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560 (21 L. ed. 710); Morgan's L. & T. R. Co. v. | La. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (30 L. ed. 237); Hannibal & St.J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527); Turuer v. Md. 107 U. S. 38 (27 L. ed. 370); Mayor of N. Y. v. Miln, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 102 (9 L. ed. 648); Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y. 92 U. S. 259 (23 L. ed. 543); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275 (23 L. ed. 550).

A charge to a vessel for officers' service in examining her sanitary condition is not invalid as a tonnage tax, but is a proper part of a quarantine system.

Morgan's L. & T. R. Co. v. La. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (30 L. ed. 237).

But a statute requiring the payment of a fee to port wardens, whether called upon to perform any service or not, is void.

Southern Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 31 (18 L. ed. 749).

Prohibition of sale of and the authorizing of seizures of intoxicating liquors during transportation may be justified under state statutes. State v. O'Neil (Vt.) 1 New Eng. Rep. 775. The Georgia local option law, which exempts from its provisions domestic wines, but prohibits the sale of spirituous liquors including wines, held, an unlawful discrimination between wines made in Georgia and the wines of other States and foreign wines.

Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. Rep. 865.

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It has been held in Rhode Island that the provision of R. I. Pub. Stat. chap. 634, of May 4, 1887, § 1, which prohibits any person from keeping any intoxicating liquors for sale," is not, for the reason that it may incidentally interfere with foreign or interstate commerce, obnoxious to the Federal Constitution.

State v. Fitzpatrick (R. I.) 5 New Eng. Rep. 673; 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 713.

Iowa Statute forbidding any common carrier to bring within that State any intoxicating liquors from any other State or Territory, with out first having the certificate therein required is a regulation of commerce among the States and void.

Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 124 U. S. (31 L. ed. —); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823. The Statute of Alabama requiring locomotive engineers to be examined and licensed is not a regulation of interstate commerce.

Smith v. Ala. (U. S. S. C.) 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804; McDonald v. State, 81 Ala. 279.

COMMON CARRIERS.

A common or public carrier is one who undertakes as a business to carry from one place to another the goods of all persons who may apply for such carriage, provided the goods are of the kind which he professes to carry, and the persons so applying will agree to have them carried upon the terms prescribed by the carrier, and who, if he refuses to carry such goods for those who are willing to comply with his terms, becomes liable to an action by the party aggrieved by such refusal.

Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. Columbia & G. R. Co. 19 S. C. 355.

Railroad companies are common carriers. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 (24 L. ed. 94); Scofield v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co. (Ohio) 1 West. Rep. 812.

So are receivers operating a railroad: Blumenthal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402; Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395; Nichols v. Smith, 115 Mass. 332.

And trustees of mortgage and bond holders operating railway:

Sprague . Smith, 29 Vt. 421; Rogers v. Wheeler, 2 Lans. 486; 43 N. Y. 598.

One railroad transporting cars of another: Mallory v. Tioga R. Co. 39 Barb. 488; 32 How. Pr. 616; N. J. R. & Transp. Co. v. Pa. R. Co. 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 100; Vt. & M. R. Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co. 14 Allen, 462; Peoria, P.N. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 109 Ill. 135. Transportation and despatch companies and fast freight lines:

Mercantile Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chase, 1 E. D. Smith, 115; Read v. Spaulding, 5 Bosw. 395, affd. 30 N. Y. 630; Angell, Carriers, § 76; Redfield, Carriers, 179; Hutchinson, Carriers, 72; Boston & Á. R. Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 571.

As to sleeping car companies see:

Pickard v. Pullman S. Car Co. 117 U. S. 34 (29 L. ed. 785); Nevin v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 92; Indiana v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 16 Fed. Rep. 193; S. C. 11 Biss. 561.

Express companies.

Southern Express Co. v. Crook, 44 Ala. 468; Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 76 Ga. 635; Buckland v. Adams Express Co. 97 Mass. 124; Gulliver v. Adams Express Co. 38 Ill. 503.

An express business conducted by a railroad company is within the Interstate Commerce Act; aliter as to independent express companies.

Re Express Companies, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 677. See also Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1 lnters. Com. Rep. 657.

