Traffic Act, 1854, as to the writs and orders therein mentioned, or in like manner as any

rule or order of such court.

For the purpose of carrying into effect this section, general rules and orders may be made by any superior court in the same manner as general rules and orders may be made with respect to any other proceedings in such court. The commissioners may review and rescind or vary any decision or order previously made by them; or any of them.

The commissioners shall, in all proceedings before them under sections 6, 11, 12 and 13 of this 'Act, and may, if they think fit, in all other proceedings before them under this Act, at the instance of any party to the proceedings before them, and upon such security being given by the appellant as the commissioners may direct, state a case in writing for the opinion of any superior court determined by the commissioners upon any question which, in the opinion of the commissioners, is a question of law.

The court to which the case is transmitted shall hear and determine the question or questions of law arising thereon, and shall thereupon reverse, affirm, or amend the determination in respect of which the case has been stated, or remit the matter to the commissioners with the opinion of the court thereon, or may make such other order in relation to the matter, and may make such order as to costs as to the court may seem fit; and all such orders shall be final and conclusive on all parties; Provided, That the commissioners shall not be liable to any costs in respect or by reason of any such appeal.

The operation of any decision or order made by the commissioners shall not be stayed pending the decision of any such appeal, unless the commissioners shall otherwise order. Save as aforesaid, every decision and order of the commissioners shall be final.

27. The commissioners shall sit at such times and in such places and conduct their proceedings in such manner as may seem to them most convenient for the speedy dispatch of business; they may, subject as in this Act mentioned, sit together or separately, and either in private or in open court; but any complaint made to them shall, on the application of any party to the complaint, be heard and deter mined in open court.

28. The costs of and incidental to any proceeding before the commissioners shall be in the discretion of the commissioners.

29. The commissioners may at any time after the passing of this Act, and from time to time, make such general orders as may be requisite for the regulation of proceedings before them, including applications for and the stating of cases for appeal, and also for prescribing, di

recting or regulating any matter which they are authorized by this Act to prescribe, direct, or regulate by general order, and also for enabling the commissioners in cases to be specified in such general orders to exercise their jurisdiction by any one or two of their number; Provided, That any person aggrieved by any decision or order made in any case so specified may require a rehearing by all the commissioners. They may further make regulations for enabling them to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, and may from time to time revoke and alter any general orders or regulations made in pursuance of this Act. Every general order, and every alteration in a general order, made in pursuance of this section, shall be submitted to the lord chancellor for approval, and shall not come into force until it shall be approved by him.

Every general order purporting to be made in pursuance of this Act shall, immediately after the making thereof, be laid before both Houses of Parliament, if Parliament be then sitting, or if Parliament be not then sitting. within seven days after the then next meeting of Parliament; and if either House of Parlia ment, by a resolution passed within two months after such general order has been so laid before the said House, resolve that the whole or any part of such general order ought not to continue in force, the same shall, after the date of such resolution, cease to be of any force, without prejudice, nevertheless, to the making of any other general order in its place, or to anything done in pursuance of this general order before the date of such resolution; but, subject as aforesaid, every general order purporting to be made in pursuance of this Act shall be deemed to have been duly made and within the powers of this Act, and shall have effect as if it had been enacted in this Act.

30. Every document purporting to be signed by the commissioners, or any one of them, shall be received in evidence without proof of such signature, and until the contrary is proved shall be deemed to have been so signed and to have been duly executed or issued by the com missioners.

31. The commissioners shall, once in every year, make a report to Her Majesty of their proceedings under this Act during the past year; and such report shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within fourteen days after the making thereof if Parliament is then sitting, and if not, then within fourteen days after the next meeting of Parliament.

(Sections 32-37 provide for fees, notices, etc.) (The Rules and Forms of Procedure under this Act are printed in 2 Nev. & Mac. R. R. Cas. 2-14.)

the use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.'

Art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.

The previous Acts of Congress regulating commerce are:

The Act of March 3, 1873, R. S. §§ 43864390, regulating the transportation of live stock, held constitutional in:

U. S. v. Boston & A. R. Co. 15 Fed. Rep. 209; U. S. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 480; U. S. v. East Tenn V. & G. R. Co. 13 Fed. Rep. 642.

The Act of June 15, 1856, R. S. § 5258. providing that railroads may form continuous lines for transportation between States held constitutional in:

Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. v. Richmond, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 584 (22 L. ed. 173); Council Bluffs v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 45 Iowa, 338; Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 32 Kan. 698.

In the report of the Senate select committee on interstate commerce, submitted January 18, 1886, pp. 28-38, the constitutionality of the Act is predicated upon the following decisions:

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 299 (13 L. ed. 996); Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (26 L. ed. 238); Gloucester

States and foreign countries, is within the power of Congress equally with the regulation of transportation itself.

erned-that is, the conditions upon which it shall be conducted; to determine when it shall be free from, and when subject to, duties or other exactions.

The power of Congress to regulate commerce is not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but keeps pace with the progress of the country and adapts itself to new developments of time and circumstances. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co. 96 U.S. 1 (24 L. ed. 708); W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (26 L. ed. 1067).

