines of nearly equal length, one starting from Providence and the other from East Providence, which unite at Valley Falls, whence the main line runs into Massachusetts. The rate charged by defendant on coal shipped at Providence is the same as on coal shipped at East Providence as far as Valley Falls and the next station; but beyond that point the rate on coal from Providence is ten cents per gross ton more than on coal from East Providence. Held:

(a) That this is an unjust discrimination; that if it is fair and reasonable for the defendant to make the charge to Valley Falls from the two termini the same, there can be no justification for making different rates to stations beyond, based upon the fact that the coal comes from one terminus rather than from the other; (b) That the evidence fails to support the contention of defendant that the extra rate upon coal received at Providence is only a fair equiv alent for the additional cost of handling it there;

(c) That under all the circumstances it is not admissible for defendant to impose upon its patrons at Providence, whose investments were made before the East Providence line was constructed, an additional charge because of the inconvenience attending the transaction of its business at that station, and for which they are in no way responsible.

Providence Coal Co. v. Providence & W. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 363.

The defendant railway company had for some time paid the cost of hauling coal which was shipped by complainant, from complainant's wharf to defendant's freight station in Provi dence, without any contract obligation to that effect, but now refuses so to do. Held, that defendant cannot be compelled to continue paying for such hauling; that what defendant did for a time as a favor or by way of encouragement, it might discontinue at pleasure, and that there is nothing in the nature of a binding usage about it. Id.

Under the Interstate Commerce Act all charges | connections-such petitioner has no standing to made by the receiver of a railroad, in respect maintain the proceeding. Id. to such business as falls under the head of interstate commerce, for any service in the transportation of passengers or property, or for receiving, delivering, storing or handling property, must be reasonable and just; and such receiver may not discriminate in his rates, charges and facilities for or against either of two connecting steamship lines, but should give to both equal rates and facilities for trade and travel, for equal service, from all points. Re Petition of Mallory, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 294.

The right to make greater charges for short than for long hauls is exceptional and depends in every case upon the peculiar circumstances and conditions; and a ruling in reference thereto in the case of one carrier would not be applicable to another carrier differently circumstanced. Id.

If several railroad companies join in making the joint tariff which constitutes the lesser charge on the longer haul, while one or more of their number makes the greater charge on the shorter haul, the case is within the fourth The complaint, in effect, asks from the Com-section of the Act; and those who make such mission an order that shall require the defend-greater charge are called upon to justify it. Id. ant roads to receive freights at Schenectady for Through business over the defendant comtransportation at Boston, at rates less than are panies' roads was done by the National Des now charged by the same roads for the trans-patch Line (a fast freight line, neither a corportation of like freights to Boston from stations poration nor an association of persons, but a nearer Boston, under substantially similar cir-name under which business was done), the sevcumstances and conditions. eral roads paying milage for the cars used, furnished to such line by a car company, and the earnings of such line being divided among the roads in agreed proportions. The tariff for the long haul traffic in question was made by the manager of the Despatch Line, who was the agent for all the roads over which it did business, and was acquiesced in by them. Held, that the defendant companies were responsible for the long haul rates. Id.

Held, that such peculiar facts are not found to exist as will justify the greater charge over the shorter line by the Central Vermont Roads. Id.

Such order, if issued, would require the roads to depart from the general rule laid down in the fourth section of the Act.

While the Act authorizes the Commission to permit exceptions, it does not authorize it to require exceptions.

The Commission has not power to make rates generally, but only to determine whether rates imposed by the railroads are in conflict with the statute.

The question whether the rates now charged complainant are excessive is not raised by the complaint.

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Facts examined, and held:

That defendant receives a greater compensation for its haul from Indianapolis to Michigan City than it does for its haul from Frankfort to South Wanatah, and consequently does not on its own line charge more for the shorter haul;

That defendant does not, and cannot, con

Boston & A. R. Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 571. Where, in a proceeding against several control the fixing of rates by the crossing and innecting railroad companies for charging more tersecting lines, and has no option but to ac for a short than for a long haul, one of the com- cept those rates which are fixed, and prorate panies claims that its only participation in the upon them, or to cease to take grain altoalleged offense consisted in its sharing in the gether; low charges on the long haul, which were not in themselves alleged to be illegal, the complaint should not be dismissed as against such company, where its interest and the liability of the low rates on long haul traffic to be affected by changes made in the higher rates on short haul traffic is so great that in case such company had not been made a party, and should ask to be made a party, it would be proper to so order.