Draymen, cartmen, and porters who undertake to carry goods for hire as a common employment:

Robertson v. Kennedy, 2 Dana (Ky.) 431; Powers . Davenport, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 497; Campbell v. Morse, Harper (S. C.) 468; Richards v. Wescott, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 589; Lecky v. McDermott, 8 Serg. & R. 500.

Ferrymen:

Richards v. Fuqua, 28 Miss. 793; Self v. Dunn, 42 Ga. 528; Clark v. Union Ferry Co. 35 N. Y. 485; Ferris v. Union Ferry Co. 36 N. Y. 312; Wyckoff v. Queens Co. Ferry Co. 52 N. Y. 32.

Wagoners, omnibus proprietors, owners of canal boats, tow boats:

2 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, Title, Carriers, p. 786.

Telegraph and Telephone Companies: State, Webster, v. Nebraska Tel. Co. 17 Neb 2 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, Title, 126; State, Am. Ú. Tel. Co. v. Bell Tel. Co. Carriers; Redfield, Railway Carriers, 1; 36 Ohio St. 296; Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. Hutchinson, Carriers. § 47; Dwight v. Brews Balt. & O. Tel. Co. 6 Cent. Rep. 472, 35 Alb. ter, 1 Pick. 50; The Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U. S. L. J. 271; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. 21 How. 7 (16 L. ed. 41); Gisbourn v. Hurst, S. 347 (30 L. ed. 1187); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 306; 1 Salk. 249; Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 Watts Hockett v. State (Ind.) 2 West. Rep. 764; Cent. & S. 285; Orange Bank v. Brown, 3 Wend. 161; | U. Tel. Co. v. State (Ind.) 2 West. Rep. 773.

COMMON-LAW DUTIES OF CARRIERS.

At common law, a common carrier was bound to make only reasonable charges.

Railroads are bound at common law to receive and haul cars of other roads.

Mackin v. Boston & A. R. Co. 135 Mass. 201; Peoria & P. U. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 109 Ill. 135; Note, 19 Cent. L. J. 111; Note, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 506.

LINES WHOLLY WITHIN A STATE; "COMMON CONTROL, MANAGEMENT OR ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTINUOUS CARRIAGE;" INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, § 1; ENGLISH RAILWAYS REGULATION, ACT 1873, § 11. Provisions of section 11, of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, apply whenever there is an arrangement with the proprietors of steam vessels for the conveyance of passengers or

Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 Eng. & Irish App. (H. L.) 226-237; Angell, Carriers, § 124; Johnson v. Pensacola & P. R. Co. 16 Fla. 623; Baxendale v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 4 C. B. (N. S.) 63; Branley v. South Eastern R. Co. 12 C. B. (N. S.) 63; Fitchburg R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 393; Ex parte Benson, 18 S. C. 38; S. C. 44 Am. Rep. 564; Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed. Rep. 531; S. C. 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 647; 34 Alb. L. J. 44; Messenger v. Pa. R. Co. 36 N. J. L. 407; McDuffee v. Portland & R. R. Co. 52 N. H. 430; Munn v. Ill. 94 U. S. 113-134 (24 L. ed. 77-87); Sand-goods to and from any port or town with which ford v. Catawissa, W. & E. R. Co. 24 Pa. 378; Shipper v. Pa. R. Co. 47 Pa. 338-341; Audenried v. Phila. & R. R. Co. 68 Pa. 370; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; Scofield v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 812, 43 Ohio St. 571; New England Express Co. v. M. C. R. Co. 57 Maine, 188; Hays v. Pa. Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 309; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 239; Smith v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 49 Wis. 443; Brown v. Adams Express Co. 15 W. Va. 821; Killmer v. N. Y. Cent. &. H. R. R. Co. 1 Cent. Rep. 525, 100 N. Y. 395.

But he was not obliged to transport goods for all persons for the same compensation.

Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 Eng. & Irish. App. (H. L.) 226-237; Baxendale v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 4 C. B. (N. S.) 63; Branley v. South Eastern R. Co. 12 C. B. (N. S.) 63; Fitchburg R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 393; Spofford v. Boston & M. R. Co. 128 Mass. 326; Sargent v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 115 Mass. 422; Johnson v. Pensacola & P. R. Co. 16 Fla. 623; Ex parte Benson, 18 S. C. 38: S. C. 44 Am. Rep. 564; Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed. Rep. 529–531; S. C. 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 647; 34 Alb. L. J. 44; Killmer v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 1 Cent. Rep. 525, 100 N. Y. 395.

