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Great Western R. Co. v. Burns, 60 Ill. 284; | bound to stop its trains and exchange traffic at
Peet v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 20 Wis. 594. the junction of another road.
See note, 16 Am. L. Rev. 832.

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Denver & N. O. R. Co. 110 U. S. 667 (28 L. ed. 291); and its liability terminates with its delivery to the connecting carrier.

Myrick v. Mich. Cent. R. Co. 107 U. S. 102 (27 L. ed. 325).

The use of cars upon other lines is a service incidental to the receiving, forwarding and delivering of traffic, and is within the provisions of the English Act.

Diphwys Casson Slate Co. v. Festiniog R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 73; S. C. 32 L. T. (N. S.) 271. Under the English Act it must appear that public convenience requires continuous carriage.

It is properly the business of a carrier by railroad to supply the rolling stock for the freight it offers or proposes to carry; and if the diversities and peculiarities of traffic are such that this is not always practicable, and consignors are allowed to supply it for themselves, the carrier must not allow its own deficiencies in this particular to be made the means of putting at an unreasonable advantage those who make use in the same traffic of the facili ties it supplies. 1

Rice v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 722.

When for a special traffic-e. g., the transportation of petroleum oils-a carrier provides rolling stock for one method, but does not provide it for another for which it publishes rates, but the shippers are expected to provide the same, the terms on which such rolling stock is to be provided should be uniform and should | be published with the rate sheets, and cannot lawfully be left to be the subject of bargain and of different terms in the case of different shippers. Id.

Barret v. Great Northern R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 423; S. C. 26 L. J. C. P. 83; 1 Nev. & Mac. 28; Caterham R. Co. v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 410; S. C. 26 L. J. C. P. 161; 1 Nev. & Mac. 32; Parkinson v. Great Western R. Co. 40 L. J. C. P. 222; S. C. 24 L. T. N. S. 830; 1 Nev. & Mac. 280; Fishbourne v. Gt. S. & W. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 224; Wannan v. Scottish Cent. R. Co. 2 Sess. Cas. 1373; 1 Nev. & Mac. 237; Pickford v. Caledonian R. Co. 1 Nev. & Mac. 252; Local Board etc. v. London etc. R. Co. & S. E. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 214; Toomer v. London etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 79; Victoria etc. Co. v. Neath etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 37; James Riddle v. N. Y. etc. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. etc. v. Taff. Vale etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. Rep. 787. 540; Swindon etc. R. Co. v. Great Western R. Co. 4 Nev. & Mac. 349.

A railroad is not justified in refusing to furnish cars for the transportation of coal, by the fact that it could at that time make more money by using its coal cars upon other portions of its line.

During the summer and fall of 1887, owing to high rates on lake vessels, there was an accumulation of coal and other freights along the line of defendant company. Held, that the proof did not sustain the charge that the company gave a preference in furnishing cars for the transportation of coke over the coal trade, or gave a preference to shippers in not requiring them to load or unload cars.

Riddle v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 688.

In the absence of a custom or rule of business placing the duty upon the carrier to notify a shipper of the arrival of cars for his use, it is the duty of the shipper to make inquiry of the proper agent of the railroad company; but if the carrier undertakes to notify, it must per form its duty in this respect. Riddle v. Balt. & O. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 778.

The proceedings and decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission relating to refusal to furnish cars are referred to in the index to this volume, under title "Charges and crimination.'

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The milage rate of three fourths of a cent per mile run, which is customary, among railroads, for freight cars of other railroad companies used upon the paying company's line, and which payment is, by the interchange of cars, practically equalized among the different roads, is not to be taken as the measure of payment for the use of cars belonging to persons other than railroad companies.

Burton Stock Car Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 329.

The Burton Stock Car Company, which furnishes special improved live stock cars owned by it, to shippers over railroads, does not exchange with or use cars belonging to others, and is in no sense a "connecting line," entitled to equal facilities for interchange of traffic, Dis-under paragraph 2 of section 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Id.

The Burton Stock Car Company is not entitled to claim that it is unjustly discriminated against, by a refusal on the part of railroad companies to pay it the same rate of milage which carriers adopt as the basis in adjusting their car service accounts with each other. Id.

A railway company cannot make a distinction in its rates dependent upon whether the traffic is booked no further than it goes by railway or is booked to a destination beyond the limits subject to the traffic statute.

Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Glasgow R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 81.

