PETITION from the New York Central A & Hudson River Railroad Company, by Chauncey M. Depew, the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company, by John Newell, and the Pittsburg & Lake Erie Railway Company, by John Newell, was filed with the Commission, at Washington, asking that an order be made permitting the above named roads, and the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio Railway Company and the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railway Company, to make such passenger and freight charges and rates from points upon the lines operated by the Pittsburg & Lake Erie Railway Company to the City of New York, the City of Boston, Eastern Pennsylvania, New York and New England points, as will be as low as those charged by the Pennsylvania Railway Company and its connections between said points, and lower than those charged from Youngstown and intermediate points to the Cities of Boston and New York and Eastern Pennsylvania, New York and New England points; and in the particulars named that they be relieved from the fourth section of the Act. (May 7, 1887.) Re GULLETT COTTON GIN CO. THE HE Gullett Cotton Gin Company, of Amite City, Louisiana, filed with the Commission a petition asking for a permanent suspension of section 4 of the Act, so far as it may apply to the gins, feeders and condensers manufactured by that Company. The petition represents that when the Company put down its plant, valued at $100,000 at the isolated point above named on the Illinois Central Railroad, protection in freights was assured, as against competing companies in more central places, which assurance the Interstate Commerce Act renders impossible of fulfilment, to the great loss of the petitioners. Re Petition of CHICAGO ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & OMAHA R. R. Co." To the Honorable, PETITION. The Interstate Commerce Commission: The petition of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Wisconsin, would respectfully show unto your Honorable Commission: The Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company operates, under lease, a line between Minneapolis and St. Paul, in the State of Minnesota; and it owns and operates a line from St. Paul, Minnesota, through Superior, Wisconsin, to Duluth, Minnesota. The distance from St. Paul to Duluth by this line is 176.6 miles, and its business between Minneapolis, St. Paul and Duluth thus passes out of Minnesota into Wisconsin, and thence returns into Minnesota at Duluth. The Company also owns and operates a line from Superior Junction to Washburn, both in the State of Wisconsin. This line is used in connection with a portion of the line first above mentioned; and the distance from St. Paul to Washburn is 187.6 miles. Duluth, Superior and Washburn are all ports on Lake Superior. All of the through business, to and from eastern points, between aforesaid lake ports and St. Paul and Minneapolis, is competitive with the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Company. That company owns and operates a line of railroad from St. Paul and Minneapolis to Duluth, wholly within the State of Minnesota, and consequently is not amenable to the Interstate Law. The distance from St. Paul to Duluth by this line is 154 miles. Duluth rates maintain via the Lakes between Superior and Washburn and all eastern points. It thus appears that while business from Minneapolis and St. Paul via the Lakes to all eastern points is competitive between_said railroads to Duluth on the one part, and to Supe rior and to Washburn on the other part, yet that, as Duluth is the terminal point of shipment common to both railroads, Duluth rates necessarily control the rates at Superior and at Washburn; so that to enable your petitioner to handle through business in competition with that going to or beyond Duluth via the St. Paul & Duluth R. R. Co., your petitioner has within the past four years expended for terminal facilities at Washburn, Wisconsin, more than $500,000; at Duluth within the year last past more than $300,000; and it is proposed to expend a large sum at Superior for the same purpose during the present season. The tariffs of your petitioner, both through and local (hereinafter to be submitted), will show that its competitive rates for through business to Superior and Washburn are less in many instances than its local rates for shorter distances over the same line, the shorter being included with the longer distance. That result is inevitable, if competition on through business with Duluth rates is to be maintained. Other *In response to requests for precedents of forms of petitions and method of presentation of applicabrief are given. The decision thereon will be retions to the Commission, the following petition and ported as soon as rendered. wise the St. Paul and Duluth Railroad, 'not be- | ter, with whom I am personally acquainted, ing within the operation of the Interstate Law, and whom I know to be the general manager could make rates to Duluth which would be be- of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha yond the competitive power of your petitioner Railway Co., the above named petitioner, and on its longer lines. No greater rates could be who made oath in due form of law that the obtained than the value of the