The weight of American authority is that the common law requires that the charges must be equal to all for the same services under like circumstances.

St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Hill, 14 Bradw. (Ill. App.) 579; Messenger v. Pa. R. Co. 36 N. J. L. 407; S. C. 37 N. J. L. 531; Shipper v. Pa. R. Co. 47 Pa. 338; Audenried v. Phila. & R. R. Co. 68 Pa. 370; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460-464; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; Scofield v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 812, 43 Ohio St. 571; New England Express Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co. 57 Maine, 188; Hays v. Pa. Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 309; State, Webster, v. Nebraska Telephone Co. 17 Neb. 126; State, Mattoon, v. Republican Valley R. Co. 17 Neb. 647; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ř. Co. v. Denver & N. O. R. Co. 110 U. S. 667 (28 L. ed. 291); Munhall v. Pa. R. Co. 92 Pa. 150.

At common law discriminations based solely upon the amounts of freight shipped without reference to the actual cost of transportation are not sanctioned.

Hays v. Pa. Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 309; Scofield v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 812, 43 Ohio St. 571; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2.

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there is railway communication, provided the railway company party to the arrangement owned or worked or was otherwise inmediately interested in some portion or other of the line of railway communication.

Caledonian R. Co. v. Greenock & W. B. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 135; Greenock & W. B. R. Co. v. Caledonian R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. R. Cas. 227.

An agreement between a steamboat company and railway company that the vessels of the former shall be run at certain times, regard being had to the convenience of the railway company and to the times of the arrival and departure of its trains, as an arrangement within the meaning of section 11 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873.

Belfast etc. R. Co. v. G. N. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 379.

But the mere existence of through bookings is not such an arrangement as that contemplated by section 11.

Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Glasgow R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 81.

The Interstate Commerce Act does not include or apply to all carriers engaged in interstate commerce, but only to such as use a railway, or a railway and water craft "under common control, management or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment" of property from one State to another; nor does it apply to the carriage of property by rail wholly within the State, although shipped from or destined to a place without the State, so that such place is not in a foreign country.

Ex parte Koehler (U. S. C. C.) 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 28; Mo.& I. R. T. & Lumber Co. v. Cape Girardeau & S. W. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 607.

The knowledge of a carrier whose line is wholly within one State that the ultimate destination of freight is without the State will not make it subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.

Mo. & I. R. T. & Lumber Co. v. Cape Girardeau & S. W. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 607. In Ex parte Koehler, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 28, Deady, J., says: "The mere fact that a railway wholly within a State, and a vessel running between said State and another, meet at a point within the railway State, aud thus form a continuous line of transportation between the two States, by the one taking up the goods delivered by the other at its terminus, and carrying them thence to their destination, does not bring the carriers who so use the rail

way and steamer within the Act. So long as es and conditions." Section 3, par. 2, of the the railway and steamer are each operated un- Act of Congress, is also a copy of a portion of der a separate and distinct control, making its section 2 of the English Railway & Canal Trafown rates, and only liable for the carriage and fic Act of 1854; the changes in the Act of Consafe delivery of the goods at the end of its gress are shown by the words between brackown route, the Act does not apply to the trans-ets in italics as follows: "Every railway comaction. To make these carriers subject to the pany, canal company, and railway and canal Act, the railway and vessel must, as therein company [every common carrier subject to the provided, be operated or used under a 'com-provisions of this Act] shall, according to their mon control'-a control to which each is alike respective powers, afford all reasonable [proper subject, and by which rates are prescribed and and equal] facilities for the [interchange of trafbills of lading given for the carriage of goods fic between their respective lines and for the reover both routes as one." ceiving and ["and" omitted] forwarding and delivering of (English Statute: "Traffic upon and from the several railways and canals belonging to or worked by such companies respectively," American Act: "Passengers and prop erty to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith.")