Where one railway company works the rail

Connecting Lines; Express Companies. At common law a railway company is bound to transport or haul upon its road the cars of any other railway company.

Vt. & M. R. Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co. 14 Allen, 462; Mackin v. Boston & A. R. Co. 135 Mass. 201.

Where cars are dissimilar in character a railway company may refuse to forward, upon reasonable requirements.

A railroad company is bound to supply suitable vehicles of transportation and to offer their use to everybody impartially.

Ogdensburg & L. C. R. Co. v. Pratt, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 123-133 (22 L. ed. 827–831).

In absence of a statute, a railroad is not

Caledonian R. Co. v. North British R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 56.

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Napier v. Glasgow etc. R. Co. 1 Nev. & Mac. 292; contra, under the Act to Regulate Com merce. Re Petition of Mallory (U. S. C. C. Fla.), 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 294.

Under the charter of the Texas & Pacific Railroad Company no discrimination against connecting roads is allowed in charging for freight or passengers.

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Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2.

Railway companies are not obliged, in the absence of a statute, to furnish to all independent express companies equal facilities for doing express business upon their fast trains.

Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1 (29 L. ed. 791); 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 545, Note. See also New England Express Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co. 5 Maine, 188; McDuffee v. Portland & R. R. Co. 52 N. H. 430; Sandford v. Catawissa, W. & E. R. Co. 24 Pa. 378.

The Massachusetts Statute does not render it unlawful for a railroad to carry on the express business itself, and to refuse to allow similar privileges to other parties.

Sargent v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 115 Mass. 416.

Under the Pennsylvania Statute requiring "That equal and impartial justice shall be done to all owners of property," a contract giving to one express company the exclusive right of transportation in passenger trains is unlawful and void.

Sandford v. Catawissa, W. & E. R. Co. 24 Pa. 378; Audenried v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 68 Pa. 370.

The English commissioners have no power to make an order on two railway companies to act jointly in doing what neither company has power to do separately. Toomer etc. v. London etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 79.

Stations; Yards; Terminal Facilities.

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A railway company may be required to furnish proper station facilities, and prevented from abandoning stations already established. State v. New Haven & N. R. Co. 37 Conn. 153; 42 Conn. 56; New Haven & N. Co. v. Hammersley, 104 U. S. 1 (26 L. ed. 629); R. Comrs. v. Portland & O. C. R. Co. 63 Maine, 269; Com. v. Eastern R. Co. 103 Mass. 254; State, Moore, v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 19 Neb. 476; Cincinnati Stock Yards Co. v. U. R. Stock Yards Co. 7 Cin. Week. L. Bul. 395.

A railway company is bound to establish new stations and siding accommodations for passengers and traffic, reasonably sufficient for the business.

Local Board etc. v. N. E. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 306; Harris v. London etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 331; Caterham R. Co. v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 410; S. C. 26 L.

J. C. P. 161; 1 Nev. & Mac. 31; Hastings
Town Council v. South Eastern R. Co. 3 Nev.
& Mac. 179; South Eastern R. Co. v. Railway
Comrs. L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 586; 50 L. J. Q. B.
D. 201; 3 Nev. & Mac. 464; London etc. R.
Co. v. Staines etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 48.

A railway company may be required to provide a waiting room for passengers and to have platforms extended for the accommodation of traffic, and siding accommodations for the reception and delivery of goods without delay.

But the commissioners cannot order accom. modation to be provided which will require the company to take additional land which it has no immediate power to take.

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Harris etc. v. London etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. &
Mac. 331.

In the case of Hastings Town Council v.
London etc. R. Co. (Hastings Town Coun-
cil v. S. E. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 179; South
Eastern R. Co. v. Railway Comrs. L. R. 6 Q. B.
Div.586; 50 L. J. Q. B. 201; 3 Nev. & Mac. 464);
it was held that the commissioners had jur-
isdiction to require a railway company to af-
ford cattle accommodations and better facili-
ties for the delivery of tickets at the booking
office; but that other orders, relating to the
construction of platforms and the erection of
a bridge and the providing of a refreshment
room, were erroneous.

A railroad unjustly discriminates against a town by placing its depot a mile and one half distant at its junction with another road.

London etc. R. Co. v. Staines etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 48; Holyhead Local Board v. London R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 37.

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An exclusive privilege or unequal rights to
omnibus, cab or fly proprietors are prohibited.