transportation to facts stated in the foregoing petition as of petithe shipper, and that would be measured by the tioner's own knowledge, are true, and that those Duluth rate. stated upon information and belief he believes to be true. The local rates of this company are believed to be just and reasonable. It has from time to time made material reductions in such rates of transportation for both passengers and traffic, so that the rates now received per ton per mile, and per passenger per mile, are as low as will permit of carriage at a profit. To fix Duluth rates as the maximum for its local rates would compel your petitioner to abandon its local traffic, or to carry it at a ruinous loss. On the other hand, an increase of its through rates to Superior or Washburn beyond the Duluth rates fixed by the St. Paul & Duluth Company would necessarily force it to abandon its competitive traffic. BRIEF. Notary Public. Herewith are filed the existing local tariffs of the St. Paul & Duluth R. R., between St. Paul and Duluth, taking effect April 15, 1887 (exhibit C), and the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R. R. between St. Paul and Duluth, Superior and Washburn, taking effect April 5, 1887. (Exhibit A). The coincidence of through rates between these roads, and for such competitive points, is shown by the following table (given below), compiled from these tariffs for convenient understanding: Examination of the Omaha Company's existing tariff (ex. A) will disclose: Wherefore, your petitioner prays to be relieved from the provisions of section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, and to be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of property between Minneapolis and St. Paul, 1. That the rates between St. Paul and nonMinnesota, on the one part, and Superior and competitive intermediate stations on the ComWashburn, Wisconsin, and Duluth, Minnesota, pany's line are made to conform to the rates on the other part; or for such other relief as prescribed for through transportation between will enable your petitioner to transact business St. Paul and the Company's lake terminals at between aforesaid points upon a basis competi- Duluth, Superior, and Washburn, and in no tive with rates of the St. Paul & Duluth Rail-case exceed the rates thus prescribed to such road Company between the two first named lake points. companies and Duluth. Britton & Gray, Solicitors for Petitioner. E. W. Winter, General Manager Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company. Thus the rates from Minneapolis or St. Paul to Turtle Lake station-seventy-five miles distant from Minneapolis and intermediate points -are less than the rates to the lake, and from this point onward nowhere exceed such local lake rates. The slight increase in rates to stations beyond Turtle Lake, and named as South Chippewa Falls, Chippewa Falls, Eagle Point, O'Neil Creek, Bloomer, Cartwright, Chetek, Cameron, Hart's Siding. Rice Lake, Bear Creek, and Car Load Classes. May 26 to July 20. Bashaw, is explained by the fact that these are The through rates in effect from St. Paul or points not on the line between St. Paul and the Minneapolis to eastern points on wheat and its lake, but off therefrom, on the road between products during the season of 1886 were as folEau Claire and Chicago Junction, as appears lows: by the diagram attached to the original petition. Comparison of such existing tariff (exhibit A) with the former tariff of February 18, 1884 (exhibit D herewith), will show the large deductions made in local rates to such intermediate noncompetitive points. While space will not permit a tabulated statement showing deductions to all such points, the following is submitted as fairly illustrative thereof: 66 To New York. Per Cwt. _271c. .25c. _24 c. Boston, export. 27 C. Boston, local.. .32 c. 27 c. of which this line received as its proportion of 3. While a comparison between the rates shown in existing tariff (exhibit A) between St. Paul and the lake ports with the rates shown in tariff of August 23, 1886 (exhibit E herewith), will show a slight advance in the rates to the lake ports, such advance was necessary to prevent a further reduction in local rates to intermediate stations which the Company could not grant and continue local business with profit. This Company has therefore conformed to both the spirit and letter of the Interstate Commerce Law; and, as by that Act intended, local shippers are receiving the full benefit of the largely reduced rates now established by it. But the present opening of lake transportation will start the shipment of grain and other products to the Atlantic seaboard thereover. Through shipment, partly by rail and partly by water, must meet competing rates via other lines; and the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Company must conform to such competing rate or retire from the business. The Company cannot do this, inasmuch as fully 90 per cent of its carriage between St. Paul and the lake ports is of merchandise coming from or going to eastern points, and but 10 per cent of its business of a local character. While rates for such through shipments for the present season have not yet been fixed, an approximate estimate thereof may be made upon the business of 1886. The rates