Where a railway company made a contract applicable to all routes which it might thereafter control, and acquired the majority of stock of another railway company and the same persons were elected respectively president and vice president of both companies, held, that the contracting company had not acquired "control" of the other railway within the meaning of the terms of the contract.

Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Mo. P. R. Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 634.

Section 7 of the American Act contains provisions similar to section 2 of the Railway & Canal Traffic Act of 1854.

General Rules.

To constitute an unreasonable preference, there must be inequality in the charge for traveling over the same line, or the same por

A railroad wholly within one State, used as a means of conducting interstate traffic in coal by companies owning connecting interstate roads, is subject to the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce; and it must be accessi-tion of the line. ble to all interstate shippers on equal and reasonable terms.

Heck v. East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 775.

A carrier is not responsible for rates made by a connecting road because of its giving them in connection with its own rates to ties desiring to make through shipments. Crews v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 703.

Caterham R. Co. v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. 1 C. B. (N. S.) 410; 1 Nev. & Mac. 32; Finnie v. Glasgow & S. W. R. Co. 2 Macq. 177; S. C. 26 L. T. 14.

The relative reasonableness of rates on shipments from western points to cities on the Atpar-lantic seaboard is to be determined by all the circumstances and conditions that affect the traffic to the respective points between which the rates are questioned, and not solely by one standard of comparison.

So far as a railroad company, whose line is entirely within one State, issues through bills of lading over its connecting lines to points in other States, and makes through rates, it falls under the Interstate Commerce Act.

Re Annapolis, W. & B. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 315.

Several railroad companies uniting in an arrangement under which a fast freight line violates the Interstate Commerce Act are responsible therefor.

Boston & A. R. Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 571.

The Illinois Statute regulating the transportation of goods under one contract to points beyond the State is unconstitutional.

Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Ill. 118 U. S. 557 (80 L. ed. 244); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31. A statute regulating the transmission of telegraph messages beyond the State is void.

W. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347 (30 L. ed. 1187); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 306.

DISCRIMINATION.

Statutory Provisions. Section 3, par. 1, of the Interstate Commerce Act is an almost literal copy of a portion of section 2 of the English Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854.

The object of section 3 is to apply to cases not within section 2, since section 2 is limited to cases of "a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstanc

Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 754.

What amounts to an undue preference is a question of fact and not of law.

Diphwys etc. Co. v. Festiniog R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 73; Watkinson v. Wrexham etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. R. Cas. 5; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 441.

The burden of proof is on petitioner charging unreasonable rates.

Harding v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 375.

The burden is on the carrier to justify any departure from the rules prescribed by the statute.

Re Southern R. & Steamship Asso., and Re Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 278.

As to sufficiency of evidence to establish charge of excessive rates, see:

Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 Eng. & Irish App. H. L. 226; Ransome v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 437; S. C. 26 L. J. C. P. 91; 1 Nev. & Mac. 63; Baxendale v. Great Western R. Co. 5 C. B. N. S. 336; S. C. 28 L. J. C. P. 81; Nichol son v. Great Western R. Co. 5 C. B. N. S. 366; S. C. 28 L. J. C. P. 89; 1 Nev. & Mac. 121.

As to the manner of determining what are reasonable charges, see:

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tennessee R. Com

mission, 19 Fed. Rep. 679; Canada S. R. Co.
v. Internat. Bridge Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 190; Inter-
nat. Bridge Co. v. Canada S. R. Co. L. R. 8
App. Cas. 723; Riley v. Horne, 5 Bing. 217;
Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. v. Brown, L. R. 8
App. Cas. 703; Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Peo-
ple, 67 Ill. 11; Stone. Farmers L. & T. Co.
116 U. S. 307-336 (29 L. ed. 636-646); Baxen-
dale v.
Eastern Counties R. Co. 4 C. B. (N. S.)
63.

A charter right to make such charges as the company might see fit is not contravened by the statute requiring charges to all persons to be equal.

Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 Eng. & Irish App. H. L. 226; Baxendale v. Great Western R. Co. 14 C. B. N. S. 1; S. C. 16 C. B. N. S. 137; Crouch v. Great Northern R. Co. 9 Exch. 557.