Marriott v. London & S. W. R. Co. 1 C. B.
IN. S. 499; S. C. 26 L. J. C. P. 154; 1 Nev.

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Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pillsbury (Ill.) 6 West. Rep. 790.

Discrimination is permitted against passengers who do not purchase tickets, equal facilities being afforded to all to purchase.

Forsee v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. 63 Miss. 67. Under the Massachusetts Statute (the general Railroad Act, 1874, chap. 372), § 138, requiring equal terms for the transportation of all persons or property, held, that a student who had paid the regular price of a season ticket was not entitled to recover the difference between the price paid and that which the company made to students upon special application. Spofford v. Boston & M. R. Co. 128 Mass. 326.

The Interstate Commerce Law does not permit the sale of tickets to any class of people at rates different from those established for the general public. The fact that it is very desirable for the defendant to make sale of its lands is not a reason for discriminating in favor of explorers or settlers.

Smith v. Northern P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 611.

The petition alleged that the defendant rail roads had, prior to the time when the Interstate Commerce Act went into effect, entered into an arrangement with petitioner to allow 150 pounds of extra free baggage to passengers presenting the "baggage indemnity certificate" issued by petitioner, and that the defendants now refuse to make such allowance of extra free baggage, held:

| refusing to sell through tickets over the roads of complainants while the latter insists on paying commissions to defendant's agents, have not contravened the provisions of the third section of the Act, which require that railroad companies shall "afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities” to connecting lines, etc. Morrison, C., dissents.

Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pa. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 357.

In the absence of statutory authority one railroad company can sell tickets and check baggage over the road of another company only by agreement; and the Act to Regulate Commerce does not in terms require one railroad company to sell through tickets over the road of another company. Id.

Held, that upon the evidence offered, the Commission cannot find that $25 per 1000 miles is an unreasonable rate for milage tickets. Id.

(a) That there is nothing in the facts disclosed by the evidence which involves any question of unjust discrimination or extortion, or any other matter over which the Commission has jurisdiction;

The Commission declines, in the absence of an actual case, to pass upon the question of the propriety of railroads continuing the issuance of free passes to the United States Fish Commission and the National Museum, to enable their employees to carry on their official duty at less expense to the United States. Id.

Commercial travelers are not entitled to milage tickets at lower prices than they are sold to the public generally. Id.

Where a railroad ticket broker, having no apparent interest in the transaction, presented a complaint alleging unjust discrimination on the part of a railroad company in permitting a certain person to transfer to another the return portion of a passage ticket, while it refused to grant the same privilege to a third person holding a ticket alleged to be similar (but which was not so in fact) held, that the person aggrieved, should complain in his own name, and that the complaint by the ticket broker would not be entertained.

Ottinger v. Southern P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 607.

A colored passenger having purchased a first class ticket is entitled to passage in a first class car; unjust preference, under section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, would not result from separating white and colored passengers, by providing cars equally safe and comfortable.

Councill v. Western & A. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 638; Heard v. Georgia R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 719.

Upon complaint to recover pecuniary damage for the ejection of a colored passenger from a first class car, the Commission has no power to award damages, since, under the amendment of the Constitution, the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury, in which case the plaintiff may recover attorney's fees under section 8 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, "to be fixed by the court."

Councill v. Western & A. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 638.

Railroads have a right to grant special priv.

(b) That the power to enforce contracts has not been confided to the Commission; nor has it any general power or authority to manage the business of carriers, but only a limited power, expressly defined by the Act, to interfere to prevent wrong and oppression in spec-ileges to religious teachers. ified cases.

Re Religious Teachers, 1 Inters. Com. Rep.

Traders & Travelers Union v. Phila. & R. 21. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 371.

The defendant companies, in prohibiting their agents from receiving commissions and in

The proviso in section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act "That nothing in this Act shall apply to * * * the issuance of milage ***

passenger tickets," applies only to the act of | R. Co. 3 C. B. N. S. 718; 1 Nev. & Mac. 45, issuing or giving out such tickets; the terms, Ransome v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 1 Nev. & conditions and circumstances upon which the Mac. 117. sale of such tickets is made are subject to and "Circumstances and conditions" of transmust be in accordance with the Act in its gen-portation are not changed by any of the foleral provision. lowing considerations:-Developing a new trade.

Larrison v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 369.

A sale of milage tickets to commercial travelers at a certain rate, and a refusal to sell to other passengers except at a higher rate, is an unjust discrimination, within the meaning of the Act. Id.