that were in effect between St. Paul and Washburn on through business interchanged with lake lines during the season of 1886 were as follows: April 7 to May 1, May 1 to July 10, July 10 1st. 2d. 3d. 4th. 5th. Classes. to close of nav igation, from one fourth to one half of the rate now es- |lowing clipping from the New York World of tablished between St. Paul and the lake ports on April 15, 1887: such through business; and it cannot expect that higher rates will prevail during the coming season. If, then, it is denied the privilege asked, of competing with the St. Paul & Duluth Company, because its share of such through transportation is less than its local rates between the same points, it must either perform local business at a loss, or retire from such through business, leaving its competitor, who is not amenable to the Federal Law, in sole possession of the field. "Dodging the Interstate Law. "St. Paul, Minn., April 14. General Freight Agent Dodge, of the St. Paul and Duluth, has gone East to make arrangements whereby freight can be taken from New York City by the New York Central, a road wholly within the State, to Buffalo, there to be reshipped to Duluth by steamboat lines, which are not under control of the new Interstate Commerce Law. At Duluth the freight can be reshipped by the St. Paul and Duluth over a route wholly within this State. In this manner it is thought a rate can be established which is much cheaper than all rail rates via Chicago." But we confidently submit that the facts thus presented establish that its transportation of "like kind of property" to, or destined for, points beyond the lake ports, is not performed Wherefore, your petitioner asks that such "under substantially similar circumstances and order be made as prayed, viz.: that this Com"conditions" with the carriage between inter-pany, in the language of the statute, "be aumediate stations on its own line. The dis- thorized to charge less for longer than for similar circumstances which create this obvious shorter distances for the transportation of pasdifference are: sengers or property" between Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, on the one part, and Superior and Washburn, Wisconsin, and Duluth, Minnesota, on the other part, until the further order of this Honorable Commission. Respectfully submitted. 1. Competition with a rival line not made subject to the Interstate Law, and which rival line may alter or change its rates between St. Paul and the lake without reference thereto, and wholly within its own pleasure. 2. Extension of such competition to the Atlantic seaboard without the control of the Interstate Law in the mode set forth by the fol Britton & Gray, Attys. for Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R. R. Co. SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Messrs. Francis M. Darby, Francis Miller and Guion Miller, for petitioner: The validity of this license was in question in Humason's Case, 2 MacArt. 158. It was contended that the law was illegal, as to commercial agents, because it was in effect an attempt to regulate commerce, and therefore, unconstitutional; but the court held the contrary. This decision, so far as it declares that the Act is not a regulation of commerce, has been overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby Co. 20 U. S. 489 (Bk. 30, L. ed. 694); S. C. 1 Interstate Com. Rep. 45. This would seem to be conclusive of this case. But it is claimed that this law was passed by the Legislative Assembly, by the authority of Congress, which has exclusive legislative power over this District. Cohens v. Va. 6 Wheat. 441 (19 U. S. bk. 5, L. ed. 300). But this court has decided that the Legislative Assembly had only municipal power of legislation; that it could not legislate on general subjects; and further that Congress could not give it power to do so. Roach v. Van Riswick and Cooper v. Dist. Col. 4 MacArt. 171, 250; Dist. Col. v. Waggaman, 1 Cent. Rep. 823, 4 Mackey, 333; § 93 R. S. D. C; Dunphy v. Kleinschmidt, 11 Wall. 610 (78 U. S. bk. 20, L. ed. 223). It is certain, in view of the late decision of the United States Supreme Court that such a law is a regulation of interstate commerce, that Congress could not delegate to a mere municipal body its constitutional power over a great national interstate question. As Congress could not clothe the Legislative Assembly with this power, its action in passing the License Law, was utterly void; and that law cannot gain any validity from the tacit acquiescence of Congress. The rule of "ratification" is laid down in the case of Mattingly v. Dist. Col. 97 U. S. 687 (Bk. 24, L. ed. 1098). It is contended that the fact that Congress has amended this law by repealing some of its provisions has given it the same effect as if it had been passed by Congress itself. But the Legislative Assembly by the very terms of the organic Act, could not pass any law that the Legislature of the State could not. Can it be successfully contended that if, in disobedience of the restriction thus laid upon it, it attempted to exercise the highest constitutional function of Congress itself, the silence of Congress, or the repeal of some purely municipal regulations, is to be construed as a recognition and validation of this assumption of power. Roach v. Van Riswick, 4 MacArt. 