For a Complete Digest of English Decisions and Index thereto see Appendix to Am. & Eng. R. Cases, Vol. 27, by Adelbert Hamilton, Esq.

Against Localities.

Preferences to localities in furnishing ties or rates for the shipment of goods are prohibited.

| and Boston, on traffic originating west of Buffalo, have not been shown to be unjust and unreasonable or to constitute unjust discrimination against Boston.

Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 754.

The fact that the export rates through Boston, and the rates on merchandise intended for coastwise points east of Portland, and the west bound rates from Boston have been made by the carriers the same as corresponding New York rates in order to put Boston on an equality with New York and other seaboard cities wherever Boston is a competitor with those cities, is not controlling in determining the reasonableness of the east bound local rates in a traffic in which there is no competition by other cities. Id.

A manufactory of plaintiff was situated twelve miles from the seaport of Swansea, and on the defendant's railway from the seaport to Liverpool. The defendant charged the plaintiff 12s 6d per ton for the carriage of iron and tin plates over its line from his manufactory to Liverpool, while other manufactfacili-urers of iron and tin plates whose works were situated within a radius of six miles of the seaport of Swansea, and therefore further Hozier v. Caledonian R. Co. 17 Sess. 702; S. from Liverpool than the plaintiff's works, C. 24 L. T. 339; 1 Nev. & Mac. 27; Jones v. were charged by the defendant, for the carEastern Counties R. Co. 3 C. B. N. S. 718; riage of their plates from Swansea to Liver1 Nev. & Mac. 45; Nicholson v. Great West- pool, 11s 4d per ton only. There is a comern R. Co. 5 C. B. N. S. 366; Richardson v. munication by sea from Swansea to Liverpool, Midland R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 1; Girar- and the rate of 11s 4d was fixed by the dedotv. Midland R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 291. fendant as the charge for the carriage of the A railway company must give equal facili- goods of these manufacturers within the six ties and similar rates to all persons in receiving miles' radius in order to enable the defendant and delivering goods. to compete with the sea carriage; and by reason of the lesser charge, those manufacturers who were thus favored were enabled to sell their plates at a lower price per ton, delivered at Liverpool, than the plaintiff. Held, that the charging of a lower rate to the manufacturers within the six miles' radius, for the carriage of their goods a longer distance than the plaintiff's was an undue and unreasonable preference and advantage granted to them by the defendent, and was in contravention of section 2 of the Railway & Canal Traffic Act of 1854, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amounts paid by him to the defendants in excess of the 11s. 4d. rate.

Cooper v.London & S. W. R. Co. 4 C. B. N. S. 738; S. C. 27 L. J. C. P. 324; 1 Nev. &. Mac. 185; Bell v. London etc. R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 185.

It is not ground of complaint against a railroad that it equalizes its rates as between small and large towns, even though the effect may be prejudicial to the large towns which before had been specially favored.

Crews. Richmond & D. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 703.

A carrier cannot be compelled to give to merchants the privilege of shipping goods from the point of purchase to their own locality and thence to the place to which the goods may be sold, at the same rate which would have been charged had there been but one ship. ment from point of purchase to point of ultimate delivery; the fact that such refusal operates prejudicially to one town and favorably to another, will not constitute unjust discrimination when the carrier applies the same rule to all towns. Id.

In view of the longer haul to Boston than to New York, the greater cost of transportation to Boston, the very much greater volume of business to and from New York, the competition by water transportation by the lakes, Erie Canal and Hudson River, and also by several rival railroad lines, and the geographical and commercial advantages of New York, the differentials on Boston local rates of ten cents per 100 pounds on the first and second classes of merchandise and of five cents per 100 pounds on the four other classes between New York

Budd v. London & N. W. R. Co. 36 L. T. N. S. 802; S. C. 25 W. R. 752; 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 393.

Where rates for carrying coal were grouped in districts adjusted not with a view to give an undue preference to one set of dealers over another, but solely with regard to their own convenience and the wants of the neighborhood, the Act is not violated.

Ransom v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 4 C. B N. S. 135; S. C. L. J. C. P. 166; 1 Nev. & Mac. 109.