If it is desired to test the reasonableness of the through rate from Frankfort to New York, all the roads responsible for it should be made defendants. It is not enough to make the ini tial road defendant, unless that road has authority to make the rate for them all.

Allen v. Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 621.

Boston & A. R. Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 571.

Evidence examined, and held: the difference in the rates at Mazeppa, compared with the rates at Red Wing and Lake City should neither exceed 2 cents on 100 pounds, nor one third part of the rates made in the adjustment of charges from competing towns.

Where, in a proceeding by one railroad company against other companies, for charging more for a short than for the long haul, it appears that the rates alleged to be illegal are local rates; that the petitioner does not pay or participate in paying them; that they are not com petitive rates to those imposed on the petition-crimination, held: er's road; and there is no allegation that such rates are excessive or unjust, and the sole grievance of the petitioner is that the defendant companies accept through traffic at lower rates than are made by the petitioner and its

Raymond. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 627.

On complaint of millers and others on the Iowa and Minnesota Division, of unjust dis

(a) That the complaint is well founded; that the rate on wheat on that division is relatively too high; that while a reasonable differential may be allowed on that division, on account of greater distance and probable larger expense

of transportation and the greater stringency of the competitive forces on the River Division, the difference above the present rate on the River Division should not exceed 24 cents a hundred;

(b) That it is not a sufficient compliance with the Law that rates are reasonable in themselves; but they should be so relatively reasonable as to protect communities and business against unjust discrimination;

(c) That when the same carrier operates parallel lines, and for any cause accepts low rates on one line, it should furnish sufficient corresponding advantages to the patrons of the other lines to prevent undue prejudice and disadvantage, and to preserve the substantial equality contemplated by the statute. Boards of Trade Union v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 608.

The operation of section 4 of the Act suspended, for ninety days, as to the traffic of the petitioner between certain points.

Re Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 17.

Petitioning railroad company relieved temporarily from the operation of the fourth section, on certain conditions.

Re Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 58.

The operation of the fourth section of the Act suspended, in its application to certain railroads and connecting steamship lines, for a period not greater than ninety days, until the Commission can make a complete examination of the matters alleged in the petition.

Re Southern R. & Steamship Asso. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 15.

The circumstances and conditions touching the transportation of passengers and freight to and from the Republic of Mexico through El Paso, Texas, by the Texas & Pacific R. Co. are (within the meaning of section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act) so substantially different from those surrounding transportation to other points on said railway as to justify said company in establishing lower rates at El Paso on freight transported for export into and received from Mexico and for delivery at El Paso than is charged at points between that city and the points where the freights originate and where the distance and haul are shorter.

Re Tex. & Pac. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. E. D. of La.) 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 30.

For proceedings of the Commission relating to complaints for violation of the Fourth Sec tion, applications for suspension, and orders suspending its operation, see Index infra, under title "Long and Short Haul."


Where English Statutes have been adopted, the settled construction of those statutes is incorporated in the Acts adopting them.

McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (28 L. ed. 269); Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U. S. 5 Pet. 265 (8 L. ed. 120); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 1 (7 L. ed. 327); McCool v. Smith, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 459 (17 L. ed. 218); The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440 (25 L. ed. 168).

See Address by Senator Cullom, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 300. Transportation in a foreign country is not affected by the English Acts.

Branley v. South Eastern R. Co. 12 C. B. N. S. 63; Zunz v. South Eastern R. Co. L. R. 4 Q. B. 539; S. C. 38 L. J. Q. B. 209.

The Commission has no authority to call a railroad company to account for any wrong of which such company may have been guilty prior to April, 1887, when the Interstate Commerce Act went into operation.

Holbrook v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 323; Ottinger v. Southern P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 607.

Where no overt acts of misconduct on the part of a defendant railroad company, which could support any judgment of the Commission or any mandatory order, are made to appear, the Commission has no discretion but to dismiss the complaint.

Holbrook v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 323.

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2. Applications under section 4; petition; verification; notice.