The constitutional power is necessarily exclusive whenever the subjects are national in character, and admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation.

Robbins v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby Co. 120 U. S. 489 (30 L. ed. 694); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45; Phila. & S. M. Steamship Co. v. Pa. 122 U. S. 326 (30 L. ed. 1200); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Ill. 118 U. S. 557 (30 L. ed. 244); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196, 203 (29 L. ed. 158, 161); Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697 (26 L. ed. 238, 239); The Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 232 (21 L. ed. 146); Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y. 92 U. S. 260 (23 L. ed. 343).

The nonexercise of the power in respect to the regulation of commerce between the States is equivalent to a declaration that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled except in matters of local concern.

Welton v. Mo. 91 U. S. 275 (23 L. ed. 347); Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (29 L. ed. 257); Pickard v. Pullman S. Car Co. 117 U. S. 34 (29 L. ed. 785); Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Ill. 118 U. S. 557 (30 L. ed. 244); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31; Walling v. Mich. 116 U. S. 446 (29 L. ed. 691); Corson v. Md. 120 U. S. 502 (30 L. ed. 699); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 50; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (24 L. ed. 547); Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527); Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489 (30 L. ed. 694); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 (29 L. ed. 158); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382; Phila. & S. M. Steamship Co. v. Pa. 122 U. S. 326 (30 L. ed. 1200); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308; State R. Comrs. v. R. Co. 22 S. C. 220.

Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 (29 L. ed. 158); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382.

Freedom of transportation implies exemption from charges other than such as are imposed by way of compensation for the use of the property employed, or for facilities afforded for its use, or as ordinary taxes upon the value of the property within the jurisdiction of the State. Id.

Power of Congress over bridges and navigable rivers.

Pa. v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 59 U. S. 18 How. 429 (15 L. ed. 436); The Clinton Bridge, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 454 (19 L. ed. 969); Miller o. Mayor of N. Y. 10 Fed. Rep. 513; S. C. 109 U. S. 385 (27 L. ed. 971); Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. U. S. 105 U. S. 470 (26 L. ed. 1143); Canada S. R. Co. v. Internat. Bridge Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 190; S. C. v. Ga. 93 U. S. 4 (23 L. ed. 782); Stockton v. Balt. & N. Y. R. Cò. (U. S. C. C.) 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411.

The Act of Congress, approved June 16, 1886, entitled "An Act to Authorize the construction of a Bridge across the Staten Island Sound, Known as Arthur Kill," etc., is valid and constitutional under the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States.

Stockton v. Balt. & N. Y. R. Co. (U. S.C. C.); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411; Decker v. Same, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 434. (See full reports of briefs of counsel in these cases.)

Said Act is not permissive merely, but gives authority and power to build such bridge, without reference to any authority or consent from the State on whose land under navigable water the bridge is to rest, and without compensation to the State.

Stockton v. Balt. & N. Y. R. Co. (U. S. C. C.) 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411.

When the United States does not seek to acquire exclusive jurisdiction over land within a State, it may condemn such land for its purposes without the consent of the State. Id.

Congress has the power to fix the maximum compensation for transportation between States and foreign countries.

Canada S. R. Co. v. Internat. Bridge Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 190; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tennessee R. Commission, 19 Fed. Rep. 679.

The power of Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes is exclusive.

Worcester v. Ga. 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 515 (8 L. ed. 483); U. S. v. Holliday, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 407 (18 L. ed. 182); U. S. v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188 (23 L. ed. 846).

It may also extend its regulations to Territories in proximity to that occupied by Indi

ans.

U. S. v. 43 Gallons of Whisky, 93 U. S. 188

44 Am. Rep. 634; Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58; 44 Am. Rep. 128; Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461; 46 Am. Rep. 637; State v. Ah Chew, 16 Nev. 50; 40 Am. Rep. 488; People v. Cipperly (N. Y.) 1 Cent. Rep. 806; State v. Fitzpatrick (R. I.) 5 New Eng. Rep. 673; 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 718; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377; State 2. Addington, 77 Mo. 110; 12 Mo. App. 217; Powell v. Com. (Pa.) 5 Cent. Rep. 890; People v. Arensberg, 4 Cent. Rep. 542; 103 N. Y. 388; Re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. Rep. 62.

States may regulate subjects of commerce which are local and limited in their nature, until Congress intervenes.

Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 (29 L. ed. 158); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382; Brown v Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (20 L. ed. 257); Cooley v. Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 299 (13 L. ed. 996); Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 (24 L. ed. 525); Gilman v. Phila. 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 713 (18 L. ed. 96); Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 245 (7 L. ed. 412); Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 (27 L. ed. 442); Miller v. Mayor, of N. Y. 109 U. S. 385 (27 L. ed. 971); Cardwell v. American R. Bridge Co. 113 U. S. 205 (2 L. ed. 959); Ouachita & M. R. Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444 (30 L. ed. 976); 1 Inters. | Com. Rep. 379.

"Legislation may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution."

Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (24 L. ed. 547); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 101 (23 L. ed. 820); State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 284 (21 L. ed. 164); Munn v. Ill. 94 U. S. 113 (24 L. ed. 77).

In the absence of federal legislation a State has power to make regulations concerning navigable water-as, by authorizing the construction of dams.

Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 245 (7 L. ed. 412); Cardwell v. American R. Bridge Co. 113 U. S. 205 (28 L. ed. 959).

Or by constructing bridges. Gilman v. Phila. 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 713 (18 L. ed. 96); Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chi cago, 107 U. S. 678 (27 L. ed. 442); Cardwell v. American R. Bridge Co. 113 U. S. 205 (28 L. ed. 959); The Passaic Bridges, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 782 (16 L.ed. 799); Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. U. S. 105 U. S. 470 (26 L. ed. 1143), and authorities cited.

And by wharfage regulations. Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 (24 L. ed. 377); Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 428 (25 L. ed. 688); Cincinnati, P. B. S. & P. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559 (26 L. ed. 1169); Parkersburg & O. R. Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 (27 L. ed. 584); and the improvement of harbors; Mobile Co. v. Kim. ball, 102 U. S. 691 (26 L. ed. 238); or by regulation of pilots; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 299 (13 L. ed. 996); Ex parte McNeil, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 236 (20 L. ed. 624); Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572 (26 L. ed. 234); but pilot regulations in conflict with Acts of Congress are void; Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90 (30 L. ed. 115).

A State may grant an exclusive ferry right.

Conway v. Taylor, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 603 (17 L. ed. 191); Fanning v. Gregoire, 57 U. S. 16 How. 524 (14 L. ed. 1043) Starin v. N. Y. 115 U. S. 248 (29 L. ed. 388).

State statutes imposing obstruction to navigation are void.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1 (6 L. ed. 23); Pa. v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 54 U. S. 13 How. 513 (14 L. ed. 249); Pa. v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 59 U. S. 18 How. 429 (15 L. ed. 436); The Clinton Bridge, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 454 (19 L. ed. 969); Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. U. S. 105 U. S. 470 (26 L. ed. 1143).

An unconstitutional provision in a state statute taxing commerce is not cured because included in the same Act with valid provisions. Phila. & S. M. Steamship Co. v. Pa. 122 U. S. 326 (30 L. ed. 1200); 1 Inters. Com. Rep.308. Generally any tax or burden laid on national commerce by a State is void.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1 (6 L. ed. 23); Passenger Cases, 48 U. S. 7 How. 283 (12 L. ed. 702); Brown v. Md. 25 U. 8. 12 Wheat. 446 (6 L. ed. 688); U. S. v. Holliday, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 407 (18 L. ed. 182); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 35 (18 L. ed. 745); Southern Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 31 (18 L. ed. 749); Paul v. Va. 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 168 (19 L. ed. 357): "The Daniel Ball," 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 557 (19 L. ed. 999). See also Erie R. Co. v. Pa. 82 U. S. 15 Wall.282 (21 L. ed. 164); Phila. & R. R. Co. v. Pa. 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 232 (21 L. ed. 146); Balt, & O. R. Co. v. Md. 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 456 (22 L. ed. 678); Welton v. Mo. 91 U. S. 275 (23 L. ed. 347); Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y. 92 U. S. 259 (23 L. ed. 543); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275 (23 L. ed. 550); U. S. v. 43 Gallons of Whisky, 93 U. S. 188 (23 L. ed. 846); Foster v. Port Wardens, 94 U. S. 246 (24 L. ed. 122); Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (24 L. ed. 547); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co. 96 U. S. 1 (24 L. ed. 708); Cook v. Pa. 97 U. S. 566 (24 L. ed. 1015); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434 (25 L. ed. 743); Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (26 L. ed. 238); Webber v. Va. 103 U. S. 344 (26 L. ed. 565); W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (26 L. ed. 1067); Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 591 (28 L. ed. 801); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 (29 L. ed. 158); 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (29 L. ed. 257); Walling v. Mich. 116 U. S. 446 (29 L. ed. 691); Pickard v. Pullman S. Car Co. 117 U. S. 34 (29 L. ed. 785); Tenn. v. Pullman S. Car Co. 117 U. S. 51 (29 L. ed. 791); Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Ill. 118 U. S. 557 (30 L. ed. 244); Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489 (30 L. ed. 694); Fargo v. Mich. 112 U. S. 230 (30 L. ed. 888); Phila. & S. Steamship Co.v. Pa. 122 U.S.336 (30 L.ed. 1200); Pullman S. Car Co. v. Nolan, 22 Fed. Rep. 276.

A state license or tax discriminating against products of other States is void.

Welton v. Mo. 91 U. S. 275 (23 L. ed. 347); Webber v. Va. 103 U. S. 344 (26 L. ed. 565); Walling v. Mich. 116 U. S. 446 (29 L. ed. 691); State v. Furbush, 72 Maine, 493; Higgins v. 300 Casks Lime, 130 Mass. 1; State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; Re Watson, 15 Fed. Rep. 511.

A state law requiring a license to sell im