Neglect on the part of a railroad company to publish rates for milage tickets is a violation of the Act. Id.

A release of liability by commercial travel ers to the railroad company does not constitute a good and sufficient consideration for such discrimination; nor does the fact that they may influence business in favor of the road, etc. Id.

Common carriers may continue the issuance of milage passenger tickets, the charges for which must be reasonable and just, and free from unjust discrimination or unreasonable preference. Id.

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Persons belonging to the class known as commercial travelers are not privileged to ride over railroads at lower rates than other persons, and to make a difference in this respect is unjust discriminatión; this is true whether tickets issued are milage tickets or in some other form. Id.

The fact that excursion or commutation tickets are put on sale at a given rate, does not entitle the purchaser of a milage ticket (each class of tickets being issued for distinct purposes and the form of contract in each case being different) to complain of unjust discrimination if charged a higher rate.

Associated Grocers of St. Louis v. Mo. P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 393.

As the United States Commission of Fish and Fisheries is one of the agencies of the government, and the distribution of fish and eggs by that Commission is by authority of the government, the transportation of fish and eggs so distributed falls within the exception of section 22 of the Act.

Re U. S. Commission of Fish and Fisheries, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 606.

Long and Short Haul; Fourth Section.

There is no counterpart of the fourth section of the Act of Congress in English legislation; but statutes of similar character are to be found in Illinois. (Act of May 2, 1873, § 3; R. S. 183, p. 884, § 125; Starr & Curt. Stat. § 147); Massachusetts (General Railroad Act, 1874, chap. 372, § 140); and Oregon (Act of February 28, 1885, § 4; Laws of 1885, p. 38.) But a larger charge for a shorter haul is an undue preference under the English Statutes. Budd v. London & N. W. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 393; S. C. 36 L. T. N. S. 802; and the same charge for a shorter haul; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 426.

But reductions in fare in favor of longer

Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. L. R. 11 App. Cas. 97;

distances are proper.

Hozier v. Caledonian R. Co. 24 L. T. 339; 1 Nev. & Mac. 27; Jones v. Eastern Counties

Or to secure traffic that would otherwise go by other lines;

London & N. W. R. Co. v. Evershed, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1029; Oxlade v. North Eastern R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 454; 1 Nev. & Mac. 72; Competing with sea transportation; Budd v. London & N. W. R. Co. 36 L. T. N. S. 802; 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 393;

The place from which goods are shipped; Ransome v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 4 C. B. N. S. 135; 1 Nev. & Mac. 109; Place of destination;

S.

Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, & L. R. Co. supra.

Of the character of the shipper, as whether rival.

Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 Eng. & Irish App. H. L. 226.

Pooling arrangements are contrary to common law, and to public policy and have been the subject of several statutory prohibitions.

State v. Vanderbilt, 37 Ohio St. 590; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2; Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Gutherie, 35 Ohio St. 666; Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 625; Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed. Rep. 529; Charlton v. Newcastle & C. R. Co. 5 Jur. N. S. 1100; Hare v. London & N. W. R. Co. 2 Johns & H. 80; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 440; Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 19 Fed. Rep. 804; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 Pa. 173; Note on Railway Pools, 15 Fed. Rep. 667; Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582.

Cost of service constitutes a real differen ce in "circumstances."

Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. L. R. 11 App. Cas. 97; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; Ransome v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 1 Nev. & Mac. 117.

Constructions upon the English Statutes as to the manner of making schedule of rates:

Colman v. G. E. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 108; Watkinson etc. v. Wrexham etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 374; Diphwys Casson Slate Co. v. Festiniog R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 73; Cairnes v. N. E. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 221; Clonmel Traders v. Waterford etc. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 92; Jones v. N. E. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 108.

It is provided by the Illinois Statute of 1873, § 3, Starr & Curt. Stat. 1885, § 147, that "It shall not be deemed a sufficient excuse or justification of such discriminations (same or greater charge for short haul), on the part of such railroad corporation, that the railway station or point at which it shall charge or receive the same or less rates of toll or compensation for the transportation of such passenger or freight, or for the use and transportation of such railroad car the greater distance, than for the shorter distance, is a railway station or point at which there exists competition with

any other railroad or means of transporta- | to New York; charging more for the same tion."

class of goods carried from Gilman than from Peoria, the former being eighty-six miles nearer to New York than the latter, this difference being in the length of the line within the State of Illinois.