3. Investigation by Commission.

4. Complaints under section 13; copies

of complaint; names and addresses to be set forth; service of copies. Answer within twenty days; filing;



6. Hearing on complaint without an


7. Adjournment and extension of time.

8. Hearing on issue joined; failure to


10. Amendments.

11. Copies.

12. Affidavits, before whom taken. Applications to the Commission for special exception under the Act will be granted only after investigation of the facts, upon a verified petition formally presenting a case.

Re Southern P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 16; Re Petition of R. Conductors, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 18.

The Commission cannot make an order or give an opinion in advance of an actual complaint and hearing.

Re Inmates of Nat. Homes, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 75; Re Petition of R. Conductors, and Re Theatrical Rates, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 18.

A desire to obtain a construction of the Interstate Commerce Act is not sufficient to support a proceeding before the Commission. Boston & A. R. Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 571.

But it is not held that a complainant must necessarily have a pecuniary interest in order to entitle him to be heard; and it seems, under the provisions of the Act, that when an infraction of the Act would constitute a public grievance, it may be the duty of the Commission to investigate it, when brought to its attention by a responsible party in a duly authenticated form. ld.


9. Subpenas; depositions.

amendment, Appendix II.)

Held, that the persons composing_the Vermont State Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry had such an interest that it was proper that they, as an association, should raise a question

as to the justice of the high rates complained of by them, and that the proceeding was maintainable upon their petition. Id.

When an important question is raised by the pleading in the case, the determination of which will affect others quite as much as the parties before the Commission, but the parties give their attention almost exclusively to the other questions, and neither by the evidence nor in argument supply the Commission with the information to enable it to be understandingly determined, the Commission will decline to decide it, and leave the parties to bring it forward again as they may be advised.

Rice v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 722.

An amendment to a complaint seeking to in. troduce new grievances and charges will not not be allowed.

Riddle v. Balt. & O. R. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 701.

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Jackson v. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 599.

On a petition charging the exaction of unreasonable rates, the burden of proof is on the petitioner to sustain the charges by evidence which shows with reasonable certainty that they are in substance true.

Harding v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 375.

Hence, petition charging that the rates on twine for harvesters, from Chicago to Hudson, was unreasonable, dismissed without prejudice, where the answer denied that the rate was unreasonable, and showed that it had been reduced, and neither party offered any evidence. ld.

Leonard v. Union P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 627.

The Interstate Commerce Act contemplates that when a complaint is made against a carrier, on the ground of exorbitant rates, the carrier may change its rates before a hearing is had, so as to remedy the matter complained of, if it shall see proper so to do.

Fulton v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 375.

The complaint charged unjust discrimination in exacting an extra rate for transporting cattle in a Burton stock car; the answer denied the fact of unjust discrimination, and no proof was given by either side. Held, that it is impossible for the Commission to say that if all the facts were before it, the greater charge could not be justified; and hence, as it is not suggested that further proceedings are desired, the case must stand dismissed, but without prejudice.

Hence, petition dismissed without prejudice, where it appeared from a reply filed by the complainant to the defendant's answer, that the rates originally complained of had been reduced, and no complaint was made against such reduced rates. Id.

If, at a hearing before the Commission, of a complaint against a railroad company, the defendant avows a purpose to comply with the Law, the Commission must not only assume that the company will do so but must act upon that assumption until it has evidence that the purpose is not lived up to.

Holbrook v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 323.

Under the English Act, where the company admitted having made an undue preference, but asserted that the cause of complaint had been removed before the application for an injunction had been filed, so that it was not necessary that an injunction should issue, held, that the complainant was entitled to an injunction for the future.

Macfarlane v. N. B. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 269.

But an attachment for disobedience to a writ of injunction was refused where it appeared by affidavits of the company that it was endeavoring to conform to the order of the court, although it appeared that the reformed scale of charges still operated in some respects injuriously to the interests of the complainants and advantageously to the other parties.

Ransome v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 4 C. B. N. S. 159; 1 Nev. & Mac. 116.

While the Commission will grant an application for rehearing for the correction of an error of law or fact, it will not direct a rehearing involving an expense to parties, unless satisfied that reargument may have the effect of changing the result. Where the relation of any carrier to the matter complained of is such that it is, in whole or in part, materially responsible for the alleged grievance, and has direct interest in any investigation of the subject matter involved, and the merits of the controversy cannot be investigated and determined in the absence of such carrier as a party, then that carrier should be made a party to the proceeding, and if not a party, no relief can be had against it.

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