171. But the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Tennessee case has conclusively settled that this law is, in effect, a regulation of commerce between the States; for in this connection, as in the case of the constitutional provision as to direct taxes, the District of Columbia and the territories mnst be included. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 319 (18 U. S. bk. 5, L. ed. 98). At least it is an attempt to regulate commerce between the District of Columbia, and (in the case at bar) the State of Maryland. It reaches out and affects the interests of that State, and is in effect an exercise of the national constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce, and not of the exclusive power of local legislation over the District. If it is an exercise of this national constitutional power, it must be subject to all the restrictions which the Constitution has imposed upon Congress. It must therefore be uniform. Either this regulation of commerce must be impartially applied to every man who engages in the business of a drummer, or it cannot be enforced against anyone. The language of the supreme court on this subject, emphatic and oft repeated as it has been, is but an expansion of that of the Constitution itself. Article 1, section 8, clause 1, says: "All duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." other. Since, then, the power to lay and collect taxes, *** is obviously coextensive with the power to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises, and since the latter extends throughout the United States, it follows that the power to impose direct taxes also extends throughout the United States." Clause 6 of the same section provides that "No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another." See Passenger Cases, 7 How. 405 (48 U. S. bk. 12, L. ed. 753); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 191 (22 U. S. bk. 6, L. ed. 69). Now if this License Law does give or may give the City of Baltimore any preference over the City of Washington, or the contrary, it is in violation of this clause of the Constitution. We contend therefore that even if Congress had formally passed this law and it had been regularly approved by the President, with all the forms prescribed for the enactment of laws of the United States, it would still be void, because of its violation of the fundamental requirement of all such legislation, to wit: that of uniformity throughout the limits of the country; Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1; Cited in Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black. 510 (67 U. S. bk. 17, L. ed. 305); for this license tax is a tax on the articles to be sold by the drummer. Brown v. Md. 12 Wheat. 444, 448 (25 U. S. bk. 6, L. ed. 687, 688); Cook v. Pa. 97 U. S. 566 (Bk. 24, L. ed. 1015); License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (72 U. S. bk. 18, L. ed. 497); Welton v. Mo.91 U. S. 275 (Bk. 23, L. ed. 347). Judge Tucker thought that "duties" as used in the Constitution, "were probably intended to comprehend every species of tax or contribution not included in the ordinary terms 'taxes and excises'." Cited in Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433 (74 U. S. bk. 19, L. ed. 98). Cooley, Const. Law, p. 494. Direct taxes must be laid by the rule of apportionment; all others by the rule of uniformity. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (75 U. S. bk. 19, L. ed. 482); Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331 (90 U. S. bk. 23, L. ed. 99). In Ward v. Md. 12 Wall. 418 (79 U. S. bk. 20, L. ed. 449), Mr. Justice Bradley foreshadows the recent decision in the Tennessee case. "It will not be denied that that portion of commerce with foreign countries and between the States, which consists of the transportation and exchange of commodities is of national importance, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation.' Welton v. Mo. 91 U. S. 275 (Bk. 23, L. ed. 347), cited and approved in Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 128 (Bk. 26, L. ed. 103). In respect of commerce between the States which consists in the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities there can of necessity be only one system or plan of regulations; and that Congress alone can prescribe. Chief Justice Marshall, 5 Wheat. 319 (18 U. S. bk. 5, L. ed. 98), says: "The power, then, to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises, may be exercised and must be exercised throughout the United States. Does this term designate the whole or any particular portion of the American Empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great Republic, which is composed of States and Territories. The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (Bk. 26, less within the United States than Maryland or L. ed. 238); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on 299 (53 U. S. bk. 13, L. ed. 996); Gloucester the principles of our Constitution, that uniform- Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (Bk. ity in the imposition of imposts, duties and ex-29, L. ed. 158); Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. cises, should be observed in one than in the 622 (Bk. 29, L. ed. 257); Walling v. Mich. 116 |