The same principle is settled by the English decisions.

London & N. W. R. Co. v. Evershed, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1029; Budd v. London & N. W. R. Co. 36 L. T. N. S. 802; 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 393: Thompson v. London etc. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 115; Greenoch v. S. E. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 319; Note, 16 Am. L. Rev. 833.

In a case arising under the Oregon Act of February 20, 1885, the court directed the receiver to charge "No more for the carriage of goods for a shorter haul than a longer one in the same direction, except to and from points where the rate attainable is affected by water transportation, in which case he may carry at as low a rate as the water craft do, without reference to the length of the haul."

Ex parte Koehler, 23 Fed. Rep. 529; S. C. 25 Fed. Rep. 73; 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 52-58.

As to construction of Illinois Statutes, see: Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Hill, 14 Bradw. (Ill. App.) 579; Wabash etc. R. Co. v. People (30 L. ed. 244); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31.

As to Massachusetts Statutes, see: Com. v. Worcester & N. R. Co. 124 Mass. 561.

The Statute of North Carolina (Code§ 1966), which imposes a penalty on any rail, road company which shall charge for transportation of any freight over its road a greater amount than shall be charged at the same time by it for an equal quantity of the same class of freight, transported in the same direction over any portion of the same railroad, of equal distance, is to be construed to mean that the compensation charged shippers for carrying an equal quantity of the same class of freight, going in the same direction, must be equal in amount for equal distances, no matter on what part of the road, at any time while its list of charges for carrying freight remains unchanged.

Hines . Wilmington & W. R. Co. 95 N. C. 434.

A lower rate should not be made for the transportation of goods intended for export trade.

Twells . Pa. R. Co. 3 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 728; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. L. R. 11 App. Cas. 97.

Carrying local passengers from one point on its line is not an identical service with that of carrying a through passenger from the same distance.

Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S. 117 U. S. 355 (29 L. ed. 920). See also Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2.

A Statute of Illinois enacts that if any railroad company shall, within that State, charge or receive for transporting passengers or freight of the same class, the same or a greater sum for any distance than it does for a longer distance, it shall be liable to a penalty for unjust discrimination. The defendant in this case made such discrimination in regard to goods transported over the same road or roads, from Peoria in Illinois and from Gilman in Illinois

Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Ill. 118 U. S. 557 (30 L. ed. 244); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31.

The Supreme Court of the United States follows the Supreme Court of Illinois in holding that the Statute of Illinois must be construed to include a transportation of goods under one contract and by one voyage from the interior of the State of Illinois to New York. Id.

And it held further that such a transportation is "commerce among the States," even as to that part of the voyage which lies within the State of Illinois, while it is not denied that there may be transportation of goods which is begun and ended within its limits and disconnected with any carriage outside of the State, which is not commerce among the States. Id.

The latter is subject to regulation by the State, and the Statute of Illinois is valid as applied to it. But the former is national in its character, and its regulation is confided to Congress exclusively, by that clause of the Constitution which empowers it to regulate commerce among the States. Id.

Notwithstanding what is said in Munn v. Illinois, and Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., in 94 U. S. 113, 164 (24 L. ed. 77, 97), the United States Supreme Court holds now, and has never consciously held otherwise, that a statute of a State, intended to regulate or to tax, or to impose any other restriction upon the transmission of persons or property or telegraphic messages from one State to another, is not within that class of legislation which the States may enact in the absence of legislation by Congress; and that such statutes are void even as to that part of such transmission which may be within the State. Id.

It follows that the Statute of Illinois, as construed by the Supreme Court of the State, and as applied to the transaction under consideration, is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States. Id.

The Commission has not been given a general dispensing power to relieve hardships under the Law, but its power in that regard is strictly limited.

Re Iowa Barb Steel Wire Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 605.

The Interstate Commerce Law contemplates that the cases in which the Commission is authorized to make orders for suspension of its operation are exceptional cases, and that where only general reasons operate, the general law shall be left to its general course, however serious the consequences in particular cases.

Jurisdiction of the Commission, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 73.

The mere probability that injury will result from the operation of the Act will not authorize the Commission to direct a suspension. Id. Incidental injuries under the Act must be borne for the public good until the Legislature provides a remedy. Id.

The prohibition in the fourth section of the Interstate Commerce Act against a greater charge for a shorter than for a longer distance

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