Where the through rate is a gross sum of a small amount for conveyance over a long route, it is enough if places that are practically in the same district have the same rate. Thus, held, no undue prejudice was caused to the trader charged the same through rates to certain places, for traffic over his siding, as was charged for traffic over the siding situated two or three miles further.

Lloyd v. Northampton etc. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 259.

Grouping rates for collieries working the same bed of coal, where the coal field extends twenty miles, may result in an unreasonable preference.

Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. 426; 4 R. &. Can. Traf. Cas. 23, 450; Broughton etc. Coal Co. v. G. W. R. Co. 4 R. & Can. Traf. Cas. 191. Where a petition complained of discrimina tion against the Town of Opelika, Ala., but the order which was prayed would, if granted, increase the discriminations against other local points, leave was given to amend the petition so as to set out the effects with reference to other local points and to afford opportunity of notice to them.

Harwell v. Columbus & W. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 631.

Where on evidence, the Commission found that cotton offered for shipment at Opelika for New Orleans was unjustly and unreasonably refused by the defendant company, in violation of the third section of the statute, while taken by it at other points similarly situated, and that connecting lines were ready and willing to unite in a reasonable adjustment of rates-an order was made requiring the defendant to cease such discrimination within ten days. ld.

tory, to Portland, Oregon, were charged at a higher relative rate than was just, it was or dered that the defendant cease to charge more than 23 cents per 100 pounds or $4.70 per ton on wheat thus transported.

Evans v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. and Reed v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 641. The relative difference in rates on pearline, and special rates on common soap on shipments from New York to Atlanta adjusted, so that the relative difference in the rates shall not exceed the difference of sixty cents per 100 pounds on pearline and thirty-three cents on common soap.

Pyle v. East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 767.

The classification of railroad ties in a different class from other lumber, thus imposing a higher rate upon ties than upon other lumber, held to be an unjust discrimination.

Reynolds v. Western N. Y. & P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 685.

Classification of coals as gas coal and common coal held, under the facts, improper. Nitshill etc. Coal Co. v. Caledonian R. Co. 2 Nev. & Mac. 39.

Rates established for the purpose of keeping up a line of road material (as railroad ties) for which the road itself has use, or to keep the price thereof low for its own advantage, cannot be justified.

Reynolds v. Western N. Y. & P. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 685.

A petition charging unjust discrimination in rates between Waterville and Mankato, and that such rates were higher than rates between Whether a special privilege, granted by railChicago and Waterville, disposed of by report road companies to manufacturers in a single of Commission that the respondent company line of trade, but not to manufacturers in genhas conceded the relief sought and had made eral, is consistent with the rule of equity and and published a tariff of the rates in accord-justice which the Interstate Law undertakes ance with the prayer of the petition. to establish, is a question upon which an opinManufacturer's & Jobbers Union v. Minne-ion ought to be expressed only after the most apolis & St. L. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 630. careful consideration; and the Commission An index of all proceedings and decisions ought clearly to see that duty requires an anby the Interstate Commerce Commission re-swer, before it proceeds to give one on ex lating to discrimination against localities will parte application. be found in the index to this volume, under title "Charges and Discrimination."

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Re Iowa Barb Steel Wire Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 605.

An index of all proceedings and decisions by the Interstate Commerce Commission relating to discriminations against specific articles will be found in the index to this volume, under title "Charges and Discrimination."

Character, Quantity, Value of Goods; Classifi cation; Underbilling.

Making of freight rates may be affected by a variety of practical considerations, as; the sparsely settled character of the country; the articles of freight upon which the railroad must depend as compared with other roads transporting similar commodities through more populous communities; the relation of local and through freights; the mode of shipping and delivering, as wheat from elevators, and wheat in sacks; and expenses of hauling empty cars.

Rates are so related to each other that the instances are very frequent where a change of rate upon one important article of commerce involves a consideration of the relative rates on other articles; it appearing that the defendant Evans v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. and Reed v. company has made a change and general re- Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 641; duction on lines of freight, and it appearing Hays v. Pa. Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 309: Scofield v. that during the next season it is intended to Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 812, make a further reduction, and that rates on 43 Ohio St. 571; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Texas & wheat from Walla Walla, Washington Terri- | P. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 2; Girardot v. Midland

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